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Bibliography can also be included at the end of the document, Endnotes should be numbered consecutively and bibliography be organized alphabetically.

The documents should be typed in double space with wide margins. All tables and statistical data should be organized with consistent style so that it may easily be composed for the Journal.

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ISSUE VII

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**Department of Political Science
Program in International Relations**

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Human Rights Violations of Marginalized People in Pakistan

Dr. Muhammad Zakria Zakar

This study intends to explore:

- 1) how cultural norms and societal traditions are used as an excuse to deny basic rights of certain marginalized sections;
- 2) how, and under what cultural logic, these marginalized sections are stigmatized and discriminated (both by the state legislation and by the non state actors) and how this discrimination leads these sections to social exclusion and non-participation;
- 3) why these marginalized sections fail to get relief from civil society and legal channels, when their rights are violated;
- 4) how they are socialized to accept human rights violations as “part of life” and fail to put effective resistance to the living and working conditions which are not compatible to the minimum standards of human dignity;
- 5) how, in the face of increasing poverty and declining living standards, the right of education, decent working and living conditions and human dignity could be realized; and,
- 6) under what policy options these groups could be empowered to come out of the cycle of poverty.

It is well-established fact that poverty, social exclusion, stigmatization, and powerlessness are the conditions, which frequently cause human rights violations. Women, children, and other marginalized groups are particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation as they have the least capability to resist sexual and physical violence and other forms of oppression. Further these marginalized groups are placed in such a social situation and power relations that their capabilities are rarely developed. They are socialized to accept the status quo. Therefore they face intergenerational poverty and consequential human rights violations.

In Pakistan, there is a complex social mechanism whereby these violations are allowed and tolerated under the “law of necessity”. Many

cultural and socio-economic reasons are cited to justify this exploitative system. "This is how we do the things in our culture" or, "what is going on is the only way of survival" are usually the arguments. Different "soft names" (e.g. corporal punishment is termed as just a snub) are given and excuses are invented to justify human rights violations. Many violators claim a kind of privacy and privilege to violate human rights under the guise of indigenous cultural and religious traditions (Levine 2003). Sometimes violations are done in the name of ideology and implementing moral order. These violations are usually committed by the state actors or by non-state actors with tacit approval of the state. For example, social and cultural freedom is restricted in the name of religion. Many restrictions are imposed on individuals in the name of Islamization program and discriminatory laws are enacted against women and minorities. Under the banner of uprooting evil, certain groups are first stigmatized, discriminated and then brutally penalized.

In Pakistan like other South Asian countries, a substantial number of working class parents send their children for paid employment and deny the basic right of elementary schooling. It is argued that child works at automobile repair workshop to learn skills---a type of informal technical education---, which is considered comparable to school education. With this cultural logic, child labor is rationalized and legitimized. However, its deeper and multi-dimensional consequences are never fully realized. Denial of schooling has long term implications on the health and well being of a child. It is not only a human rights violation in its own right but opens possibilities for further violations in work place where children work in unfavorable and sometimes dangerous working conditions

When children are placed at workplace (be it a automobile repair workshop or a roadside small hotel) they are usually isolated from their families and communities as they are usually from poor rural families sent to urban areas for work. Human rights violations at work place are multiple and deeper. At work place, the trainer is not only employer but also has parental authority to control child's behavior. In the absence of parents, trainer is responsible for all needs of the child. So the child is not only controlled by the trainer but sometimes trainers "delegate authority" to senior child workers to supervise the junior child workers. Usually these children are treated as personal servants without any wages or any sort of protection. Sometimes child is treated as "common property", every body gets his service---the co-workers, friends of the

trainers, senior co-workers, etc. If the child shows “disobedience”, these people have a mandate to physically punish him.

The child cannot leave that place no matter how badly he is treated. The child is socialized in way that physical violence and verbal abuse becomes a part of his work. He cannot go elsewhere, he may not have competence to explore other options and to switch for better place. In the failure of all the protective layers (like family, police, law enforcement institutions and civil society) child becomes an easy victim of employers/trainers/customers physical and sexual violence. Since he cannot seek relief from any other agency/institution, therefore his rights are likely to be violated in many spheres. The unchecked wholesome power in the hands of trainer makes the child-trainer relationship highly imbalanced. Sometimes this imbalanced relationship puts the child in virtually captive condition.

Similar is the case with female child workers employed in homes to perform household jobs. Being young and females, they are more vulnerable to sexual violence compared with their male counterparts working in workshops. Female child worker (usually called housemaid) is equally powerless and voiceless. If she resists sexual assault, she may lose her job, which she might not be able to afford. Additionally, resistance or complaint might land her to jail for committing ‘consensual sex’, as the onus of proving rape rests with her (and not on the rapist¹). Though relatively less stigmatized than female sex workers (FSW), socially housemaid has little credibility or social status. If she complains about violence or sexual harassment, her voice may not be taken seriously. “This type of girls usually talk in this way” may be the standard perception. Further, to perform her routine work, she enters into the personal space of others (e.g. for cleaning bedroom, she has to enter into the bed rooms which is a private space of another person) and as a consequence, she loses her own personal space (if a person is inappropriately dressed in his bed room, he cannot be blamed. But this situation may be called as sexual harassment for a maid).

Understandably, both formal and informal systems may not provide any relief to housemaid’s complaint as they consider it a part of

¹ According to Pakistan Human Rights Commission Report, thousands of poor and voiceless women are languishing in jails because of their inability to prove that they were raped. If they cannot prove, it is assumed that it was a consensual sexual act which is a serious crime.

her work. Hence, in case of rape or physical violence, a housemaid has little capacity or clout to invoke legal channels to bring the 'criminal to justice'². Above all she is socialized and trained to remain silent, and considers such events as a part of her job, something like an "occupational hazard". Her occupational socialization also tells her not to resist but to endure. She usually works for long hours and live in unsuitable conditions (e.g. sleeping on the kitchen floor). She is exposed to physical, emotional abuse by household members. She is deprived of her parent's affection and support, and is exposed to humiliation by the children of her employer (Arat 2002). Housemaid earns very little and sometimes is paid only "in kind" in the form of leftover food and used clothing (UNICEF 1997). No matter how cruel and humiliating conditions she faces, housemaid has little options to change the job for better environment. Even if she changes employer, there is no guarantee that she would be treated better at the hands of new employer. Theoretically, she has right "to resign", but practically she is in a captive condition to bear the violence and exploitation.

Social Construction of Work Place as Captivity

The question is how this captivity is created and sustained? Basically, there is a system norms and traditions which is used to legitimize this captivity. For example, corporal punishment given by trainer is not only tolerated but is considered a part of the training (e.g. beating by trainer is considered a blessing in disguise). Culturally teacher has wide powers, he is considered "always right"; "whosoever disobeys teacher would be luckless", as the proverb goes. In short the captivity is socially constructed and culturally approved. As a result, the captor (may be named as mentor, trainer, customer, owner of the house, etc.) has unfettered powers to control the behavior of his/her dependents (these dependents may be working children, FSWs, housemaids, etc.). This highly imbalanced and one-sided dependency provides many "safe opportunities" for human rights violations.

² Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan provides many constitutional guarantees like equality before law, equal protection of law, due process of law, dignity of human beings, etc., to be enforced by the courts. These high sounding rights are inviolable. However, for the marginalized population, the violations of these rights is a routine and not a rarity

It may be noted here that violence is ingrained in this captivity. In these relations corporal punishment (a flagrant act of violence) is considered a legitimate way of teaching. This method is also considered religiously approved³. Usually, parents of the child gave the trainer an open mandate to use corporal punishment for effective skill learning. Such delegation of parental authority to trainer gives him (the trainer) a social immunity from any accountability of his conduct with regard to his relations with the child. The trainer also considers it his inherent rights to treat the child the way he likes.

In short a child is absolutely at the “disposal and pleasure of the trainer”. Sometimes the trainer just gives a fair beat to child if his “mood is off” or just to vent out his frustration. Such an authority also encourages the trainer to interfere in every aspect of the child’s life (Butt 2003). Consequently, entire life of the child comes under surveillance, and control. All these things are done in a culturally approved ways and no body feels pinch to such grave human right violations.

Child workers are not alone to face this ordeal. Many other vulnerable groups like street children, female sex workers (FSWs), Hijras also face more or less similar situation. Though they are placed in different situations and power relations, their ability to resist violence is fairly limited (similar to those of working children, though, due to different reasons). Their social capacities are eroded by the worst type of criminalization, stigmatization and very harsh discrimination.

In Pakistan, the problem is not poverty alone. Some zealots may inflict acts of violence against FSWs and Hijras “to punish these deviant bodies for their sins”. Further, this individually initiated arbitrary violence is sometimes socially and legally tolerated⁴ (Zakar 2004). Even police is reportedly involved to commit acts of aggression against Hijras⁵ and

³ Many sacred commandments are quoted to justify corporal punishment for women and children. Like parents are allowed to physically beat their adolescent if he/she fails to regularly offer five times prayer or if wife shows disobedience to her husband.

⁴ There are frequent press reports that FSWs and Hijras experience sporadic and unprovoked violence just because of their social stigma. There is a considerable social tolerance to such acts of violence.

⁵ The police frequently teased and harassed *hijras*. Sometimes they had to seek relief from the superior judiciary against police behavior. For

cross the limits of law while dealing with FSWs. All these acts are ultimately tolerated in the presumption that victims themselves are at fault. By shifting blame to the victims, violence is justified (Cole 2003). Ideological zealots want to punish these stigmatized population by committing acts of violence (Zakar 2004) and sometimes state apparatus itself, in Foucault's words, "tries to inscribe power of the state on the deviant bodies". In short, many human rights are violated while controlling these socially constructed stigmatized population.


This violence has far reaching implications. First, violence against marginalized groups not only hurt the targeted victims but also the society at large. When FSWs face stern legislation, frequent police raids and violent attacks on their houses, it makes them further marginalized and stigmatized. In such a situation, FSW's ability to resist or/and report clients' violence is significantly impaired. She cannot report the matter to police nor could she seek legal recourse because she herself is defined as 'criminal' (her client knows this fact and exploits it accordingly).

Second, legitimizing violence creates a culture of violence; corporal punishment becomes "medium of instruction and communication". A workshop proprietor while justifying corporal punishment said: "This is how I learnt and this is how I would teach". In short, poverty, discrimination, stigmatization and violence have a relationship. The interplay of these factors tends to create an environment where violation of human rights is a norm and not an exception.

Many types of arguments are developed to justify violence against powerless dependents. "They deserve such behavior", "they cannot understand the language of love and decency" said one employer when he physically and verbally abuses his child employee. Gradually,

instance in December 2003, the chief justice of Lahore High Court issued orders to the station house officers (SHO) of various police stations in Lahore to refrain from harassing the eunuchs who were earning their livelihoods by staging dances in the limits of their police precincts. The court issued these orders on the writ petitions of two *hijras* (Perveen alias Peno and Munir alias Mehwish) who had appealed to the High Court against the unlawful harassment of SHOs (*Financial Times*, Dec. 16, 2003).

the marginalized people accept this as a part of life and put least resistance (as they never had a taste of decent life). The fact is that they are denied the basic rights of education, decent living, respect and dignity. Misery, violence and humiliations become a part of their life. In such a situation, their personalities are mutilated and their chances to come out of the cycle of poverty become very rare. The above discussion may be schematically presented in figure 1.



Analytical Framework

Every day across the globe, many people experience violence. There are different kinds of violence and different social processes through which these violent acts are carried out. When an individual decides to commit violence, he/she crosses certain spaces to reach to the body of victim. According to the theory of mindful space, if the victim understands the processes of violence, he/she could predict the

incidence and could make necessary preventive measures before the damage is done.

While explaining the theory of mindful space, (Burlae, 2004) argued that there are two ways in which people experience violence: invasion and captivity. Usually, people try to invade others spaces and make them captive. In extreme cases, the captivity could be physical, when a person is held hostage by force (hostage itself is a form of violence). Sometimes captivity is not maintained by brute force but by social or economic power. For example, a wife in patriarchal culture continues to live with her husband, even if she does not like him (or she is married to him without her consent). Legally, it is a normal situation but, in reality, she is in captivity (because she does not have the option to break the relationship).

To elaborate this point further, Burlae (2004) writes “All violence is invasion or captivity of some sort. However, not all acts of invasion or captivity are defined as violence when they occur”. It is a matter of common observation that violence does not start randomly within intimate relationships (e.g. husband-wife relationship, trainer-trainee relationship, etc.). First, there is some sort of invasion (somebody invades into some others space). Usually, violence starts from mild type (verbal intimidation or threats) to extreme acts of violence (like hitting some body with some object). Theory of mindful space explains how individuals invade others spaces and held them in captivity. And thereby captive people are subjected to physical and sexual violence.

In some cultures, captivity and violence are institutionalized. For example, in Pakistan, women especially poor and illiterate, are treated as a property of men. Based on gender constructions, women cannot work or live independently (for women, to be unmarried is undesirable and divorce is stigma--- an extremely disadvantageous situation), hence they have to be dependent on men. Hence their very role as wife is a form of captivity. (In Punjabi language, one of the words for husband is *Malik*--means owner. A woman is sometimes asked, “what is the name of your owner”?). Accordingly, culture gives the owner (husband) a right to “keep the property” according to his wishes (i.e. patriarchal norms). So “ownership” is culturally permitted and any liberating act of “the owned property” is considered an act of deviancy, hence punishable (including corporal punishment). To strengthen this captivity, many religious commandments and traditions are cited and violence is projected to be

religiously legitimate⁶. For example, it is considered perfectly normal if husband beats his wife for a “legitimate reason,” or parents beat their child to make him/her conformist, or, teacher beats his/her pupils to expedite learning process⁷. Further, behavior of dependents is normatively controlled through a number of strategies including intimidation, coercions and threats, emotional abuse, isolation, minimizing, denying and blaming, using children, using male privilege and using economic abuse---all acts of violence.

Violence is the violation or invasion of territory or the act of holding people captive within a territory. In terms of war or a hostile takeover, it normally occurs as a land invasion and the resulting imperialism. This sense of violation of territory or captivity within territory is true on an individual level as well. For women, violence is a cultural norm in which energy and bodies are the invaded territory or women are held captive to territory. Cultural norms offer roles in which women must direct their energies toward others to an extreme...They can even invite territorial invasion and captive roles, keeping hierarchy of patriarchy intact (Burlae 2004: 87).

Normally, human beings react when they are held captive as all sorts of captivities are usually disliked. A captive situation (even though extreme acts of violence are not committed) has implications on human personality. Since captivity is a negation of sovereignty of an individual's actions, therefore, it generates anger and resentment. And one manifest outcome of anger is release of emotional energy. According to the theory of mindful space, “inner self is the emotional energy—the energy that is used to express emotions or emotional state.” In extreme cases of rage, people get their faces reddened and their limbs get stiff. This energy is

⁶ In this paper, the researcher is only concerned about the people's perceived position of their religion about corporal punishment (their own subjective interpretations upon which their actions are based). What is the actual position of Islam regarding corporal punishment is beyond the scope of this inquiry. (However, many Ulema argue that violence is not permitted in Islam under any circumstances.)

⁷ There are commonly quoted religious tradition that husband has authority to beat his wife provided he does not break her bone, or, disfigure her body, or, should not slap on her face (Zakar 2004).

also expressed through sexuality. In short, emotional energy is a natural thing and all people have this energy. According to the theory of mindful space, emotional energy moves between, among, and within human beings and their contiguous spaces. For a normal personality, emotional energy needs to be there. A human being cannot be normal if he/she loses his/her emotional energy or this energy is fragmented due to frequent acts of violence.

Normally, emotional energy remains in a state of balance. Any thing that violates the integrity of body or the integrity of sexuality through non-consensual sex is an invasion of bodily space. And through this invasion, the balance of emotional energy gets disturbed. Taking food is also a form of invasion (as some energy enters into the body). But, the natural ingestion of food and removal of waste from body are balancing acts that human beings require to sustain life. Other energies that enter the body and its adjacent spaces also require such balancing acts. When there is violence, there is no balancing act.

Understandably, when extreme violence occurs, emotional energy can become completely out of balance and fragmented. In extreme cases of violence enormous amount of emotional energy is released from the body and as consequence death may be the result. Burlae (2004) draws an analogy between balloon and human personality. Balloon exists as long as it has the capability to contain its essence--the air. With slight budes, balloon's shape is slightly changed but it retains its existence. Similarly when emotional energy of an individual is intact, he/she remains normal.

Emotional integrity is the ability to maintain one's emotional energy in the body and its adjacent spaces, when appropriate. At times, this energy needs to leave one's spaces to express emotions. Consensual sex, appropriate anger, birth, death, and artistic creations are a few examples of emotional energy leaving the body as needed (Burlae 2004:91)

Bodily Space

Bodily space is the most immediate space that surrounds emotional energy. Bodily space is fleshy, and its integrity depends on the skin or bodily orifices. The actual body is protected by skin. Any thing that violates that integrity or the integrity of sexuality through

nonconsensual sex is an invasion of bodily space (Burlae 2004;). Hence this invasion has far reaching social and psychological consequences (Ashford 2004). When someone invades other's body by hitting or stabbing, the emotional energy can become extremely out of balance (Cole 2003). Fragmentation of energy from extreme violence is responsible for a number of health and mental health problems.

Anything that violates that integrity or the integrity of sexuality through nonconsensual sex is an invasion of bodily space. Any invasion from surgery to forced sex could be violence by definition of the resulting extreme fragmented behavior during or after the event. There are consistencies in the behavior of people who have just undergone major surgery and those who have experienced sexual violence. In fact psychosis can occur after both major surgeries and rape (Burlae 2004:94).

According to the theory of mindful space, body protects emotional energy and when body is invaded, emotional energy becomes fragmented. For example, most of the street children lost their sensitivity (through fragmented emotional energy) to violence because their bodily space is frequently violated. Or, female sex workers face many mental health problems due to frequent invasions and penetration into their bodily spaces (because of their habitual tolerance to bodily invasions, FSWs are called "socially dead", may be because of fragmented emotional energy). Same is the case with beggars, working children and housemaids who frequently become victim of violence. Their exposure to physical and sexual violence makes them extremely perplexed about the identity and dignity.

Street children are initiated into sex at an early age, often without their consent, and they are subject to a range of sexual practices than often leave them perplexed about their own sexual identities. Street kids of both sexes are frequently raped by older boys and they are sometimes used for passive anal intercourse (Scheper-Hughes 1994:994).

Continuous exposure to violence and humiliation pushed the marginalized people to accept it as a part of their life and work (at some stage they stop resisting invasions). Understandably, when one gets victim of violence every day, and even many times in a day, he/she may

not have enough emotional energy to show anger. Their fragmented emotional energy makes their personalities disintegrated.

Personal Space

Personal space means 'the space that surrounds the bodily space' (Burlae 2004). Normally, the personal space varies according to a person's social class, influence, income, age, occupation, gender and reputation. For example, for women and children this space is typically smaller than that of men and adults. Powerful and influential people have more personal space than the powerless and marginalized people. Obviously, for the protection and maintenance of personal space, one needs certain skills and social status.

In most of the cultures, women are supposed to be careful and cautious about their personal space. They are supposed to move and walk carefully, and occupy minimum space, and ensure that there is "enough space" between their bodies and others' (strangers) bodies. In Pakistan, women are not allowed to roam around but confine themselves within the allocated space (it is the one way to ensure their personal space). Women are also expected to be mindful about the space when they decide to move. For example, if any woman wants to board on public transport, she needs to make it sure that there is enough space available in the bus (space in the bus should not only sufficient to accommodate her body but her "personal pace"). If there is not enough space, she is not expected to board on the bus (thus allowing the men to occupy that space, as for men space regulations are different).

However the matter of personal space is very complex and sometimes paradoxical. In certain situations, women are asked to observe strict standards to protect their personal space. In some cases, their personal space is eliminated on the pretext that they do not have the capability to protect their personal space, so they need help of others. Hence, some body enters into their personal space to "protect them". In this way they lose their own personal space.

Women are often expected to exist in the spaces of others. A woman may live in his house, work in his organization, and drive his car. Such arrangements imply that the woman is held captive to his space. Because gender is directly related to social class, women often struggle to maintain safe and adequate

personal space independently... Transportation may be inadequate; living space may be unsafe; or because of invasions of bodily and personal space over time, the psychological boundaries protecting bodily and personal space may not be intact, allowing for unnecessary invasions (Burlae 2004:96).

It may be noted here that some cultures deliberately erode personal space in the name of 'implementing moral order'. Sometimes violation of personal space is covered by law, as in Pakistan, police smell mouths to detect whether a person has consumed alcohol or not (consumption of alcoholic beverages is unlawful in Pakistan). Police also question the nature of relationship if adult male and female are sitting in the same car (as per *Haddood* law, an adult female cannot sit with a male, if he is not her *Mehram*—close kinship relations like husband, brother, father with whom illicit sexual relations are extremely rare). In such situation, she loses control on her own personal space. She needs the help (or intervention) of state functionaries or *Mehram* to maintain her personal space (technically when somebody else is there, her personal space erodes automatically).

Sometimes, personal space is invaded by non state actors in the name of ideology. The *Ulema* dominated NWFP government in Pakistan is considering to introduce a new legislation which allows the appointment of *Mohitib* who would stop undesirable acts by force or encourage other "pious people" to do the same. Many marginalized sections complain that their bodily and personal spaces are violated by people who profess a mission "to promote piety and suppress the evil acts" (Zakar 2004; Cole 2003). For example, street children complain that sometimes passerby hit them just to teach them that they should obey parents by living with them (Zakar 2004). And houses of women having "dubious charter" are raided by state functionaries (and sometimes by private zealots) to check "what is going on there." In short, stigmatized sections lose their personal space in many ways.

Cognitive Space

Cognitive space is the space of psychological process. It is a figurative space, unlike bodily and personal space. It consists of one's ability to take in information---emotional, rational, or otherwise---process it, and formulate a reaction (Burlae 2004). With this space, individual sets

boundaries and limits at cognitive level to protect himself/herself from violence (De Becker 1997).

