

Successive governments failed to establish a tax culture due to an inequitable structure. The political leadership itself does not pay its taxes diligently. The repeated bowing down of the government to shutter-down threats of traders and the repeated refusal of large land-owners to meet their tax obligations is increasing the burden of taxes on the helpless poor, the organized sectors, and the honest people. It is estimated that only about 1% of Pakistanis pay their taxes.

Fragile Economy and Foreign Dependency

Pakistan, an impoverished and underdeveloped country, suffers from acute foreign economic dependency. The GDP calculated at the purchasing power parity was only \$299 billion in 2001. Pakistan's economic prospects, marred by poor human development indicators, low levels of foreign investment, and reliance on international creditors for hard currency inflows, were on an upswing through most of 2001.

Pakistan is a low-income country, with great promise for growth but is held back from reaching middle-income status by chronic problems like a rapidly growing population, sizable government deficits, and a heavy dependence on foreign aid, recurrent governmental instability and large military expenditures. It is to address these fundamental faults in Pakistan's economy that the IMF has initiated the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the country. This is discussed in further detail later in the paper. Like all developing countries, Pakistan's population is largely employed in the agricultural sector, which accounts for about 48 percent of the labor force. In today's world the Industrial and Service sectors are the largest growing areas of a developed county's economy. Yet Pakistan only employs 39 percent of its population in Service, and a minute 13 percent in Industry. Even more importantly, large landowners, controlling most of the production, mark Pakistan's agricultural sector. Hence, only a minimal amount of the profit from exports goes to the poor people working for the large farmers. It is these people who constitute a large portion of Pakistan's population. It is also these people who are living in abject poverty in the rural regions of the country, devoid of the right to feed their families.

Pakistan's key issues are:

- (1) One major problem that Pakistan needs to deal with is the fact that its expenses are far more than its revenues. Partly due to decades of lax fiscal management, but more because of myopic policies in its external relations, the militaristic structure of the state and the narrow vision of its rapist elite, Pakistan is Rs 100 billion short of the money to simply keep its existing machinery operational.
- (2) Earlier, the GOP had been touting the fact that it has achieved the IMF imposed budget defect target. What it neglects to mention that it achieved the target through questionable means. Firstly, it drastically reduced its developmental expenditure from 7.5 per cent of GDP in the early '90s to a paltry 3 per cent. The GOP plans to increase spending now.
- (3) There is the additional problem of a gap of between 5 and 6 per cent of GDP per year between domestic national savings and investments which translates to approximately Rs 150 billion being financed from external borrowing. This further adds to the crippling debt that is allowing the IMF and World Bank to interfere in the formulation of domestic economic policies.
- (4) The external debt of around US\$ 38 billion is more than 90 per cent of GDP, and four times the annual foreign exchange earnings. Pakistan can neither repay nor service this debt. So far the GOP has only postponed the inevitable, default by piling up further debts at abominably high rates.
- (5) Pakistan's exports comprise 0.2 per cent of world exports and diversification from a single crop economy has remained an elusive dream. Therefore to hope for exports to be the driving force of economic recovery, as the government is doing, would require an astronomical rise in exports, and the price of cotton. In other words it is impossible.
- (6) The country's ability to export is also affected by sluggish world trade, which coupled with an over valued currency, is rendering Pakistan's exports uncompetitive. With the rise in the price of oil, the gap between import bills and export receipts is widening.
- (7) Until now this gap has been met with remittances and short-term borrowing. But due to a decline in remittances for a number of reasons and Pakistan's declining credit, this is no longer an option. It therefore seems that it is impossible to maintain the present levels of growth rates and imports as well as meet debt servicing.

- (8) Public sector industries are also deeply in the red due to over-manning, corruption, and the protection given to large defaulters of utilities. The combined debts of just WAPDA and KESC (which deal with electricity and gas respectively,) are Rs 91 billion while the loans of 18 public sector enterprises is close to Rs 250 billion.
- (9) The GOP was offering 15 to 18 per cent interest rates on its saving schemes which is far too high for it to be able to generate high enough returns to service the debt and still have enough left over to finance developmental activities. Subsequently, the interest rates were decreased.
- (10) Most of Pakistan's industry faces the issue of negative or nominal growth, while value-added industry is operating at 30% below capacity. The limited growth is due to a lack of comparative advantage, the lack of credit availability and a high interest rate. Despite inflation being well below double digits, interest rates are as high as 15 to 18 per cent on loans! This is too high to keep the present economy afloat, let alone raise it to a maintainable level of growth.
- (11) There is also a lack of confidence in the government by the private sector. How can a government that cannot even handle domestic peace issues be expected to turn around an economy that is in the throes of a downward spiral? Therefore the private sector has been occupied in short-term trading and currency speculations, which do nothing for growth or the welfare of the state.
- (12) An obvious result of this situation is that the disparity between the rich and the poor has grown. The share of the poorest 20 per cent of households has fallen to 7 per cent while the richest 20 per cent are receiving over 45 per cent.

Foreign Dependence: The Control of the IMF and World Bank

Pakistan is plagued by the "curse" of the IMF and World Bank. Constant deficits in the current account of the balance of payments and depleting foreign exchange reserves is causing the extension of credit to become an exercise in haggling and bargaining. The only way that Pakistan can now secure loans and vital extensions on its debt is to institute the Structural Adjustment Programs that have been drawn up by IMF economists. The problem is that the benefit of these programs is questionable. Most countries have suffered immensely from them. Instead of improving the economy, these programs have been destroying them. This is reminiscent of countries like Brazil and Russia in the '80s and '90s

when they were drowning in debt and faced mounting poverty. And did the IMF and World Bank's policies help them recover? The answer is "No." In fact they made the situation much worse. Whenever the IMF's policies fail, they give the standard excuse of poor implementation by government officials, corruption and the lack of political will. Policies are made within constraints. The IMF refuses to acknowledge these constraints just as it refuses to make country-to-country adjustments. No two situations are alike.

The following reform measures need to be carried out soon:

- (i) The effectiveness of the government in public expenditures is limited and contributes to poor economic performance, low investment, and inadequate social services. The politicization of routine decision-making has weakened the civil service and diverted expenditures to lower-priority activities. To prevent this, the government is to downsize itself to a reasonable number of staff so as to increase its processing efficiency. Mobilize general sales tax and income taxes for increasing revenues. The rate of sales tax at 15% is very high and needs to be reduced to about 5% or so.
- (ii) The GOP must decrease its deficit. A more practical proposition for decreasing the deficit would be for the government to lower yields on its securities and saving schemes.
- (iii) To assist industries interest rates will have to be cut further in order for these operations to breathe.
- (iv) The industry should weed out the units that do not operate up to certain efficiency standard so as to allow the inflow of cash to competent units. Ceasing to provide revival packages to dying industries as Pakistan has been doing for the last decade can do this. They need to let the free market take its course and eliminate non-competitive firms.
- (v) The government needs to 'right-size' itself so as to improve its efficiency and cut back on expenditure on benefits. The multiple layers of required processing shake the present effectiveness of policy. A smaller, more efficient government would mean that policies would not hit the streets after the fact.
- (vi) A problem far greater than corruption is the lack of competence in public sector enterprises. There is a

need for more specialists in key departmental positions instead of the present use of generalists to man key positions.

- (vii) Pakistan currently spends more than twice as much as India and Sri Lanka do per student at the primary and secondary levels does. Hence there is a need to restructure the social aspect of the public sector through decentralization, so as to bring about greater efficiency.
- (viii) After the acquisition of nuclear weaponry, Pakistan needs to review its defense spending and the size of its army. There is no real need to be spending more than the size of the budget on a defense that could, most probably, never be required.

The primary economic policy issue for Pakistan is reduction of its debt burden, which constrains economic growth, and the Government's capacity to fund poverty reduction and social sector expenditures. This in turn requires that the fiscal deficit be reduced to a sustainable level. Of Pakistan's "twin" debt problems, the external debt is the more critical issue for short-to-medium-term economic management. In fiscal year 1998, debt servicing exceeded 50 percent of export earnings, and even after debt rescheduling, debt servicing in 2001 was over 35 percent of export earnings. By end June 2001, Pakistan's external public sector debt, at \$32.8 billion amounted to 55 percent of GDP, having grown at an average annual rate of 5.4 percent throughout the 1990s. Today's debt is estimated to be 38 billion.

Poverty Issue

The most serious issue is increasing poverty in the country. In the 1990s, the poverty level had more than doubles from about 16% to about 36%. At least, 36 million people fell below the poverty line in the decade.⁴ Poverty continues to increase in Pakistan. Falling growth rates, accompanied by rising income inequality and increasing unemployment, have resulted in increasing poverty during the 1990s. Whereas the proportion of the poor estimated in various studies shows variation, in 1998-99 roughly one third of the population was below the poverty line, based on a minimum consumption requirement of 2550 calories per adult. The share of the lowest 20% has decreased while that of the richest 20% has increased.⁵ Meanwhile the HDI index of Pakistan in 2000 was a low 135 out of 174 countries surveyed by the UNDP.⁶

The Government has identified "good governance" as one of the five "strategic pillars" of its poverty reduction strategy. Good governance includes improved strategies and management for external and domestic debt; medium-term budget and expenditure management and financing for pro-poor public services; restructuring of intergovernmental relations, including devolution and civil service reform; access to justice, including legal, judicial, and police reform; and capital markets development.

Suggested Reform Measures

- (1) Downsizing of the public sector. The number of public servants to be reduced in the federal govt. purpose to shape a leaner, more flexible public service. Federal Govt. to shed some of its traditional functions, by privatizing or transferring them to other levels of government or by creating autonomous units.
- (2) A continuous move to broaden consultation process to all stakeholders affected by Govt. policy.
- (3) Open Govt. Ensuring that the private sector, civil society and other groups all have voice, and are all part of the process. This distribution of power will encourage consensus, not dissension. Democratic governance will lead to development that is more likely to be sustainable in the long run. We should change the public service, the way we make decisions and our approach to consultations, because the old ways are becoming obsolete, too rigid, and no longer serve us well.
- (4) Institutionalize a culture of excellence by rewards scheme.
- (5) Institute or improve performance measurement methods.
- (6) Adopt mission statements (covering role and objectives)
- (7) Institute performance indicators (both qualitative and quantitative. They must be relevant, suitable and verifiable for each program).
- (8) Adopt the Value for Money philosophy
- (9) Urgent need to improve skills of employees. Training institutions like NIPAs, ASC, CSA be revamped as a priority NUPA established sharper focus on improving skills, emphasizing productivity needed. A comprehensive plan missing.

- (10) Functional Services. All be autonomous (in recruitment and also promotion). All have their very own setups. The issue of uniformity is addressed.
- (11) Recognize that the restoration of governance is impossible without citizen involvement in oversight and accountability. This requires the provision of open access to information to all citizens (through the enactment of the freedom of information act), establishing performance criteria for all public offices.
- (12) Institute the Citizens Charters scheme. Publishing and enforcing citizens' charters that elaborate the rights of citizens with regard to public agencies and finally providing support for independent research and analysis of public sector functioning.

The National Reconstruction Bureau's Devolution and Local Government Plans

As previously stated local governments are very well established in a large part of the world. The Musharraf-Jamali Government fully supports the NRB system of local government. The system was established in 2001 and consists of three tiers (district, tehsil, union) of local governments. The system is manned by directly elected officials (union) and indirectly elected (tehsil and district). There are about 105 districts, 376 tehsils, and 4, 147 union councils. The nazims are headed district governments. The district government structure includes about 12 offices, including the District Coordinating Officer. The erstwhile divisions have been ended. The offices of the Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, and the Assistant Commissioners have also been ended. These offices were the relics of the British Raj and it was a commendable move of the Musharraf Government to finally abolish them. However, the new local government system suffers from serious malfunctions. This was largely expected though. On the whole the performance of the systems has not been very successful.

The insiders are reportedly of the view that reports of misuse of financial powers by elected representatives in favor of the parties they belong to are being floated by vested interests that do not want the new system to succeed, and the situation has resulted in the issuance of an amendment in the SLGO for taking away the remaining powers with no consideration to the fact that under the new system the monitoring committees of the union councils are bound to

form citizens community boards in urban and rural areas which will be empowered to undertake community development with official recognition and cost sharing. The citizen themselves are empowered through these boards to create or improve their infrastructure of upgrade services. Transparency and empowerment have been strengthened through the citizen's community boards, which will provide information to the monitoring committees of the union councils, Tehsil councils.

The Issue of Federalism

Federalism in the simplest sense signifies the division of powers between the national government and the constituent units. The federation of Pakistan needs to be restructured because it is imbalanced. The Punjab province has more weight in the federation than all the rest of the constituent units. This state of affairs is unlike any other federation in the world. Pakistan has too few provinces for its size.⁷ Several proposals have called for the breakup of the Punjab province in two or three parts. However, given the deep-seated fear of national disintegration this otherwise worthwhile move shall not be undertaken. Plus, the military remains adamantly opposed to the idea.⁸ The second proposed constitutional package marks a significant structural change in Pakistan's political system.

Article 63A relates to the disqualification of the members of the National Assembly (MNAs) and the members of the provincial assemblies (MPAs). The measures to ensure strict party discipline in the legislatures are indeed stringent. Strong political parties are needed to ensure an effective legislature. Also, the earlier horse-trading culture will end once and for all. These measures, therefore, may be endorsed.

The Council of Common Interest (CCI) is a forum mainly to resolve a dispute between the federal government and the provincial governments on matters like water sharing and provincial rights over income from hydropower, natural gas, oil etc. The Article 153 has been changed to strengthen the CII. Specifically, the said Article will be amended to change the composition of the CII, to provide for its permanent secretariat, and to make quarterly meetings of the CII mandatory. However, the exact change in the membership of the CII is not given. How will the provincial Governments have a greater say in the CII? Will the federal government vote be reduced to just one instead of the previous four? We do not know. The document is silent on the new composition of the CII.

The National Economic Council (NEC) has also been revamped. It shall become the apex economic body of the federal government. The Planning Commission may be strengthened by elevating the status of the deputy chairman, Planning Commission who is a minister of state to a full-fledged federal minister and chairman of the commission.

On matters of Inter-governmental fiscal relations in Pakistan the document correctly notes the main problem - highly centralized system, weak provincial tax administration systems, and dependence of provinces on fiscal transfers from the federal government.

The federal government can have jurisdiction over income, excise, import duties or levies, customs, tariff and corporate taxes only. Later on, all revenue from trade like customs, tariff and import duties and levies is merged into one single tax to be called import tax.

All property taxes and local service fees, permits for building, etc. should be given to the local government. The issue of inter-governmental fiscal relations is very critical to the health of not only the economy but also the federation itself. The cursory manner in which the document treats this matter is unwarranted. After all, we have been waiting for this formula for over a year. Surely the military regime could have done a better job here.

The document continues with the details of strengthening the accountability mechanisms in the country. As expected, the NAB has been made a permanent constitutional office. The document merely mentions that the scope of the law covers every citizen indulging in corruption.

The last proposal pertains to the issue of Constitutional amendments. It merely gives the concession of adding a minimum time period (60 days) for the public debate prior to the initial discussion of the proposed bill by either house of parliament.

