Electoral Authoritarianism with Pakistani Characteristics An analysis of mandate manufacturing from the dynamics of electioneering in hybrid regimes

Abstract

The paper attempts to explain the discomfort and reluctance of such regimes to accommodate popularly elected governments. To identify the distinct traits and procedures that characterize hybrid governance, this paper conducts a feature analysis of hybrid regime typologies such as defective democracy, electoral (competitive) authoritarian regimes, neo-authoritarianism, and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. After a survey of literature through qualitative content analysis, it is hypothesized that in multiparty hybrid systems, the decision to organize free and fair elections is significantly influenced by elite fragmentation. Adopting democratic reforms becomes a calculated move to manage internal conflict and maintain the regime's legitimacy in the context of internal power dynamics and disagreements within the ruling class. This suggests that variation in regime capacity to channel political support needs to be taken into account when examining the relationship between state capacity and electoral control under authoritarianism. Thus, it follows that elite fragmentation among important institutions—the political class, over-ambitious factions of the judiciary, military, bureaucracy, business tycoons, powerful religious clergy, and other key stakeholders— play a significant role in maintaining the inherent nature of multiparty electoral authoritarianism to manufacture mandate and resist popular opinion.