Cognitive invasions include a range of verbally violent behavior, mostly innocuous...Examples includes triangles, passive aggressiveness, value judgments, arguing for its own sake, facts versus feelings, verbal vomiting, one-upmanship, the martyr, character bashing, blaming, and scapegoat. These are all ways that people accidentally (or not) offer verbal violence to others (Burlae 2004: 96).

So, first line of defense against violence is cognitive space. When an individual fails to protect this space, the invader is encouraged to make further violations of other spaces (e.g. personal space and bodily space) and commits violence. In other words, violation of cognitive space may be precursor of the invasion to other spaces. Cognitive invasions include a range of verbally violent behaviors. Sometimes, through such invasions, an invader “tests waters” to plan for further advancements. Usually women are taught to “keep men at distance” by maintaining their cognitive space. However, many cultures rarely give them power and support to safeguard cognitive space. Further, women are under risk of incurring displeasure (and consequential violence) of powerful invaders if they try to maintain this space.

Women are often victims of cognitive invasions because of their lack of knowledge of limit setting strategies and, of course, overt sexism, which is micro-level and macro-level threat to women maintaining their spaces. Again, cultural norms create roles in which a women’s cognitive space is not hers to direct. A wife may have to defer to her husband to maintain survival. A female nurse may have to defer to a male physician for her job (Burlae 2004).

If cognitive space is appropriately protected, invader gets a message that further invasions would be resisted. It is unlikely that a person makes advances if he get clear message that space is well guarded. Many women are forced into situations in which they must defer to be patriarchal arrangement to survive. Many women do not acquire the ability to say no in the larger culture because their survival is threatened if they do master this skill (Burlae 2004). The result is that

women, children, housemaids, etc., exist in the spaces of others to survive. Understandably, living in the spaces of others, non-consensually, is extremely dangerous. But the problem is that from the very beginning individual is socialized in such a way that he/she voluntarily and habitually surrenders his/her cognitive space to others. While elaborating the point, Burlae (2004:97) argued, that after years of accepting forced invasions and captivity, women sometimes learn to relate only within the space of others and consider this type of space as normal. They understand that the macro- and micro-level forces of patriarchy are at work in deterring a safe opportunity to reject invasion and captivity.


Violation of Spaces as Human Rights Violation

According to theory of mindful space, an individual needs to protect three spaces (cognitive space, personal space, and bodily space) in order to deter violence. If these spaces (or any one of these) are violated, it hurts the individual personality and normalcy. Hence, any significant violation of these spaces is automatically a human right violation. The question is: how these spaces could be safeguarded? A basic thing is that individual needs power and autonomy to maintain these spaces. Usually the spaces of discriminated, stigmatized and marginalized people are violated. For the protection of these spaces individual needs

- 1) sufficient training and socialization to understand the importance of safeguarding these spaces;
- 2) availability of normative safeguards and social support system so that individual is empowered to defend these spaces;
- 3) existence of legal support so that violators of these spaces could be deterred; and,
- 4) availability of sufficient minimum resources at the disposal of each individual so that he/she may not “sale-out” these spaces for survival.

When society fails to empower an individual to protect his/her spaces, violence is the result. Further, violation of spaces hurts individual permanently and his/her ability to put resistance gets impaired. Hence the individual is trapped in the cycle of poverty and marginalization. The idea has been schematically presented in the figure No 2.

Figure 2: Violation of Spaces of Marginalized Groups in Pakistan



Discussion

Marginalized sections especially children, women and other stigmatized groups are usually illiterate. Illiteracy itself is a form of insecurity and a worst kind of deprivation (Sen 2003). Midst of this insecurity, such groups' first and foremost concern is to maintain their survival. For this, they usually compromise their personal integrity and human dignity (Sano 2000). Because of their low status and social incompetence, they are usually engaged in menial and dangerous jobs which often carry some social stigma. Involvement in these activities further stigmatizes them and excludes them from the society at large. As a result, they become the victim of violence and oppression at the hands of public functionaries as well as of the community.

It may be noted here that these marginalized people are not "few unlucky and lazy bums". They are the product of the overall socioeconomic and political systems of the society. Through

stigmatization and exclusion, society first denies their access to resources and makes them poor. Then, their poverty is projected as a “natural order of things”. For example, begging is a human rights violation as it undermines human dignity (It is prohibited in Islam). But, in Pakistan, through system dynamics, baggers assume a social role and perform certain social function. People give them alms and, in turn, get *Swab* (divine blessings). At popular level, assumption is: “God made some people rich, and some poor, hence poor have a right to beg”⁸. In a way, society becomes instrumental in perpetuation of the institution of beggary by legitimizing it. By projecting the phenomenon of beggary in religious idioms, both civil society and state tolerate this flagrant human rights violation.

When volume of poor people increases, politics creeps in. The people start looking for causes and culprits for their miseries, and politicians provide them concept and vocabulary. This situation provides a chance to ideologues to exploit the situation to get a political mileage. When more and more people are recruited into the “poverty business”, their social volume increases. Many political elites need their existence for political functioning. (Look at the ‘baggers syndicates’, people associated with sex-related human smuggling and huge business flourishing on child labor and their relationship with business, industry and politics). Involvement of more people, either directly or indirectly, means more politics and greater chances of persistence and even growth of this system.

Understandably, if a human right violation is culturally tolerated, legal remedies (if any) to check this violation automatically become ineffective. In such a situation, victim rarely tries to seek relief from legal channels. Worse, sometimes, laws are also discriminatory and could even be used to further marginalize the already stigmatized population (Zakar 2004). For instance, if female sex worker goes to a police station and files a complaint against the violence committed by her client, she would immediately be arrested under *Sharia* law, as selling sex is illegal. Hence, in reality, she is not able to get any relief from the existing social

⁸ Incompetent and non representative regimes have a persistent tendency to use religion for concealing their incompetence. For example, when there is shortage of water, President or Prime Minister appeal the people to pray to Allah for rain. They never explain or held accountable why they have failed to construct dams.

system or legal channels. It makes her more vulnerable to violence and exploitation (Syed 2004).

The marginalized people have their own subculture and political philosophy. Usually, with the active support of politicians, they blame modernity and Western model of development responsible for their sufferings (Cole 2003). Politicians argue that modernity and Westernization has not delivered. Marginalized people see some plausibility in these arguments. For example, if poor people send their child to automobile repair shop for skill learning (instead of sending him to school), they find good reasons for their decision. They may not have money to pay the school expenses. They also know that after years of schooling, there is no guarantee that the child would get a job. With this logic, the intrinsic harms and possible human rights violations may not be a matter of concern for the poor people (Mayer 1988: 99).

When Western model fails, they try their indigenous ways to reduce poverty. Promoting charity may be one way to eliminate poverty. Recently it has been reported that millions of professional beggars entered in Karachi (a highly industrialized port city of Pakistan) in the holy month of Ramadan to collect Zakat (mandatory alms). Despite all the efforts of government, the operation of this huge informal sector could not be stopped, as there is a well connected and strong mafia operating behind them (Ghori 2004)⁹. Similarly there are countless number of housemaids in Pakistan (about 800,000 female domestic workers in Lahore alone¹⁰) who work in highly humiliating conditions. Because of the “hidden” nature of the domestic work, no body knows how many of these helpless and voiceless girls are physically and sexually mutilated¹¹ (ILO 1998).

Due to involvement of substantial number of people in “poverty business”, they develop their own subculture; convert the informal system to a formal one. Madrassa (Islamic schools) may be a fit example for this process (Pakistan witnessed a phenomenal growth of Madrassa

⁹ Ghori, Habib Khan. 2004. “Thousands More Beggars Likely to Enter Karachi”. *Dwan* (an English Daily, October 14). Karachi: Pakistan Herald Publications.

¹⁰ It is not possible to get exact data about the child worker. However various these conducted in the Department of Sociology, this figure was drawn.

¹¹ For example studies in Indonesia estimate that there are around 400,000 child domestic workers in Jakarta and up to 5 million in Indonesia as a whole, and about 500,000 in Sri Lanka (ILO 1998)

in the 80s). Now, government wants to control this institution but it is so strong that, sometimes, it challenges the writ of the state (International Crisis Group 2002). Similar is the case with some other developments like beggary, and child labor. Since more and more people join these "occupations", government's ability to restrict their operation becomes limited.

Hence the juxtaposition of poverty, lack of investment on education and social sector, dependency, unplanned urbanization and migration, stigmatization and discrimination continues to produce and reproduce social conditions which push more and more people to margins. These marginalized people ultimately become a part of the system and to some extent they develop their own system and sub-culture. In order to ensure their existence, discriminatory laws are enacted and sometimes religion is used to justify unjustifiable. When they are part of the system, politically it is difficult to alter the situation.

POLICY OPTIONS

1. *Effectiveness of the existing legal framework for poverty reduction and protection of human rights in Pakistan*

In Pakistan, despite tall claims of the present government, discriminatory laws still exist in the law books. Time and again, government has promised to change *Haddood* ordinance and blasphemy law (such laws are frequently and massively abused to victimize the minorities and stigmatized sections), but government's words do not match with deeds.

In fact, in Pakistan, poverty is not yet linked with human rights. Theoretically, there are laws to help the poor against oppression and exploitation, but, practically, poor cannot invoke these laws to protect themselves. For example, if a child worker is subjected to sexual violence, he may not be competent enough to preserve the evidence, or, courageous enough to go to police station to get the criminal case registered. Similarly, if a housemaid is raped while cleaning bedroom of her employer, how could she arrange "four pious witnesses" to prove the rape (as per law, onus to prove rests on the victim and not on the rapist). Such obvious lacunas in the law must be removed. *Such laws not only fail to help the poor, but also further marginalize them.* With the context of Pakistani society, this paper tried to identify the social conditions

where human rights of marginalized people are violated and legal channels fail to provide any help to the victims.

2. *Incapacitation of the marginalized to seek relief from existing legal channels*

The other dimension of ineffectiveness of legal system in poverty reduction is that marginalized people themselves are passive and may be reluctant to seek relief from legal channels. The reason is that poor people feel high degree of insecurity because of their illiteracy, discrimination and social exclusion. They cannot take any “bold step” to challenge the ‘status quo’. They tend to accept physical and sexual violence and other forms of oppression in exchange of meeting certain needs. Second, marginalized people are systematically trained (and sometimes indoctrinated) to accept poverty and human rights violations as a part of their life (and even a part of their belief system, “to be poor is a blessing”). They are socialized to consider it as their fate which they cannot change by their efforts (usually message is conveyed by using religious idioms, it is the Will of Allah). With such a mindset, it is unlikely that the poor people seek help from the existing legal system against the human rights violations. Policy makers should consider such social realities in mind while drafting laws for the protection of poor.

3. *Eradication of poverty within the framework of protection of human rights*

In Pakistan, both state and civil society need to change the very concept of charity. People of Pakistan donate Rs. 70 billion (\$ 1.2 billion) annually to Mosque and *Madrassa* (Islamic school) in the form of charity. Government of Pakistan also collects Zakat (religious tax) for the poor. Additionally, billions of rupees are given to poor by private citizens. This huge charity has not significantly reduced poverty nor has it provided any visible relief to the miseries of marginalized people. It may be noted here that the present system of charity hurts the poor people’s self-concept and dignity. Consequently, it not only fails to develop their capacity to earn and to empower them to safeguard their rights but also stigmatize them as beggars (ever increasing number of ‘professional beggars’ in Pakistan may be one out come of this system).

There is, therefore, a need to change the basic concept of charity. It should be realized that poor are entitled for help; it is their inherent right to live a dignified life. Society should build their capacity

and empower them to come out of cycle of poverty through participation and positive contribution. Government and civil society should recognize this right of the poor and formulate policies accordingly.

4. *Role and capacity of NGOs and other civil society groups to assist the poor*

In Pakistan, various non governmental organizations (NGOs) have been working in the area of human rights especially protection of rights of women, children and minorities. Some religious forces/organizations (who got substantial electoral strength in the last elections) oppose these NGOs by calling them “Western agents” who want to secularize Pakistani society. Sometimes, these NGOs are forced to suspend their operations as the conservative forces use violence against them (like physically attacking the offices of NGOs). Obviously, this situation is very dangerous for the society in general and for poor people in particular. It is essential that government establishes its writ and implements rule of law so that pro-poor NGOs could play their role effectively.

5. *Role of local government and community in checking human rights violations*

Recently, Government of Pakistan has introduced “devolution plan” by decentralizing the administrative and financial powers at grass-root level. Now, the task of poverty reduction and protection of human rights is delegated to elected representatives of the local government. Since more powers and responsibilities have been given to elected representatives, there is a need that they should be aware about the relationship between poverty and human rights violations. In this regard, it is necessary that each local government should take steps to check human rights violations of the marginalized sections in its respective district.

6. *Elimination of the use of violence and stigmatization for imposing moral order*

In the 80s, military government in Pakistan tried to Islamize society by introducing various *Sharia* laws. These *Sharia* laws are highly discriminatory against women and minorities. Additionally, these laws infringe various fundamental rights including freedom of expression, and belief and interference into private space of individuals. These laws also

promoted stigmatization and discrimination in the society. Certain religious militants also promoted a culture of violence; they tried to control behavior of others by applying brute force. There is a need that appropriate legislation should be introduced to check such trends in the society. Without checking discrimination and violence, marginalized sections cannot be empowered.

7. Government's handling of marginalized people as "administrative problem"

In Pakistan, at government level, stigmatized sections are not being treated as a human right problem. For example, FSWs, street children, and beggars are considered as an "administrative problem" to be handled by state bureaucracy (e.g. labor inspectors, police, and other law enforcing agencies). Law enforcement officials (rarely trained in behavioral sciences) try to check these "menaces" through raids, arrests and punishments, thus further marginalizing these already marginalized sections.

Obvious result of this approach is corruption and denial of the problem (through fabricated data). Interestingly, one labor inspector in Lahore argued that the rights of child workers rarely violated in Pakistan. In his perceptions, it was wise if a child learns skills and becomes a 'breadwinner' (instead of studying school for many years and then fail to get a white color job). At policy making level, poverty should not be treated in isolation but it should be linked with human right violations.

8. Capacity of Community in creating awareness about human rights

The issue of human rights violations is not simple nor could it be solved by short term measures. It is not realistic that all the children could be enrolled in the school within a year. So it is advisable that human rights of the working children and other marginalized sections should be protected even at their work place. (Society should not wait for the ideal situation when child labor would be eliminated and all children would be enrolled in school). To achieve this objective, certain steps could be advisable:

- Communities usually tolerate human rights violations because of ignorance (people may not be aware about the exact nature and gravity of the human rights violations). It is therefore essential that

the community should be aware about the dangers and hazards, a working child faces at work place. It would ultimately lead to collective actions on the part of community to stop these violations.

- Working children as well as their parents/guardians should also be educated about the long term implication and negative effects of putting children on work (by denying their schooling). To achieve this objective Tracy Holland (1998) suggested

Teaching street children and working children about human rights can help them with harsh realities of their lives and, hopefully, transform them. Two ways can be used. The first is to allow children to tell stories of their lives and then introduce the concept of human rights into the stories. The second is to develop projects such as building community centers that can impart the rights to the children's lives.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

1. *Structural dimensions of human rights violations*

This study provided a sociological account of various socio-cultural and structural dimensions of human rights violations of marginalized groups in Pakistan. Such worldview projects poverty as "normal and natural" and human rights violations as "fate of the unlucky people". Hence, helping poor becomes not more than a voluntary exercise, just a way of getting blessing of Allah. This research has also demonstrated that poverty reduction is not possible by "generous distribution of charity." It needs a social system which provides opportunity to poor people to develop their capacities through education, social inclusion and participation. More research needs to be conducted to understand how various cultural norms and traditions are used to justify discrimination, stigmatization and consequential human rights violations.

2. *Understanding Violence within the framework of theory of mindful space*

In Pakistan violence against marginalized people is very common and usually tolerated at societal level. Within the framework of theory of mindful space, this research intended to delineate the social

processes of violence and its perpetuation within Pakistani society (how is it convenient for an individual to commit acts of violence on others). The results of this study also provided fresh understanding about the relationship between violence, poverty and human rights violations. This research focused on:

- how cognitive and personal spaces of powerless and marginalized people are eroded by putting them in disadvantaged working and living conditions;
- after violation of these spaces, how their bodily space is intruded which result into emotional fragmentation; and,
- how these violations of spaces permanently incapacitate the victim and impairs his/her ability to come out of the cycle of poverty;

3. *Unspeakable domains and human rights violations in Pakistan*

Every society has its own priorities and perceived problems. In Pakistan, certain conservative sections of society refuse to recognize some human rights violations as the “real problem of Pakistan”. For example, if any NGO tries to highlight the sexual abuse of street children or housemaids, such efforts would be negatively perceived: “it is a Western propaganda to *malign* our culture”. Sometimes, discrimination and stigmatization are projected as legitimate way to punish the deviants (Hence human rights dimension of the acts is ignored). Culturally, there is a ‘clock of silence’ on sex related matters and usually such areas are considered “unspeakable”. In this way, things are swept under carpet by saying, “this is not the problem of our culture.” There is need to investigate such areas so that human rights violations could be documented and this research is an effort to this direction.

4. *Deeply embedded discrimination and legal structures in Pakistan*

The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan enshrines various fundamental rights like equality before law, equal protection of law, due process of law, etc. to its citizens. Further, the basic law prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of race, color, sex language, political and other opinion, national or social origin. But, in reality, many people are discriminated and these people have least capability to invoke constitutional remedies for the protection of their rights. The

problem lies in the socio-cultural and structural conditions of the society which exclude some people and deny their access to minimum resources necessary for survival. The results of this study identified those conditions especially the factors that compel people to silently bear human rights violations.

5. Research for the promotion of human rights and poverty reduction in Pakistan

In Pakistan, no serious effort has been made to study poverty in relation to human rights violations. Many politicians (both religious and secular) talk about human rights violations selectively and with political motives. There is need that serious and high quality knowledge is produced to increase understanding of the policy makers.

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PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY AND THE US

Nazir Hussain

The Pak-US relations have seen many ups and downs for the last fifty years. However, some issues remained constant and have been profoundly effecting the bilateral relations of the two countries. Among them the nuclear program of Pakistan has been a dominant factor since 1971, when Pakistan seriously began to develop its nuclear program for security purposes, in the backdrop of third Indo-Pakistan war, which effectively exposed the vulnerability of Pakistan defence as a result of conventional asymmetry with India.

According to some critics, Pakistan being the most allied ally of the US had to compromise its sovereignty and independence to win over US economic and diplomatic support. However, she never remained uncompromising over couple of issues such as its nuclear policy, which became a major irritant in its relations with the US.

The nuclear issue and its resultant effects on Pak-US relations is an important and interesting study to be explored. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to present a critical analysis of the US role in the nuclear program of Pakistan. In order to have a profound understanding of the issue the paper has been divided into four parts. In the first part, the US interests in South Asia and their impact on Pakistani policy making have been discussed. The second part analyzes the role of the US in the development of Pakistan's nuclear program particularly from 1953 to 1985. The third, part is devoted to Pakistan's nuclear policy and the US reactions from 1987 to 2001. The last part explores the new trends in the US administration in the backdrop of 9/11 terrorist attacks and its impact on the geo-political and geo-strategic environment of South Asia, with special reference to Pakistan.

However, before analyzing these factors it is important to note that there is no official version of Pakistan's nuclear policy or nuclear doctrine. There are some precepts on nuclear policy of Pakistan or it is mainly derived out of the statements and speeches of Pakistan's leaders from time to time. Therefore, the term Pakistan's nuclear policy in this paper would be taken with reference to interpretations and perceptions derived out of different statements and speeches of Pakistan's leaders.

The US interests in South Asia

South Asia has never been a priority area in the US strategic calculations.¹ The regional issues and compulsions of international strategic dynamics have always forced the US to take the region seriously. Therefore, the US interests in the region have been subject to time and circumstances. The Cold War politics compelled the US to align as many countries of Asia as possible to control and curtail the growing influence of Communism. Therefore, the main interest of the US in South Asia during that period had been to counter the Soviet political and military expansion, which reached to its climax in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

However, right from the beginning when Pakistan joined Western Alliance system in 1954, there were differences and divergences with regard to priorities and perceptions of Pakistan and the US over the security issues and threat perceptions. Pakistan's aim in joining the Western Alliance was to bolster its security against India, whereas the US never wanted to antagonize India.

This fact proved right when in the wake of 1962 Indo-China war, the US and Western countries backed India and provided it with generous economic and military assistance at the expense of Pakistan's security. Later, on the eve of 1965 Indo-Pakistan war; military embargo was imposed on Pakistan, despite the fact that Pakistan was the party to the Western Alliance system.² Although the US had used the influence and goodwill of Pakistan to establish its historic diplomatic relations with China yet she did not respond in the same manner during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. However, despite divergent security perspectives, Pakistan continued to be a part of Western Alliance and a frontline state against the Soviet expansion.

It was in the wake of 1974 Indian nuclear explosion and Pakistan's quest to achieve a qualitative deterrence against India, which led the US to adopt the non-proliferation policy a high priority agenda towards South Asia. Pakistan was subjected to undue criticism and economic sanctions by the US as a result of its nuclear policy, whereas India conveniently got away with its nuclear ambitions.

However, the maintenance of peace and stability of the South Asian region became the primary objective of the US after the overt nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998.³ For this the US has been trying in

earnest to avoid any conflict or war between the two nuclear-armed neighbors and implementation of nuclear risk reduction measures in South Asia. Although the 9/11 terrorists attacks and the war on terrorism did not bring any major change, particularly with regard to India Pakistan relations yet Pakistan became wily nilly a frontline state once again, this time against terrorism.