Strengthening Political Party System

The GOP needs to strengthen the party system in Pakistan. Generally, political parties are weak institutions in the country.⁹ The Election Commission should make sure that all political parties have internal elections, are audited by independent auditors, and have

accounts and membership lists open to the public inspection. We need to make sure that the parties practice what they preach. Democracy is a process that needs time to be nurtured. Political parties are essential for the functioning of a robust democracy. It is about time that we addressed the matter of weak party system in Pakistan.

The Issue of Sustainable Development

Pakistan is suffering from a major challenge stemming from the twin problems of increasing poverty and environmental degradation. There is ample evidence to suggest that Pakistan is failing in its battle to protect its environment. We must remember that economic growth though desirable must also be environmentally stable. Pakistan is facing a crisis because of a rapidly eroding stock of natural resources. Pakistani forests are dwindling, now constituting less than 5% of the nation's area.¹⁰ With one of the highest rates of deforestation in the world, Pakistan's forests are in urgent need of protection and conservation. All available evidence indicates that the overall situation of Pakistan's environmental challenges is very serious. The problems of environmental degradation are getting worse, not better.

In the face of daunting problems there have been only a few notable environmental initiatives. The efforts of a few organizations like Agha Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP), the World Conservation Union (IUCN), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the Government of Pakistan (GOP) have achieved some success in the field. The GOP has taken several steps to arrest further environmental degradation through a National Conservation Strategy (NCS) adopted in 1992, followed by an Action Plan for 1993-1998. Later, provincial strategies were also prepared. The IUCN played a leading role in the formulation of not only the NCS but also the Sarhad Provincial Conservation Strategy (SPCS). In addition, the Northern Areas Conservation Strategy is also being prepared with its assistance. A central feature of IUCN operational style is the considerable emphasis on undertaking the participatory and consultative approach to decision-making. Though tedious, these approaches have been incorporated in all IUCN programming. The participatory mechanisms are also institutionalized by the AKRSP in the Northern Areas. This effort has also attracted worldwide attention for its high success rates. There are other success stories also. The

point is that in an overall dismal scenario there is still hope. There is definitely a glimmer of light in an otherwise clouded sky.

Reform Strategy

The GOP attaches the utmost significance to conservation and sustainable development. It already has formulated a National Conservation Strategy (NCS) and one provincial conservancy strategy as well. For the first time, environmental impact assessment studies are being introduced for all large-scale industrial and development projects. Programs are being launched for the capacity building of the Environment Protection Agency to effectively implement the policy. The GOP is promoting actions to conserve the environment. The GOP will assure that sustainable development takes place from now on. The NCS will be implemented as a high priority. An action plan for implementing the NCS in some areas has been prepared by the Ministry of the Environment and Local Government. The World Conservation Union (IUCN) is a path breaker in this trend in the country. Other than the IUCN, the Agha Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP) in their Northern Areas program has also institutionalized the participatory mechanisms. In particular, the efforts of AKRSP in the Northern Areas have attracted worldwide attention for its innovations and high success rates. Plus, a few other organizations like the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) have achieved some level of success in the conservation field. Perhaps, the best example of such collective action is that of AKRSP in the Northern Areas of Pakistan. Primarily, the success of the AKRSP stems from the respect that it commands in the area, having made sustained efforts in introducing participatory management philosophy and innovative techniques in the field. The manner in which the AKRSP is able to harness the energy of countless village organizations for the purposes of sustainable development of natural resources is indeed impressive. It has been noted that the AKRSP's flexibility and grass-roots emphasis greatly contributed to its achievement. The participation by NGOs must become an integral part of rural development.

Effective decentralization is synonymous with effectiveness, openness, transparency, accountability, and predictability. Therefore, immediate measures should be taken to institutionalize these values at the local government level. The whole idea is to institutionalize the partnership approach at the local level. This is also a part of the "bottom-up" strategy. Comparative research indicates that natural

resources are best conserved when a participatory approach is adapted to foster development.

Reform Measures

The government and local communities join hands in developing the policy. The local community is allowed to participate in the decision-making. The local community has certain acknowledged rights to the natural resources under consideration.

Decentralization is the only viable strategy to solve governance problems in Pakistan because it is at the local level that people contact government departments in meeting their daily needs. Accordingly, there is a need for an effective third tier of government backed by sufficient resources to meet public needs. Effective local participation in the design and implementation of a regional conservation strategy requires a willingness to listen and learn from the locals. This requires an attitude change in our bureaucracy.

Development programs that allow the people to participate in the decision-making process are more likely to succeed. Plus, the public ownership of a program is also more likely to ensure its sustainability. In sum, proper participatory management of natural resources has worked in other places. It can be done in Pakistan also. The World Development Report 1994 notes that "consumer voice" mobilized through groups can become significant force in reform and reorganization (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1994). These groups can impart feedback and monitoring to curtail abuses and hold government officers accountable to the public.

Lessons Learned in Natural Resource Management Practices

Pakistan has its share of success stories. The example of AKRSP has been described earlier. The AKRSP model may be copied for attaining best results in the field. Privatization is less relevant, perhaps, to drainage and irrigation, which must be carried out on a scale beyond that of the individual land holding. However, it is possible that a system relying largely on direction from local landowners will work better than one involving stakeholders with diverse interests. More research needs to be undertaken on a suitable model for managing Pakistan's forest resources. Some consideration needs to be given to the possibility of diminishing the

role of government in the administration of resources as an adjunct or alternative to decentralization of government management.

A generic Participatory Management and Evaluation (PM&E) framework could be adapted for our use. Why the PM&E approach? The PM&E techniques go beyond top-down models to include stakeholders in the very process itself. This approach creates a communication channel between those in authority and those living as intended beneficiaries. In addition, it recognizes that development and conservation programs might be challenged, and therefore decision-makers must be prepared to respond accordingly. The steps in the sequence are:

- (i) Recognize who should be and who wants to be involved.
- (ii) Explain the participants' expectations of the process, and in what manner each group or person wants to contribute.
- (iii) Define the priorities for monitoring and evaluation.
- (iv) Describe the indicators that will provide the information needed.
- (v) Submit a detailed plan on the responsibilities, methods, and timing of the collection of information.
- (vi) Collect information.
- (vii) Analyze information.
- (viii) Decide on how the findings are to be employed and by whom.
- (ix) Clarify if the PM&E needs to be sustained, and if so, how?
- (x) Repeat the cycle after every six months.

Who will do it and how?

The Ministry of Environment and Local Government will provide the lead, energy, and impetus for the program. It will facilitate the whole process and help in devising a framework for integrated conservation through participation. Thus, it will spearhead meaningful networking at the district level to facilitate conservation in a scientific manner. The Ministry has to immediately take up required preliminary groundwork to make the Roundtable mechanism a success. Consultants from the outside may be hired for the purpose. The actual work of the Roundtable will be obviously grounded in the concrete reality of the district itself.

In sum, work at several levels is needed to make the Roundtable a success. Each individual partner must become better organized to make a real difference. However, the most important role in the Roundtable process is that of the local government. Without the GOP, taking the lead, all else shall fail. We hope that within a year we shall have effective government machinery in place at the district level. Pakistan's conservation efforts depend upon the successful development of the local government system in Pakistan.

NOTES

¹ Home > UNDP Governance Program > Overview, Pakistan,

² UNDP Development Report 1996

³ The Musharraf regime and the governance crisis: a case study of the Government of Pakistan, 50.

⁴ Ibid. 84.

⁵ Ibid. 86.

⁶ Ibid. 86

⁷ The Musharraf regime and the governance crisis: a case study of the Government of Pakistan, 124

⁸ Ibid. 125

⁹ The list of parties includes: Awami National Party or ANP [Wali KHAN]; Balochistan National Movement/Hayee Group or BNM/H [Dr. HAYEE Baluch]; Baluch National Party or BNP [Sardar Akhtar MENGAL]; Jamhoori Watan Party or JWP [Akbar Khan BUGTI]; Jamiat-ul-Hadith or JAH [Sajid MIR]; Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Fazlur Rehman faction or JUI/F [Fazlur REHMAN]; Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Niazzi faction or JUP/NI [Abdul Sattar Khan NIAZI]; Millat Party or MP [Farooq LEGHARI]; Milli Yakjheti Council or MYC is an umbrella organization which includes Jamaat-i-Islami or Ji [Quzi Hussain AHMED]; Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Sami-ul-Haq faction or JUI/S [Sami ul-HAQ]; Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan or TJP [Allama Sajid NAQVI]; and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Noorani faction or JUP/NO [Shah Ahmad NOORANI]; Muttahida Quami Movement, Altaf faction or MQM [Altaf HUSSAIN]; Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan or MMA [NA leader]; National People's Party or NPP [Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi]; Pakhtun Khwa Milli Awami Party or PKMAP [Mahmood Khan ACHAKZAI]; Pakhtun Quami Party or PQP [Mohammed AFZAL Khan]; Pakistan Awami Tehrik or PAT [Tahir ul QADRI]; Pakistan Democratic Party or PDP [Nawabzada KHAN]; Pakistan Muslim League, Functional Group or PML/F [Pir PAGARO]; Pakistan Muslim League, Junejo faction or PML/J [Hamid Nasir CHATTHA]; Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz Sharif faction or

PML/N [Nawaz SHARIF]; Pakistan Muslim League, Quaid-I-Azam faction or PML/Q [Mian AZHAR]; Pakistan National Party or PNP [Hasil BIZENJO]; Pakistan People's Party or PPP [Benazir BHUTTO]; Pakistan People's Party/Shahid Bhutto or PPP/SB [Ghinva BHUTTO]; Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf or PTI [Imran KHAN].

¹⁸ Pakistan country report, 1994.

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POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR IN PAKISTAN (A case study of Sindh)

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Abstract

Pakistan gained its independence from direct colonial rule with much hope for the betterment of its largely Muslim population of peasants and labourers, which has remained unrealized to this day, not only economically but educationally and politically. Analysts blame the failures in these important areas on the illiteracy and ignorance of the masses, lack of preparedness in democracy, immature political behaviour in their every day political affairs, decreasing level of interests in national politics and continued political instability from its independence to date.

During its short history the country has not only witnessed the dismemberment of its Eastern wing but has also experienced several experiences of internal and external unwanted situations like wars, assassination, Marshal Laws, forceful change of governments, military interventions, imposed referendums, strikes, agitations, ethnical and sectarian crises, religious clashes, unfair role of political parties in nation building process etc.

If we look at this situation individually on the basis of provincial responsibility, the Sindh Province seems to be responsible to some extent to its mass illiteracy, political unawareness, system of feudalism (wadera shahi), spiritual leaders (Pirs), and ethnic/sectarian crises, whereas, the contribution of Sindhi leaders in the making of Pakistan is unquestionable and historical. The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of Political behavior on changing political trends of Pakistan in general and Sindh in particular.

Pakistan was introduced on world map as an independent Muslim state on 14th August 1947. The creation of Pakistan reflects the largest demographic movement in recorded history. Nearly seventeen million people - Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs are reported to have moved in both directions between India and the two wings of Pakistan (the Eastern wing is now Bangladesh). Sixty million of the ninety five million Muslims on the Indian subcontinent became citizen of Pakistan. Subsequently, thirty five million Muslims remained inside India making it the largest Muslim minority in a non-Muslim state (Ziring, 1997).

Since its birth the country has been engaged in precarious struggle to define a national identity and evolve a political system for its linguistically diverse population. Pakistan is known to have over twenty languages and over 300 distinct dialects, Urdu and English are the official languages but Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtu, Baluchi are considered main languages. This diversity has caused chronic regional tensions and successive failures in forming a constitution. Pakistan has also been burdened by full-scale wars with India, a strategically exposed north western frontier, and a series of economic crises. It has difficulty allocating its scarce economic and natural resources in an equitable manner. It is said that political developments in Pakistan continue to be marred by provincial jealousies and in particular by the deep resentment in the smaller provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP against what is seen to be a rude attitude by the big brother Punjab in the realms of benefits, power, profit and patronage. Pakistan's political instability over time has been matched by fierce ideological debate about the form of government it should adopt, Islamic or secular. In the absence of any nationally based political party, Pakistan has long had to rely on the civil service and the army to maintain the continuities of government (Jalal, 2002; Malik, 1997; Hayes, 1986).

Considering the mentioned facts and figures it becomes necessary to trace the individual provincial political history as to why and how's of the actual responsibility for the sad state of affairs, and devising a *modus operandi* to chart a better course of action for the future. Here, I present the case of Sindh province, the second largest, a stakeholder share to national power, full of natural resources and major contributor to the national exchequer.

Sindh in a Historical Perspective

The history and politics of Sindh has been moulded by its geography, socio-cultural realities and a system of political control relying on an official policy of patronage which has evolved over the centuries and has been maintained by successive dynasties of Sindh and regimes with minor variations. The abode of the well-known Indus Valley civilization, Sindh (the land of Sindhu or Indus) has given us familiar names like Indus, India, Hindu and Hindustan (Waseem, 1989). The second largest province of Pakistan in terms of population and largest input into the country's GNP, Sindh is also known as Mehran.

Since antiquity, its history has been characterized by the river Indus a cross-cultural influence. While the rice provided the lifeline to the economy, transportation and cultural developments, the hospitable, ingenious and peaceful inhabitants gave the world an extremely developed cultural heritage anchored on rural communities and small townships on both banks of the river. Like the Nile Valley of Egypt, the Indus Valley, both a beneficiary and a casualty of the bounties and vagaries of the river, gradually merged into a vast desert stretching into Rajasthan, Southern Punjab and Eastern Balochistan, while a delta and neighbouring marshes of Katchh demarcated the southern and southeastern frontiers. The inhospitable Thar desert straddling the Katchh and the neighboring delta made the eastern and southern fringes the frequent abode of pastoral communities. Although it has been largely tribal through most of its history, Sindh was not altogether pastoral (an assumption wrongly made about the tribal societies). Both agriculture and Commerce had been established in Sindh rural communities with ports straddling the banks of the Indus and further south on the Arabian Sea.

Surrounded by desert on all three sides, Sindh did not escape frequent invasions and immigration throughout its known history. The indigenous Dravidians were overtaken by the Aryans from the North who reorganized the society by pioneering various traditions in Hinduism. On the eve of the Arab arrival in Sindh 711AD, Sindhis pursued syncretic traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism though political power was in the hand of Hindu Rajas. The consolidation of Muslim rule in area as far as Multan inaugurated a new era of peace and tolerance. Given the emphasis on equality propounded by the Muslim Sufis, many members of the under privileged class converted to Islam. Both Ulama and Sufis pursued policies of tolerance towards non-Muslim and in the absence of any external political and religious pressures or influences from the rest of India or the Muslim world, Muslim and Hindu communities pursued policies of co-existence. The spiritual form of Islam through Pirs and Dargahs held way over its spiritual counterpart, represent by Ulama and Maddrassas (Malik, 1997).

