Musharraf on Trial: A Preliminary Critique of the Law of High Treason

Abstract

The normative relationship between a coup d’état and high treason has hardly ever been thoroughly debated in Pakistan. Now that Musharraf’s trial of high treason is underway, it seems to be an opportune time for such a debate. The Supreme Court is expected to take the lead role in the unfolding of the debate. Already in the Sindh Bar Association (2009) the court has played part of the role by making some preliminary comments. One of the major comments was that Musharraf’s purported coup of 2007 had resulted in violation the independence of judiciary—a principle that the court declared was part of the basic structure of the constitution and (hence) inviolable. The court further observed that a coup that violated an inviolable constitutional principle justified invocation of the law of high treason. Apparently it was a more narrowed-down approach to interpreting the high treason article in the constitution. However, did it reflect the historical and theoretical context of the law of high treason was the question that the court did not address? Accordingly, the aim of this essay is to place the law of high treason in its historical and theoretical backdrop and to note the subtle transformation that the normative relationship between a coup d’etat and high treason has recently undergone.