In the backdrop of strategic changes in the world with Iraq devastated, the US war on terrorism continues in the Middle East and China emerging as a possible challenge to the US hegemony in Asia, India constitutes a strategic prize for the US interest in the region at the cost of Pakistan. Therefore in the long run it is India and not Pakistan, which would be strategic partner of the US in South Asia and beyond.⁴

Development of Pakistan's nuclear program and the US

The development of Pakistan's nuclear program has two phases. Both phases have their own dynamics and reactions from the US. In the first phase 1953-1971, Pakistan's quest for nuclear technology was driven purely by scientific desire. With the establishment of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Committee in 1953 to its upgradation into Atomic Energy Commission, (PAEC) Pakistan was already a decade behind India in this vital field of energy and technology. The most daunting challenge to the PAEC was the paucity of scientists and technicians in nuclear technology. Pakistan benefited from the US 'Atom for Peace' program and sent its scientists for training to the US and many Western countries. Pakistan also benefited from the US cooperation in nuclear field by acquiring a Nuclear Research Reactor of 5 MW in 1962.

Therefore, the development of Pakistani nuclear research was possible with the US cooperation. Later with the establishment of Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) with Canada under full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, Pakistan was well on track for nuclear development. Some of the reports, though unconfirmed, also mentioned about the possible sale of nuclear reprocessing plant by the US or Britain in 1967-68 but refused by Pakistan on financial grounds.

Thus during the first phase of nuclear development in Pakistan, the US provided technical and scientific cooperation in the nuclear field, which helped Pakistan to built its nuclear program on sound footings. However it was the second phase of Pakistan's nuclear program, reshaped after the trauma of Indo-Pakistan war and dismemberment of Pakistan, that irritated the US policy makers and leaders.

Pakistan in the backdrop of its dismemberment realized the fact that it had to meet the Indian challenge in more qualitative and meaningful manner. Therefore, Pakistan's nuclear development was now studded with security connotation to its advancement since 1971. The 1974 Indian "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" (PNE) had changed the security paradigm into India's favor and Pakistan was left with no choice but to embark on nuclear path.

The US response to Pakistan's quest for nuclear technology in this phase was totally different. The US adopted coercive and threatening means to stop Pakistan from acquiring the nuclear technology. The US not only put economic and military embargoes against Pakistan but also compelled France to cancel the nuclear reprocessing plant deal with Pakistan. The US did not confined to these methods alone but its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger threatened Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to 'make horrible example out of him' if he did not stop the nuclear path. However, the choice for Pakistan was little and limited, therefore, Pakistan continued to develop its nuclear program to its logical conclusions. The subsequent governments in Pakistan continue to base their security calculations against India on nuclear path, and therefore did not come under US pressures to stop its nuclear program. Though there were some reports of Pakistan 'capping' and 'rolling back' its nuclear program but later events proved that these reports were unfounded and mischievously circulated against Pakistan. Nonetheless, the US Congress passed several Pakistan-specific and nuclear related legislation to curb and control Pakistan's nuclear program.

However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 altogether changed everything and Pakistan once again became the frontline state against the Soviet expansion. Though the US stance on Pakistan's nuclear program remained unchanged but its focus became muted in the wake of great regional security changes both in Afghanistan and Iran. Subsequently, the US administration offered sanction waivers to Pakistan with military and economic aid package of \$ 4.2 billion spread over six years including the sale of 40 F-16 aircraft to augment Pakistan's conventional defenses. Later, this sanction wavier was followed by other US Presidents, who continued to certify to the US Congress of Pakistan not developing its nuclear program to weapon enrichment. The aid and presidential waivers were in practice when in 1985 the first report of Pakistan's nuclear weapon capability was revealed.

Pakistan's Nuclear Policy and the US

As described in the beginning that there is no official nuclear policy or doctrine of Pakistan. Whatever is available on its nuclear policy and doctrine is based on statements and speeches of Pakistani leaders. Therefore, based on these statements and speeches, Pakistan's nuclear policy can be categorized into two periods; first the nuclear ambiguity which prevailed from 1987 to 1998 but it continue to create deterrence in the region. Second is the minimum credible nuclear deterrent policy since the overt nuclearization of South Asia in 1998.

Pakistan had no officially stated nuclear doctrines but technical considerations and writings by experts suggest that its core nuclear strategy is to hold Indian cities hostage by counter value targeting, against a conventional Indian invasion or preemptive air attack that could threaten Pakistan's defenses with collapse.⁵ It is widely believed that for Pakistan, nuclear weapons are its weapons of "first strike and last resort" and for India they are of "second strike use", meaning that India would first absorb a first strike and then retaliate. These theories are developed on the grounds that Pakistan, with its small land area, has limited strategic depth compared to the much larger India, which has large strategic depth. Pakistan believes that its nuclear weapons essentially make up for the discrepancy in conventional military assets between the two countries.⁶ One strategic expert says that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is like the unwritten British constitution, which lists some broad objectives to be achieved in different situations. "The three main pillars of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is that it is Indian-specific, it is to make up for asymmetry in conventional arsenal (India has larger forces than Pakistan) and that it would use them if the very survival of the state is threatened."⁷

The Nuclear Ambiguity

Pakistan's nuclear weapon capability became known when the first report to this effect was revealed by several sources around the world. Pakistan neither denied nor confirmed these reports, maintaining a nuclear ambiguity. But in 1987, Dr. A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistani nuclear capability, announced in an interview that Pakistan possesses the nuclear weapon capability. This semi-official confession sent shivers across the globe and the US Congress once again got reactivated to impose further restrictions and limitations to stop Pakistan's path to nuclear weapons.

Later, President General Zia-ul-Haq also acknowledged the possession of nuclear weapon capability by Pakistan,

“Pakistan has the capability of building the bomb whenever it wishes. Once you have acquired the technology which Pakistan has, you can do whatever you like.”⁸

But Gen. Zia was too clever to explicitly confess it, as he stressed that Pakistan did not intend to manufacture nuclear arms and asserted that it had not enriched uranium to weapon grade. President Zia later declared that he had been speaking only of Pakistan's broad technological capabilities, and had not meant to imply that Pakistan was pursuing nuclear weapons program.⁹

The revelation by Pakistan was meant to convey the message at home and abroad that Pakistan has acquired the weapon capability but it is restraining to develop it into a nuclear bomb. The message was important because at the one hand scores of stories were appearing in the international media about Pakistan's secret nuclear activities and smuggling and clandestine ways of acquiring some critical materials. So to silence these reports and let the world know that Pakistan has acquired everything necessary for nuclear weapons and there is no need to get materials through smuggling and clandestine ways. On the other hand, Pakistan's erstwhile neighbor, India was concentrating largest-ever forces along the Pakistani borders, through operation Brasstacks, it was necessary for Pakistan to ward off any Indian misadventure on Pakistan.

However, these revelations led the US Congress to oppose continued US security assistance to Pakistan unless it accepts verifiable restraints on the production of weapon-grade uranium. The US administration sent its Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Michael Armcost to Pakistan to express US concerns over nuclear developments by Pakistan and seek verifiable restraints on Pakistan's nuclear program. This was rejected by both the government and the opposition in Pakistan.¹⁰ Despite these rejections the US was compelled to provide economic and military assistance because of Afghan crisis and the aid cut off at this juncture would have resulted in undermining the US interests in Afghanistan.

By 1988 many had believed that Pakistan has acquired the nuclear weapon capability but it maintains an ambiguity over its possession. As many in Pakistan believed that if without denoting a

nuclear device Pakistan has achieved deterrence against India, there is no need to go overtly. As President Zia revealed,

“With respect to their (India’s) nuclear capabilities, if they create ambiguity, that ambiguity is the essence of deterrence. The present programs of India and Pakistan have a lot of ambiguities, and therefore, in the eyes of each other, they have reached a particular level, and that level is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.”¹¹

Later, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto despite severe domestic and US pressures on Pakistan’s nuclear program continued to maintain nuclear ambiguity. As she declared in 1989,

“We do have the knowledge but I think there is a difference between knowledge and capability. So we do have knowledge, if confronted with a threat to use. But we do not, in the absence of any threat, intended to use that knowledge. In fact as a matter of policy my government is firmly committed to non-proliferation but any one-sided action by any country in the subcontinent can trigger off a nuclear arms race.”¹²

However, during this period the US was again compelled to continue its aid to Pakistan but now with a different reason. Many in the US Congress thought to support the democracy in Pakistan and therefore, another aid waiver was approved, and the US Congress settled for a marginal limitation on Pakistan’s nuclear program. With the Geneva Accords being implemented to withdraw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the US President not willing to certify about Pakistan’s nuclear program, the US was no more compelled to continue its aid waivers for Pakistan, thus in 1990 the US stopped all aid and assistance to Pakistan and it became the most sanctioned ally of the US. One of the most serious results of aid cutoff for Pakistan was the non-delivery of 71 F-16 aircraft agreed by the two countries in 1989.

However, during the sanctioned period, Pakistan was not only able to diversify its economic donors in Japan and West Europe but also continued its nuclear program. Thus in 1995 the US Congress, while debating the aid to Pakistan issue in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, admitted that the aid cut off had become counterproductive. The Congress remained divided on the issue but became more receptive to the US Administrations’ suggestion of reconsidering the aid ban.¹³ Therefore, in February 1996 President Clinton signed into law a

Congress Bill that relaxed restrictions on economic assistance to Pakistan and permit a one-time release of \$ 368 million in military hardware ordered by Pakistan prior to aid cutoff.¹⁴

The policy of nuclear ambiguity by Pakistan had created the required deterrence in the region, therefore Pakistan continued to follow this policy. The US was somewhat reconciled with the fact that Pakistan had acquired the nuclear weapon capability despite its sanctions and restrictions, and therefore the US began to apply gradual concessions to Pakistan. This policy continued from both sides till 1998, when India conducted five nuclear explosions on May 11 and 13. The nuclear deterrence was called off and Pakistan was faced with severe security dilemma. The Western countries including the US pressurized Pakistan not to detonate the nuclear device.

To fuel the fire, Pakistan's security and scientific status was being challenged by the Indian leaders. On the one hand, Indian leaders began to threaten Pakistan of a possible attack in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and on the other challenged the Pakistani scientists to explode the nuclear device if they have any capability. Therefore, Pakistan was left with no choice but to restore the security balance in the region. Thus Pakistan conducted six nuclear explosions on May 28 and May 30 to respond to the Indian threats and restore the strategic balance in the region.

Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

Under the new strategic equation Pakistan had to discard its policy of nuclear ambiguity. After 1998 Pakistan formulated the policy of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. The policy was revealed in October 1999 by President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and enunciated by Foreign Minister Abdul Satter on November 25, 1999. Foreign Minister said,

“Minimum nuclear deterrence will remain the guiding principle of our nuclear strategy. The minimum cannot be quantified in static numbers. The Indian buildup will necessitate review and reassessment. In order to ensure the survivability and credibility of the deterrent Pakistan will have to maintain, preserve and upgrade its capability. But we shall not engage in any nuclear competition or arms race.”¹⁵

President Gen. Pervez Musharraf while speaking at International Nathiagali Summer College declared,

“The rationale behind our nuclear policy is purely security and we only want to maintain credible deterrence to deter any aggression against our homeland.”¹⁶

However, at the same time President said,

“Pakistan, unlike India does not harbor any ambitions of regional or global status. We fully support creation of a strategic self-restraint regime in the subcontinent and expect a positive response from our neighbor. However, security of Pakistan will remain paramount in our minds and hearts. Apart from achieving minimum deterrence capability the main thrust of Pakistan’s nuclear program is on peaceful application.”¹⁷

On the other side, the US response to the post 1998 developments was very different. First the US along with the Western States tried to put pressure on Pakistan not to explode the nuclear device, without providing any security guarantees. Therefore after the Pakistani nuclear tests, the US put further sanctions on Pakistan. It also set forth five nonproliferation “benchmarks” for India and Pakistan. They included; halt further nuclear testing and sign and ratify CTBT; halt fissile material production and pursue FMCT negotiations; refrain from deploying weapons and testing ballistic missiles; restrict totally the exportation of any nuclear materials or technologies; and take steps to reduce bilateral tensions, especially the issue of Kashmir.¹⁸ But nothing concrete was achieved from these “benchmarks.”

The US also imposed “democratic” sanctions on Pakistan after the military coup in October 1999. Further sanctions were imposed in November 2000 and September 2001 on some Pakistani and Chinese institutions.¹⁹ However, the entire scenario changed in the backdrop of 9/11. The US not only removed most of the restrictions gradually but also helped Pakistan in military and economic areas.

Pakistan’s Non-proliferation policy

Here it is important to discuss in brief Pakistan’s non-proliferation policy. Because like development of its nuclear program, Pakistan made non-proliferation as main agenda of its policy in the region. Therefore,

soon after the Indian PNE in 1974, Pakistan proposed to declare South Asia as Weapon Free Zone. But India out-rightly rejected this. Later, Pakistan offered mutual inspections and bilateral non-proliferation to India. This also met the same fate.

According to Leonard Spector, over the years Pakistan offered a wide range of comprehensive bilateral nuclear arrangements with India, including the reciprocal ratification of the NPT, mutual acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear installations, comprehensive bilateral inspections, the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia and formal mutual pledges not to manufacture nuclear arms. India rejected these proposals in large part because these tend to treat India and Pakistan as equals and because these would restrict India's right to develop nuclear arms.²⁰

However, in 1988 an earlier codified agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations was signed during Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Islamabad in 1988. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto renewed the offers made by her predecessors for a variety of non-proliferation and nuclear arms control measures but India continued to reject these proposals. Again in 1995, Pakistan proposed to hold five-power talks involving Pakistan, India, China, Russia and the US for creating a regional nonproliferation regime. The nonproliferation regime was expanded from the regional to global context to cater for the Indian fears of Chinese threat. But India again, like other Pakistani proposals also rejected this one.

Following its nuclear explosions in 1998 Pakistan declared a unilateral moratorium on testing and its desire to prevent a nuclear arms race in South Asia. During the Foreign Secretaries' level talks in October 1998, under the agenda item for Peace and Security, Pakistan offered a Strategic Restraint Regime with India.²¹

Later, President Pervez Musharraf also said that Pakistan fully support creation of a strategic self-restraint regime in the subcontinent and expect a positive response from India.²² However, India continues to ignore these proposals.

Post 9/11 Pakistan's Nuclear Policy and the US Agenda

The post 9/11 scenario, once again brought Pakistan into the security calculations of the US and Pakistan became the frontline state

against 'war on terrorism' in Afghanistan. Pakistan maintained its nuclear stance in the post 9/11 period but there appeared new fears in the US about safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and their possible use by fundamentalists, and various other scenarios to that effect.²³

However, Pakistan has a very safe and sound command and control structure of its nuclear weapons. Pakistan had created the National Command Authority headed by President Gen. Pervez Musharraf which authorizes to take a "unanimous decision" for using nuclear weapons unlike India where the Prime Minister has been given powers to take similar decisions. President General Pervez Musharraf also brushed aside the concern about Pakistan's nuclear assets,

"We are a responsible nation and are aware of our international obligations. Our command and control structures, which have been in place for four years now, are water tight."²⁴

Later, in January 2003 the Development Control Committee (DCC) of the National Command Authority in its meeting chaired by General Pervez Musharraf approved to further tighten up security of different defensive layers, enhancing effectiveness of water tight safety of materials, equipment and technology.²⁵

The second concern arises out of the overt nuclearization by India and Pakistan and the dangers of an accidental war. Therefore the US encourages the nuclear risk reduction measures and nuclear restraint regime in South Asia.²⁶

There are two answers to this apprehension. First Pakistan has been emphasizing on nuclear non-proliferation since 1974 and offered a Nuclear Restraint Regime soon after 1998 nuclear explosions but India did not responded. However, Pakistan still maintains the peaceful and defensive nature of its nuclear program. Secondly, in the face of continued rivalry and issue of Kashmir unresolved, the US emphasis on Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures may be unfulfilled.

Conclusion

Reviewing the nuclear policy of Pakistan and the US reactions to this policy, one is inclined to believe that the US role in the economic and military development of Pakistan is crucial.²⁷ However, history and events have proved that in the face of crises, Pakistan had to rely and

defend at its own. Therefore, despite Pakistan continued to be the part of US alliance for the major part of its history since 1947, it has never compromised on its security and independence and that includes nuclear weapons.

It may look that the US policies towards Pakistan at most had been discriminatory in the regional context. But it should be remembered that Pakistan is major recipient of the US aid in the region and not India. If Pakistan wants to get rid of US sanctions and restrictions it must rely at its own economically and militarily. And on the part of the US, it has been seen that sanctions and restrictions proved counterproductive. So instead of sanctions there should be a policy of engagement and persuasion.

Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons for defending its security and integrity against India. Pakistan has all the desire to resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful means and negotiations and wants to see a stable and peaceful region devoid of the nuclear dangers. Till the time these ideals are not achieved, nuclear weapons are the only guarantee to maintain the status quo. Therefore, nuclear weapons are fundamental in Pakistani security calculations and no Pakistani can compromise on this vital issue.

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The Major Economic Issues Confronting Pakistan and Possible Solutions (1990-2003)

Ms. Mubeen Irshad

Every nation needs and desires to be developed and prosperous as soon as possible, but in spite of all their efforts to achieve economic development the less developed countries are facing many economic issues such as low growth rate, high population rate, poverty, low investment, debt problem and unemployment. Pakistan, as an underdeveloped country is confronted by major challenges.

In recent years, Pakistan has faced severe macroeconomic imbalances, declining economic growth, rising poverty, and poor social indicators. During the 1990s, the fiscal deficit and the current account deficit as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 6.9 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively (compared with the 1980s average of 7.0 and 3.9 percent respectively). The average economic growth rate decelerated from 6.5 percent in the 1980s to 5.4 percent in the first half of the 1990s, and to 3.6 percent in the second half. The incidence of poverty increased from just over 20 percent in the late 1980s to 32 percent in 1998/99¹

Growth was impeded and poverty increased in Pakistan in the 1990's. Such imbalances cannot be sustained indefinitely, and the longer they persist, the greater the subsequent adjustment needed. Furthermore, they usually manifest themselves in high inflation and periodic balance of payments crises. The government is of the view that if these are left uncorrected, the worsening macroeconomic balances would lead to higher accumulation of debt, a loss of national sovereignty, an uncertain environment for investment and jeopardizing the prospects for sustaining high growth.²

In Pakistan during the 1990s many problems dominated the economic agenda. Between the years 1988 to 1999, little work was done in addressing the macroeconomic imbalances. No stable policies were seen and it created a negative impact on growth. Prior to 9/11, Pakistan's economy was struggling under the weight of a huge foreign debt. The key agricultural sector was also severely crippled by drought. Both factors were responsible for constraining growth well below the 6-7

percent range necessary for making a significant dent in the country's gripping poverty.

Major Economic Issues:

Growth Rate:

Economic development is a multidimensional concept. In the process of economic development, theories of per capita income to theories of mental satisfaction are described. Economic growth is not stable and constant but is the process, which is required to grow simultaneously. Pakistan is not only trying to increase national income but also wants it to grow continuously.

Despite the Government's best efforts and the successful implementation of the IMF's Standby Arrangement (SBA), investors' confidence has still not been restored; the investment rate has plummeted to the lowest level since the 1950s. The falling investment rate has adversely impacted the economic growth rate, which averaged 3.5 percent over the last three years. As a result, given Pakistan's high population growth rate (2.2 percent), real per capita income increased only marginally over the three years. In dollar terms, per capita income declined from \$473 in FY1998 to \$429 FY2001 because of the sharp depreciation in the Pakistan rupee. Economic growth in FY2001 is estimated at 2.6 percent compared to 3.9 percent in FY2000. The deceleration of the growth rate was primarily due to the drought-induced reduction in the agriculture sector's output, which posted a negative growth rate of 2.5 percent, as well as a reduction in hydroelectric power generation. The drought caused a loss in national income of about 2.0 percent. Non-agricultural GDP grew by 4.3 percent, as against 3.1 percent in the previous year. During the three-year period, average growth rates in all sectors have been low and there are wide year-to-year fluctuations as well.³

Table 1: Growth Rates of GDP

Item	1980s	1997-1998	1998-1999	1999-2000	2000-2001(P)	Average 1988/99-2000/01
Real GDP (at factor cost)	6.5	3.5	4.2	3.9	2.6	3.5
Agriculture	5.4	4.5	2.0	6.1	-2.5	1.8
Industry	8.2	6.1	4.9	-0.1	4.2	3.0
Services	6.7	1.6	5.0	4.8	4.4	4.7

Source: Economic Survey, 2000-20001, Economic Advisor's Wing, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, 2001.

Population:

The size and rate of growth of the population has an important bearing on the economic development of Pakistan. A large population is a great impediment to economic growth. It also causes a low per capita income, more consumption and low saving. The growth rate of population is higher than the growth in GNP and the basic needs of the people are not satisfied.

Table-2-Population (%) falling within 2 and 5 miles radius of public and Semi- public institutions

Provinces	% population within 2 miles radius			% Population within 5 miles radius		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Punjab	99.6	32.1	49.2	99.7	82.4	88.7
Sind	100.0	24.2	55.5	100.0	69.5	82.1
NWFP	100.0	41.2	49.4	100.0	88.4	90.0
Balochistan	100.0	28.7	40.5	100.0	28.7	40.5
Total	99.8	32.1	50.3	99.9	78.6	83.4

Source: Fifth Five Year Plan.

Employment:

A rapidly growing population increases the consumption expenditure of the people due to leading to reduce saving and low investment levels in the country. This results in both unemployment and underemployment and a consequent fall in national income.

Pakistan's labour force is growing at a rate of 2.4 percent. With the declining rate of economic growth, the capacity to generate employment has also fallen. As a result, about 1.5 million people may have been added to the ranks of the unemployed. The unemployment rate in 1998-99 was already around 6 percent, and this did not take into account the very large number of workers who were not fully occupied. Unemployment in urban areas was higher (8 percent), and, while gender-desegregated data are not available, some surveys show that the unemployment rate is higher among females than males.⁴

Poverty:

Poverty increased during the 1990s. In 1996 the percentage of people living below the poverty line in terms of a minimum income of \$ 1

a day was 31 percent. According to a 1998-1999 survey, one third of the population was living below the poverty line, based on a minimum consumption requirement of 2550 calories per adult. Since 1998-99, poverty has significantly increased the fiscal squeeze has intensified, development spending has declined and Pakistan has experienced a severe drought.