The Sindhi waderas and haris (peasants) both carried a strong grudge against the Hindu Baniya (businessman) and in the 1940s, idealized Pakistan as the ultimate source of deliverance. (See Hamza Alavi in Gardezi and Rashid, 1983:237-256). Historically and

Politically Sindh has its own recognition as it has remained part of the Bombay (now Mumbai) presidency until 1936 without denigrating Punjabi, Sindhi or other cultural identities. It is a historical fact that the state, from its earliest times, defined its administrative units as provinces (subhajat). Multan, for a long time, remained part of Sindh under the Arab conquerors, this way the Sindh was an integral part of Qandahar-based dynasties. It has also remained ceded to the huge Bombay presidency for nearly a century.

It is note worthy that it was G.M. Syed who more than any body else, presented a supportive resolution on Pakistan in Sindh assembly in 1943 by surpassing the other Muslim majority provinces. This proves that the sindh politics remained confined to a feudal elite until the predominantly urban urdu speaking refugees from India provide a turning point when millions of well educated, mobile and resourceful Muhajireen transformed the demographic, political and economic contours of Pakistani Sindh in their own favor. The sociopolitical cosmos was further compounded with the migration from up country in the wake of Karachi's growing financial and industrial significance. Gradually Sindhis found themselves in the difficult role of reluctant hosts to new pressure groups on their land. (Malik)

Ethnic identities are as important as the territorial identity in the history of any ethnic group or nation. The regional/provincial leaders, in their efforts to carve out ethnic identities, advocated cultural mutualities. The adoption of cultural symbols by ethnic elite is mainly to project a cohesive, legitimate and integrated identity. Folk cultural symbols are mostly used to create ethnic identities. Sindhi nationalists found a common ground with other groups in the writings of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, the way the Punjabi, Muhajir, Baloch and Pushtoon elite would seek cultural separatism through specific symbols (Mahmud, 2000).

As we all know that the ethnic identity is always based on linguistic and racial influences. The Sindhis perceived urdu as a major cultural threat to Sindhi ethnic identity as they were already underprivileged both politically and economically. Keeping in view that the Sindhis could claim a shared history indigenous roots and a long-held language to build their ethnic dominancy (Malik, 1997).

This problem turned into a serious situation with Sindhi-Urdu controversy in 1970. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tried to establish working relationship with the Urban Sindhis with out alienating those in rural areas, though it is said that G.M Syed always considered Bhutto to be a Punjabi agent whose interests were just to entrench himself in federal political corridors of power through support from the populous Punjab due to its dominancy over the economy, bureaucracy and the army. However, it is on record that Mr. Bhutto went to the limits to alleviate the problems of the Sindhis, to some extent, he initiated the quota system to redress the Sindhi grievances. It was only through this regime that maximum number of Sindhis got jobs in Federal and provincial services which had hitherto been dominated up to 1971 by the Urdu-Punjabi bureaucrats groomed in the vice regal tradition of the British (Malik, 1997). To some extent Karachi was made opened to accommodate a maximum number of Sindhis to counter demographic changes that had occurred previously because the founding fathers had conceived Karachi to be the Capital City of Pakistan. Later, in the 1960s more than 1.7 million Hazaras/Pushtuns were made to settle in Karachi by General Ayub Khan. Mr. Bhutto tried to address this demographic imbalance which aggravated an already volatile situation with added salt by General Zia-ul-Haq who allege to be believed in the British tradition of 'divide and rule' to eliminate any threat to his 'personal' aggrandizement of power. Islam as a comprehensive way of life, and forerunner of 'equality' and 'equity'. The historians believed that the religious parties, foremost among them the Jamat-e-Islami (formerly Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Hind in undivided India which had opposed the very idea of Pakistan) became the custodians (Thakaidars) of Islam inclusive of other religious parties and denominations. The youth and other susceptible people were indoctrinated and became receptive to 'brainwashing' through misinterpretations of facts and injunctions where 'emotions' become more powerful than any 'reason' or 'logic'. In the original 'Objectives Resolution' 'Sovereignty was surrendered to Allah', nowhere, it was meant or implied that Pakistan would be a 'theocratic state' (Aziz, 2003). The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was never intended to connote a 'theocracy' (rule by religious elites). The rise of misguided illiterates and educated illiterates through religious bigotry has alienated the most potential resource that any country can ever have-the youth who are supposed to be the 'promise of a new dawn in the realms of tomorrow'. This phenomena is more prominent in Sindh and the resultant behaviour is apolitical not political. The greater the suppression, the higher the moral degeneration. The

greater the moral degeneration, the greater the loss of character. Islam gave us character, and character being the only vestige of redemption is forever lost. Attitudes are shaped and learned. The resultant behaviour is the natural outcome. What we see and observe in Sindh can be replicated in other regions with the same circumstances.

From the early days of Pakistan to the present. We have witnessed the phenomena of 'imitation', first in Karachi, then 'the Karachi model' followed by other regions. So we have had our generations of 'hippies' 'beatniks' and outsiders. From Elvis Presley to the Beatles, from disco Donna Summer to Michael Jackson to Breakdance, to subservience to Uncle Sam to unchecked population growth is witness to our generation's moral turpitude and consequent socio-political behaviours. Political expediency created so many centers of learning and specializations without thinking about the creation of opportunities with available resources. The youth of Sindh and Pakistan remain a 'surplus commodity' having no direction to channel their resources onto the 'highway of the future'.

Efforts to harness provincial resources to fill federal coffers breed regional alienation and resentment among provincial elites. Punjabi dominance of the civil-military bureaucracy, along-with a high concentration of wealth and investment in the Punjab Province, fuel accusations of unfair treatment and exploitation from other provinces and ethnic groups.

Today, provinces continue to quarrel over distribution of resources and power relative to one another and to the central government. Disputes over the waters of the Indus River are especially frequent; major canal and dam diversions in Punjab prompt accusations by Sindh of unfair distribution of water. The constant contention among provinces results in costly delays in infrastructure projects. Such practices have also fueled tensions within the provinces, particularly in Sindh, Pakistan's most multiethnic province. Neglect of the long-standing demands of a burgeoning Muhajir population in Sindh's urban centers and the general absence of broad-based representative institutions have brought ethnic and class tensions to the political breaking point.

Problems followed the division of the subcontinent in 1947, as waves of Urdu-speaking Muhajirs migrating from northern India

marginalized the province's local Sindh population both ethnically and linguistically. Primarily settling in Sindh urban centers (Karachi and Hyderabad), the new arrivals promptly filled the void created by the departure of Sindh's Hindu population to form the bulk of the middle class. They also took over a substantial portion of property left by Hindus fleeing to India. The Muhajirs came to dominate various forms of commercial and industrial activity in the province, and Urdu replaced Sindhi as the province's official language. They also retained considerable strength in the bureaucracy, despite growing Punjabi dominance.

However, over the years waves of non-Muhajir migrants (for example, Punajbis and Pathans) in search of employment, along with the implementation of a system of placement quotas for government jobs and college entrance, curtailed Muhajir opportunities. Combined with efforts by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to redress Sindhi grievances during the 1970s, Muhajir alienation and resentment grew. Increasingly under-represented with the corridors of political power and influence, yet constituting a dynamic economic and commercial force in Sindh's urban centers, Muhajirs gradually identified themselves as a people without a state (Malik).

Rural Sindhis were equally dissatisfied. Deep resentment of Muhajirs was accompanied by similar animosities towards Punjabis, who dominated a civil and military bureaucracy stationed in the interior of Sindh and owned vast tracts of land within the province. Sindhi under-representation within commerce and industry magnified these resentments (Waseem, 1989; Ziring, 1997).

As turmoil has escalated in the 1980s and 1990s, the Muhajirs have demanded recognition as the fifth nationality of Pakistan, a fairer allocation of provincial resources, and greater representation in elected bodies, federal and provincial services, and the police force. Yet official efforts to address these problems have been inadequate, because of chronic institutional weakness at both the provincial and the national levels and a lack of support for the Muhajir cause within political elites. The conflict has bred suspicions of collusion between India and MQM "terrorists". In addition, efforts to meet Muhajir demands would compromise powerful vested interest, especially in rural Sindh (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon, 1996).

Thus, I have tried to present a picture of political behaviour in Sindh, and socio-political ecology based on the shaping of attitudes via religious-feudalistic-vice regal bureaucratic thought-indigenous native and immigrant pathos. It is my contention that our generation and future generations have no tomorrow unless, we collectively and consciously re-prioritize our needs in their proper perspective, re-orient, re-think civil society, and advocate equitable participation through consensus and compromise. Let us adhere to the philosophy that 'to each according to his due, to each according to his capacity (contribution to collective wealth) to each according to his need. Let believe in the new paradigm of 'interdependence'. Pakistan was and is a blessing, let us fritter it away.

Conclusion

The future of Pakistan even after 50(fifty) years of its existence is still under question and needs to be thoroughly worked out especially in area of its relations and policy of equilibrium among its provinces. The actions of both civil and military leaders have exhaustively tried the Pakistani people and their struggles as a nation. Pakistan faces the unenviable task of setting government priorities in accordance with the needs of its diverse and unevenly developed constituent units. Regardless of the form of government – civilian or frequent military interventions, Islamic or secular – solutions of the problem of mass illiteracy and economic inequities on the one hand, and determine the degree of political stability, or instability, that Pakistan faces in the decades ahead. But the people and the nation perseverance offers the world great cultural, religious and intellectual traditions. Currently the social fabric of the country is weakening. While successful separatists movements are not likely in the future, a grave political and economic crisis is a continuing weakening of state structures increasing cynicism with politics and the state, mistrust of the whole political system, a chronic crisis of the economy could easily lead to de – legitimization of the democratizing system. This would also imply a weakening of national integration, and stronger emphasis of ethnic, linguistic, religious forms of political identities.

The future of Sindh in particular hangs in the balance. Political paralysis is hearting economic development, and the economic problems restrict financial possibilities to develop infra structure and social support systems. At this juncture an outright ethnic or minority insurgency in Sindh seems unlikely.

Finally, we are not facing any threat of war or danger from India in terms of nuclear capability. Our greatest danger from India keeping in view the emerging Indo – US nexus is India's impending and emerging future prosperity, which might tempt some of our regions to fracture Pakistan into pieces for economic gain and join India. Let us not wait to who will cast the first tone to fracture Pakistan.

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THE METHODOLOGY OF RULING ELITE IN CULMINATING THE ETHNIC DISHARMONY: A CASE STUDY OF SINDH

ABDUL LATIF TUNIO

The attitude of ruling elite plays a central role in composing the structure of society. It's role in ordering the state building process in multi-ethnic societies is crucial. And without the development of national culture, the society is neither a nation nor state, but unstable political entity, merely surviving with the use of coercive methods.

Pakistan being a homeland of diverse cultures, despite the experience of 1971, continues to face the problem of ethnic challenge. The current trends in October 2002 election indicate that ethnicity plays a pivotal role in our national politics. But study of ethnicity in Pakistan is a neglected area. It needs to be revisited for understanding changing paradigms in our society.

This paper is an attempt to analyse the policies of ruling elite resulting in feeling of injustice, denial and deprivation through non-democratic mechanism. It is also my endeavour, in smaller way, to investigate the capacity of the existing state functionaries to facilitate the realization of national sentiments through a socialization process among the indigenous nationalities. The major assumption of my study is that despite the controlled democracy, an alternative strategy based on the culture of consensus can contribute to inter-ethnic understanding in Pakistan.

In multi-ethnic society, the process of achieving national integration is a difficult task. Much depend on the tendencies of ruling elite in formulating different policies. Two main methodologies are usually employed by elite powers for this tasks. The first strategy involves the "assimilation process" which eliminate the distinctive cultural traits of different groups into a kind of a national culture, usually that of the dominant group; the second method is the process of "unity in diversity" which establishes individual national loyalties without eliminating different cultures¹. These two methodologies use the techniques of coercion and consensus respectively, as an apparatus of state power.

In case of Pakistan, state applied "assimilation process" for building the Pakistani character. It was essentially a systematic attempt to create a unitary culture with main concern to foster Pakistan's Islamic identity. Because a unitary system is easier for a privileged class to control and rule. It sought to ignore rather absorbs the diverse cultures, races, histories and units, which made up the federation of Pakistan. Religion was used as a tool to gain control and dialogue between inter-ethnic communities was never initiated.

A top down approach was employed in nation-building process at the cost of indigenous cultures. No mass mobilization was done for political socialization which ultimately blocked the growth of national character and the sentiments for Pakistani nationalism; consequently, the indigenous nationalities who took pride in the Pakistani independent movement started holding cleavages concerning the state policies.

In 1948 Bengalis made move for the status of Bengali Language as a national language. But Urdu was sole national language. English was made the language of official correspondence. The language is double-edged sword it can play a integral role or otherwise. The way the Urdu was promoted at the cost of diminishing the status of other native languages. However by 1956 constitution Pakistan became bi-lingual state when Bengali was also recognized as national language but die had been already cast in shape of cultural fragmentation.

According to a Sindhi linguistics if establishment had taken care of this issue, the possibility that such an uproar of voices would not have resonated so strongly against the imposition of Urdu². Ironically, despite much emotional emphasis on Urdu, the power elite in Pakistan used English as a tool of dominance to maintain exclusive control over the state.

According to an eminent scholar, Pakistan is the only country whose national language has no roots in its soil. And whose national history as taught in the standard national curriculum does not represent the indigenous cultures and their contribution to its independent movement³. Social studies taught in educational institutions provided an account of events that occurred outside the Pakistan territory. Perhaps that is reason; all educational policies have no relevance in the identity-building of our national character.

In the formative phase, early death of Jinnah caused an ideological drift. The successors of Jinnah lacked the vision of Pakistan. They lost trust in mass movements and relied on the apparatus of state power. A new 'hierarchy of power' was established. In fact, Pakistan was hijacked by bureaucratic set up. The new agenda laid focus on strengthening state structures particularly its military component.

In normal cases, the nation-building process precedes the state building and establishes the norms of society and state formulate policies in conformity with those norms. But since Pakistan creation was a by product of top-down approach, the state building process gave lead to nation-building process. It was hoped that if state structures are built hurriedly the nation-building would follow.

Despite the fact, political space of Pakistan was regional in character. All provinces, with the exception of N.W.F.P. were named after the principal ethnic communities. But history of Pakistan was fabricated as an account of alien culture rooted in northern India.

The model of national integration provided by centre of powers was paradoxical. The development of a state that happens relatively independent of society provides the basis of rebellion, resistance, or other forms of subversive activities. No integrated effort was made to study the relations between state and society.

The ruling political elite in Pakistan sought to use the 'ideology of Pakistan' against the demands of different nationalities and ethnic groups for greater political autonomy. The elite's looked at the aspiration of ethnic groups for autonomy as tantamount to national disloyalty, which in reaction made regional identities more assertive.

Indeed, the ethnic disharmony is an outcome of widening gap between expectations and achievements of the diverse ethnic groups. Those who perceive themselves at loss exhibit their intolerance sometimes in violent way to demand their basic rights. For achieving national integration the convergence of state and nation is prerequisite for producing harmony in any society.

In early period, the hierarchy of power concentrated in Punjab with Muhajirs as junior partners de-emphasized the ethnic identities

as political forces for mass mobilization. Hence the alienation of local ethnic groups from the political system destabilized the process of nation-building in Pakistan.

The ruling elite with a colonial character followed the policy of denial and rejection. They tried to protect their interests by monopolizing power and excluding others. They abolished all notions of provincial autonomy and distorted the norms of federalism in West Pakistan by their experiment of one-unit. The National integration and unity were perceived in bureaucratic rather than political terms. The creation of one-unit was justified as put by Ayashia Jalal, on the basis of administrative efficiency, grader economy and a foil against provincialism⁴.

The main concern of elite view was to eliminate the traces of ethnic values constitution could not be made, as in the words of a leading intellectual M.B. Naqvi, because west Pakistan elite were not prepared to be permanent minority to be ruled by East Bengalis⁵.

The state elite strongly believed that modernization and centralization of power followed with economic growth will bring national integration. On the other hand, ethnic communities feared strong centre as a negation of their dream of Pakistan. These conflicting perception produced cleavages in our society. The world view of dominant elite, as identified by Dr. Tahir Amin, was that "the road to eventual equalities lies through initial inequalities⁶". To them social justice was a dependable variable on modernization with the incorporation of Islamic ideals.

But according to Stephan P. Cohen an American expert on South Asia, the most important conflict in Pakistan society is how state should implement its political agenda on Islamic identity⁷. This ideological confusion has enabled the ruling elite in camouflaging their policies in the name of Islam.

In opposing the creation of Pakistan, the Muslim religious parties argued that Islamic identity couldn't be confined to particular territories to be governed by secular elite. Further more, the partition of India would divide the ummah. After independence they formulated a new strategy whereby they have succeeded to avenge their pre-partition defeat in post-partition victory⁸.

The modern nation state is collectively imagined as a space of legitimate power. To legitimize their illegitimacy, all military regimes in Pakistan have used the power of state and religion as instrument of their dominance. All military regimes have interpreted Islam and meaning of Pakistan on the lines on their political agenda. How can one forget the referendum of 1985 when General Zia manipulated it in name of above slow gone to seek the seat of power. He took pride to pronounce that he is on Islamic mission to accomplish. In the words of Stephen Cohen the image building in Pakistan that sovereignty belong Allah has made Pakistani rulers to believe that God bestowed power⁹.

The Sindh Factor

The ethic problem is the problem of national consciousness of Sindh people. This concept refers how Sindh are redefining their concept of community in the wake of post partition socio-economic and political currents within Sindh¹⁰. In fact, it is question of their identity and survival in the face of demographic transformation in Sindh after independence.

Before proceeding, I must make it clear, the purpose of this paper is not to support or oppose Sindh nationalism. It is an attempt to bring out conceptualization of threats in the image building of Sindh Society. Those threats may be real or imaginary but have wider implication for Sindh.

In Pakistan movement, the role of Sindh is that of pioneers. After partition the refugee took place were greeted with warm hospitality. But to the astonishment of native Sindh people the settlement of refugees took place in Sindh. The concentration of refugees in big cities of Sindh and Karachi in particular. There is a body opinion who strongly believe that since Liaquat Ali Khan (an immigrant) had no political constituency in Pakistan, mobilized the concentration of diverse refugee groups in Karachi.

The suffering of Sindh people started in July 1948. Karachi was placed under the ire control of central administration. Sindh had already suffered on account of departure of prosperous Hindus, arrival of a large number of destitute Mahajirs and devastating floods¹¹. The situation worsened in with the loss of Karachi which was main source of revenue for Sindh.

Urdu was spoken by 4% of the country's population was made Pakistan's official language and any opposition to it was considered an act of high treason against Pakistan and Islam¹¹. Urdu was declared compulsory for all but teaching of local languages was not compulsory for Urdu speaking people¹³. Sindhi was banned as a medium of instruction in Sindh University at Karachi. In a demonstration pleading for the restoration of their language were batton-charged in front of first prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan¹⁴. The Urdu speaking elite who enjoyed lions share an civil service, conceived them as chosen people. They looked on Sindhi culture with hatred, as they wanted Pakistan's official culture to be that of Mogul court of India¹⁵.

This centrifugal tendency combined with other socio-political and economic inequalities not only limited the process of inter-ethnic socialization but added to the growing deprivation and frustration in Sindh community.

The land left over by Hindu was given to non-agriculture Urdu speaking claimant who in turn gradually sold the land either to Sindh wadera or Punjabi Settlers¹⁶. After the construction of Kotri barrage most of the irrigated land was allotted to army pensioners mostly Punjabis. In similar fashion, land reserved for settle on Guddu Barrage was allotted mostly to Punjabi elite¹⁷.

All these factors, along with the experience of one unit, generated ethnic polarization in the politics of Sindh. It created a wave of nationalism in Sindh in late 1960s. Bhutto defused the steam of Sindh nationalism by recognizing Sindhi language as a provincial language in 1972. Bhutto had managed to integrate Sindh people closer to Pakistan. It may be noted that since 1997 election, the Sindhis have overwhelmingly voted for Federalist Party.

However Urdu speaking were provided free government facilities to learn the local language. The Muhajirs community saw it cultural onslaught on their character, which was conceived sparkle as the origin of Muhajir Movement.

After MRD Movement in 1983, Zia in a deliberate move distorted the fabric of politics in Sindh by his multi-pronged strategy. On one hand he supported muhajirs against PPP, on other hand favored Sindh nationalist and also facilitated Panjabi penetration in

Sindh. He created cleavages in the politics of Sindh on ethnic lines. The ethnic polarization was used by him to get political mileage out of the situation.

In early 1990, military establishment saw the MQM organization as put by Dr. Moonis Ahmer, a state within state¹⁸. This paradigm shifts in attitude of Pakistani elite marginalized the MQM. They lost trust of power elite in Pakistan. However, in last October election 2002 same old techniques of divide exclude and rule was applied. The MQM was offered a piece of cake in power sharing to oust the majority party in Sindh from power. This method of ruling Sindh is fraught with deleterious ramifications for national integration and harmony.

Conclusion

An ideological inspiration can create a state, but there are many cases in the world where ideological zeal has not proved long lasting. Since we are yet living under the system of nation state system. Therefore, Pakistan being a part of that system can be held together only by a territorial nationalism.

On ethnic conflict, a conceptual reordering require for ethnic socialization to win the heart and minds of the people. A new image building of state of Pakistan as benevolent parent is to be created. For that purpose cultural pluralism is essential for the conflict resolution in enter ethnic cleavages. Moreover ethnic studies should get focus in our educational policy at higher level to explore the areas of convergence between state and society in Pakistan.

The future of Pakistan depend on ethnic cooperation, In this regard dialogues among nationality can create a sense of broader participation in nation building of Pakistan. The tendency of ruling elite to take unilateral decision on controversial issues like Kala Baagh Dam and the Greater Thal Canal, without mobilization of public opinion or cultivating the cultural consensus will destabilized the process of nation building. The water dispute is a flash point between two principal provinces of Pakistan. And any miscalculation on the part of establishment will pose a real threat to the integrity of country.

A balanced distribution of resources must be allocated between large cities, small towns, rural and semi rural areas. More

ever military should provide more space for political system in governance affairs. The default of democracy can only be cured by more democracy.

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THE TRIBAL SETUP AND ELECTIONS 2002 IN BALOCHISTAN

Mansoor Akbar Kundi

Introduction

The general elections 2002 in Balochistan were the 8th elections since 1970 when it was raised to a full-fledged province status. Balochistan remained a Chief Commissioner/Agent to Governor General Province from 1947 to 1970. From 1954 to 1970 it was a part of the One-Unit System. Balochistan experienced very little economic and political development during the One Unit period. Three factors were accountable for the fact. First, the strong hold of Sardari/tribal system which did not allow development; second, the entrenched civil and military bureaucratic system without any representation from the province; and third, the insurgencies movements in different parts of the province against the Central government due to which the Central government paid little attention to development.¹ For example, between 1947 to 1956 in the Prime Minister Cabinet there had been not a single Federal Minister from Balochistan. Six Prime Ministers changed and in none of the Cabinets there had been a Minister who belonged to Balochistan. In 1956 under the Prime Minister of Hussain Shurawardi, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, a strong tribal Chief was inducted into Cabinet.² Similarly, between 1958 to 1970 there was not a single minister from Balochistan.³

The first general elections in Balochistan were held in 1970 soon after it became an administrative province, then in 1977, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1996, and 2002. The Balochistan Assembly comprised 23 members including the reserved women seats in 1970 until 1977 when raised to 43. The present strength of the Assembly is 65 including minorities and women. All the elections in Balochistan have been held on party bases except in 1985 when they were held under the Zia-ul-Haq regime on non-party bases. The National Assembly comprised only five members out of which a lady was elected on the reserved female seats.⁴

Bases of Support for Political Parties/ Candidates

It is ethnically and politically divided --- a factor accountable for no government claiming majority in its Assembly in all the 8 elections (1970, 1977, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2002) since the establishment of Balochistan as a province in 1970.

There are three major sources of support for a person or political party in Balochistan. They are tribal/Sardari factor; political/ideological and ethnic. There can be a personal source but that did not appear a strong base. By personal I mean when a candidate gets elected to Provincial or National Assembly by his sheer popularity without a political party or tribal support. The tribal/Sardari source of support for a candidate/party in Balochistan is a tribal/personal factor supported by ethnic/tribal factor, and political and ideological. In 2002 elections political/ideological and tribal/Sardari bases appeared effective.

Table 1
Major Sources of the Parties/Candidates**
Support in Balochistan

PML (Q)	political, tribal/Sardari
PML-N	tribal/personal
MMA	political/ideological
NA	tribal/Sardari
JWP	tribal/Sardari/
BNM	political/ideological, ethnic
BNP-M	political/ideological, tribal
PMAP	ethnic/tribal, political,
PPPP	political/personal
Independent	ethnic, tribal/Sardari

* MNA/MPA/Senators

Tribal/ Sardari Bases

The tribal/Sardari bases are rooted in Sardari and Khan system of the province having been in practice for hundred years. The Sardari system exists in Baloch/Brauhi belt while Khan system in Pashtu speaking. There are around 35 major tribes in Baloch/Brauhi and Pashtun area. The Rind is the biggest tribe in Baloch area. The leading tribes in Brauhi areas are Mengal and Mohamad Hasni. The Kakar is the largest Pashtun tribe (see table 5). The role of the tribal Chiefs is still imminent. It can be evident from the fact that out of 17

Chief Ministers of the province from 1973 to 2003 not a single one belonged to a common man or middle class. All of them were Sardars or bigwig of the tribal society.⁵

The Khan system in Pashtu speaking is a form of tribal setup but less stronger and entrenched than the one in Baloch/Brauhi set up. The Sardari system is stronger in Baloch/Brauhi. The Sardari system may have lost its entrenched role but still continuing due to the lack of roads and communication network. More roads, electricity and schools, the rapid the system will loose its control.⁶

Table 2

Major Tribes in Balochistan

BALOCH	BRAUHI	PASHTUN
i. Rind subdivided into Bugti, Marri Domki, Jamali,	i. Mohamad Hasni	i. Kakar subdivided into numerous tribes
ii. Lashar subdivided into Magsi	ii. Mengal	ii. Acakzai subdivided into numerous tribes on both sides of Afghanistan
iii. Umrani	iii. Raisani,	iii. Mandokhel
iv. Khetran	iv. Zarakzai/Zehri	iv. Nasir
v. Khoso	v. Shahwani	v. Zarkoon
	vi. Bizenjo	
	vii. Jhatak	
	viii. Lehri	

Ethnic Factor

The ethnic bases play a role and are intermingled with Sardari system as a supportive factor. As mentioned the major ethnic groups are Baloch, Brauhi and Pathan. The Pashtu speaking population has increased after the Afghanistan crisis in 1979. Majority of the Afghan refugees in Balochistan carry national I.D. and can speak local languages. If one includes Afghan speaking population in Balochistan then they constitute the largest ethnic group. The settlers from other provinces constitute a sizable population chunk.⁷ The nationalist's parties garner support on ethnic bases in particular.

By ethnic it is meant that when a political party or candidate seeks or makes appeal to voters on ethnic grounds of being Baloch,

Brauhi and Pashun. The ethnic factor played a role in past elections particularly in 1988, 93 and 1996 elections. The nationalist parties from Baloch, Brauhi and Pashun belts were successful but in 2002 they appeared to have a setback.

Political and Ideological Factor

The political and ideological factors play a role. The role has exceeded in case of MMA, the party which is supported largely on ideological and political grounds. The PML-Q sought its support on political and ideological grounds but the candidate's personal influence supported by tribal/Sardari and money factor played a role. The leftist parties also seek support on political/ideological grounds.

Percentage of Votes Cast

According to the Election Commission Office in Balochistan, the total registered votes in Balochistan were 3,413,393. The total votes polled in the elections were 1,015,412.⁸ The over percentage of votes cast was 30%. The percentage of the total votes registered in Balochistan was low. The elections data of the past seven elections show that it ranges between 22% to 39%. Three factors are accountable for the poor mobilization of voters. First, the lack of communication in the constituencies comprising huge areas. Second, the lack of education and political conscious among voters as common in many rural areas of Pakistan. And third, the lack of party support among voters or party penetration.

According to the official report of the Election Commission of Balochistan the percentage of votes cast of the total registered votes in the National Assembly varies from 23% to 46.30%. The 46.30% cast was on the NA-265 Dera Bugti. On the rest of the constituencies the percentage was not more than 33.65% including the Mekran belt where the ration of education and vote participation is higher. The Dera Bugti figures are disputed and alarmed the concern of monitoring agencies for bogus voting due to the fact that government or election holding institutions were unable to check it. Similarly, on the provincial seats the percentage of votes cast varied 12.29 to 33.71 in large with some constituencies as 39.46 or 41.41. The lowest was in PB 15 Loralai-II from where the PMAP Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan Musakhel got elected. The highest percentage of votes cast was in PB 24 (Dera Bugti) as 76.28.

The election turn out was lowest in Quetta city. The major factor accountable for the lowest turn down was the restructuring of the constituencies which deprived a number of people from voting.⁹ Interestingly, no party in Balochistan has claimed a simple majority in any of the elections due to which no government in Balochistan has been a coalition free.

The elections 2002 were marked as "a shift in the political trends of the province". The elections were marked as a paradigm shift in the sense that it the changes made it different from the past elections. First, there resulted changes in the voting trends. The voters in large ignored the nationalists' stand and voted for a right wing party which secured for the first time a promising success. Second, more mobilization in voters' support for the new candidates a bit other than tribal entrenched lines. Obviously the elections resulted in many new faces. Around 75 percent new faces reached the Assembly. The number of seats of the Provincial Assembly increased from 43 to 65.

The decision of the Musharraf regime for the fixation of female seats in the assemblies, a commendable step for the promotion of female representation in legislatures, made the figure swell as 11 female members entered the floor on reserve seats. The three seats were reserved for minorities. The 2002 elections brought 41 new faces. As mentioned it was the first time since 1970, except 1985 when elections were held on non-party bases that saw the arrival of such a big percentage of new MPAs.