The challenge of poverty alleviation in Pakistan needs to be taken up as a matter of political enterprise. If poverty is thought of as the inability to participate equally in the affairs of the community, then the agenda for poverty alleviation ought not to be confined to issues relating to income and consumption shortfalls alone. Issues such as the advancement of basic education, the provision of public health and the protection of legal, civil and political rights, all need to be addressed as integral parts of any anti poverty agenda.⁵

A conscious decision has been taken to bring the issue of poverty alleviation to the center- stage of economic policy making. A strategy to reduce poverty and improve income distribution has been developed. Sustained pro-poor economic growth, based on robust private sector activity and investment is the key element of the poverty reduction strategy.

Macroeconomic policies are being integrated with social and sectoral objectives to ensure that plans are supportive and consistent with a common set of objectives to spur growth and reduce poverty. The government has also prepared an anti poverty programme, revamping the Zakat system, micro credit bank and improving social indicators. It is very important to improve the income distribution for reducing poverty. Measures to this front are recorded in the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) of the Government of Pakistan.

Investment:

The debt burden has generated the problem of low investment. From 1993 to 2000-01, a decline in investment is seen. Shahrukh Rafi Khan highlighted the investment problem as,

Investment and savings rates in Pakistan have always been low, but they have now fallen to the lowest levels since the early 1950s. An important factor responsible for the continuous fall in the investment rate since FY1993 has been the growing debt burden and the associated debt servicing requirements. This has forced the Government to curtail

the public sector development program, and public investment has declined from 9.1 percent of GDP in FY1993 to 5.6 percent in FY2001. During this period, private sector investment also declined from 10.1 percent of GDP to 7.5 percent. The decline has, however, occurred only in private sector investment; public investment increased slightly, from 5.2 to 5.6 percent of GDP. Investment in real terms in FY2001 was also less than that in FY1998. The decline was observed in almost all the industrial sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing, mining and quarrying, construction, electricity and gas.⁶

The economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan following the nuclear test in May 1998, further dampened foreign investment flows to Pakistan. Even after the 9/11 incidents, it lowered investor's confidence. The poor law and order situation, the lack of continuity in economic policies, the arrest of political leaders and businessmen, the freezing of foreign currency accounts have undermined investor's confidence. "Consequently, total foreign investment declined from \$823 million (\$601 million foreign direct investment and \$221 million portfolio) in FY1998, to just \$182 million (\$322 million foreign direct investment and \$140 million portfolio) in FY2001".⁷

Savings:

National savings, a measure of financing available from the nation's own resources for investment, have declined from 14.3 percent of GDP in FY1998 to 12.7 percent in FY2001. However foreign saving has marginally increased from 1.9% of GDP in 1999 –2000 to 2.0 % in 2000-2001.⁸

Table 3: Savings and Investment

(Percent of GDP)

	1980s	1977-98	1998-99	1999-00	2000-01
National Savings	13.8	14.3	11.4	13.7	12.7
Total Investment	17.5	17.3	15.6	15.6	14.7
Fixed Investment	15.8	14.7	13.9	14.0	13.1
Public	8.6	5.2	6.0	5.7	5.6
Private	7.3	9.5	7.9	8.2	7.5

Source: Economic Survey, 2000-2001, Economic Advisor's Wing, Finance Division, The Government of Pakistan, 2001.

Mr. Ali Shah highlighted the savings as,

While domestic savings are higher than national savings because net factor income from abroad is negative, they also show a declining trend. Domestic savings declined from 15.2 to 14.4 percent of GDP over the three-year period. The low levels of private savings are the result of various factors, including high dependency ratio, financial repression, unpredictable returns on savings, low and fluctuating growth rates of per capita incomes, and a poor investment climate. The overall rate of savings is reduced further because of negative government savings, which were a negative 1.8 percent of GDP in FY2001.⁹

While there is some debate over why the savings rate in Pakistan is so low, there is consensus on several issues:

1. There is a strong correlation between household savings and the real rate of return on financial assets, which means that the government's policy of keeping real interest rates low, financial repression has helped reduce the level of domestic savings
2. The greater availability and ease of access to financial institutions, markets and instruments should cause the savings rate to increase.

3. Foreign capital inflows, foreign aid which were supposed to fill the savings- investment gap, have actually had a negative impact on domestic savings and have not acted as a catalyst to increase national savings.
4. Similar results regarding household savings and the availability of bank credit have been observed.
5. Inflation and uncertainty about the future as has been common in Pakistan has been responsible for capital flight and greater consumption than is perhaps warranted.¹⁰

Other factors that may be responsible include cultural factors, such as where savings in the form of assets, particularly gold and jewellery, substitute for financial savings. Due to lack of awareness and the use of banks, the real savings rate is higher than the financial one.

External Trade and Balance of Payments:

The most critical factor to affect industrialization has been the trade regime. The trade regime in Pakistan was held responsible for gross inefficiencies in the industrial structure towards the end of the 1960's, allegations that later helped to develop a new liberal orthodoxy with respect to trade policy. The structural adjustment programs agreed to by the Pakistan governments since 1988 include trade sector reform as a major plank in the strategy. The trade policies and the changing trade regimes over the years have influenced the course of development particularly industrialization in Pakistan. Pakistan's trade patterns have changed dramatically since 1947. Rafi Khan explained exports and imports of Pakistan as,

From being a primary good exporter, Pakistan now exports primarily manufactured and semi manufactured commodities. However, its exports are still critically dependent on cotton, which contributes as much as 60% to exports. From about 11% of GDP in 1947, exports and imports together amount to around 35% of GDP. Remittances have played an important role in Pakistan's economy since the late 1970's, and once provided as much as 10% of GDP. There role has since diminished, and they account for around 3% of GDP.¹¹

Just as the industrial policy of the early years was maligned for causing inefficiency in the economy, so too was the trade policy. The same reasons were given for distortions being caused in the structure of

the economy by trade policy, and also alleged to have resulted from industrial policy. Pakistan's trade pattern and trade policy have continuously been moving towards fewer and fewer controls, lower tariffs, and more openness.

Following the nuclear tests in May 1998, restrictions on cash margin requirements were imposed on imports, and the exchange rate regime underwent various changes. In FY2000, the managed exchange rate system was adopted, and during the year the nominal exchange rate was kept almost unchanged.¹²

At the beginning of FY2001, the managed float was abandoned, and a market-based, free-floating exchange rate system was put in its place. The currency came under several speculative attacks during the year, and in FY2001, the rupee depreciated by 18.6 percent against the dollar. Because of the low rate of inflation in Pakistan, this resulted in a real depreciation of over 10 percent in FY2001, which provided a much-needed boost for exports.

Exports fell from \$8.6 billion to \$7.7 billion and imports from \$10.1 billion to \$9.3 billion in FY1999. The export concentration ratio in Pakistan is 0.56, which is high. Textiles account for almost 70 percent of total export earnings. While specialization in textiles may not be an obstacle to export growth, dependence on a narrow commodity base greatly increases balance-of-payments vulnerability.¹³

Table 4: Growth of Imports and Exports

(\$ Million)

	Exports	Imports
1997-98	8,628	10,116
1998-99	7,779	9,432
1999-00	8,569	10,309
2000-01	9,202 (percent of GDP)	10,729
1997-98	13.9	16.3
2000-01	15.2	17.7

Source: Annual Report 2000-2001, State Bank of Pakistan, 2001.

Objectives of a commercial policy:

A commercial policy ought to have the following objectives,

1. Maintain equilibrium in the balance of payments and balance of trade or at least limiting the extent of disequilibrium.
2. Attain favourable terms of trade so that with the same quantity of exports, the country is able to import greater quantities of goods and services and thus achieve a net addition to real income.
3. Promote exports to derive the full benefits of comparative advantages and also to finance the country's import requirements.
4. Import substitution accelerate the rate of capital formation, create employment opportunities, narrow trade and payments gaps and seek a certain degree of national self sufficiency.
5. Ensure adequate availability of imported goods for both development and other purposes.

6. Keep the internal and external values of the national currency at desired levels.

Debt Problem:

In the case of Pakistan, foreign debts assumed large and unmanageable dimensions after the break up of the country in the early seventies. Since then and until recently, a moratorium on the annual debt servicing has been granted to Pakistan so that the country may be able to tide over its foreign exchange problems. But unfortunately, in spite of all that efforts debt servicing has been constantly increasing over time.

Pakistan is suffering from a severe debt 'overhang': total debt increased from PRs2,672 billion in FY1998 to PRs4,003 billion in FY2001.¹⁴

Table 5: Total Debt, External Debt and Internal Debt

(PRs Billion)

	1997-98	1998-99	1999-2000	2000-2001
Total Debt	2,671.9	3,135.4	3,416.2	4,003.3
Internal Debt	1,176.2	1,375.9	1,559.9	1,708.5
External Debt	1,483.1	1,695.9	1,788.4	2,223.8
Other Explicit Liabilities	12.6	63.6 (% of GDP)	67.8 (% of GDP)	71.0
Total Debt	99.8	106.7	107.3	115.3
Internal Debt	43.9	46.8	49.0	49.2
External Debt	55.4	57.7	56.2	64.0
Other Explicit Liabilities	0.5	2.0	2.0	1.8

Source: Annual Report 2000-2001, State Bank of Pakistan, 2001.

Since 1997 to 2001 the total debt increased including both internal and external debt.

As a percentage of GDP, total debt increased from 100 to 115 percent, with domestic debt increasing from 44 to 49 percent, and external debt from 55 to 64%. The increase in the external debt has been about \$2.6 billion over the three-year period, but because of the sharp depreciation of the Pakistani Rupee (PRs), external debt-GDP ratio has increased sharply, particularly in FY2001. Servicing debt is the major problem affecting both the fiscal and the balance of payments situations. Total debt servicing increased from PRs 278 billion to PRs 325 billion and interest payments increased from PRs 192 billion to PRs 237 billion during 1997-98 to 2000-01.¹⁵

Table 6: Debt Servicing

(PRs Billion)

	1997-98	1998-99	1999-00	2000-01
Total Debt Servicing	278.3	343.1	353.9	325.0
Total interest payments	191.6	220.1	256.8	237.1
Domestic	160.1	178.9	206.3	178.8
Foreign	28.7	38.0	44.9	50.5
Payments of Principal (foreign)	86.7	123.0	97.1	87.9

Source: Annual Report 2000-2001, State Bank of Pakistan, 2001

An examination of the ratio of debt servicing to total revenue and export earnings is quite revealing. External debt servicing accounted for as much as 55.4 percent of total export earnings and 34.9 percent of total foreign exchange earnings in FY1998; because of debt rescheduling, these declined to 37.4 and 23.3 percent in FY2000. Because of reduction in the interest rates on national savings schemes, interest payments on domestic debt also declined in FY2001.

According to a debt reduction and management committee report,

Total debt servicing as a percentage of tax revenue has also declined from 78.4 to 68.9 percent. It is evident that despite the two debt reschedulings during 1998 to 2001, the external debt-servicing burden remains very high. Moreover, with total debt servicing pre-empting 57 percent of total government revenue, the Government is hard-pressed to accelerate its poverty reduction activities. For Pakistan to successfully address its problems of rising poverty and falling economic growth, a long-term approach for dealing with its debt burden has to be found. Pakistan has prepared a debt reduction and management strategy that focuses on continuing strong fiscal adjustment to limit public borrowing, boosting exports through structural reform, seeking new borrowing on concessional terms, and writing off or rescheduling debt.¹⁶

Pakistan is facing twin debt problems of large external and internal debt. It is the more critical issue for short to medium term economic management.¹⁷

Impact of 11 September, 2001 and War against Afghanistan on Pakistan's Economy:

September 11th and the ensuing war in Afghanistan have compounded the country's economic problems. When the U.S.A was under attack on September 11, 2001, it adversely affected the already weakening global economy as well as Pakistan's economy. Agricultural output was also affected by a shortage of irrigation water supply. Due to the perception that Pakistan is in a war zone when U.S.A attacked on Afghanistan, several airlines stopped services to Pakistan. At the same time, domestic textile and garment manufacturers suffered cancellations of export orders and a sharp drop in new orders stemming from weaker external demand, partly based on importers' anxieties that manufacturers would be unable to maintain their existing production schedules.

The Ministry of Commerce has estimated that if Pakistan does not receive more favourable access to the US and EU markets now for its exports, the loss of export earnings (stemming from current events) would be in excess of \$1.5 billion. The current account deficit also widened somewhat in 2002 owing to more subdued export growth and reduced inflows of worker remittances and other private transfers. Even in the event that exports are granted free access to the US and EU, this is likely to be partly offset by reduced import demand resulting from depressed consumer sentiment in these markets. Inflation during 2002 has picked up somewhat on account of rupee depreciation and an increase in utility prices.¹⁸

The front line status of Pakistan in the war against terrorism in the post September 11 and global recession has put the country's economy at great risk. Pakistan would not benefit in the long run, Infact its difficulties have increased. The uncertain atmosphere has created adverse budgetary impacts in the form of additional expenses due to an increased number of refugees, efforts to counter domestic terrorism, the maintenance of law and order and securing both Eastern and Western borders. Shortfall in revenue collections has also resulted because of a slowdown in imports. Pakistan lost investor confidence, which has subsequently led to a depressed state of the domestic stock market. All in all, the losses to Pakistan's economy associated with 9/11 and the Afghan crisis are estimated at \$2.5 to \$3 billion.

Its major impact is being felt on export and the government's revenue which have been falling behind the target that have put some extra strains on the twin deficits of the budget and the balance of payments. Another blow to Pakistan economy caused by the conflict was a rise in international shipping insurance premiums.

In order to rescue and revise the country's economy, the government has prepared a five point agenda. This agenda includes fiscal support, revival of concessional aid, increased market access, support from international financial institutions and debt relief.¹⁹

According to the latest figures available, Pakistan's external debt now stands at 38 billion dollars; this consists of bilateral and commercial loan and institutional credits. With a view to offsetting the losses that the economy might suffer, a number of bilateral donors have committed 781 million dollars so far. Pakistan is seeking rescheduling of loans to create some fiscal space. But it is also essential that the donor community help in retiring high cost commercial loans. It is, therefore, crucial that donors provide more grants than loans. Any assistance, which can help to keep under control the budget and the balance of payment deficits, will be timely. Allowing its exports, greater market accessibility can also help Pakistan's economy. The European Community has already done this. The latest promises by the U.S Secretary of State, do not seems to be enough even if implemented in full. The agreement with the European Union would certainly give the exports a boost and offset some of the initial setbacks. However, if similar trade concessions could also be obtained from the U.S, Pakistan would be well poised to achieve the stipulated export target.

Offsetting this to a certain extent has been the lifting of U.S sanctions that had been imposed in response to Pakistan's nuclear testing and military take over. Pakistani textiles have been given greater access to the U.S market and the IMF recently negotiated a new loan package for the country. International aid pledged thus far totals \$3 billion. Included in that figure are grants, write offs of bilateral debt and humanitarian assistance. But these actions have not neutralized the adverse economic effects and Pakistan is still economically worse off following 9/11.

Pakistan, at present is going through a difficult phase. Shaukat Aziz said Pakistan always believes that a strong, stable and economically vibrant Afghanistan is good for the world and its neighbours. He said the economy of Pakistan and Afghanistan is very much inter-linked. Afghanistan is a land-locked country so a lot of the goods go through Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan's private sector is active in Afghanistan and Afghan traders come to Pakistan and buy a lot of goods, he said. However, he said if aid begins flowing in Afghanistan, the economic activity would pick up and Pakistani companies would compete in prices and quality that would boost the economy.²⁰

War against Iraq: Strains on Pakistani Economy:

The return of Pakistani workers from the Gulf countries, in addition from the US, in large numbers could result in further deterioration of the unemployment situation, besides ending the bonanza of remittance income from the overseas workers. The inflation rate is, also rising due to any extra-ordinary increase in crude prices.

The increase in crude prices has put pressure on the prices of a number of other items, as well. Recently, according to a Press report, the chairman, Wapda, has asked the government either to allow it to raise the electricity tariff by 40 paise per unit or provide it Rs17 billion from the non-tariff sources, pleading that its cost had risen tremendously as a result of increase in the price of furnace oil from Rs10, 371 per ton in December, 2002 to Rs15, 000 per ton, at present.

The agriculture sector had, also, been adversely affected due to increase in the price of diesel, since it had become much more expensive for the farmers now to run the tube wells, for the purpose of irrigation. Transporters had, also, lost patience. They were demanding

that either the government should allow them to raise transportation charges. No stability is seen in oil prices.

Indo- Pak Forces Stand Off: Burden on Economy:

As regard to the economic burden of the mobilization, Pakistan had spent 2000 crores rupees on the mobilization and subsequent on maintenance of the forces. This was a great burden on the fragile economy of Pakistan and imposed great strain on the taxpayers of Pakistan. But the aid and waiver of debts offered to it by the US have compensated adequately for whatever damage has to be viewed through the prism of the realities of foreign aid and not in isolation.²¹ Indian Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha said that India is in a much better position economically than its arch- rival to fight a war. Compared to Pakistan, we are 100 times more prepared.²²

Budgetary Impacts 2003-2005:

To the people these budgets have promised poverty reduction, employment generation and price stability. To the business community, it has assured lowering of taxes and simplification of procedures. It has also talked about policy consistency. No new taxes and yet this is exactly what the new budget delivers. But of course that does not take into account all the hidden or indirect taxes that are levied on the famous common man.

The Finance Minister proposed the abolition of the 5 % excise duty on paper and cardboard, which is supposed to make books and stationery cheaper. But again, "is supposed to" are the operative words here. What guarantee do the country's bookworms have that the reduction will be passed on to them by publishers, both the legitimate ones and the industry's pirates and by booksellers? Education planning is a vital task with serious ramifications. The 80% increase in allocations in the budget is extremely encouraging, but what will be its breakdown within the sector? And what are we going to do with our information technology graduates? Do we have jobs for them or are we going to export them to other countries? Foreign exchange reserves are decreasing. According to the latest world report in corruption ranking Pakistan is at number 73. Pakistan has left IMF but is knocking on another doors. Dam construction is under severe political criticism and water reservoirs are decreasing at a dangerous level. Oil prices are not stable, day-by-day seeing an increase in prices.

The budget's success depends upon re-aligning our attitudes to meet the drastically unsure global picture and its effects within the country. There cannot be a more crucial moment to develop understanding, tolerance and unity as a nation. The national budget can serve as a touchstone.

The budget should be judged by not only what it promises but also by what it is able to deliver at the end of the day. The budget will be put through a severe test as it becomes operational.

Possible Solutions:

State as a Superior Authority:

Economic planning is advocated on the ground that the state is a superior authority and it has a better understanding about the economic problems of the people. It can therefore utilize the available resources in the best interest of the people.

Optimum Utilization Of Resources:

In an unplanned economy, private enterprise is guided solely by the profit motive regardless of social benefits or costs. In a planned economy, there will be proper distribution of resources, between the production of essential and non- essential goods. It is the planning authority, which encourages the former and suppresses down the later.²³

De politicization:

Our politicians ought to be role models, their life styles beyond approach in all respects, inspiring people to follow their lead. But politicization of institutions has been practiced by incompetent persons. It is generally believed that corruption has not done as much damage to our country as incompetence.

Favouring the Terms of Trade:

The volume and direction of foreign trade in a country certainly plays an important role not only in economic development but also in determining the level of general well being in a society. It is the State, which through planning can control the volume and direction of foreign

trade, so that the terms of trade remain favorable and the country moves rapidly on the path of economic development.²⁴

Devolution of Power:

Elected local governments took power on August 14, 2001, but there is still some confusion regarding the powers and roles of the various levels of government, as well as between the elected representatives and government officials. Since delivery of almost all public services has been devolved to the local governments, successful implementation of the reforms will have far reaching implications for accelerating poverty reduction and human development. However, the implementation will need to be closely monitored because fiscal decentralization has implications for the country's overall fiscal management and thus could put at risk the ongoing stabilization program of the Government.²⁵

Reduction of Economic Inequalities:

Inequalities result in heart searching and social tensions. Reduction of inequalities in income, wealth and economic opportunities is therefore the main aim of a modern welfare state.

Democratic government:

Political stability is required for economic growth. In 2002 elections Jamali was elected as Prime Minister of Pakistan at a time when the economy was facing severe crises. Now Shaukat Aziz is Prime Minister of Pakistan as well as the Finance Minister. Factors like low- income levels, unemployment, high inflation rate, poverty, illiteracy, inadequate infrastructure facilities, heavy debt burden are aggravating the terrible economic condition. The current situation demands these problems are addressed immediately by the government. The federal budget 2004-05 sets out reforms to prop-up various sub sectors of the economy, along with a variety of popular measures such as increase in pay and pension and tax concessions for retailers.

Conclusion:

No doubt restoring economic growth will be the ultimate key to stability in Pakistan. Having said that, what needs to be done to bring sustained economic improvement to the masses? Historically this has not occurred in Pakistan because the government has despite extensive

World Bank assistance, failed to design a coherent approach to poverty reduction. More generally the country has suffered from, political instability and lack of continuity in economic reforms and policies, low levels of domestic savings and investment, unstable macroeconomic conditions, high level of protection to domestic industries and discrimination against primary production and exports and an unusually low level of public investment in human capital i. e health and education.

These policy failures have created the poverty and income disparities at the heart of the current instability. To rectify this, the government will have to revamp its whole approach to the country's economy.

Economic stability, continuity and consistency of economic policies should be the government's highest priority. Shifting moods and changing priorities through u-turn would not improve the state of the economy. Instead, it will sprout an ambience of uncertainty. Pakistan is standing at an important cross roads and it is necessary to advance forward by implementing the right policies, the country's economy would grow rapidly.

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¹⁰ Rafi Khan, op.cit., p.78.

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Post 9/11 Security Environment and India's Coercive Diplomacy

Imran Iqbal

The manner in which the perceptions and goals of the United States were being evolved after 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent war against terrorism had deep and immediate repercussions on the geo-political and geo-strategic environment of different regions. Countries like Pakistan and Palestine had to confront with new challenges, since their adversaries were taking cue from the new precedents set by the US. The United States in its campaign against terrorism introduced and incorporated concepts like doctrine of pre-emption and limited war. Seizing an unusual and timely opportunity, presented by post 9/11 international political environment, countries like Israel, Russia and India, laid claim to their sovereign and inalienable right to wage wars against newly found terrorists in their regions. For instance, both Israel and Russia conducted outrageous and audacious attacks on the Palestinian and Chechens respectively, justifying them as their sovereign right to take pre-emptive actions against possible terrorists attacks by their adversaries. With great impunity and immunity provided by the post 9/11 international political environment and US unilateral policy, these countries became ever more aggressive and uncompromising towards their adversaries; putting in jeopardy the whole fabric of domestic, regional and international order and peace.

After December 13 terrorist attack on its parliament India too claimed the rights to launch 'limited war' and 'preemptive strike' against its archrival Pakistan. The application and incorporation of such concepts into India Pakistan relations further aggravated the whole scenarios. However, India could not materialize its threats to launch limited war and preemptive strike against Pakistan due to number of factors such as nuclear deterrence and Pakistan's role as a front line state against terrorism.

The doctrine of pre-emption was introduced and applied by the US ostensibly to combat weapons of mass destruction and to deter and defend against any threat before it is unleashed or to prevent and forestall terrorist acts like 9/11. The US pre-emptive actions against Iraq was still going on when its ramification were minutely felt in South Asia

region, where India also claimed the right of pre-emption against Pakistan. India used these concepts as a part of its coercive diplomacy against Pakistan to achieve its overt or covert objectives. It still remains a moot point whether the introduction of these concepts though somewhat theoretically helped India achieve its objectives against Pakistan or proved futile.

This paper focuses on the concept of 'limited war' introduced by India in its policy toward Pakistan. The paper also looks into the causes or incentives, which led India to trifle with dangerous conceptions like Limited war or hot pursuit. The paper also investigates the restraints or limits, which debarred India from materializing such concepts against Pakistan.

The Conception of Limited War and Nuclear South Asia

After December 13 terrorist attack on Indian Parliament, which infuriated the hawks in the Vajpayee cabinet, some of the jingoistic elements in the ruling junta demanded punitive or retaliatory actions against Pakistan for abetting terrorist activities against India. During the opening days of escalation different options were proposed and considered to teach Pakistan a lesson for its alleged support to terrorists. India blamed two *Jihadi* outfits *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (LT) and *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JM) for terrorist attack on its Parliament. India believed that these groups, nourished and sponsored by Pakistan's ISI, had spread their tentacles deep inside India. These groups recruited *Jihadi* or terrorists from different *madrassas*, numbering in thousands and with their training camps inside Pakistan's administered Kashmir. Some Indian Ministers proposed to launch a 'limited war' or 'surgical strike' against Pakistan to stamp out these camps operating inside Pakistani held Kashmir.

The danger or possibility of some retaliatory actions by India against Pakistan became alarming when some of the leading politicians in the ruling Junta threatened to cross the line of control into Pakistani held Kashmir through launching a surgical strike to stamp out the *Jihadi* camps. For instance, Prime Minister Vajpayee said, "India which had resisted crossing the line of control during the kargil conflict in 1999, might not show the same restraint in future."¹ Similar statement was given by the Indian Junior Foreign Minister Omar Abdullah when he expressed that "nobody is talking about full fledge war. There can be a possibility of a pinpoint covert action to take out camps that are operating

from across the border.”² The BJP leading hawk L.K Advani also confirmed Pakistan’s fears by stating “New Delhi was considering an as yet unspecified but deadly hard hitting response which did not exclude a hot pursuit of militants target across the border.”³

In the backdrop of these serious but irresponsible statements emanating from India, different scholars and strategists argued India’s claim or legitimacy to undertake such adventurous action against nuclear Pakistan as well as the feasibility and implications of such actions on the geo-political and geo-strategic environment of the region. Before we look into the causes which led India to contemplate launching a limited war against Pakistan as well as its feasibilities and implications, let us briefly analyze the very conceptions of limited war and its meaning. The concept limited war is somewhat complex and slippery term, since it belongs to the political world with a lot of gray areas and complexities.⁴ The phrase limited war is multifarious and multi-dimensional not only in its theoretical expression but also in its practical dimensions. The phrase lends itself to manifold use.⁵ It can broadly be defined as a war short of total war. The concept of limited war is not new. It has been practiced for centuries. However, It gained currency after the Second World War and with the advent of nuclear bomb. The long history of warfare has recorded many occurrences of limited wars between different states. These wars however, remained limited less by conscious choice than by considerations of domestic policy.⁶

Limited war can also be defined as a war in which neither side seeks the total destruction of the other. Since 1945, this has meant war short of nuclear war. Limited war must not end with the annihilation of the loser; the victory must be settled for more limited objectives. This limitation must be deliberate, and consequently must lead to the limitation of mean, not only in favor of the loser, but also to achieve an optimum peace at the least possible cost. Limitation can therefore, be viewed as the proof of wisdom in statesmanship and strategic planning.⁷

Most of the writers or scholars in their bid to elaborate the meaning and nature of limited war tend to refer to either Korean War or Vietnam War as good examples of ‘limited war’ fought between the Soviet Union and the United States. No doubt these wars were fought on ideological grounds with limited objectives and without escalation, yet scholars tend to ignore the other factors, which kept these wars limited. The single most important factor was the absence of home ground. Both superpowers indirectly fought these wars thousand of miles away from

their backyard. They remained backer, supporter, or facilitator during these wars. For example, during the Korean War United States formed an alliance under the UN umbrella with the objective to liberate South Korea from the Communist North Korea. Similarly, during Vietnam War the US directly participated in the Vietnam War to help the Vietnamese fought against the Communist insurgents.

Thus, it was unlikely that these wars could have escalated into full fledged wars between two superpowers. Therefore, it would not be wrong to claim that the idea of 'limited war' undermines the strategy of deterrence. It is improbable and highly dangerous to suggest that the idea of limited war can bring war back into political practicability between two nuclear powers such as India Pakistan.

However, theory of nuclear deterrence was challenged during the military stand off between India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan are in possession of enough nuclear warheads and missiles to eliminate each other within hours. Then what led India to contemplate limited war against nuclear Pakistan? Was it a daredevil stunt that would have turned out to be mutual suicide? Or was it simply old die heart tradition of saber rattling in South Asian politics? Whatever the reasons, but seeing Indian war preparations and the post 9/11 international political environment, the probability of such action could not be ruled out or taken too lightly.

Lets us look into the factors that encouraged or prompted India to contemplate limited war against a nuclear Pakistan. India under BJP government developed a strong moral and political base for launching a limited war against Pakistan. For instance, domestically, BJP government enjoyed overwhelming moral and political backing for some punitive or retaliatory actions against Pakistan, as it suffered embarrassment at the handful of militants who stormed their Parliament and exposed the vulnerability of security forces. As President Bush took full advantage of pervasive fear, anger and sense of insecurity among American population as a result of 9/11 terrorists attacks and which helped hawks in his administration to formulate foreign policy objectives on radical and hawkish lines and helped Bush administration to develop a strong moral and political case to attack Taliban and Iraq. Similarly BJP government out of such circumstances or conditions found moral and political base to take some sort of military action against Pakistan.

Secondly, India had a strong incentive to go for such adventurous action because of political division within Pakistan's society over some important issues including Pakistan's support to US war against Taliban. There was also difference of opinion among some of the senior generals in the Pakistani army over US policy and its military campaign in Afghanistan. Above all Pakistani forces were busy on the western front where Taliban and al-Qaida elements were regrouping and some of them sneaking into Pakistani cities. In such circumstances it would have been very difficult for Pakistan to engage its forces on two fronts particularly with India, which enjoyed considerable conventional superiority against Pakistan.

The sense of superiority in the conventional field particularly in air force was a great hoax for hawks in BJP led government to contemplate limited war against conventionally weaker Pakistan. Secondly the successful and stunning victory of the United States with exceedingly effective and precise air attacks during Gulf war and Serbian war, inspired India to contemplate such action despite the facts that the United States possessed the most advanced and state of the art technology and immense resources and above all overwhelming conventional and nuclear power at its disposal against much weaker opponents.

Third main incentive for India to think of such action was the post-9/11 international political environment that strongly favored India's position or stance as being victim of terrorism. As US waged war on the Taliban simply alleging their regime a supporter and harbor of terrorism and terrorists and without establishing and providing tangible evidence against Osama's involvement in the 9/11 terrorists attacks. Likewise it became easy and convenient for India to take military actions against Pakistan, simply and conveniently projecting it the supporter and harbor of terrorism.

Lets us critically analyze the practicability and impracticability of undertaking limited war between the two nuclear neighbors of South Asia. In the midst of Indian rhetoric or threats to undertake surgical strike or limited war against Pakistan some scholars and strategist in their bid to find precedent of such war in the South Asian political history referred the Kargil conflict. They considered kargil conflict as the best example of limited war between India and Pakistan, ignoring the fact that it was not fought between regular forces of both countries rather it was fought between Indian forces and *Jihadi* militants covertly backed and

supported by Pakistan. Throughout the crisis Pakistan kept on denying the involvement and presence of its forces on the kargil hills. Thus, it would be naïve to consider kargil conflict as a good precedent for a limited war between two nuclear neighbors.

According to the experts and strategists, the ability to conduct a limited war requires a very complex, expensive, and sophisticated command and control mechanism arrangement. Whereas, both India and Pakistan are far behind in sophisticated command and control system and arrangements. The danger of escalation cannot be underestimated and overlooked. Even some Indian political and military strategists questioned the rationale and plausibility of launching a 'limited war' against nuclear Pakistan. They expressed deep concerns and impressed upon B.J.P government to weigh all options and be mindful of risks and dangers involved in such strategy with regard to nuclear Pakistan.

Indian Army Chief said 'a nuclear exchange on the sub-continent would be disastrous for the whole region. There is no question of it not being viable to attack the camps. We can achieve the desired result, provided we know where the camps are and we have the right weapons to attack without too many civilian casualties.'⁸

Even Indian armed forces asked for a careful and calibrated reply from the government. "Not averse to carrying out surgical strike or hot pursuit across the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir, the military would like the country security managers to factor all subsequent possibilities including an armed conflict between nations."⁹ Some analysts emphasized the greater need on Indian part to clearly identify the real perpetrators before taking any such actions. "This can only be achieved by an exhausted probe which withstand scrutiny by the international community. Any such plan i.e. hot pursuit or surgical strike should also weigh repercussions, including the possibility of a full fledge conflagration-taking place along the border."¹⁰ The ex-Indian army chief called for response with caution and pointed out that any action across the border would mean targeting Pakistani air bases which are as of then, occupied by U.S forces, 'We have to respond with a composite, unified response and with caution.'¹¹

Experts in Defense and Strategic affairs wondered whether the likely extend of damage would make the operation worthwhile at all; whether the casualties would be worth incurring; whether the use of air power would lead to escalation in hostility; and whether we would be

fretting away international goodwill.¹² "It is utterly ridiculous to suggest we go across now. We do not even have exact intelligence on their location. This is plain rhetoric and a verbal war being waged'. Penetrating into enemy territory means using air power and neutralizing anti aircraft capabilities. And India's position cannot be compared to that of Israel or the United States."¹³

However, it was widely feared that India's saber rattling and the dangerous game of brinkmanship that it was indulging in, might have led both countries wily nilly into a military exchange that neither wanted, as there was no guarantee that India would be able to contain that dangerous game it was indulging. The escalatory situation showed the negative side of nuclear deterrence, because one of the paradoxes of the existing deterrence is that it is most effective when both side are mutually vulnerable –so that means that within a nuclear context, antagonist cannot be locked in a 'zero sum game' environment. Their survival is linked together. Nuclear deterrence requires the prevalence of conflict and common interest between the two sides. But this could also imply that only one side makes concession, which could lead the other side to take greater risks.¹⁴

Secondly with regard to India and Pakistan's relations where history is littered with hatred, conflicts, wars, and distrust, it would be wrong and misleading to suggest or believe that through rationality, on the part of decision makers, a degree of control over battlefield is possible or feasible. Once war breaks out, no one can guarantee that it would be kept limited or conducted as rationally and coolly as one can play a game of chess. With regard to India and Pakistan, it might be possible or easy to exercise a degree of control over the soldiers fighting hundreds of miles away, but to control warmongers, religious fanatics or extremist and highly emotional people on both sides, would turn out to be a Herculean task for the decision makers on both sides.

When statesmen and general populace on both side regard their cause as just one and worth sacrificing then the war become moral and emotional crusade, which cannot be compromised by settlement that stop short of destroying the evil against which it is waged. Even if 'limited war' takes place and one succeed in its objective, the other would not sit with its hands tied behind, rather the loser would open other fronts, where it feels more strong and try to settle score, thus setting in a chain reaction that would end at total destruction on both sides.

Nothing is more ominous and omnipresent than mistrust and misgiving between the two nations and their governments. With such deep and entrenched hatred and suspicion the chances of miscalculation of each other intentions and actions enhance to a greater extent the chances of escalation. However, the idea of launching a 'limited war' against Pakistan, floated by Hawks in B.J.P led government could not be materialized as it became clear that any such strategy, involved greater risks of escalation and would have led to mutual suicide or annihilation.

Doctrine of Pre-emption: India draws Parallel

After toppling the Taliban government and effectively rooting out al-Quaida network from Afghanistan, the US launched its war against Iraq in March 2003, on the basis of a doctrine of pre-emption in blatant defiance and disregard of the United Nation Charter. The manner in which the perceptions and goals of the US were being evolved between these two wars had deep and immediate repercussions for countries like Pakistan and its adjacent regions, since their adversaries were taking cue from the new precedents set by the Bush administration. During his State of the Union address, Bush highlighted or envisaged the future policy or rule of engagement with regard to the world politics in the backdrop of war against terrorism.

According to the National Security Strategy of the United States, the comprehensive strategy of the United States would be to combat weapons of mass destruction that included proactive counter proliferation efforts, to deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. "We cannot let our enemies strikes first. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the US will, if necessary act preemptively."¹⁵

The dangers and contradictions inherent in the Doctrine of Pre-emption were so serious and severe that it even shook the sturdy edifice of transatlantic relations and friendship. The Bush doctrine at once set anxiety in European Capitals, particularly Germany and France that openly berated the doctrine and US war against Saddam Hussain. Questions were raised what if other powerful states claim the right to attack their weaker neighbors by invoking the right to pre-emption in the name of self defense? The unilateral pre-emption through military action was a clear violation of the fundamental obligation of state under the charter of the UN and the international law on the right and duties of

state to refrain from aggression and the use of force except in self-defense against an armed attack¹⁶

However, acting in self-defence only on the bases of sheer suspicion and preconception with regard to the intension and proclivity of the adversary for a possible aggression does not provide moral and legal base for such actions. In assessing whether war is acceptable, modern just war theorists first ask whether the cause is just. They proclaim that wars of aggression are unjust; self-defense is just and a sovereign right of an independent nation, only if threat is credible and imminent and enjoy strong moral and legal support from world organization such as UN and Security Council, and state can act preemptively to prevent such attacks before they are unleashed or materialised.¹⁷ Under the International political and moral praxis, war must be the last resort, and all possible options must be exhausted before state recourse to military force. Force becomes acceptable, only when all available diplomatic means are exhausted. However, problem arises with regard to the sincerity and seriousness on the part of government to try all possible diplomatic options before the use of force. How can we know that all options were tried before the use of force, state sometimes use force too quickly without recourse to mediation, diplomacy, or economic carrot and sticks.¹⁸

The US pre-emptive action against Iraq was in full swing when its impacts were felt in South Asia. India and Israel turned out to be the first countries that deliberately followed the United States precedent of unilateral preemption to deal with their adversaries. India soon seized upon it, declaring that New Delhi had a better justification to launch pre-emptive strike to defend itself. A spat started between India and Pakistan over whether the doctrine of pre-emption could be extended to South Asia. First came the assertion by Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha that India had a much better case to go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the US has in Iraq.

He expressed India's designs of launching a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan. According to him India would do whatever it takes to fight so-called Pakistan's sponsored terrorism in Kashmir, including possible preemptive operations. He deluded himself into believing that precedent set by the US-led military intervention in Iraq had boosted international opinion regarding India's position on disputed Kashmir. "We derive some satisfaction because I think all those people in the international community realize that India has a much better case to go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the US has in Iraq."¹⁹ He

while highlighting India's case said that India had suffered terrorism for 20 years, but after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the world realized the gravity of the situation in South Asia. "Then came a situation where they decided to put pressure on Pakistan to desist from cross-border terrorism. It has not worked, it is our war. A pre-emptive strike or any other kind of strike is the sovereign right of every country in its own self-defense recognized as such by the UN charter."²⁰

According to Pakistan, the India's moves were inspired by Bush's doctrine of pre-emptive strike. India's eagerness for the American advocacy of pre-emptive military strikes against possible security risks was behind the military moves against Pakistan. The moves were a follow-up of the statements by Vajpayee and Advani drawing parallels between the US and Iraq with the alleged cross-border terrorism across the Line of Control. India wanted to imitate US unilateralism in the conduct of its foreign policy but what was apparently not clear to India was that even the US was finding it difficult to garner the support of such longstanding allies as Germany and France for its pending attacks on Iraq.²¹

Responding to India's threats of pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, President Pervez Musharaf threatened though somewhat implicitly of unconventional war, in case India indulged in such dangerous game of pre-emptive strike. Addressing an army corps reunion, Musharaf although did not mention the threat of nuclear weapons, yet conveyed his readiness to take severe and effective measures at the height of the crisis. Giving an implicit warning he stated Pakistan's willingness to step beyond conventional warfare if it had to defend its sovereignty and territory. He stated, "In my meetings with various world leaders, I conveyed my personal message to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that the moment Indian forces cross the Line of Control and the international border, then they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan."²²

Answering to the belligerent remarks by the Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan warned, "Any misadventure by India will be met with full force. India should not harbor any illusion of launching pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan as it would constitute a major miscalculation on India's part, leading to grave consequences."²³ The then Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali also warned India of such misadventure saying any misadventure in the garb of a pre-emptive strike by India would be met with full force by the

people and the armed forces of Pakistan. "If they are thinking of pre-emptive action, Pakistan knows how to defend itself and respond to any misadventure,"²⁴ Pakistan's Hawkish Minister for Information Sheik Rashid in his bid to match Indian's rhetoric and demagoguery responded in the manner of his typical style said that India presented fit case for pre-emptive strike as it had amassed weapons of mass destruction and was responsible for massacre of innocent civilians in Ahmedabad, in India's Gujarat state, and occupied Kashmir. "It is India which is a fit case for pre-emptive strikes - there is ample proof that India possesses biological, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. If it comes to war there will be no chirping birds, no grass will grow and there will be no funerals to take out."²⁵

However, much to Indian disappointment and chagrin, the United States sent a crystal clear message to India, saying that any attempts to draw parallels between the Iraq and the Kashmir situations were wrong and overwhelmed by the differences between them. Washington impressed upon India that she should not use the doctrine of pre-emptive strike upon Pakistan that it has used in Iraq. "Indian officials have recently speculated that the US pre-emptive action in Iraq could be seen as a justification for similar action by India against Pakistan over Kashmir. Iraq invaded, occupied and brutalized Kuwait in 1990. The international community came together to drive Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991."²⁶ According to the Bush administration the US and its coalition allies took action against Iraq only after 12 years of the UN Security Council resolutions, including the UNSC resolution 1441 which was passed 15 to 0, failed to achieve Iraq's disarmament. "The circumstances that made coalition military action necessary in Iraq do not apply to the subcontinent and should not be considered a precedent."²⁷ However, New Delhi, which had been trying for quite some time to secure the US support or tacit approval for a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan on the plea of cross-border terrorism failed to win over the sole superpower's consent. The US rejected India's logic of pre-emptive strike against Pakistan and asked India somewhat unequivocally not to use the US-led strike against Iraq as a pretext for an attack on Pakistan.

As for terrorism the world does not accept the Indian view of Kashmir being a simple case of terrorism. The Kashmiri's freedom struggle is considered indigenous and genuine, which exploded into full fury nearly one and a half decades ago and continues unabated. Even if Pakistan had been extending somewhat a tacit approval or covert support to the Kashmiri insurgency yet it is well established fact no

foreign support or encouragement could sustain such a long struggle if it were not indigenous. As for some religious enthusiasts or *Jihadi* who have somehow become involved in it, President Musharaf took steps to keep such elements in check. Secondly the power equation between Pakistan and India was not the same as that between Iraq and the US. Pakistan possesses enough conventional and unconventional arms to deter India's aggression. Although India does enjoy considerable superiority in terms of its conventional weapons yet it does not provide any clear guarantee to win decisive war against Pakistan.

Indian thinking or contemplation to launch a pre-emptive strike against its nuclear neighbor was fraught with several constraints or problems. First, it was unclear that such sub-conventional operations could be sustained over time without escalating into a full-fledged conventional conflict and, possibly, even a nuclear exchange. Second, by actually conducting operations across the LoC instead of threatening to do so, New Delhi might also have lost the unwavering support it had enjoyed from the international community regarding the sanctity of the LoC; such operations might actually validated Islamabad's assertion that the LoC was violable. Finally, as S. Kalyanaraman noted, when the Operation Parakram related crisis erupted the international focus shifted away from Pakistan-sponsored terrorism towards efforts to prevent the outbreak of war between two nuclear adversaries.²⁸

On the other hand, America's ability to do as it pleased in Iraq was largely a function of the tremendous asymmetry in military power between the US and Iraq. Saddam Hussein's rhetoric notwithstanding, Iraq never had a chance of fighting a US invasion. In the case of India and Pakistan, the military asymmetry was nowhere comparable to that between the US-British forces and the Iraqis. Pakistan could fight India to a draw despite India's military modernization, even if one were to ignore the nuclear aspect. The UN and other international players did not have the opportunity to intervene against a US pre-emptive strike. But an Indian pre-emptive strike would have most likely been subject to international condemnation and intervention.