Tribal Setup in Balochistan

The total area of Balochistan is 347,056 sq.km or 34.722 million hectares, which is 43 percent of the total area of Pakistan. In 1941 according to the census notification of the British Indian government the total population of the province was 859,000 out of which 90% were Muslims. Out of the total population of Balochistan 15.6% live in urban centers and the remaining 84.4% in rural areas with a density of 12 per square kilometer. Lack of water hinders development. 85% of the population is scattered in rural areas. In 2001, there were a total of 6,911 villages. At the time of independence in 1948, Balochistan comprised three parts: the British Balochistan; Leased Areas; and Native Balochistan. The first comprised agencies, being part of Afghanistan or enjoyed autonomous status, ceded to the British.

- They included Zhob Agency/district, Loralai district except Duki and Chaghi district/Agency, except the area that did not fall in the British jurisdiction. The British Balochistan included Pishin and Killa Abdullah districts, Duki Sub-division, and portion of Sibi district.
- The leased areas of Kalat which included Quetta sub-division, Bolan Pass and Kachhi Districts and Nushki sub-division of Chaghi.
- The native Balochistan consisted of the Marri and Bugti tribal areas. And the princely states of Kalat which included Mekran, Kharan and Las Bela jointly run by the representative of the Khan and an Assistant or Political Agent. And areas ceded to British from Afghanistan under the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879. The native Balochistan comprised around 75 percent of the area of the today Balochistan .

The population of Balochistan is divided into tribes. In Balochistan there are around 40 major tribes.¹⁰ They are divided into sub-tribes. Each tribe comes under a Sardar. The tribal homogeneity is entrenched particularly in Baloch and Brauhi areas which were called native Balochistan. The largest Baloch tribe is Rind which is further divided into full-fledged tribes such as Marri, Bugti, Jamali, Jamoot In Brauhi area the largest tribe is Muhammad Hasni. Mengal is equally largest tribe. In Pashtun area the biggest tribe is Kakar. The following tribes are divided into full-fledged tribes such as Marri, Bugti, Badini, Shahwani, Raisani etc.

The present tribal system is 350 years old. It was actually formed and restructured when Kalat state was founded by Mir Ahmad Khan in 1666, the largest state in area-wise of the total 562 princely states in British India. The head of the Kalat state was called Khan who was above the Sardars. There were three more states (smaller in area) Mekran, Kharan and Lasbela, independent but paying respect or allegiance to Khan of Kalat. Although, the sovereignty of Kalat as an independent state was weakened on the establishment of the British rule in Balochistan, after the Britishers got control of a number of areas from the rulers of Kalat in 1883 but his Chieftain along with three states continued and they were free in internal jurisdiction. The British did not exercise day to day administration but enjoyed allegiance from the Chiefs.¹¹

Administratively and tribally the Khan of Kalat was at the top as can better be defined in his annual *Darbar* session. He on his right was flanked by Chief of Sarawar and on the left by the Chief of Jalawan. In the row sat the Chiefs of concerned tribes. The Chiefs of Sarawan and Jalawan were two tribal orders superior to tribal Chiefs. The sub-Chiefs did not attend the annual session and their problems could be addressed by the Chief of the tribe.

Similarly the rulers of Mekran, Kharan and Lasbela were followed by the Chiefs of the tribes living under their rules. The occasion when the ruler and Sardars got together was called *Diwan* in which matters of mutual interest and importance were settled.¹²

The tribal Chiefs in Pashtun areas remained but became less effective due to the British penetration after they established garrisons and offices after the conquest of Balochistan in 1876 which mostly comprised Pashtun areas. Another factor was the infrastructure and mobilization compared to the Native Balochistan.

How Tribal Setup Influences Electoral Process

The tribal setup in Balochistan can determine an electoral process in different ways. There are four factors which can influence the tribal factor in an electoral process. First, the numerical strength of the tribe and their allegiance by force or choice to the Sardar. Second, the lack of development, infrastructure and education amongst the tribe or lack of overall mobilization of the tribesmen. Third, the crisis of participation where there is no penetration or active role of a political party garnering their support on political ground or alternate popular leadership. Fourth, the support of establishment/government in favor of the Chief.

Explaining the first factor, the numerical strength of a tribe can play a role in favor of candidate. The bigger the tribe is the more there are chances of tribal factor of winning the constituencies. The elections results in Balochistan since 1947, and particularly since 1970 it was raised to a province status show that tribes with population have exerted an influence.

The lack of development and infrastructure is a supportive factor to earlier factor. The ratio of tribal factor particularly in favor of the Chief and his kith and kin (enabling his role as the King's Maker) is higher when there is lack of development in the area. The role of Sardar is higher and louder in the areas where there are no roads. The greater the roads and infrastructure the less stronger are tribal roots. It is particular in case of Pashtun belt where after the establishment of British rule in 1876 roads, schools, bridges and garrisons were raised. The tribal factor and role of Sardar is loose in Pashtun belt than in Baloch and Brauhi.¹³

The crisis of penetration in a an area where there is no political party has roots, the tribal factor is countered or can be countered by a political party which support comes on the political and ideological grounds and which tickets are allotted to candidates other than their tribalism or social affluence. Two political parties in Balochistan are particular, the ideological (JUI/MMA and nationalists BNM, and PMAP.

Lastly, the role of establishment in support of a candidate with tribal status which loyalty it wants to gain. The establishment factor may not be a sole factor in winning of the constituency but it supports the candidate who is mostly the tribal Chief or his immediate kin. The elections process can also be influenced once the establishment follows the requests/suggestions of the tribal Chiefs regarding the transfer of officers of his choice.

Major Political Parties in Election 2002

In elections 2002 there were 9 major political parties in race. By major I mean the political parties which exert an influence by enjoying voters' support and have been taking part in the provincial politics since 1988 under the new or old labels. They are the Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q); Muthahida Majlis Amal (MMA) the strong support of which came from Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam; Jamoohri Watan Party (JWP); National Alliance (NA); Balochistan National Movement (BNM); Pakistan People's Party Parliamentary (PPPP); Pakhtoonkwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP); Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M); and Balochistan National Democratic Party (BNDP). Also, independents constituted a role in the politics as they were successful on many constituencies. Many MPAs this time were elected independently. They included Jamal

Shah Kakar who later on joined MMA and is now the speaker. The political parties drew their support on ideological, political, ethnic and personal basis. Zubaida Jalal who won the general seat for the National Assembly got elected as an independent candidate but she enjoyed the support of establishment and later on joined the PML-Q. A turning factor in her elections was the withdrawal of Sher Jan, a candidate for Provincial seat who commanded the voting support of Zikris. The Zikris were to vote for nationalists. Sher Jan was shown a carrot and stick policy to withdraw. His withdrawal favoured Zebaida to win the Kech cum Gawadar 272 seat.

PML-Q

The leading party in the assembly was the PML-Q. The PML was the political party which enjoyed the political, moral and may be the financial support of military establishment (the Pervaiz Musharraf regime). In the political analysis it was a King's Party which was designed and supported to serve the interests of the government. Many of the MPAs from the PML-Q are new but its veterans were the renegades of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). They in past played an active role in its politics and got elected to the Assembly on its tickets. The major support for the party came on personal influential grounds rather than political. In other words, they had the potential to win the constituency even if they had not contested elections on the party platform. They were influential and big wigs of the area. The party won a female seat on adult franchise, a wife of an ex MPA/Minister and tribal bigwig who himself was debarred from politics. She was elected from PB 17-Loralai IV. The present strength of the PML-Q is 21.

MMA

The MMA, an alliance of six political/religious parties formed in 2002, the major strength of which in Balochistan comes from JUI, emerged as the second leading political party with 18 seats (including of females). The other five components of the MMA, Jamaat-e-Islam; Jamiat-ulema-i-Islam -Noorani; Jamiat-ulema-i-Islam-Sami ul Haq; Tehrik Millat-i-Islami Pakistan of Sajid Naqvi; and Jamiat Ahle Hadith Sajid Mir do not have political support in Balochistan. The Jamaat-e-Islami holds influence in Quetta and few cities; the influence has grown during the last many years.

The JUI-F has been holding political influence in Balochistan politics right from the founding days of the province in 1970. It has joined the coalition government of Balochistan despite all its ideological/political differences with its government partner — a factor accountable for possible speculation about its joining the government with PML-Q after the 2002 elections. It joined coalition in 1970 with National Awami Party (NAP) in 1973; with Jamoohri Watan Party and BNM-Nationalists in 1988 under Nawab Akbar Bugti as the Chief Minister; in 1991; and 1993. The party might have suffered a political setback in Balochistan after the 1997 national elections in which many of its party veterans including Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman lost their constituencies in NWFP and Balochistan (particularly in the NWFP where the party was reduced to almost a minimal position in the National and Provincial Assembly). Nonetheless, the party continued to play a role in Balochistan politics both as a political party and pressure group.

The 2002 elections has raised strengthened the party position in the Assembly compared to its past best success in 1988 elections (then 43-seat Assembly) with six seats. Two factors were largely accountable for the overall MMA success. First, the Afghan situation in which the Taliban government was toppled and the military actions in which thousands of Afghans were brutally killed and the events following the toppling of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Second, the weakening of the nationalist parties in the province. The three Baloch/Brauhi nationalist groups in the province are Balochistan Nationalist Party Mengal (BNP-M), Balochistan National Party (BNP) and the Balochistan National Democratic Party (BNDP). In Pashtu Speaking belt the nationalist party is PMAP.

The nationalist parties failed in pursuit of votes. It is particular in case of the nationalist parties in Baloch/Brauhi belt. The PMAP which is a nationalist party compared to its past performance did not do that bad. But the nationalist parties in Baloch/Brauhi belt have met a political setback.

Shedding light on the poor performance of the parties, three factors are mainly accountable for the. First, the division among their ranks over personal/ethnic and political matters not only weakened their stunt but made them divided over the issues over which they appealed to voters in past. Second, their past

performance while in power due to the lack of development in their constituencies alienated voters in general. It is to be reminded that the nationalist parties from Baloch/Brauhi belt have enjoyed their share of cake in power. The 1996 elections brought the nationalists in power after Sardar Akhtar Mengal became the Chief Minister of the province (from February 23 1997 to July 29 1998). Third, the establishment support for a number of candidates (PML-Q) in the constituencies where the nationalists claimed strong hold. However, the fact remains that the support of establishment was not the only factor in winning of their constituencies.

The JUI was traditionally rooted in the Pashtu speaking belt of Balochistan where the major rivalry to it came from the Paktoonkwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) which seems to have lost its political grounds due to poor performance with winning five seats. The political support for MMAP/JUI not only came from the Pashu speaking area but also from the Baloch/Brauhi speaking areas. The recent MMA/JUI success came as a political defeat for many Baloch and Pathan nationalists in the Kalat Division whose support came on ethnic/political grounds. The PMAP could play an important role in the recent game of numbering for the Balochistan coalition of PML-Q but it did not due to the fact that MMA decided to join the treasury benches and the required majority was achieved without any bandwagoning from small parties.

NA (Millat Party)

The Nationalist Alliance, merged under the Millat Party banner, did comparatively well with 7 (now six) seats. The party voted for Jamali, and its member, Yar Mohammad Rind, a strong Baloch Sardar and the old political partner of Nawab Bugti in the past, is inducted as the Minister in the Jamali Cabinet. The inclusion of Rind as a Cabinet member was the part of the deal --- essential to win the support of NA in the center and province.

JWP

The Jamoohri Watan Party (JWP) the brain child of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti has only four seats in the Provincial Assembly. It was founded by him in 1990 soon after the assemblies were dissolved. The party's platform actual supported nationalists' stand for more development in Balochistan without interference from the center. Due to the BA condition Nawab, his son, and son-in-law were debarred from elections. He however made the King Maker

role by sending his own men. The JWP performance in the elections was as expected.

The party yes or no depends on the goodwill of Nawab Bugti. No member of the JWP can overrule Nawab's decision --- a factor accountable for many political upheavals the party has met in the past. The decision of Nawab Bugti overshadows the overall decision and planning process of the party. Nawab Bugti due to past differences with Zafarullah Jamali did not allow his party to vote for Jamali as the Prime Minister. During Nawab Bugti coalition government as the Chief Minister with the JUI during 1988-1991, Zafullah was the opposition leader in Balochistan Assembly and supportive of establishment in center. The bid went on for the support of Bugti votes in the assembly as Zafullah humbly persuaded him by visiting him twice in Dera Bugti. The JWP could play a very important role under the situation.

There is only one remaining independent candidate out of 7 actually elected; the rest joined other parties, mostly the PML-Q. Balaj Marri, the son of Nawab Khair Baksh Marri. The independent candidates in Balochistan have played an important role in the balancing act of the provincial politics. The present restriction on joining of an independent candidate a political party soon after his/her elections was a good omen for the stability of provincial government based on party line and dismay for the independent candidates to bandwagon for their interests without joining a party. In all the elections in Balochistan held party bases, there have been eminent roles of independent candidates. It is due to the entrenched Sardari and Nawabi system --- a personal base of support for a candidate or even a party if he joins it. In 1970 in the 21 member-assembly 4 of them were independent. They played a balancing role in the provincial politics. Three of whom later on joined the PPP (after Bhutto dissolved assembly and installed Barozai as the CM). The independent candidates have either joined the party in power or the coalition government without losing his independent status but as a Minister. In 1993 Nawab Zulfiqar Magsi rose to the Chief Ministership as an independent candidate. He had been under continual pressure from the PML-N government in center to join the party rather than remain as an independent candidate which he defied.

PPPP

The Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarian (PPPP) has two seats. Both of its MPAs are PPP old veteran (Sadiq Umrani and Shafiq Ahmed Khan) and have been owing allegiance to the party discipline since 1980. The PPP members in the Balochistan Assembly (during 1991-1993 and 1996-99 when the PPP was in opposition to the PML-Nawaz (in center) supported the government for local benefits.

PML-N

The PML-Nawaz participated in the Balochistan by contesting few candidates in the elections but it did not win any seat except on NA- 263 Loralai where Yaqub Khan Nasir succeeded by a narrow margin against his candidate. The success of Yaqub Khan against all odds was due to his tribal and personal background than the party support. The PML-N enjoyed support in Balochistan from 1988-99 but since the fall of Nawaz Sharif majority of its activists have changed their loyalties to PML-N. They in fact enjoyed personal/tribal support than the party. They remained in PML-N and then turned to PML-Q due to the promotion of their perceived interests by gaining the support of establishment. The PPP in Balochistan could emerge as the strong political party, particularly in the Nasirabad and Mekran divisions, but due to tribal set and lack of leadership it failed to do so. It was particular due to Z. A. Bhutto dissolution of Balochistan Assembly in May 1973 and the military action in Marri-Bugti area resulting in the fleeing of thousands of Marri tribesmen to Afghanistan.

Senate Elections

The elections for Senate were held on February 24, 2003. There were 38 candidates in the race. The party position in the Senate Elections was as expected. The PML-Q emerged as the leading political group with 9 seats (5 generals, 1 technocrat and 3 females). The MMA secured 6 (4 general and 2 technocrats); the National Alliance 2 (1 female and 1 general), the BNM, BNP and JWP respectively with one seat. The PMAP could not win a seat but its candidate succeeded due to the decision of the Nawab Bugti that three of its four party MPAs would support the candidate of the PMAP, Nawab Ayaz Khan Jomezai, a young Chief of the Jomezai, a Pashtu speaking tribe, who actually lost elections for a MNA seat against the MMA candidate. As quoted Nawab wanted to repay the debt of the PMAP when it voted for the JWP candidate in the

Senate elections. It also involved tribal factor as the Nawab Ayaz is the head of the Jomezai tribe. The Senate elections brought back Saeed Hashmi, a former MPA and Minister (1985-1999).