Secondly, the US could absorb the costs of war and reconstruction in Iraq. The Indian economy was in a take-off stage and was growing at a healthy rate. A simple cost-benefit analysis would make it obvious that it was not in India's interest to jeopardize its overall stability and well being to pursue a misadventure against Pakistan. With each round of brinkmanship, India sought more concessions and greater

implementation along the lines of Musharraf's speech. No doubt, it would have been a terrible mistake on the part of India's leaders to consider extending the notion of pre-emption to South Asia without recognizing a number of constraint or dangers inherent in the geo-strategic and geopolitical environment of South Asia.²⁹

India's experiment of Coercive Diplomacy

It still remains a moot point, whether India's coercive diplomacy against Pakistan yielded results to India's expectation or rendered no fruits to Pakistan's advantage. However, there have been conflicting claims on both sides with regard to the success and failure of coercive diplomacy by the BJP government against Pakistan. The second important question remains, what prompted India to launch coercive diplomacy? Before we argue these questions let us briefly look into the meaning and implication of coercive diplomacy.

The aim or objective of coercive diplomacy is to back one's demands against an opponent with a threat of punitive actions for non-compliance that he would consider likely and powerful enough to convince him to comply with the demands. It is used both for defensive and offensive purpose. When it is used as an offensive tool, it becomes a form of blackmailing. While practicing coercive diplomacy, States use stick and carrot vis-à-vis communication, signaling, bargaining, and negotiation also play important role. "States apply coercive diplomacy to minimize the economic, psychological and political cost or damage which otherwise are involved in the use of force or war."³⁰

There are four essential variables that play a pivotal role in the application of coercive diplomacy: the demand, the means used for creating a sense of urgency, the threatened punishment for non-compliance and incentives. The difference in these variables, yield five basic types of coercive diplomacy. These include "ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, the 'try-and-see approach, the gradual turning of the screw, and finally the carrot and stick approach."³¹ During the year long crisis India used the first two approaches while avoiding the later two. For instance, India did not put or gave an ultimatum to Pakistan with regard to its demands, secondly it did not use any incentives, instead India used the try and see approach, and gradual turning of the screw.

The success of any strategy depends, in part, upon effective communication between the parties, which could be communicated by

both words and actions. A successful coercive diplomacy requires coordination between words and actions.³² No doubt India successfully applied this approach and created a good deal of coordination between its words and actions. For instance, India threatened to teach Pakistan a lesson and the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, while reacting to December 13 terrorist attacks on Indian parliament, hinted that India could cross the line of control and there were growing demands from different parties and groups to fight a final battle against Pakistan.³³ To match the words with actions India amassed its full force on Pakistan's border and moved its air and navel power on offensive position against Pakistan.

According to Robert Art, his research on applications of coercive diplomacy by US policy makers over the past 12 years revealed that, "coercive diplomacy fails more often than it succeeds."³⁴ There are some serious challenges that policymakers have encountered in the use of coercive diplomatic tactics:

Compellence in general is much more difficult than deterrence. Unlike a policy of deterrence which sets up very clear "red lines," trying to compel an adversary to take certain actions requires policymakers to set up a system of rewards and punishments to impose a risk for the continuance of undesirable behavior. "The problem with coercive diplomacy," Art cautioned, "is that you're [only] using force either to threaten or use in a very limited [way]."

Coercive diplomacy is extremely difficult to sustain over long periods of time—particularly when part of a multinational effort or campaign. Discussing the political challenges that coercive diplomacy can place on policymakers, both at home and abroad, Art stressed that it is often difficult to maintain political support for coercive diplomacy over long periods of time. Additionally, as it is so difficult to judge success and to decide what level of force should be used during different junctions of the effort, Art noted that coercive diplomacy was even more challenging to manage when employed by international organizations such as NATO or the United Nations.³⁵

According to some analysts or scholars the spate of Indian coercive diplomacy was inspired by the domestic reasons and some considered the changed international political environment after 9/11 terrorist attacks that overwhelmingly favored Indian position with regard

to its Kashmir policy and relation to Pakistan, was main motivation behind India's coercive diplomacy. Some are of the opinion that India adopted and used the coercive diplomacy out of sheer frustration as a result of Pakistan, growing popularity and its status as a front line state against terrorism and growing international diplomatic and economic support.

According to some analysts, India used this occasion, to accuse Pakistan of sponsoring the attack. "Three days after the attack on Parliament, New Delhi tenuously connected Pakistan's ISI with a collaborator in the conspiracy. India's quickly mounted a campaign of coercive diplomacy cloaked in the same theme that President Bush used in launching the war against terrorism in Afghanistan."³⁶ However, according to some, it was uncharacteristic of India to apply coercive diplomacy in its foreign policy. "By threatening an all out war with Pakistan that could escalate to the nuclear level, India has entered the uncharted waters of nuclear brinkmanship."³⁷

According to Indian point of view the application of coercive diplomacy was the result of Pakistan's failure to end its cross-border terrorism against India. India placed overwhelming demands on Pakistan. However, some analysts believed that India's newly found coercive diplomacy was the result of Musharaf's popularity as a faithful ally of US and Pakistan role as a front line state against terrorism, a idea that was reminiscent of Afghan war when Pakistan under Zia played a front line role against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and accrued enormous economic and military aid. The emergence of Pakistan from virtual isolation into spotlight as a result President Musharaf's decision to join US war on terrorism outraged Indian

According to some analysts the reason behind Indian coercive diplomacy was that India wanted to exploit or make the best use of post 9/11 international political environment that had placed Pakistan in an awkward and untenable position as a result of its policy towards Taliban regime. The reaction of Indian leadership over terrorist attack on the parliament, pointed toward a direction that New Delhi wanted to pursue in the post-9/11 international political environment. "India wanted to use the opportunity to root out the Kashmiri insurgency which, it claims, is being fuelled by Pakistan. The prevailing environment favored India because, after all, the US did not provide convincing evidence against Osama."³⁸

Another opinion was that the ostensible justification given remained that of Pakistan's failure to end cross-border terrorism. But

given the evolving internal political dynamics in India, the maintenance of tension with Pakistan appeared to be increasingly tailored to domestic compulsions. Basically, India had pursued the policy of utilizing the post-9/11 situation to suppress the liberation movement in Kashmir by dubbing it as terrorist movement; the worst communal riots in ten years engulfed the state of Gujarat, which had embarrassed the BJP government. The basic fact was that it suited India to maintain pressure on Pakistan under the pretext of countering terrorism.

However, the kind of hatred of Pakistan that was being created by the BJP could not be in the long-term interest of the region, and responsible circles in India were already expressing concerns over this shortsighted approach.³⁹ Whatever motives or reasons behind India's adoption of coercive diplomacy against Pakistan were, but one thing was clear that the length to which India went in reaction seemed utterly disproportionate to the incident.

The Indian coercive diplomacy was neither succeeded nor failed if judged by its objectives that India apparently was pursuing. We can safely call it a half victory and a half defeat and in both the role of United States remained pivotal. However, the application of coercive diplomacy by India did bring some phenomenal changes in the geo-political environment of South Asia as a whole and India Pakistan relations in particular. For instance, for the first time the US role and involvement in the region became more active and unequivocal. To defuse the Indo-Pakistan confrontation or tension became a test for US, which either had been on Pakistan side or Indian, since it established its diplomatic relation with both. For example, during the Afghan war the US sided with Pakistan forging a strong diplomatic and military ties that led to the defeat of Soviet Union and the ultimately its demise. And on Indian side during the Kargil conflict. Thus it was a daunting task for US to strike balance or fair deal with both India and Pakistan. To support and appease one at the cost of other was out of question and to keep both happy was somewhat painstaking and challenging task.

However, US did bring some pressure on Musharaf government in order to mitigate India's growing anger with regard to its neutral role. India had already accused United States of playing double standard with regard to its war against terrorism and Indo -Pakistan relation. Secondly India through its coercive diplomacy against Pakistan wanted to expand Security Council resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 to encompass cross border terrorism, against Kashmir. However, this experiment failed

rather it backfired as through “applying coercive diplomacy New Delhi blurred its own case as to which was the aggrieved party and which was the belligerent.”⁴⁰

India dangerously overreacted by choosing to exploit military brinkmanship for coercive diplomacy. India’s overt aim was to force Pakistan to outlaw militant organizations operating across the line in Indian held Kashmir and to get the support of the international community to make this permanent. In essence, India hoped to seal off Kashmir irrevocably from Pakistan’s influence, to drain the Kashmir struggle for independence at its roots, and to turn Indian held Jammu and Kashmir into a normal state inside the Indian union. Apart from this India also sought to stigmatize Pakistan permanently in the eyes of the world as a terrorist state.

If one observe President Musharaf’s landmark Speech of December in the backdrop of these objectives, one can find out to what extend Indian coercive diplomacy succeeded and failed. President Musharaf during his speech acted or displayed both statesmanship and brinkmanship qualities. He put the Pakistan Army on high alert and threatened to retaliate with force if India took any kind of action. He warned India saying that any attempt at crossing the border would be met with full force. He however, offered India a chance to resolve all issues including Kashmir through peaceful means. He took actions against religious parties, believed to be involved in the terrorist activities and at the same time called upon India to end its state terrorism against kashmiries. He also urged the world community to play an effective role in resolving the Kashmir problem. He said that the legitimate demand of the people of Kashmir couldn’t be suppressed without its just resolution. He also called upon the international community to bring an end to Indian state terrorism and human rights violation. “Let us allow human rights organizations, Amnesty International, international media and the united nations peace keepers to monitor activities of Indian occupied forces.”⁴¹

However, President Musharaf’s address, which even the BJP leadership in India called path breaking, did not lead to any reduction in the concentrations of Indian forces along Pakistan’s borders. President Musharraf banned five *Jihadi* groups, including those named by India, and announced that Pakistan was committed to eliminating terrorism in all its manifestations. However, the coercive approach was maintained for another nine months, the justification offered being that Pakistan had not stopped cross-border terrorism, or had not handed over the twenty

wanted personals. Various vague deadlines were mentioned from time to time, such as end of winter, when local elections were due in India, in the hope that the confrontation might improve the prospects of the BJP. This did not happen, and President Musharraf's call for de-escalation, and for resumption of a dialogue continued to fall on deaf ears.

The Indian efforts to intimidate were further intensified, after the referendum held in Pakistan by President Musharraf. Various terrorist incidents were cited to justify threats of decisive military action, and as Pakistan declared its resolve to defend itself, the international opinion became concerned over the threat of a conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbors. However, by that time, the Indian leadership had started talking about maintaining the coercive approach till October, when the two sets of elections were scheduled. Indian spokesmen maintained that they had achieved their aims and objectives and had acted independently of any external pressures.

However, the most significant effect of the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation created by the Indian attempts at intimidation was to highlight the need to resolve the Kashmir dispute. There is now broad international support for the resumption of a dialogue that Pakistan has been urging, as the most practical means of ending tensions, and resolving problems peacefully. This made Indian prime Minister to attend the SAARC summit held in Islamabad in January 2003. India's attempt to capitalize on the 9/11 events and to use coercion had proved futile, and eventually it announced the withdrawal of its forces that created the opening to resume that dialogue.

Conclusion

Post 9/11 international political environment tempted India to experiment with the concepts like 'limited war' and pre-emptive strike against Pakistan. During a yearlong military stand off, India tried all possible coercive tactics against Pakistan to achieve its overt and covert objectives in the region.

However, India could not use the option of launching a 'limited war' or 'pre-emptive strike' against Pakistan, as such notions were fraught with risk of all out war and nuclear escalation. Even some key military strategists and analysts questioned the very rational and plausibility of launching a limited war against nuclear Pakistan and

expressed deep concerns with regard to risks and dangers involved in such strategy.

Indian plans or threats to launch limited war or pre-emptive strike against nuclear Pakistan were no doubt, easier said than done, as the last thing, which both nations wanted, was war. India's coercive diplomacy did not bring about any radical change in the domestic or foreign policy of Pakistan, however it forced Musharaf regime to make premature implementation of the premeditated policies, particularly with regard to the internal and external role of religious groups. Secondly it helped the United States for the first time, though somewhat painfully to deal with both allies out of its traditional framework of (enemy of my enemy is my friend). The US policy or rule of engagement towards both India and Pakistan became somewhat unequivocal and balanced.

End Notes

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Anti Americanism in the Muslim World

Munawar Hussain

The 20th Century was known as "The American Century", during which, the United States won the Cold War, with its democratic and capitalist ideology, and emerged as the only global super power in terms of military, economic, technological, and cultural standards. Popularity of English language and persistent desire of the people around the globe, to immigrate to the United States, underlined the reality of US predominance.¹ "End of History" is a thesis that foresees the coming century to be the American century, and nothing less.

On the turn of the century, the terrorists attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, dazed the world in general and the USA in particular. The post 9/11 era has proved to be the antithesis, tagging it to be the *end* of American century. The attacks were unprecedented in terms of death and the magnitude of destruction or damage, but the American response also proved to be unprecedented. For example, changes in immigration policy, strict observation on American Muslim citizens, and the massive investigation of the public by FBI was undertaken.²

The American accepted the reality that "we are living in a new era of anti-Americanism." Even some of the scholars expressed such views "The attacks of September 11 expressed nothing if not hatred of America."³ Thus it has only given hike to anti-Americanism as a distinctive feature in the post-September 11 scenario. Political personalities, scholars, commentators, writers, and individuals all over the world not only condemned the attacks and the loss of the precious lives in general, but also gave various explanations of the attacks. The aim of this research is also to dig out the answer to the question that was specially tossed by the president of USA, George W. Bush – "Why they hate us".⁴

Some Americans give psychiatric explanation of this hatred and believe that they (Muslims) are jealous of our prosperity.⁵ This explanation does not seem logical since if Muslims are jealous of American prosperity then why are they willing to migrate there? Similarly,

why are they not jealous of other prosperous nations like Japan, China, and Western European countries?

The devastating September 11 attacks and the unforeseen anti-American approach is attributed to multiple factors. Some of the orthodox Americans assume it as God's wrath because of shrinking morals, homosexuality, and problematic happenings like abortion, etc.⁶ This is again a normative assumption or explanation that remains short of an objective assessment. The third, explanation for this is given by scholars like Samuel P. Huntington who put it to be a clash of civilizations between the Muslims and the West (1993, 1996). It does not seem in line with the situation on ground that almost all of the Muslim countries condemned the 9/11 attacks and some of them even joined Americans in their war against terrorism – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait – to name a few. Secondly, neither America is waging war against all Muslim nations, nor all Western countries are supporting America in its war against Muslim countries.

Thomas Friedman gives another explanation which points out fundamentalism as a major cause of anti-Americanism. He explains that this fundamentalism can be found in all religions that clash with modern and progressive people.⁷ Again if this explanation stands valid, question arises why finger is not raised on Hindu, Jewish, and even Christian fundamentalism in America, which can serve as a threat to Americanism. If we thoroughly analyze the current American presidential elections, apparently these were the Conservatives who won over the Liberals. In reality George W. Bush has been taken over by an extreme Right-Wing who are out of the main-stream American society and do not represent gigantic American political traditions, i.e., liberalism and conservatism.⁸ They are formulating American domestic and foreign policies. At domestic level they have curtailed the American liberty – “Patriot Act”⁹ – for which America was idealized in the world. At foreign policy level, they believe that it is their God-given right to rule the world and impose American values forcefully. If we accept Thomas Friedman's explanation, then it is imperative for America to get rid of these fundamentalists, and to make itself a worthy-to-be-followed model, as American forefathers like George Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Jackson tried to build “city on the hill” and were successful.

Widely accepted explanation is that the American values are the cause of anti-Americanism. But people like Salman Rushdie (2001) actually mix up American cultural values with the political values as he

has given a brief list of what fundamentalists are against in modern societies: "freedom of speech, a multiple party political system, universal adult suffrage, accountable government, Jews, homosexuals, women's rights, pluralism, secularism, short skirt, dancing, beardlessness, evolution theory, sex."¹⁰ This list is a mixture of political and cultural values, which in fact creates misperception of the Muslim attitude. Secondly, Muslims are not against American political values or any of its cultural values. For instance, a recent poll published by the PEW Centre of International Policies gave a number of options to Muslims in which they were asked as to why they dislike the U.S. Is it because of U.S. policies, its values, or its democracy? People did not say that they dislike American democracy or its values. Even an adherence to American political values (democracy, liberty) has been noted, whereas, America has been heard to be blamed for not letting them adopt these cherished values. Empirical evidences also go against this value-based explanation. Majority of all-aged Muslims especially the youth is found to be wearing jeans and T-shirts, drinking Coco Cola and Pepsi, go to McDonalds and KFC, remaining clean shaved, using SHELL and CALTEX oil, and love to join American multi-national corporations, proves that they are not against American political, cultural, or economic values.

Akbar S. Ahmad gives another very interesting explanation by taking into account the loss of dignity of the Muslims in the changed social order, as the causative agent, nudging the world to harbor an anti-American attitude.¹¹ This explanation is partly acceptable by being one of the independent variables that led to anti-Americanism (dependent variable); however, it cannot be termed as a dominant cause of anti-Americanism at all. By reviewing history, we can reach at the conclusion that such feelings were against all powers that were effecting a change in the status-quo everywhere in the world. For example, a class that was at advantageous position in some system had shown grievances against the party responsible for change in the status quo. It can, therefore, not be out of place to say that all colonized people during the colonial rule in 19th and 20th Century, have been anti-British, anti-Spanish, anti-French, or anti-Italian. So one cannot say that it is Muslim-specific phenomena; while it has proved to be generally applicable everywhere in the world. We can rephrase this variable as a bitter historical experience.

Ivan Krastev believes that anti-Americanism is becoming an instrument in post-Clod War politics. He explains that "Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History' has come to pass" because American

ideology – democracy and capitalism, lacks ideological rivals. He explains that various “ideologies, anxieties, and political strategies come together to be recombined and recycled for a new life.”¹² This argument may have some explanatory power when applied to Europe, where democracy has been experienced at advanced level and they may feel lack of rival ideology after the demise of communism. However, it is a non-starter in the case of the Muslim world where democracy has not purposefully been allowed to be in effect due to the authoritative rulers and intrusive powers, like the case of Algeria and Egypt.

All the above explanations may have some of empirical evidences, which can be applied to specific cases; situation and specific area, but these variables do not explain general phenomenon of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. These arguments have either come from Americans themselves or from some non-American scholars who view the phenomenon of anti-Americanism from their own perspective, missing the other side of the coin, hence shoving themselves and their readers from viewing the exact picture.

If these variables do not provide satisfactory explanation of anti-American phenomenon in the Muslim world, then how can it be explained amongst the Muslims? The answer to this question, which forms the main argument of the paper, is that American politico-strategic and economic policies which contradict with its idealistic world view, towards Muslim countries, and the historical bitterness, are the main causes of anti-Americanism found in the Muslim world. Thus, the attitude that gets developed as a result may be termed as ricochet or a vocal criticism against the American polices, but *must* not be termed as anti-Americanism. Such policies spur resentment among the Muslims that have been exploited by some radical groups for the sake of some political gains. This viewpoint can be proved by Newton’s basic law, which states that every action has equal and opposite reaction. Here the American policies are “action” and anti-Americanism is the “reaction.” This viewpoint is also shared by many non-American and some American political leaders, scholars, columnists, commentators, and individuals, some of whom are mentioned here:

M.B. Naqvi, a well-known journalist and freelance columnist, writes, “it is not correct that all those opponent hate America. They merely dislike, indeed hate, the policies that the Bush administration is pursuing”.¹³

David Ryan, lecturer in History, De Montfort University, Leicester, writes about American policy effect on others “particular ideological and economic national interests filled the history of U.S. foreign policy with ideas and systems that undermined the liberty, democracy and self-determination of others.”¹⁴ Iraq is the case in point that breeds anti-Americanism.

The London Review of Books (LRB) published reactions to the events of 9/11. One comment in the LRB on October 4 was that “The US had its coming.” This sentence is explained by Richard Crockatt that “America is an imperial power seeking hegemonic control globally, in the course of which it has generated numerous enemies whose opposition is both understandable and justified.”¹⁵

John. L. Esposito, Professor of Religion & International Affairs, and Islamic Studies, at Georgetown University Washington DC, writes that as the result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, America adopted isolationist attitude unknowingly by withdrawing the flow of aid to many of the Muslim countries; similarly, the Gulf War severally curtailed the economic support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to other Muslim countries and the population explosion resulted in poverty, unemployment, and corruption; all which but generated miseries for the general public and nothing less, which led to opposition voices, which “called for greater political participation and accountability at home and charged that Western policy towards democratization is predicted on a double standard.”¹⁶

Mushahid Hussian, a well-known politician and columnist writes “there is no personal animosity towards any American or Westerns from people they have met, only a strident political critique and resentment of American foreign policy, which is where the roots of anti-Americanism lie.”¹⁷

Arondhathi Roy, an Indian novelist, while commenting on American War on Terrorism, writes in “The Guardian”, September 27, 2002, “the task that never ends is America’s perfect war, the perfect vehicle for the endless expansion of American Imperialism.”¹⁸

Saul Landau, while describing the cause of anti-Americanism, writes about the public opinion study in 44 countries by PEW Research Centre that “ironically, the majority in countries like Egypt and Turkey like ‘American technology and culture [but] they are displeased over the

spread of American ideas.¹ By explaining the word "ideas", he writes, "here ideas mean not just the exporting of Bay Watch and other T & A shows, but refer also to the exercise of naked imperial power in the Middle East."¹⁹

All of the above-mentioned statements prove that the way America pursue its politico-strategic and economic interests that contradicts its projected ideals propounded by its founding fathers as "Life, Liberty and Prosperity", is the major cause of so called anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. Once it is proved to be the dominant cause of reaction against American policies, it is imperative to know what anti-Americanism is, before explaining the American policies for the Muslims.

Definition of Anti-Americanism

Being a matter of perception and a point of view, which may vary from person to person, it is hard to define this term; which means it will always remain illusive. There can be many definitions; one definition is that it is "an element of irrationalism and resistance to the facts that may run counter to prejudices."²⁰

Paul Hollander, an analyst, also considers irrationalism in his definition. He writes that anti-Americanism is "an unfocused and largely irrational, often visceral aversion toward the United States, its government, domestic institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people."²¹ This definition has some problematic areas in itself. For example, Tony Benn, a British politician, who rejected American policy in Afghanistan on certain logical bases, does not prove him to be a hater of America or its people and culture.²² Secondly, Hollander's definition confuses anti-Americanism with a critical stance towards particular aspects of American policy or culture. This definition can also be applied on American intellectuals, professors, or ministers who debate American internal and external policies, like Noam Chomsky, Paul Kennedy and others.

The other definition can be the absolute antagonistic feelings against the United States in which one does not criticize the US in some specific terms, but it is the absolute denial of America in all terms, as Ivan Krastev tags this kind of anti-Americanism as "murderous anti-Americanism,"²³ which is visible in the case of Latin America. But, it is not applicable in the case of Muslim countries, since the majority of

Muslims do not deny America in absolute terms – already mentioned while describing the result of PEW polls.

If we do not agree with the above definitions, then how can we define anti-Americanism? Anti-Americanism is a concept, which is wide-ranging and its application differs from area to area. It has various forms depending on the context in which it is being employed.

Like Europe, anti-Americanism can be defined in the context of the Muslim world that there is perceptual gap between American- and the Muslim-worldview. For example, America justifies its invasion on Iraq for eliminating the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein, and the efforts to democratize the region. On the other hand, Muslims perceive American invasion as occupation of their land for America's economic and political interests. Thus it is proved that the definition of anti-Americanism is vague and any vocal criticism of US values or policies does not necessarily fall in its domain. So one can safely say that Muslims are not anti-Americans as per the Rightist²⁴ definitions of the term; on the contrary anti-Americanism is in actual a protest against American deviation from its proclaimed ideals.

American Policies Towards Muslim World

After getting an understanding of the term “anti-Americanism” it is desirable to analyze, how the US pursues its politico-strategic and economic interests, which creates resentment among Muslims. In this regard, the support to Israel, backing of status quo and ignoring public opinion, power-based policies and militaristic response is briefly discussed as under:

Support to Israel

One of the major causes of resentment against the US among the Muslims is its support of Israeli policy of suppression under the pretext of self-defense. Muslims consider Israel as imperial outpost of America in the Middle East. Even bin Laden, the friend-turned-foe, in his *fatwa* on February 1998, says about American support to Israel's operation of Palestinian people, as a reason of his grievances.²⁵ US support to Israel is not the only known reason among Muslims but it is also considered by Americans themselves, as the basic impetus leading to the catastrophic happenings of September 11. According to Christopher Hewitt, 6.0% of the articles or editorials, published in the American newspapers, held the US backing to the Israeli policies as the major factor for the attacks on the Twin Towers.²⁶

The riddle that has always been looming the Muslims is that if America attacks Iraq under the plea of weapons of mass destruction (WDM), violating the UN resolutions, and posing a threat to its neighbors at the same time, then why this pretext is not applicable in the case of Israel, which at the same time fulfills similar qualifications under which Iraq has been targeted. Saul Landau writes that when he asked from his Washington National Security source, as to why Israel was not bombed, which “invades her neighbors, has developed weapons of mass destruction and violates more UN resolutions than Iraq.” The answer was, “Israel has a powerful lobby here and no oil.”²⁷

Backing and Enforcing Status-Quo in the Muslim Countries/Ignoring Public Opinion

Majority of the Muslims perceived that the US is supporting the status quo in terms of keeping in power the unpopular regimes. It is therefore, that unpopular leaders like Hussni Mubarak of Egypt, etc, proves to be more sympathetic and more supporter of the US, in terms of her policies for the region. In return the US explicitly supports such rulers, which in itself produces hatred against the US. However, primarily their grievances are against their own rulers who do not take measures to improve socio-economic conditions of their people; and that they do not follow the guiding principles of Islam. But the public, of course, is not in a position to show their grievances against their rulers because of the iron fist policy; instead, they take demonstrations against the US. In some cases even the rulers let people steam out their grievances against the US, caching on the anti-American feelings as a bargaining chip for the economic aid and political support by the Uncles Sam.²⁸

Moreover, the long-standing unresolved issues, like Palestine, Kashmir, and Chechnya is a cause of Muslim anxiety, accusing America, in turn, being the sole super power, having much influence in the UN, and even then not playing its due and just role for the resolution of these disputes. Instead, America has strategic and cordial relations with Israel and India that helps them continue their occupation over Muslim territories.

The present American policies are not much changed for the Muslims, since the days of Cold War. The US almost continued the same policies where little attention was paid to the public opinion. The US focus was based on strategic considerations in which they required

alliances with rulers not with popular support. While the US approach towards Europe was quite opposite, where the focus has been on achieving popularity due to the fear of communism. Therefore, US took certain measures to improve the lives of people so that they may not be disillusioned with the status-quo. In the Muslim world, the negligence of public opinion resulted in the rise of radical Islamic movements, an increasing recruitment, and widespread sympathy for them. What they feared in Europe, happened in the Muslim world.²⁹

Thus, we can say that supporting unpopular leaders, ignoring public opinion, miserable socio-economic conditions, and American irresponsible attitude towards Palestinian, Kashmir, and Chechen conflicts has necessarily generated resentment against American policies.

Power-Based Policy

The US is a unique nation in the world, claiming to be based upon some novel ideals, which are: "the declaration of independence, the U.S. constitution, the notion of democracy, free enterprise, individual freedom, separation of power, an independent judiciary, and so on."³⁰ But, the history of International Relations elaborates the US dealing with the Muslim world to be resting on power-based foreign policy rather than idea-based approach. For example, in the war against terrorism the Bush administration threatened the Muslim countries by giving only two options of "foe or friend." It means that the countries that support the US war against terrorism were friends, otherwise foes. Some scholars like Dr. Tahir Amin holds responsible a lobby in the US, persuading the government and people that Muslims do not understand these ideas (like democracy). They are known as confrontationist, as Samuel P. Huntington, puts it that there is incompatibility between Islam and democracy (Samuel 93, 96). Bernard Louis is another example who writes that Arabs respond best to power.³¹

In this lobbying, media also plays a role by portraying an adverse image of Islam; for example, Oreilly Factor, Day Sight (Talk Show) in the Fox News Channel. Wall Street Journal and the New York Times also published articles of biased writers like Thomas Friedman against Muslims. Historians also distorted the image of Islam, like Dr. Philip K. Hitty who writes that it is Islam that offered competition; no other religion is offering such a competition, therefore Islam is a target.³²

Militaristic Response

It is generally observed that America uses military option as a means to attain politico-strategic and economic interests in the Muslim world, than in the other parts of the world; the glaring example is the Gulf War of 1991. Even under the democrat's presidents the US applied the similar policy, especially for the Muslim world. For instance, President Clinton in his farewell speech on January 20, 2001 said, "I had to bomb Iraq, not just to distract attention from my personal problems, but because American presidents cannot tolerate disobedience from the Saddam Husseins of the world."³³ Another example is the US response to the challenge of September 11 in the shape of invasion on Afghanistan to liquidate enemies, and invasion on Iraq under a justification of idealism, whereas, this option has not been applied on North Korea, where instead the US adopted the policy of engagement. In the view of American presidents like Clinton, the Americans would not fight an enemy who will fight back – Fidel Castro is a case in point.

This militaristic option provided best opportunity to radicals to recruit young Muslims who easily accept their (radicals) world-vision and become ready to respond with arms. The case of Iraq illuminates this argument where various groups are recruiting youth to fight guerilla warfare, with almost scanty arms, countering a far more equipped US and the allied forces in possession of most modern weapons, and ultra-sophisticated tactics, letting them entangle into their self-created quagmire.

Bitter Historical Experience

Other than American policy, another variable that produces resentment among Muslims vis-à-vis America is the bitter historical experience. This variable has been explained by Akbar S. Ahmad, who believes that changing social order in which Muslims lost their honor is the cause of anti-American feelings.³⁴ As history breeds future enmities, two important developments had profound effects on the psyche of Muslims:

1. **Crusades:** It was the period of triumph for Christians, and for the Muslims it was a moment of loss. Whenever this term is used, as per President Bush and Spanish Prime Minister, it refreshes the pain.
2. **Colonialism:** It was a bitter experience for Muslims in which they lost political power for the first time in their history. Colonialism not only devastated political and economic status but also the Muslim culture. It influenced their psyche in which the element of

negativism got emerged in their politics. For example, John F. Develier writes about Syrians' negativism against French,

“A legacy of French mandate was attributed of negativism. Those who represented best Syrian attitudes were in opposition – criticizing, refusing, nay-saying. They got little experience in the constructive respect of and the administrative responsibilities that go with political parties. This affected their attitude when they were in power.”³⁵

After brief examination of the factors, we have come to the conclusion that it is in fact the American policies of persuasion of its politico-strategic and economic interests and the historical bitterness that are responsible for the whole reactive conduct against the Americans. It was not a new phenomenon in this part of the world but it had its roots in the Colonial period and was shown against colonial powers that ruled at that time. When colonial powers controlled the area, they imposed their values, i.e. secularism, capitalism, and nationalism. Muslims viewed them as antithetical to Islamic teachings. This feeling made them react against the British, French and Italian masters, buying for themselves the tags of being anti-British, anti-French, and anti-Italian. Keeping in line with the tradition, enthusiastic steps from the US have led the poverty-ridden and politically-deprived Muslims to react the same way, leading to a situation where they have again been interpreted as anti-Americans. Of note that the American policy needs to be reconsidered, so that the natural reaction of the Muslims to any of the US steps may not turn into producing anti-American attitude in any sense of the terms.

Secondly, the definition of anti-Americanism will always remain illusive, since vocal criticism over the US policies vis-à-vis this region, country, or religion, cannot be labeled as anti-American in true essence. The logical definition, that may be agreed, would be as opposition to Americanism in all sense of the terms – whether it comes to American people, culture, territory, or political and financial institutions, etc. If we view anti-Americanism from this definition we can say that this term is not applicable to Muslims. For instance, various polls show, like the one conducted by PEW, that Muslims always have exhibited an involuntary desire and that too in an unintentional manner, to adopt American political values and even some cultural values, for example, love to speak English, wearing jeans, drinking PEPSI, and willingness to immigrate to America. This feeling at the same stems from the belief that

America is the most tolerant society in the world where individual rights (however, these have been curtailed by Neo-Cons) are protected and respected.

In a nutshell, after having analyzed of factors responsible for the so-called anti-Americanism, one can see a perceptual gap between the US and the Muslim worldview. Now the question arises that if there is a perceptual gap then how this gap can be abridged? The answer to this question is that anti-Americanism is not something that can be located and bombed. But it is the battle of hearts and minds. This battle cannot be won without reaching the hearts and minds of affectees. Therefore, firstly, it is suggested that the US should revisit its power-based policy vis-à-vis Muslim countries with idea-based foreign policy, adopted successfully in the case of Europe.

Secondly, America should use its influence over India and Israel to resolve long-standing Kashmir and Palestinian disputes. Until these conflicts are resolved, peace cannot be achieved in both the Middle East and the South Asia, which of course is not in the American politico-economic interests, and it would surely not help improve the American image at the same time.

Thirdly, Muslims are at the receiving end. US being the most powerful nation in the world, should evolve a mechanism of reconciliation rather than confrontation by improving and balancing the image of the involved parties. Lastly, both parties can bridge the gap on the bases of common ideas. Friendship must be based on “shared appreciation” for free debate, democracy, the ideas that the American people have always stood for since their independence, would work a lot better than a relationship based on the visible pre-eminence of American power.

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Role of Black Negroes in the American War of Independence

Iqtidar Karamat Cheema

The beginning of sixteenth century marked the arrival of British in America. They adopted agriculture, as their basic profession because of vast and fertile land of America was very conducive for such profession. Cotton and sugarcane were the two major crops that could grow on that fertile soil, but their cultivation required more and forceful hands. However, soon this problem was overcome with the help of black slaves. The Portuguese who had settled in South Africa realized that the Negro population of Africa could be very useful in America for the cultivation. For this purpose a Portuguese brought twenty black Negroes with him to sell them along with other products in Jamestown. Later on this became a usual and profitable trade.

The arrival of first Negro in American still remains an unknown fact. It is believed that Balboa had thirty Negroes with him when he discovered the Pacific. Cortez brought three hundred slaves for the conquest of Mexico. However, by the 1530 the considerable increase in their population encouraged them to plot an uprising. It is said, that when his own men in Peo killed Pizarro, his own slaves carried his body to the cathedral. As far as the English colonies to the North America were concerned, the slave trade did not begin until 1619, when a Dutch man of war, probably a privateer sailing under letters of marques from the prince of Orange, put into the newly established colony of Jamestown with twenty Negroes.¹ It was not until the Royal African Co was chartered in 1672 that the North American slave trade began to flourish.² Since the Royal African Company was launched under the protection of the Crown and contributed to the fortunes of the Royal family, the government itself encouraged the colonies to buy slaves.³

In 1714 the total slave population of the British colonies in North America was only 59000. By 1754 it had risen to 298000.⁴ By the Seventeenth Century 44000 slaves were being imported annually. The first reliable census, in 1798, showed 1582000 slaves and 406000 free Negroes in a total population of 3250000. Probably the first Negro slave to arrive on the United States mainland were imported by Lucas Vasquez de Ayllon.⁵

In the American war of independence both the British and the Colonial captains used Negroes against each other. From the beginning of hostilities in 1775 the question of arming the Negroes, slave and free, became quite controversial. In the early days of the war of independence, General Washington decided that Negro services were not needed. The council of war, which Washington held on July 9, 1775, an order was sent to recruit officers who were not to enlist any deserter of the ministerial army, nor any stroller, Negro, or vagabond, or person suspected of being an enemy to the liberty of America George Washington issued many ordinances for the abolition of Negro soldiers, but on November 7, 1775, Lord Dunmore, the Governor of Virginia, issued a proclamation that caused serious and immediate concerns among the patriots.⁶ The Virginians became alarmed and hated Dunmore's open support for slaves.

On November 23, 1775 there appeared an article in the Williamsburg paper severely criticizing Dunmore's proclamation and pointing out to the Negroes that the British motives were entirely selfish. Negroes were urged not to join Dunmore's forces and were promised good treatment if they remained loyal to the Virginian patriots. During March of the following year, Dunmore himself reported to the British Secretary of State that enlistment of Negroes was proceeding very well. During the war a large numbers of Negroes deserted and joined British army, with the hope to get freedom. This situation worried Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina who were especially alarmed over the future of slavery regardless of the outcome of the war.⁷

The presence of British troops in America and the existence of the war had an unsettling effect on Slavery in general. Slaves ran away in large numbers even if they had no intention of reaching the British lines. Thomas Jefferson estimated that in 1778 alone more than 30000 Virginian slaves escaped. Ramsey, the South Carolina Historian asserted that between 1775 and 1783 his state lost at least 25000 Negroes. It has been estimated that during the war Georgia lost about 75% of her 15000 slaves. How effective the British were in utilizing this manpower is not at all clear.

However, there have been conflicting accounts with regard to the role and value of Negroes in the British army. It is said that a large number of Negroes were trained by the British army and were sent to harass their Georgian masters during the resistance movement during eighteen century.

Washington, the commander of colonial army had refused to recruit the Negroes but after British successfully use them, he realized their importance and took immediate measures. On December 31, he partially reversed his policy regarding the enlistment of Negroes and in a report to the president of the Congress expressed his willingness to permit the enlistment of free Negroes.⁸ He admitted that the free Negroes who had served in the army were very much dissatisfied at being discarded. He further reported that it was feared that they would seek service in the British army if they were not permitted to serve with the patriots. On January 16, 1776, Congress approved Washington's plan of permitting free Negroes to enlist.⁹

The British bid for Negroes, during the war had the effect of liberalizing the policy of the colonists towards Negroes. Not only did Washington order the enlistment of free Negroes, but also the other colonial Empires, either by specific legislation or mere by reversal of policy, began to enlist both free and slave Negroes. In 1776 a New York law permitted the substitution of Negroes for whites. In the same year Virginia went so far as to permit free mulattoes to serve as drummers, fifes and pioneers, and in the following year Virginia merely required that all Negroes who enlisted should furnish a certificate of freedom secured from the justice of the peace. In 1778 both Rhode Island and Massachusetts permitted slaves to serve as soldiers.¹⁰ In the same year North Carolina, in legislating against fugitive slaves, made it clear that the penalties under the law were not to be applied to liberated slaves in the service of North Carolina or the United States army.

Under these promises to pursuit the freedom, Negroes were enlisted in the state and continental armies in large numbers. In 1778, Massachusetts and Rhode Island felt that enough Negro soldiers could be raised within their borders to form separate regiments. Indeed, it appeared, as though states were now vying with each other in enlisting Negroes. New Hampshire offered the same bounty to Negro soldiers that it giving to whites, and masters were given bounties as payment for the freedom of their slaves. When the recruiting of the white soldiers in Connecticut declined, a vigorous enlistment of Negroes began. New York offered freedom to all slaves who should serve in the army for three years.

Before the end of the war, most of the states, as well as continental congress, were to receive their freedom at the end of the war. Georgia and South Carolina were the two states, which opposed the

enlistment of Negro soldiers.¹¹ It was a source of considerable embarrassment to Col John Laurens, who, in 1778, was asked to raise several battalions of Negroes in his native South Carolina. In 1779 Congress recommended that 3000 Negroes be recruited in Georgia and South Carolina.¹² The Congress was to pay the owners not over \$ 1000 for each slave recruited; rather at the end of the war the slave was to be set free and given \$ 50. Georgia and South Carolina were alarmed at the plan and summarily rejected it.

Despite the several pleas of Laurens, neither state ever permitted such enlistment. By this time Washington had so completely accepted the idea of Negroes as soldiers that he could write of Georgia and South Carolina, that spirit of freedom that at the commencement of this continent would have gladly sacrificed every thing to the attainment of its object, has long since subsided and every selfish passion has taken its place. Even in these states, however, Negroes were running away to fight with the British and win their own freedom. 5000 out of the 30000 soldiers, who fought the war of independence, were Negroes. Despite the fact that the bulk of the Negro population was in the South, the Majority of the Negro soldiers were from the North.

Negroes served in every phase of the war and under every possible condition. Some volunteered, others were drafted, while still others were substituted for white draftees. There were only a few separate Negro-fighting groups. In Massachusetts two Negro companies were formed, one under Major Samuel Lawrence and the other the Bucks of America under Middleton, a Negro Commander. Connecticut put a Negro company in the field under the leadership of Captain David Humphreys, while the Rhode Island black company was under Col Jeremiah o1ney. Some of these groups won the admiration and respect of their leaders and of the citizenry. Lawrence's company was described as a group of whose courage, military discipline, and fidelity their leader always spoke with respect. On one occasion his men rescued him after he was completely surrounded by enemy.

The command of an all-Negro company was at first, studiously avoided by most of the white officers. There was therefore, some difficulty in securing a commander for the Connecticut Company of Negroes. Finally Captain Humphreys volunteered his services and under his leadership the group so distinguished itself that thereafter the officers were said to have been desirous of obtaining appointments in that company as they had previously been in avoiding them.

In the battle of Rhode Island, August 29, 1778, the Negro regiment under Col Greene distinguished itself by deeds of desperate valor, on three occasions they repulsed the Hessian soldiers who were charging down on them in order to gain a strategic position.¹³ In 1781 when Col. Greene was surprised and killed near points Bridge, New York, his Negro soldiers heroically defended him until they were cut to pieces and the enemy reached him over the dead bodies of his faithful men. One white veteran described them as brave handy troops. They helped to gain liberty and independence.

Majority of the Negro soldiers fought primarily under white officers. The integration of them was so complete that one Hessian officer, Schloezer, declared that no regiment is to be seen in which Negroes were not to be found in abundance and among them are able bodied, strong and brave fellows. Not only were they in the regiments of the New England and the Middle Atlantic States but they also were to be found fighting by the side of their white fellows in the Southern States.

Hardly a military action between 1775 to 1781 was undertaken without Negro participation. They were at Lexington, Concord, Ticonderoga, Bunkerhill, Long Island, white plains, Trenton, Princeton, Benirgton, Brandywine, Stillwater, Bemis Heights, Saratoga, Red Bank, Monmouth, Rhode Island, Savannah, Stony Point, Ft. Griswold, Eutaw Springs and Yorktown On all fronts they fought bravely and with enthusiasm. In any undertaking, which involved large numbers of persons most of the Negroes who served in the war for independence would forever remain anonymous to posterity. There were some, however, who by their outstanding service, won recognition from their contemporaries and made a conspicuous place in history of the war for independence. Two Negroes Price Whipple and O1iver Crowm Well, were with General Washington when he crossed the Delaware on Christmas Day 1776.¹⁴

There are many instances of the Negroes serving in the Navy during the war of independence. Having piloted vessels in coastal waters before the war, their services were finally accepted during the dark days of the war. They were able and ordinary seamen, Pilots, Boatswain's mates and Gunners mates. They were among the crews of the coastal galleys that defended Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia. Dr. Luther P. Jackson has called attention to the service of Virginal Negroes in the Navy of the revolution. He points out that

Negroes sailors fought on the patriots, Liberty, Tempest, dragon, Piligence and many other vessels and indicates that some were enlisted for as many as ten or eleven years. In Connecticut and Massachusetts Negroes served in the navy, such as the three black seamen who were on captain David Porter's Aurora and a like number that were on the crew of the galley Aurora.¹⁵ When he was only fourteen years old, James Foster was powder-boy on Stephen Decatur's Royal Louis and participated in the victory over several English vessels.