With all observation and criticism about the elections, the elections involved three factors of support for a candidate. It involved ideological/political support, money-dealing, horse trading and tribal support. In case of the MMA candidate the ideological/political factor played a dominant role. One can say that least horse trading or money was involved in the election of the MMA Senators. In case of the election of the PML-Q and some other candidates' money factor is alleged to have been involved. It was particular in case of an industrialist from Sindh with the support of government and his own wealthy affluence.

Conclusion

The elections 2002 in Balochistan are regarded as the watershed elections in the sense that there appeared a drift in the voting behavior from the past elections. For the first time in the political history of the province a party based on ideological/political bases secured a leading position in the elections. The political parties securing their voting bank on the nationalist and ethnic grounds met a setback. The major sources of support for political parties were tribal/Sardari, political/ideological, and ethnic. The tribal and Sardari factor however played a strong role in the elections. The tribal factor is supported by Sardari and personal factor. The tribal and Sardari factor is combined. A Sardar is voted into assembly by his tribesmen. The Tribal/Sardari factor can be weakened if development is made in the area such as the construction of roads, schools, and electricity. The road linkage is a pre-requisite.

The continuation of the electoral system in Pakistan can facilitate the electoral process in the country as well as Balochistan on more democratic lines. The abruptness of electoral system in 1999 by the army was a setback to the overall electoral process.

NOTES

¹ For detail see Mansoor Akbar Kundi Balochistan: Hope and Despair, Quetta, New Quetta Book Stall, 2002. p. 15

² Under the six Prime Ministers there had been not a single induction of a Minister from Balochistan until 1956 when Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was inducted as the Federal Minister under Hussain Shurawardi.

³ Mansoor Akbar Kundi. "Our Neglected Backyard" The News, Islamabad 3 December, 1999

⁴ In 1962 in National Assembly five members from Balochistan were elected. They all belonged to the tribal/Khan background. They were Mir Jam Qadir, Begum Khadija Khan, Khair Bakhsh Marri, Dera Khan Khosa and Atta Ullah Mengal, see Jhang, Quetta, October 5, 2002.

⁵ Balochistan: Jamuriyat ka Safar, a historical and constitutional background of the province published by the Provincial Public Relations Department, Quetta, 1997

⁶ Mansoor Akbar Kundi "Balochistan: A Victim of Ethnic Rivalries" The News June 8, 1992

⁷ Mansoor Akbar Kundi "Afghan Refugees: When Going Back is hard Choice" The News June 12, 1992

⁸ The percentage was based on the facts and figures shown in the Elections Results Handout published by the Pakistan Election Commission, Quetta, November 2002

⁹ Azizullah Khan, "Uneven Contest" in Harold, Karachi, February 2003 p. 59
¹⁰ Mahmood Ali Shah, Sardai, Jirga & Local Government System in Balochistan, Quetta: Qasim Book Depot, 1992, p. 21

¹¹ Mansoor Akbar Kundi, Balochistan: Hope & Despair, Quetta, New Quetta Book Stall, 2002, see chapter 1.

¹² op. cit. Mahmood Ali Shah, p. 21.

¹³ see Ikhar Balochistan, October 2001, p. 21

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Pakistan's Political Culture: a Transition to Democracy

Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad Choudhry

It is well known fact that in Pakistan, repeatedly elected institutions have been pull down in the name of "genuine" democracy, or for greater interest of the country. Each time democratic governments were over thrown with the charges of corruption, inefficiency and failure of constitutional machinery, etc., and the new architect of democracy pretended to be the only savior of the country. The new comer invariably designed the re-building of the political system, ensuring the protections for himself in future. Repetition of series of such dramas is continuing since the first military coup of 1958 – a formative phase of Pakistan's political and social development.

The question that can be asked is that whether we are moving towards a political culture, conducive for the growth of democratic norms and values or just following the 56 years old beaten track? In this article the author has tried to analyze the present political situation in the context of cultural and democratic changes in the country. The objective is to assess whether a particular political culture is evolving, which in turn could contribute to foster the democratic norms and values. In this regard it would be appropriate to define political culture so that parameters could be laid down for such assessment.

In essence, a culture provides a view of the world for those who subscribe to it. Its images, basic beliefs and values secure as the framework or set up of optional lenses by which individuals perceives, interpret, and evaluate the physical and social universe, the realities and conditions that surround them, and the events and developments that occur in the universe. A culture defines what a good society is, what values ought to be preferred, what standards of conduct are appropriate, what the rights, what the responsibilities of individual members of the society are, and how members of the society ought to behave towards one another. The political aspects of a culture shape and mold the subscribers' views, political institutions, processes, and events. The political culture defines what is a good and preferred kind of system, what kinds of political goals and values ought to be applied in judging political institutions and behaviour as

good, just, or rational. More specifically, a political culture provides three kinds of political orientations that affect attitudes and behaviours.

Cognitive Orientations pertain knowledge and awareness of political objects and events. A culture conditions the extent to which people have some awareness or knowledge of government, an interest in politics, or pay any attention or focus on the political events. Affective orientations relate to an individual's feelings of attachment to, involvement in, or identification with the political community and system. Evaluative orientations, closely related to effective orientations, entail the moral or normative judgments made on the basis of individual or prevailing beliefs and values about the political community and system. Believers in a culture that emphasizes the value of equality, individual rights, and human freedom will tend to highly evaluate democratic systems, which maximize opportunities for participation, and which promote the related values. By contrast, people who subscribe to an ideological creed, which emphasize the effects of capitalism and which asserts that the equality and true democracy can only be attained through socialism, will tend to evaluate western style democracy in negative terms.

High cognitive and affective orientations breed tendencies towards active political involvement. Globalization targeted to political cultures as well. Information technology and media revolution has universalized the political ideas and concepts (which is definitely a positive aspect of globalization). In turn, it generated an environment supportive for democratization of political systems.

Pakistan's political culture has been deeply influenced by its socio-economic pattern of the society inherited from British India. It has been practically subjected to an authoritative political culture. Feudal system has a very tight grip over political as well as economic resources. Democratic norms and values hardly could find any place in such a setup. A major break through in this system appeared, first time in 1970's general elections when masses were mobilized in the name of economic equality, democracy, and social justice. However, this phase proved very short lived, as traditional political elite penetrated into and captured the power structured of the day. That phase eventually ended in 1977 as a result of military take over. Since then the political system started to take a new turn towards

regionalism, religious fanaticism, *bradary* politics, etc. Authoritative tendencies reverted as a result of non-party based elections of the local bodies of 1979 as well as General Elections 1985.

After 11 years period, as a result of General Zia's death, party based elections took place in which, against the expectations of the establishment, Ms Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) emerged as the largest party in the Centre and the Provinces of Sindh and formed the government. However, in Punjab, establishment's sponsored IJI headed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif emerged as the majority party. It could have been a good start of two party system in the country. But unfortunately during this period people saw the extreme of intolerance, horse trading, political bribery, leg pulling etc. Hence this phase, which continued till October 1999, can be termed as the height of barbarian, uncultured, and uncivilized politics. In 1990, Nawaz Sharif had helped the military to oust Benazir Bhutto. Mr. Sharif also willingly accepted the military's autonomy and its domestic and external missions and roles. When he attempted to transgress the terms of that pact by appointing his own nominee as chief of army staff in 1993, the military sacked him with PPP help. In 1996, when Ms Bhutto transgressed her power sharing pact, the military first destabilized her government with the Muslim League's help, and then engineered her dismissal (LaPorte, Robert Jr, 1997).

The prominent feature of the period discussed above is failure of political leadership in establishing its supremacy over military. After Mr. Bhutto's failure in strengthening democratic institutions and respect democratic norms, the military enhanced its power and influence, first indirectly, and then started openly demanding share in power (Lodhi, 1994; Hussain & Hussain, 1991; Rizvi, 1985). Though General Zia failed to convince the people for military's constitutional role, he categorically declared after elections of 1985 that he would not transfer, rather share the power. General Jahangir Karamat in his annual address to the Pakistan Navy War College in October 1998 proposed the formation of a National Security Council, composed of military and civilian officials. After the general elections 2002 General Musharraf has materialized the Plan of National Security Council by making it a part of LFO. It is considered as against the norms and values of democracy.

Before and after the elections of 2002, General Musharraf took many steps to ensure the domination of military in political

power. In April 2002 he made a formal bid to retain power by holding a referendum to extend his presidential term for five years, by bypassing the procedure specified in the Constitution of 1973. This referendum was highly criticized by the public. On 16 April 2002, Justice Tariq Mahmood of the Baluchistan High Court resigned from the Election Commission to protest against the unconstitutionality of the referendum (*Dawn* 17th April, 2002). Official results in that referendum put the turnout at 62 percent, with 97.71 percent. Independent observers estimated the turnout at less than 10 percent (Abbas, 2002). Although the political rallies were banned at that time, more than 30 public meetings were held at the public expense of more than Rs.3 billion. Lahore District *Nazim* Mian Amir Mahmood admitted that his District Government had funded Musharraf's 9th April rally (*Nation*, 11 May, 2002). However, public resentment, resistant, and political opposition from the political parties and international opinion was many times more than that faced by General Zia and General Ayoub Khan's referendums. This fact indicates the high level of awareness among the masses.

Through the Legal Framework Order (LFO) of 21 August 2002, Musharraf has validated all acts and decrees of his government, including a five years extension of his presidential term and position as Chief of Army Staff. He has also given him power to dismiss the National Assembly, appoint service chiefs, approve appointments of justices of superior courts, and establish a National Security Council that will legalize the military's political role. Declaring that the Supreme Court has given him the authority to amend the constitution, Musharraf states: "These steps are essential to introduce real democracy in Pakistan" which is moving from 'democratic dictatorship to elected essence of democracy.' (*The Nation*, 22 August, 2002).

Declaring that the Supreme Court has given him this authority, Musharraf rejects the Parliament's right to ratify his LFO, "I am hereby making it (LFO) a part of the constitution", said Musharraf. "There is no need to get it validated or ratify from parliament". (*The News*, 22 August, 2002).

Political parties, international political organizations and other national as well international associations and organizations are much critical towards the rules regulations, procedures, and extra constitutional steps taken by the government before and after

elections. Violations of parliamentary traditions and values have made the situation adverse. There is a long list of such actions which has made the impartiality of government doubtful. According to the election laws, once election schedule is announced no change in the election laws can be made. But in these elections the laws has been changing till the last moment.

The government helped to bring political leaders and parties into electoral alliances, including Sindh Democratic Alliance (SDA) and Grand National Alliance. Because in both of the alliances the parties had limited popular support, the government's attention remained focused on Muslim League Q (PML-Q). Its President Mian Azhar supported the formation of National Security Council, backed the president's step to curb the prime minister's powers, and lauded Musharraf's efforts to get rid of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto (*Dawn*, 1 March, 2002).

The Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) accused the government of pre-pole gerymending of constituencies to assist its supporter PML-Q, Sindh Democratic Alliance (SDA) and Grand National Alliance. According to ARD, the government used administrative and fiscal sources to assist its civilian partners including large scale postings and transfers of bureaucrats in sensitive constituencies (Interview of ICG with ARD President Nawab Zadah Nasrullah Khan and Raja Zafar-ul-Haq, Islamabad, July 2002). According to the opposition, rigging also includes inducements and pressure by senior government officials, intelligence agencies, and district *Nazims* on PPP and PML-N politicians as well as independent candidates to switch their loyalties, in particular to the PML-Q. A political leader said "The agencies, ISI, Military Intelligence are involved in pre-pole rigging as are corps commanders and administrative officials" (ICG Interview, July-August 2002).

Although the government denied these allegations, it made no secret of its preference for PML-Q and other pro-government candidates or its opposition to the PPP and PML-And politicians. State controlled media was also fully used to defame PPP and PML-N candidates. Weeks before the elections the government brought anti-PPP ministers from Sindh Democratic Alliance into the Sindh Cabinet (*The News*, 2 July, 2002).

President's constitutional amendments not only render the prime minister and parliament powerless, they also reduce t power and authority in federation. By 1973 constitution the prime minister's advice on the appointment of provincial governors binds the president (Article 101 of the Constitution of 1973). Recent constitutional changes have transferred that power to president. Provincial governors have in turn, been given the powers to dismiss their respective assemblies on presidential advice. Decision to create the National Security Council also violates the principle of federalism. Dominated by the president and his military political appointees, the NSC will advise the president on all vital issues including dissolution of provincial assemblies. As a result the provincial governments will become hostage to the military dictates. Awami National Party leader stresses that the military is "reintroducing a unitary system. We will never accept this change." (ICG interview, Peshawar, July 2002).

The cumulative effect of such steps has made the legitimacy of these elections doubtful. The main objective of elections is told as to legitimize the use of power. This objective can hardly be achieved. Results of the elections has enhanced the problems for ruling elite, politicians (both, in opposition as well as in ruling party) and serious threats to the shaking democratic system itself. Elections 2002 resulted into a hung parliament in the centre. In NWFP the alliance of religious parties i.e. MMA has got un-precedented success and formed its government. Same is the situation in Baluchistan. In Sindh nearly 50% seats were captured by PPP but depriving it of the government the central government managed an alliance of number of minor parties to form a fragile coalition. It is only Punjab where the ruling clique is enjoying a very comfortable majority and the opposition is totally ineffective. As a whole the government as well its military partner is walking on a tight rope. Negotiations between the government and the opposition are facing serious hindrances. Demands of one side are death tolls of the other. None of the parties are inclined towards compromise. Under such a situation the whole 'democratic' setup can be collapsed at any time.

Conclusion

The above discussion suggests that though the authoritative nature of the political culture is still unmoved, people are too much aware about the political system. Considerable resistance to arbitrary manipulations of the military elite cannot be easily digestible for the public. The affective, cognitive, and evaluative orientations are quite

high. People low level of electoral support to the state sponsored PML-Q indicate public affiliation for their respective political parties is too much stable. Media trial of certain political leaders/parties had no effect on the election results. These factors are positive signs for the further political development on the country.

Resistance against the distortion of federation and the parliamentary system by military elite is significant. Within and without, the house political forces are unanimous regarding the future setup of the country. Crisis in transition to democracy is not something new in politics of the developing countries. However, the output of such crisis and conflicts would definitely be supportive for the system as well as culture provided all the character of the scene comes out of their shell and consider the demands of the day. It is essential even to strengthen our stand on certain international issues such as Kashmir, Palestine, etc.

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Recommendations & List of Participants

RECOMMENDATIONS

During the two day National Conference on "Pakistan: new Challenges and Options for Regional and Global Adjustments", a variety of views were presented, on the matters of security that concerns Pakistan. We are aware that the security concerns are not only confined to external threats or the manner in which we plan our foreign policy but domestic institutions and their proper functioning within our society are equally important.

Discussions and presentations of views by themselves do serve a useful purpose but is not enough to either influence the policy makers or to mold a large public opinion. It becomes important to present concrete and viable solutions and recommendations to help solve the issues. The conference has come to the conclusion that in order to safeguard Pakistan's security as well as face challenges existing from the rapidly changing regional and international environment, the following are recommended:

1. There needs to be a shift in Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Instead of relying on the dependence of a sole power, which with the passage of time leads towards the dictates of a foreign power, we must create new alliances based on our national interests. In this respect Pakistan must coordinate its policies with its traditional allies like Iran, Turkey, China and other Muslim countries like Malaysia.
2. The foreign policy makers either in the representative institutions or in bureaucracy must adhere to the views of the scholars and deliberations of intellectual endeavors like this conference. We observe that in the past serious misjudgments were made by the policy makers - a glaring example of which is a policy towards Afghanistan during the Taliban regime which for all practical purposes isolated Pakistan, thus seriously threatening its security and even its sovereignty.

3. The deliberations of the conference took a serious note of the appropriate role of the domestic institutions and political process in strengthening Pakistan's security. Equally important is the adherence to the Constitution, in letter and spirit. Furthermore, there is no shortcut to a viable economic structure as many examples in the recent world events have shown that. It was observed that unless a continuous political process takes shape, there would always be a threat to Pakistan's national interests as well as security.

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Articles, Book Reviews, Review Articles and Policy Papers on themes of contemporary domestic, regional and international issues with particular reference to Pakistan's Politics, Society and culture are welcome for *Al-Siyasa*.

The articles should be between 4500-6500 words. The Contributors are advised to submit two hard copies of the manuscripts along with a soft copy on floppy diskette or CD, or send via email as an attachment. It is desirable that references be as endnotes in APA or Cambridge style at the end of the document.

Bibliography can also be included at the end of the document. Endnotes should be numbered consecutively and bibliography be organized alphabetically.

The documents should be typed in double space with wide margins. All tables and Statistical data should be organized with consistent style so that it may easily be composed for the Journal.

Abstracts

Authors should submit abstracts of their articles, of 100-300 words. The first page should include the title, authors' full name, institutional affiliation, address and email address, if possible.

Note: The advisory Board reserves the right to accept or make necessary editorial revisions. All correspondence should be addressed to the editor.

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A Journal of Politics, Society and Culture
Special Conference Issue



Department of Political Science
Programme in Diplomacy & Strategic Studies

University of the Punjab, Lahore

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Established in 1933, the Department of Political Science is one of the
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M.Phil and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science as well as M.A and Ph.D. in
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Conference Special Issue

NATIONAL CONFERENCE

APRIL 8 – 9, 2003

Pakistan: New Challenges and Options for Regional and Global Adjustments

CONVENER
DR. SYED FAROOQ HASNAT
PROFESSOR & CHAIRMAN

COORDINATOR
MS. TAHMINA RASHID
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR

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THEME OF THE CONFERENCE

By and large, conferences and discussion sessions are held to take cognizance of the prevalent conditions and to suggest means to modify or alter the decision making processes - so as to correspond with the requirements of a society. In exceptional circumstances, the task of the participants becomes more daunting but nevertheless challenging, especially, when the variables and inputs attain a huge proportion. It is in this context that the current conference has been arranged by the Department of Political Science.

The basic task before the participants was to understand the dynamics of a new world order, an unmatched power of the sole super power and the changes that are being brought forward by such developments. Today's Pakistan finds itself in the middle of the global adjustments and that poses new challenges- both in the sphere of domestic as well as foreign matters.

There is hardly a second opinion that today's Pakistan is forced to conduct its policies, both foreign and domestic, within a disposition controlled by a sole Super-Power - based in terms of military as well as economic strengths. A certain set of "Global Values" enforced by the "New World Order" in the early 1990s could not resist the gigantic impact of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 9/11, 2001. Whatever the intensions of the terrorist groups might have been, there is no denial that the September attacks on the World Trade Center in New York - a symbol of the American economic power as well as that of the Free Market Economy and Pentagon - headquarter of the United States overwhelming military capabilities, changed the traits of the global relations. These changes along with their modalities would be a key topic of debate in the near future.

Pakistan exists in a vicinity of simmering tensions, conflicts, mounting crisis and above all is bordered by at least one neighbour that had been proliferating antagonism through its various conducts. In the period preceding the year 2001 certain developments, which directly affected the international community in general had taken

place thus invoking the American interests. For example, when in response to the Indian nuclear blasts Pakistan detonated a series of nuclear devices in June 1998, the United States imposed sanctions came into immediate effect. Secondly, the decades old Afghan war and its repercussions leading to the presence of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network had direct fallout of the American policy on Pakistan. Furthermore, the October 1999 military takeover in Pakistan became yet another irritant in the U.S. - Pakistan relations.

An important characteristic in which policy projection is to be designed is the recognition of the reality that nation state is no more the only effective player in our newly created world system. Even an individual or a group can become an active target of global and regional security concerns. As such, policies will be shaped not on the basis of inter-state interaction alone but on the act of terrorism itself and the sensitivities about the invisible enemy or even its shadows as being witnesses in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless, the state power (military and then followed by a promise of economic relief) has become a vehicle of solving conflicts, may it be Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. A vital point to consider is that all these conflicts were administrated by an outside power, with its overwhelming military might, utilizing fully its authority. The traditional mechanisms of inter-state or even regional pressures were undermined because of the reality that highly complicated ground realities were not as confused as we witnessed in the mentioned cases. It is no surprise that even before the happenings of September, the new world order that emerged a decade ago had brought forth such concepts as "terrorist groups", "insurgencies" and "civil wars" – with connotations of the failure of the traditional paradigms to solve the crisis. Thereby, more attention should be diverted towards these realities in the South Asian and Middle Eastern context. In these two parts of the world, the suspicions are old and tensions have been allowed to grow to become a multifaceted problem.

In the past, on numerous occasions, our foreign policy apparatus misread the regional fault-lines of societal changes and conversion of simmering regional and international tensions into conflicts. Significant occurrences of failed prediction are: (1) General Zia ul Haq's visit of Iran on the eve of the Islamic Revolution; (2) Recognition of Taliban faction in haste; (3) An embarrassing lack of knowledge about the dynamics of the Central Asian Muslim States;

(4) Absence of enthusiasm and approach towards such traditional friends as Iran, Turkey and Jordan, coupled with policy of reassurances with traditional allies of Pakistan; (5) Pakistan's diplomatic retreat from the Middle East region, thus removing an umbrella of congenial environment; (6) Most important of all, inadequate diplomatic response to explain the gross violations of human rights and the repression carried on by the Indian troops towards the helpless Kashmiri people.

It won't be an over statement to say that as a minimum Pakistan has to overhaul its regional strategy, put in order its perception abilities and a lot of work is to be done to establish a strong structure for the task ahead – and for that a new decision-making apparatus must be positioned in place.

There are a variety of questions that are being asked and became an area of discussion, ranging from the massing of more than a million Indian troops at our borders to the international and regional reactions to the ill-conceived policies of the Talibans and its fallout on the Pakistani society. The Indian standoff came in the middle of the Afghan crises, where Pakistan had to play a very delicate role to preserve its sovereignty as well as remove the threat to our nuclear and missile asserts. Furthermore, Pakistan emerged as an important State in combating the international terrorism.

Keeping all the above mentioned factors in view it became imperative for the Department of Political Science to invite various scholars to gather on one platform and discuss these matters so as to help understand the difficulties being confronted by Pakistan. We have proposed suggestions for the policy makers, which we believe would help formulate a more dynamic and realistic policies.

Scholars from various Universities and Research Institutes presented their papers. We invited scholars from Baluchistan University; Sindh University, IPRI; Quaid-e-Azam University; LUMS; Multan University; Peshawer University and faculty members from our Department. There were four basic issues that needed to be examined and which formed parts of our Conference proceedings.

1. International terrorism

Post Sept 11, 2001 scenario and US response pushed Pakistan towards joining its alliance, as President Bush left no room for an alternative response. The events altered the entire outlook for Pakistan, a big State of 140 million people. Following its decision to side with the international coalition against the "terrorist network" of Osama bin Laden, Pakistan today is singled out as a frontline state fighting the scourge of terrorism.

2. Indian Threat

After the September 2001 events the Indians tried to exploit the situation in their favour by making all efforts to defame Pakistan as a terrorist State. The Indian leaders tried to align the Kashmiri freedom struggle with that of international terrorism but failed due to the wise policies of our government. Recently the Indian leadership threatens to make a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan. The Pakistani response has been direct and forthcoming. The Prime Minister has warned India to refrain from any adventure as that would prove futile.

3. Iraqi War

Pakistan has been concerned with the situation in Iraq, although at the time of the conference the war in Iraq was at the initial stages. After the occupation, the U.S. has not been able to gain a commanding control of the local dissent and there have been casualties on the American side. Apart from that the efforts to establish a viable and acceptable government structure is facing a number of hindrances. The public opinion in Pakistan as well as in other parts of the Muslim societies is concerned about the long term American economic and strategic interests in Iraq.

There has been American request for sending troops to assist the American law and order machinery. No matter how noble the Pakistani intentions might be, it would be regarded as a hostile act by the people of Iraq. The Pakistani troops would be seen as part of an occupation force and would be detested by Iraqi population. Because of the sensitivities of the Pakistani people with those of the Muslims of Iraq, it becomes a dilemma for the government to oblige the American request to send its troops.

Pakistan's Domestic Turmoil

The October 2002 National and Provisional elections presented a new era for Pakistan's domestic scene. The minority government at the Center and the induction of MMA in the mainstream politics and its adjustment with the existing realities makes us evaluate and think about the important subject. It was expected that there would be a new direction of a political process in the country and the system which was derailed because of the collapse of Nawaz Sharif government in October 1999, would be reorganized and reformed. However, the elections presented a unique situation where three parties emerged at the central stage giving way to defections in the form of 'forward blocks' as well as hardening of the policy positions. The matter of Legal Frame Work (LFO) became a highly contentious issue where the government and opposition parties have taken rigid stance. The future of the establishment of the political institutions in the Pakistani politics would largely depend on the ability of the political forces to agree on a formula which is acceptable to all.

Professor Dr. Syed Farooq Hasnat

CONVENOR

A WORD FROM THE COORDINATOR

Seminars and conferences are essential tools for teaching and research as both go hand in hand in the academia. Such events provide opportunities to acquire first hand knowledge and training for the students as well as teaching faculty. The participants' exchange of views and experiences with the experts in the field helps them to understand the manner in which different problems as well as solutions are highlighted in a scientific way.

A dialogue of such a nature promotes a better and comprehensive vision of the issues and assists the researchers as well as students to formulate an informed opinion. This in turn, leads to an accurate and realistic analysis of an issue or a situation based on scientific findings with more objectivity.

A conference of the kind, which was held in April 2003 also becomes instrumental in assisting the policy makers. It is not possible to have such a variety of views on a single subject but apart from such exercise.

The Department has a progressively evolving research program and has been holding a series of seminars on current domestic, regional and international issues by inviting scholars from various disciplines. Special lectures by delegates of national and international repute, both local and foreign, have been organized on issues such as Globalization, Feminism, Development paradigms in Feminist Research, Human Rights, Terrorism, Environmental issues, Pakistan's Foreign Policy and domestic political scene of the country.

A long abandoned tradition of publishing the Department's research Journal *Al-Siyasa* has been revived and a new tradition of Policy Papers is being established. These activities coupled with the conference have now established a research culture at the department.

In the absence of any financial and logistical support & assistance, organizing such events becomes a huge job. From the conception of the idea of holding a two days National Conference to

the actual proceedings on 8th and 9th of April, 2003, the Department solely relied on its own resources and the will of the team involved. From a note of invitation to an eight page colorful conference brochure, the self reliance team with its leader enthusiastically worked and enjoyed the luxury of this intellectual endeavor. In an environment of dearth of intellectual discourse such forums of debate have become the rarity, made possible by the vision of all the team members involved.

The scholars covered a range of issues both global as well as domestic. There is a common practice of holding seminars and conferences on international issues ignoring the local and provincial dynamics of the Pakistani society, therefore, the department decided to have a full day session on the domestic issues. The discussion on local and domestic issues provides useful information as well as feedback from the scholars belonging to the respective areas. It could provide reasonable information to the policy makers and helps the governmental institutions in formulating future policies.

The response from the students was enormous as they willingly helped and participated in all the events. Their inquisitiveness was visible during the question-answer session after each presentation. It was a useful training exercise for all the participants and there was a strong demand to publish the papers presented. The department invited papers from the guest participants and the demand of the participants has been materialized in the form of this special issue of *Al-Siyasa*.

The Department has plans to continue holding seminars and conferences to provide forums of discussion and debate on issues of national and international importance.

Ms. Tahmina Rashid

PROCEEDINGS

A two-day National Conference on "Pakistan: New Challenges and Options for Regional and Global Adjustments" was organized by the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore on April 8-9, 2003. There were 5 sessions of the Conference dealing with four themes: (1) Inaugural; (2) Security Concerns of Pakistan; (3) International Concern: War, Terrorism & Foreign Policy; (4) Pakistan's Foreign Policy and (5) Pakistan's Domestic Scene. Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed was the keynote speaker. Delegates from Peshawar, Islamabad, Quetta; Jamshoro (Sindh); LUMS and Political Science faculty presented papers on the related themes.

The Convener of the Conference and Chairman of the Department of Political Science, Prof. Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat while welcoming the delegates and scholars highlighted the dangers that confront Pakistan and its security. He went on to emphasise that "today's Pakistan is forced to conduct its policies, both foreign and domestic, within a disposition controlled by a sole Super-Power – based in terms of military as well as economic strengths." Dr. Hasnat suggested that in order to safeguard Pakistan's security the society needs to be strengthened by means of a viable economic order as well as people's participation in decision making.

Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed in his keynote address termed the U.S. involvement in Iraq as unjustified and against the norms of International justice. He said that Pakistan must redefine the concept of national security and should evolve a regional based foreign policy. The Senator said that US have exhibited jungle law and violated all norms of decency and modern civilization. He praised the newly vitalized Political Science Department and its academic activities.

Dr. Rasul Baksh Rais (Pride of Performance), a visiting Professor of Social Sciences at LUMS analyzed in detail the rapidly changing regional environment and presented various options for Pakistan's Security Concerns. In the same session Dr. Imtiaz Bukhari, Vice President, IPRI highlighted dangers of conventional asymmetry among nuclear-armed rivals, Pakistan and India. He was

of the opinion that if arms race between the two South Asian nations goes uninterrupted it can lead to serious armed conflict. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad speaking on Pakistan's Security: Imperative and Rationale of Missiles said that Pakistan has to rely increasingly on the most advanced military technology as a force multiplier for her defense, therefore, correct identification of and timely adjustment to the latest trends in weapons technology is very important. He went on to argue that India's deployment of missile defenses would make imperative for Pakistan's offensive force modernization, so that it could guard itself and penetrate India's defenses. Thus, according to the speaker, Pakistan's nuclear deterrence requires maintenance of an unmistakable, secure retaliatory capability, preferably unchallenged by quantitative or qualitative improvements of Indian missile defense systems. Dr. Khawaja Al-Qama, Professor, Department of International Relations, Multan University was discussant of the session.