History is full of intriguing examples of slaves becoming stronger, more prudent and better patriot than their masters. The role of Black slaves or as they were contemptuously called Negroes is unforgettable. They were indispensable in the US war of independence against the British Empire. It would not be wrong or exaggeration to say that victory of Patriots against British army would have been much costly in terms of lives, time and material without the Negroes. It is fact that the Negroes became brave and intelligent soldiers after white treated them as human being. They rendered enormous services and sacrifices during American war of Independence. Today the United States of America owe a lot to them for their heroism and sacrifices.

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Origin of Ethnic Identities in Pakistan

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Plurality in every state and society is a natural phenomenon and various ethnic identities continue to grow and flourish in the society. Neither developed nor developing state can be exceptional in this case.

Every society or state is naturally plural, there are various ethnic identities that grow and develop in society. No developed and developing country can be placed in an exception. Pakistan is also one of those countries, which has been fraught with ethnic identities and conflicts. Apparently they all claim to be Muslims but inwardly they are stratified in various ethnic identities on the basis of language, territory, economic interests, profession, race and politico-cultural denominations. In the recent past ethnic conflicts have been main source of instability of Pakistan. The current paper looks into the factors, which, have been contributing in the growth of these ethnic identities.

Before we investigate these factors, let's briefly look into some available definitions, which explain and elaborate this complex phenomenon. Ethnicity seems to be a new term, however the word "ethnic" is much older. The word ethnic is most probably derived from the Latin word "ethnic" or from Greek word "ethnic" which means national, foreign and gentile.¹ In the Middle English text written before 1400 A.D, the word "ethnic" has also been recorded. "Ethnic" in English, began as an adjective, meaning "Pagan" or "heathen"². In 1941, sociologist W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, in the *Social Life Of A Modern Community*, employed the term for the first time as noun, hence wrote. These groups... we have called ethnics."³ Anthropologists describe ethnic as: "A group possessing some degree of coherence and solidarity composed of people who are or at least latently, aware, of having common origins and interests."⁴ According to Cambridge Encyclopedia. "It is a group of individuals identified on the basis of race, colour, language and territory."⁵ Furinival states, "A group of individual living side by side but not intermingling with each other."⁶ Cynthia Enloe states that: "People grouped together on the basis of territory, professions,

language, geography without conflicting with each other until and unless they are triggered to do.”⁷

There are a number of factors which directly and indirectly consolidate ethnic identities and foment ethnic conflicts. They can be categorized as:

1. Colonial rule and its impact.
2. Neglected ideological stances.
3. Language issue.
4. Uneven economic development.
5. Instable political system.

Pakistan emerged on the basis of Islam, but no observer could deny the fact that under the veneer of religious unity there existed a bewildering heterogeneity of customs, regional cultures, language and ethnicity. In Pakistan there are different blocs that exist on the basis of territory, language, caste, religion, culture and professions. Regimes and governments have come and gone in Pakistan, the blocs over whom they have attempted to rule have remained. The Balochis, Pakhtunis, Sindhis, Siraikis, Mohajirs, Punjabis and host of other smaller ethnicities always tried to strained with the borders of Pakistan to assert themselves versus one and other and federal government often in the face of frequent oppression and violence.

It is not out of context to delineate here those factors such as, political, economic, social and colonial domination, which proved a hurdle in placement of different blocs on their right place and which created a sense of insecurity among different ethnic blocs and they started to put more demands on the political system of Pakistan for preserving their identity. Pakistan, a truncated country has remained caught in the whirlpool of conflicting ethnic identities since its inception, because of certain inherent shortcomings, which, Pakistan inherited. Pakistan has been divided into macro-level ethnic blocs and each bloc is further divided into many micro-level ethnic identities. These blocs were to be set in such a way that the political edifice of the country should have been founded out consolidated and cemented structure. It has been tragic that the ruling political parties and military-bureaucratic oligarchy ignored importance of ethnic blocs which were not only imbalanced but eroded in such a way that country encountered shocks and breakdowns.

Colonial rule and its impact:

The colonial rule in its traditional pattern created unbridgeable gap in the Sub-Continent. The policies of the Britishers and particularly, the strategy of 'divide and rule' introduced changes in Indian society. Its impact helped the colonial power, but created gulf in major ethnic blocs. The uncontrolled blocs interaction came to Pakistan as a legacy.

The British government attempted to centralize different regions of Sub-Continent under its rule randomly putting them into a political and administrative strait jacket regardless of their ethnic and religious complexions and identities. Where British government could not conquer the remote and inaccessible tribes and apprehended trouble from them if they were brought under the British government's direct control. They found it that would go to their advantage to leave them undisturbed granting them a sort of indirect rule⁸. This left their traditional, social and power structure intact leaving them more or less in primitive state of living.

In post-colonial era some of these regions because of having geographical contiguity and Muslim population became a part of independent Pakistan. Government of Pakistan attempted to bring these regions into mainstream of national culture by using different means particularly, the name of Islam and one national language. The ruling elite did not induct the people of these regions into mainstream and opportunities were not given to them for flourishing their regional culture and language by exploiting the resources of their own region. This all happened due to lack of sincere leadership at the helm of the affairs after the death of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Prime Minister Khan Liaqat Ali Khan. The tribal and feudal elite of these regions, when threatened by the loss of privileges and status due to incorporation in larger state resist these incursions and in appropriate circumstances became champion of greater autonomy for their respective regions.

Muslims of Sub-Continent united under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah for getting an independent state where they could spend their lives according to Islamic rules and regulations, but that unity was temporary fragile unity among divergent ethnic groups. Pakistan movement even with invocation of religious symbols and appeals, particularly at its later stage, also could not weld the divergent ethnic blocs into one strong nation. When anti-colonialist fervour declined, the divergent ethnic blocs staked out various types of claims.

British government in order to win the loyalty of the different ethnic blocs and ensure control and stability gave preferential treatment to certain ethnic blocs willing to offer loyalty and support to British government over the ethnic blocs which showed continuous resistance and were therefore, not considered suitable material for recruitment in colonial military bureaucratic structures. This policy caused uneven development among blocs as well as mutual animosity, which in postcolonial era served as basis for demands for rectifying this uneven and unequal development or demanding separate region⁹. This policy placed Punjabis and Pakhtoons in Pakistan in a pre-eminent position in colonial military apparatus than Balochis, Sindhis and Bengalis. Rectification of these imbalances became demands of some of the ethno-nationalist movements such as in East Pakistan and in the province of Sindh.

Colonial power in the Sub-Continent persuaded a policy of uneven economic development partly due to their preferential treatment for certain ethnic blocs and regions consequently, Pakistan inherited generally highly unevenly developed areas which stimulated the striving among the inhabitants of the less developed areas¹⁰ to make different type of demands which created great danger for the security and stability of Pakistan.

British government paid more attention on the development of institutions of military and bureaucracy on the basis of modernization, centralization and secularism. The political institutions based on the accountability of rulers or popular sovereignty developed slowly. Due to this policy bureaucracy and military institutions became overdeveloped and powerful and political institutions under-developed and weak. The same situation continued in independent Pakistan. In the absence of sincere political leaders, strong and stable political system could not be evolved. Military and Bureaucracy started to fill this vacuum by taking over power whenever they found the weak political institutions in crises. Such intervention in politics was made in the name of restoring law and order, stability and national integration, development and progress. The less developed and discriminated blocs in independent Pakistan frequently found themselves in what has been called a new variety of colonialism--the internal colonialism¹¹. Such colonialism was considered to be a political and economic framework in which certain ethnic blocs dominant in military and bureaucracy or political institutions used their advantageous position to serve their narrow parochial or institutional

interest. The case of Pakistan is very delicate in nature where at the early stage of the life of the country, the bureaucracy and military, recruited from a narrow ethnic base, became powerful enough to capture political power and where at least four martial-law have been imposed. This deprived the ethnic blocs, under-represented in military and bureaucracy from participation in the state affairs and decisions concerning allocation of development resources. Lack of political participation and resulting uneven development, inability and inflexibility of the military-bureaucratic rulers to engage in dialogue the regionalist forces especially with the Bengalis of East Pakistan created a high level of alienation and disaffection¹². Political and military elite could not place different blocs in their proper place. Deprived blocs started to feel insecurity as they used to feel in predominant Hindu society before independence. These blocs started to put more pressure on political system in the form of different demands but infant political system could not respond positively and adopted coercive means to suppress these ethnic identities but this policy could not work on the long run basis and ethnic identities emerged in a more forceful way.

Neglecting ideological stance

Religion played a vital role in forming Muslim community, serve as a mobilizational force to create nation and religious ulemas contributed towards freedom movement. Pakistan came into existence through the efforts of Muslims to protect their dispersed religious community in the South Asia from the antagonism of the much larger Hindu community. It was hoped that the bond of religion would supersede other bonds (for example, regional, linguistic and cultural) among Pakistanis. Because it is said that Pakistan was created on the basis of Islam, and Islam, as an ideological power dominates all socio-cultural barriers. Seemingly and theoretically, it reflects the truth because the Muslims are one and during the freedom movement, the main slogan was "Pakistan Ka Matlib Kia La-ilah-Il-Allah". But immediately after partition, this ideological support could not be provided and the tempo of ideological fervour, which was mobilizational factor during the freedom movement, could not be kept at the peak and religion was not used to keep both wings of Pakistan together. After the emergence of Pakistan as a state, no one knew how it has to be run and how the traditional ideology of Islam would be translated into the constitutional framework of a modern state¹³.

After Quaid-i-Azam and Khan Liaquat Ali Khan's death political leaders who assumed power were politically weak and could not formulate such policies, which could become a source of satisfaction for religious blocs. The modern tendencies of political leaders awakened the religious leaders of the country to a realization¹⁴ that if they did not use the current popular fervour and enthusiasm for an Islamic state the whole meaning and purpose for which million fought and made countless sacrifices would be lost. The Objective Resolution generated a serious debate between religious and secular elements. Ulemas whose significant contribution towards the creation of Pakistan was challenged by the secular and modern groups of elites¹⁵. The projected debate led to the widening of the gulf. The core of the religious ulemas asserted that Pakistan should emerge as an Islamic polity and also put forth four guidelines of Islam for polity.

According to core ulemas, the task of legislation should be taken upon the following four guidelines of Islam:

1. Acceptance of divine sovereignty and subordination of government to it.
2. Dominance of Sharia as the basic law of the land.
3. Enactment of Islamic laws and amendments in those existing ones, which were unIslamic¹⁶.
4. Exercise of the state powers strictly within the prescribed boundaries of Islam.

Before any solution of the debate would have taken a direction an issue of non-Muslims emerged on the political horizon. The particular focus was on Ahmedis. Ulemas wanted Ahmedis to be treated differently whereas liberal and modernist directly or indirectly supported other religious minorities and they quoted Quaid-i-Azam's statement immediately after the creation of Pakistan. "You will find in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of state."

In the beginning, it appeared that it was just a small political aberration but soon it became grave and serious. Central government imposed martial-law in Lahore¹⁷ and used all coercive means to suppress ulemas. For the time being the anti-Ahmedia agitation was being sub-dued but the heat of flames were still there and it raised its head in the era of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. When ulemas became successful

in their demand to declare Ahmedis as non-Muslim minority. Ulemas wanted to put them out from social stream and deprived from all kinds of rights. It is not even according to Islamic rules and regulations, which consider non-Muslims as equal citizen of state and if they pay Jazia then Islamic state is responsible to protect the lives of these non-Muslims and to provide them all basic rights. Different religious blocs in the initial phase due to weaknesses of political elite got opportunity to prove that Pakistan was created as theocratic state but reality is not this as it is clear by the words of father of nation Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah:

“In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by the priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims such as Hindus, Christians and Parsis but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizen and will play their significant part in the affairs of Pakistan”.¹⁸

On another occasion he stated.

“You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan.... you may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of state.....we are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state”.¹⁹

Different religious blocs such as Sunni and Shia come into conflict due to having minor differences with each other, which were made bigger by the ruling elite. Differences are not only between main blocs such as Sunnis and Shias but truly speaking even among main Sunni bloc and sub-blocs, sharp differences exist in religious beliefs and practices, the most prominent of these being the Brelavi and Deoband. In practice this means the establishment of separate mosque for the different sub-blocs with their own Imams. Though they are all wedded to the same God, the same Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him), the same Book, one Kaba and route to it but they are not muthid on the one definition of Islam²⁰. Often it has been observed that sub-blocs among Sunnis have serious disagreement in the matter of performing rituals and even sometime has serious contradiction in saying the name of Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him), The glaring example of it can be found in serious clash between Brelavis and Deobandis in Lahore in early 1984. The irony was that one bloc had called the Ya Rasool Allah Conference, which was held in Badshahi Mosque Lahore, while the other insisted that

the conference be called the Muhammad-ur-Rasool Allah Conference ²¹. The clash between Brelavi and Deobandi outside the mosque was only controlled after the police Lathi-charged the crowd and used tear gas. A large number of people were injured, little realizing that they were making a mockery of the teaching of the Messenger of God in whose name the conference was being held.

Language issues:

Soon after her inception Pakistan faced the first major blow in the matter of integrity in 1948 on the issue of language. Statistically Bengalis were the majority community about 56 percent of the total population. The basis for the demand that Bengali be made an official language, because it was the language of a majority of the people of Pakistan. Political elite chose Urdu as the national language for creating integrity particularly between two wings. But this move was not appreciated by the Bengalis and they agitated against it²². The Bengali stated that English was the colonial symbol and Urdu was the language of the migrant Urdu-speaking people from India, therefore instead of these languages of Pakistan, Bengali and Urdu should be taken as the official languages of the country. Father of the Nation realized the sensitivity of the matter and went Dhaka on March 21, 1948 and declared "that Urdu no other language was going to be the state language of Pakistan. He further warned the Bengalis that any one tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan" ²³. The language issue settled for the time being. But after the death of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah language issue re-emerged forcefully in 1952. The Bengalis became vocal and resorted to agitational tactics. Ruling elites continued with the old decision and did not agree with Bengalis. The coercive measures suppress the issue for the time being but it continued later on as well. Thus the language movement turned into an open struggle between the nationalist from East Pakistan and central ruling elite of West Pakistan. The genesis of Bengali nationalism within Pakistani nationalism can be treated to this movement. It was clear that East Bengal was not prepared to surrender essential features of its corporate cultural identity to the idea of primary loyalty to an Islamic identity. Bengalis were deeply conscious of belonging to a distinct cultural group. They regarded their language as one of the beautiful languages²⁴. The language issue consolidated Bengali nationalism more than any other issue, though the constitution of 1956 and 1962 recognized both Urdu and Bengali as official languages of Pakistan. The bitter struggle which the Bengalis had to suffer to secure due recognition

for their language had left a permanent scar which was but the first of its kind on the process of integration between the two wings of Pakistan.

Declaration of Urdu as national language was also not appreciated by Sindhis. The declaration of Urdu as a national language paved the way for the Mohajir's hold over educational institutions in Sindh²⁵. In 1957 it was declared that Sindhi no longer be the medium of instruction. The Sindhi were unable to understand why their language could be the medium of instruction during colonial rule but not in their own free and independent country²⁶. Sindhis consider themselves as a deprived bloc in the presence of Mohajir's domination in all spheres of life due to having better education than Sindhis. In 1952 a separate university was established in Karachi, which was clearly more inclined to encourage Urdu than Sindhi. Decision of 1957-58, by the university of the Karachi forbidding students from answering examination question in Sindhi added fuel to fire in already existing severe conditions²⁷. This discouragement of the language was resented by the most of the Sindhi-speaking people. Ruling elite formulated such policies intentionally or unintentionally which enhanced the process of alienation of Sindhi form both the Mohajirs and ruling elite.

Pakhtoon nationalists always supported Pashto as an identity marker. Wali Khan son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan off and on gave statements in support of Pashto²⁸. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan used to consider Pashto language very important for the existence of Pakhtoons on the map of the world. Actually by using language as an identity marker the leader of NWFP wanted to remain at political scene of the country. Central ruling elites have doubts about their loyalty towards state and did not induct them into mainstream. Therefore, they always felt sense of deprivation within their own country and used unfair means to preserve their identity.

Language issue was also exploited by the politicians of Balochistan for getting greater autonomy in power. By doing so they gave air to the hidden flames of distrust among major ethnic blocs and sub-blocs. Minor ethnic blocs or sub-blocs started to feel insecure in these circumstances and for determining their identity adopted all right and wrong means²⁹.

The people of Southern Punjab due to ill-devised policies of the ruling elite launched Siraiki language movement in the era of 1960s. Sense of ethnic- nationalism emerged among Siraiki speaking people

due to injustice, lack of development, providing less access to power, goods and services. The sense of deprivation among Siraiki-speaking people in Southern Punjab has led to the assertion of a separate identity of which language is the most powerful symbol³⁰. The consciousness of being a distinct Siraiki identity is more wide spread now than it was before. The Siraki language movement can be said to have been successful in creating that identity.

Uneven economic development:

Political stability, peace, harmony and unity can be achieved through removal of sense of deprivation among various ethnic blocs and it is only possible if there is economic equilibrium at national as well as at regional level and all the economic fruits of growth are equitably distributed among all the ethnic blocs without making any kind of discrimination. Ethnic blocs come into conflict only when they are deprived from basic necessities of life. It happens, when a particular bloc comes into power and formulates policies in the best interests of their own specific bloc by ignoring other blocs. Ultimately deprived bloc resists against such policies and this resistance can be in form of a conflict, for instance, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came into power, he tried his best to facilitate Sindhis and ignored Urdu-speakers Mohajirs. These moves created a tussle between Sindhis and Mohajirs and this tussle is still continued. Economic resources are not allocated according to the pressing needs of ethnic blocs of different regions. Developmental funds are allocated to those regions, which are already developed and have capability to exploit their indigenous resources for economic stability. Ruling elite should try to evolve a policy through which sense of deprivation among small region can be removed. Otherwise conditions can take a turn like in East Pakistan before 1971. Bengalis always showed dissatisfaction towards the economic policies of the ruling elites, which created a widening disparity between East and West Pakistan. During the first decade East Pakistan's economy was relatively stagnant compared to West Pakistan. A number of complex economic and non-economic factors led to the widening interlink economic disparity in the first decade. There are two important factors which are necessary to mention first, West Pakistan got the bulk of the migrant entrepreneurs, who played the principal role in West Pakistan rapid industrial development³¹. The second factor, and this was the result of public policy, was the decision to set up the capital in Karachi. These two factors led to a higher absorption capacity and higher demand on the government for resources in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. During

the first decade the central government allocated nearly two-thirds of its developmental and non-developmental fund to West Pakistan³². This disparity in allocation of economic resources led to the charge of discrimination against the Bengalis towards the central government. The most serious grievance of Bengali ethnic blocs was the transfer of resources from East to West Pakistan. Due to their deprivations, which they faced by the central ruling elite, they were compelled to say that they are colony of West Pakistan and they started to put more pressure on the political system of Pakistan for greater autonomy.

Economic disparity between different ethnic blocs in Pakistan should be removed. National Finance Commission should work independently for creating a balance among different regions.

Instable political system:

Ethnic identities of Pakistan do not necessarily threaten the national integration of state. These ethnic identities have been living without any conflict until and unless they are triggered to do so since the creation of Pakistan. Only when they entered into struggle of power they come to conflict with each other. Pakistan's diversity in multi-ethnicity, Multi-linguality and Multi-culturalism required a stable political system for its integration and viability and more so it should not be happened by military coup³³. The political system of Pakistan has encountered many shocks and few breakdowns. At every juncture of the history positive political development was impaired by one problem or the other. One of the most serious setbacks was independence of Bangladesh³⁴.

Hassan Askari delineated that repeated military take overs contributed to political instability in the country.³⁵ Military institution is considered in a developing polity like Pakistan the most organized and disciplined institution. Whenever the political instability and crumbling system warrants, the military comes forward to shoulder the responsibilities.³⁶ Military has been influencing the decision making process of government due to weak civilian rule. Military do not have confidence over political leader and political parties.³⁷ Whenever military has stepped into political arena it treated the bureaucracy as the natural partner of power. The mutual relationship (military-Bureaucratic oligarchy) have been more negatively linked with the development process even when civilian rule is there, military and bureaucracy play an effective role indirectly in the functioning of government.³⁸

Political instability encourages the social diversity, which creates conflict among different blocs of society. Political system of Pakistan can play an effective role in the process of peace, stability, and harmony by having these characteristics.

1. System and succession should be there.
2. System must have the quality of absorbing shocks and breakdowns.
3. System maintenance and sustenance must be there.

Pakistan's political system is unstable due to facing many shocks in the form of martial law imposition and a breakdown in the face of dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971.

Conclusion:

The history of Pakistan is replete with the conflicting ethnic blocs. The military regimes and the civilian governments did not consider it as the threatening issue. They even did not realize that ethnic blocs are the building blocs. If they are not settled on the balance basis the whole building remain shaking and unpredictable. Pakistan suffered disintegration. Inter-ethnic bloc conflict in Pakistan, has destabilized the political system and undermine foundations of the state. The inter-tribal conflict in the tribal areas, the Sindhi-non Sindhi violent conflict in Sindh, Shia-Sunni cruel and regressive activities have become a norm of Pakistani Society. No doubt the decision makers try their level best to diffuse the situation, control violence and minimize conflicts, but the strategies and policies, formulated and implemented in the country fall short of achieving the objectives. In many ways the policies backfired and the situation was aggravated to a point of insecurity. Particularly in Sindh is too volatile to be controlled. Whenever escalation takes place the government and agencies try their utmost to deescalate the conflict. The ethnic imbalance damaged the society a lot is to be done.

Ethnic blocs politics can remain well structured, cohesive and integrated if the role of the government is well threshed out, calculated and effectively implemented. The government has to leave adhocism and temporary arrangement. It should devised long term planning to put various ethnic blocs in such political and economic setting that they can supportive and not dispersive. It can only be done if government developed think- tank consisting of educated people instead of military-bureaucratic elite. It can produce good results. The other aspect is that

transparency and accountability should be adopted in an effective way so that doubts in ethnic blocs are minimized and confidence is restored.

It appears to be a colossal task but will to do on the part of the government in creating and developing mutually accommodating communities and ethnic blocs, the political environment of the country might-improve not rapidly but incrementally.

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