The third theme of the Conference dealt with "International Concerns: War, Terrorism & Foreign Policy" and was presided by Dr. Rasul Baksh Rais. Dr. Khawaja Al-Qama's paper was on the Impact of Globalisation on the security of Pakistan. He highlighted concerns that would accompany the efforts of any future global village as presented by the Western industrialized countries. Ms. Tahmina Rashid, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, spoke on the unique subject of the effects of war on women and children. She, in a detailed description of the sufferings of the women, during the recent Iraq war in particular, emphasized that women and children become an easy prey during such conflicts. She gave extensive examples from the Bosnian war where millions of Muslim women became a target of War machine unleashed by the Serbs. She suggested that those provisions of International Law and Conventions that concerns Women and Children must be followed in letter and spirit. Nazir Hussain, Assistant Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-e-Azam University presented a paper on "War on Terrorism: implications for Pakistan" He presented various option for Pakistan's security. His first option is to wipe out the menace of internal terrorism; secondly, to take concerted and practical efforts to stop 'infiltration' in the occupied Kashmir and apply 'hold for a while on Kashmir' policy. Thirdly, in order to forestall any pre-emptive action from India, normalize relations with India, not from a position of

weakness but from a position of strength and fourthly, capitalize upon the new changing strategic environment at the international level and increase contacts and cooperation with European countries, especially with France, Germany and Russia besides traditional friends like China. While Ms. Mubeen Irshad, a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab spoke on "China's Foreign Policy towards Pakistan in the changing Geo-Strategic Environment" and suggested that Pakistan needs to strengthen its relations with its dependable ally, China.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy formed the fourth major theme of the Conference. Dr. Sohail Mahmood, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad presided. Keynote Speaker Dr. Mughees-ud-Din, Associate Professor, Institute of Mass Communication, University of the Punjab exposed the hypocrisy of the American media policy of the American "War Machine" and quoted various examples from the Iraq War where the western media either concealed or misrepresented the real situation at the battlefield. He was of the opinion that Pakistan must be aware of such tendencies. The other speaker Ms. Umbreen Javaid dealt in some length the issues of Indo-US strategic partnership and its ramifications for Pakistan. Dr. Adnan Sarwar Khan, Chairman, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, Peshawar, in his presidential remarks presented various deficiencies in Pakistan foreign policy, especially in reference to Taliban's Afghanistan. In his opinion Pakistan should have played a more responsible role towards its Western neighbour.

The last session dealt with various issues of Pakistan domestic scene in general and provincial dynamics in particular. Dr. Imtiaz H. Bukhari presided this session. The keynote speaker Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad Chaudhry, Chairman, Department of International Relations, Multan University was of the view that for a viable democracy in Pakistan there needs to be a well entrenched political culture and values as well. Aslam Pervaz Memon, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Sindh University presented a paper on the Political Behavior in Pakistan with special reference to Sindh province. His main argument was that although the social fabric of the country is weakening but separatists movements are not likely to gain any prominence in the future – though grave political and economic crisis is weakening the state

structures thus increasing cynicism with politics and the state, which in turn results in the mistrust of the whole political system. Dr. Mansoor Kundi, professor of International Relations, Quetta University presented a detailed account of Tribal Setup and Election of 2002 in Baluchistan and said that these elections are regarded as the watershed elections in the sense that there appeared a drift in the voting behavior from the past elections. For the first time in the political history of the province a party based on ideological/political bases secured a leading position in the elections; while Abdul Latif Tunio, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations educated the audience about the role of the ruling elites in Sindh province. Mrs. Iram Khalid, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab discussed the role of Democracy and its essentials in Pakistan. Dr. Sohail Mahmood critically examined the salient features of governance and its implications for Musharraf/Jamali government. He stressed that emphasis on good governance is a prerequisite of sustainable development and national prosperity. According to him the essentials of good governance are well known and include (i) Accountability; (ii) Voice; (iii) Rule of Law; (iv) Transparency; (v) Participation and (vi) Effective Devolution and Decentralization. In the end he suggested the need for people's participation in policy making as well as decision making process.

The Convener of the Conference, Prof. Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat in his concluding remarks thanked the participants for their excellent presentations and said that the enthusiasm of the students must be recognized and cherished. He also appreciated the efforts of the faculty members, in particular Ms. Tahmina Rashid, the Coordinator of the Conference. The Convener presented the recommendations of the two-day Conference, which were unanimously approved.

PRESENTATIONS

PAKISTAN'S DEFENCE POLICY: IMPERATIVE AND RATIONALE OF MISSILES

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

The offensive missiles are one of Pakistan's most important national security imperatives in the contemporary strategic environment. It has, therefore, taken steps to test and ready a variety of ballistic missiles for induction into its armed forces. The surface to surface Ghauri-I medium range and Shaheen-I short-range ballistic missiles were handed over to Pakistan Army's Strategic Force Command for induction on January 9, 2003 and March 6, 2003, respectively. The Khan Research Laboratories and the National Defence Complex claimed that these missiles carry all types of warheads and are highly accurate.

India had already handed over her surface to surface Prithvi-I, nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles to her Army in May/June 1997.¹ This placed them at some distance from Pakistan's eastern border. According to the Indian official announcement its recently tested Agni-1 missile would be deployed within a year. In addition, India announced to test an Intermediate missile, Agni-111, having 3,500 km-range this year and then move toward the intercontinental-range class.

India's missile program has received boost by her strategic partnership with the United States and her defense collaboration with Russian Federation and Israel. On February 5, 2003, for example, the US eased her rules on the export of dual-use technology to India. The sale of US dual-use technology, or hi-tech products could have military applications.² Moreover, the US did not oppose the transfer of Arrow missile and Cruise missile technologies to India by Israel and Russian Federation, respectively.

The extra-territorial links of the Indian missile program add distinct variable to the emerging missile capabilities in South Asia. While this will be discussed in detail in the latter part of the paper, it is worth mentioning that India is committed to develop and procure anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems. It has a potential to challenge Pakistan's security by upsetting the mutual deterrent relationship between India and Pakistan built on retaliatory

capabilities. An effective Indian ABM force deployed against Pakistan's offensive nuclear capable ballistic missiles would not only undermine its nuclear deterrence against India but also dramatically increase the Indian ability to launch a disarming/decapitating first strike against Pakistan's nuclear assets.

India and Pakistan fail to adopt non-provocative ideas in their strategic policies. Therefore, they have been living in both peace and war –in a condition of radical uncertainty. Consequently, actions by both India and Pakistan at this time appeared to reflect a reversion to what has widely regarded as a central problem in international relations: the so-called security dilemma, defined as "the dynamic in which one state's efforts to increase its security are perceived as being achieved at the expense of another state's security, promoting a spiral of competition that usually manifests itself in an arms race that, ultimately, leads to war".³ Presently, both India and Pakistan interpret each other's defense related-policy(s), as a hostile move. Consequently, they have been involved in perilous conventional and non-conventional arms race.

The strategic analysts in both states claim that the missiles as the means of delivery vehicles, is an integral component of their nuclear strategy. They argued that today, missiles and other pilotless craft could be launched from the air, ground, and sea hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of miles from their intended targets. These weapons find their way to their destinations using a variety of pattern-recognition and other computer technologies. Cruise missiles, for example, are programmed to recognize distinct visual features such as mountains, water formations, and buildings as they find their way to their targets.

It is within this parameter of issues and strategies outlined above that this paper examines the role of missiles as delivery vehicles for Pakistan's security pursuits. In this context, it must be stated that the growing range and sophistication of the Pakistani missile armory has greatly augmented the national capabilities for attack and deterrence.

The Strategic Backdrop

The Military has dominated human affairs since the dawn of civilization. Thucydides wrote that the quest for domination has proved an enduring feature of human existence: "Of the gods we

believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist forever after us..."⁴

The military related inventions gave their possessors tactical and operational advantages with often far reaching strategic effects. Macgregor Knox wrote: "The Industrial Revolution thus progressively abolished time and distance in war, made weapons ever more destructive and precise, and allowed the instantaneous collection of ever-greater amounts of information about both enemy and friendly forces."⁵ Nevertheless, the invention of atomic fission and fusion had brought radical change in the potential destructiveness of warfare. Since 1945, the nuclear weapons and nuclear capable delivery systems have been the focal point of the strategic discourse. Lawrence Freedman wrote, "Part of the nuclear proliferation debate was always the issue of delivery. It was one thing to acquire mighty weapons, but how were they get to their targets?"⁶

The galloping revolution in the weapons-delivery systems is posing continuous challenge to the makers of modern strategy. The most fascinating point in the contemporary strategic thought is that it is based on hypothetical concepts. The nuclear strategists lack the experience of real total war between or among the nuclear weapon states. Ken Booth wrote that the traditional military professionals criticized the nuclear strategists on grounds of their inadequate practical experience.⁷

The nuclearization of South Asia is a reality. May 1998 nuclear explosions chief effect was/is that "total war" between India and Pakistan no longer appeared to be a rational instrument of policy. Its because a nuclear conflict could have no victor. Nevertheless, little else changed. Strategic thinking in both India and Pakistan largely followed traditional patterns. There is more continuity than change in their strategic relations. Indeed, one of the most striking realities, since the 1999 Kargil conflict, has been the growing pessimism about the prospects for avoiding limited war between India and Pakistan.

The Indo-Pakistan border remains heavily militarized. Indian and Pakistani troops frequently clash across the Line of Control (LOC) between India and Pakistan. The artillery duels and firing of small arms have been a regular feature along LOC. In addition, they

have been fighting limited border war at the Siachen Glacier, since the winter 1983-84. The 2002 eyeball to eyeball confrontation further augmented the mistrust and deteriorated their relations. There is a possibility that the current tension and hostile propaganda could ignite total conventional war, which may lead to nuclear weapons exchanges.

This condition of relationship questions the pro-nuclear lobby belief that states behave with robust caution when confronted with even a modicum of nuclear risk. According to this school of thought, fearful of the prospect of nuclear engagement states are deterring from acts that raise nuclear risk. Kenneth Waltz, for example, argues that "the presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious ... Why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything?"⁸ To be precise nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have failed to ensure peace in the region. It seems that they accommodated the nuclear weapons in their belligerent environment.

On January 4, 2003 India publicly announced a formal nuclear command structure under civilian control.⁹ Which made public a set of political principles and administrative arrangements to manage her arsenal of atomic weapons. Although the broad outline of India's nuclear doctrine was already known, but the nature and chain of her command and control over the nuclear weapons had remained unclear. In fact, On August 17, 1999 an officially constituted advisory panel to the Indian National Security Council released draft of her nuclear doctrine. Only a formal Indian parliament's approval of that draft is awaited.

India conducted five separate missile tests in January, February and March 2003, including one of the surface to surface, solid propellant, nuclear-capable Agni-I, which has a range of 700-750 kilometers and can be launched from rail and road sites—allowing for easy transport. On February 12, 2003 the successful test of Brahmos the supersonic anti-ship cruise missile with a 280-290 kilometer range, jointly developed by India and Russia, would have great strategic implications for Pakistan. Moreover, the Brahmos test had introduced a new family (Cruise) of missile in South Asia.

Pakistan, however, did not test any missile in response to the Indian January/February 2003 tests. On March 26, 2003, however, Pakistan tested her Abdali; a short-range nuclear capable missile

after India conducted the sixteenth test of her Prithvi 1—a short-range missile capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. On January 9, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher reiterated comments he made after India and Pakistan tested missiles in October 2002, saying that the test contributed "to a charged atmosphere" on the subcontinent. He added that, despite publicly announcing the tests in advance, India's latest test would "make it harder to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear and missile arms race".¹⁰

The announcement of Indian nuclear command structure and her missile tests verify that India has been strengthening her military muscle, which pose a serious challenge to Pakistan's current defensive arrangements. To be precise, military security, as ever, remains the priority of Islamabad. Therefore, Pakistan has adopted and articulated its much-criticized strategy of last resort.

India's Nuclear Doctrine: Offensive and Defensive Missile Capabilities

On January 4, 2003 in a statement issued after the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting—attended by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his deputy Lal Kishenchand Advani, Defence Minister George Fernandes and Foreign Minister—the government announced, any decision to launch a nuclear attack will be taken by the political leadership and executed through the nuclear command. Moreover, the CCS also approved arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliation in all eventualities. The important details of the CCS announcement are the following:

- The NCA comprised:
A Political Council, and An Executive Council.
- *The Political Council*
Chaired by the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee.
Power: It is the sole body, which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.
- *The Executive Council*
Chaired by the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister Brajesh Mishra.
Responsibility: Provides inputs for decision making by the NCA and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.
- *Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Forces Command*
He is responsible for the administration of the nuclear forces.

It was also reported that besides those from the services, the Strategic Command would have a fair number of civilian staff, including experts from the Indian Nuclear Energy Commission and missile experts from the Defence Research & Development Organization. Significantly, the creation of the Strategic Forces Command had ended the tussle between General Headquarters Indian Army and Air Headquarters Indian Air Force for the control and command of Indian nuclear arsenal, till the writing of these lines.¹¹

The CCS once again confirmed the essence of the 1999 nuclear draft as an official policy. The structure, therefore, would help India to ensure a swift retaliatory strike and avoid any confusion that was bound to unfold if it faced a nuclear, chemical or biological attack. The only new element in the doctrine is the interesting caution it has introduced to its "No-first use" posture. India said its arsenal aimed to deter threats not just from nuclear weapons, but also those from chemical and biological weapons. "In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons," the CCS stated.

India's establishment of a nuclear command and control system was aimed at giving a structure to its strike capability. In addition, the announcement to use nuclear weapons if attacked with biological and chemical weapons was an important extension of her policy of using nuclear weapons. This proves that nuclear weapon and their use is very much a part of India's strategic policy.

The United States has also retained a nuclear retaliatory option to prevent nations with chemical and biological weapons from assuming that the use of these weapons of mass destruction will not invite a nuclear response. Significantly, President Bush's new security doctrine suggests that the United States will henceforth attack adversaries to prevent them not only from using but also from acquiring the technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction. While following the Americans experience, India may adopt this strategy in the near future.

The Indian CCS, however, did not announce all. Missing from its statement is the actual composition of the NCA at its Political and Executive levels. The Government also mentions that it has "reviewed and approved the arrangements for alternate chains of

command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities". This is a reference to a situation in which the Prime Minister may be incapacitated during a crisis. But the CCS did not reveal how the power to press the nuclear button would move down to the political chain in the event of such a contingency. Importantly, the acute problem—technological backwardness—exists in the process of succession within the command authority. India lacks the ability to install uninterrupted communications channels between different levels of succession.

Among its other recommendations, the National Security Advisory Board had asked the government to review its no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy in light of the history of the last four years in its *National Security Review*, submitted to National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra on December 2002.¹² The CCS didn't accept this recommendation. It makes sense that a country with large conventional resources will not renounce the option of No First using nuclear weapons.

The recent developments indicate that India is hurtling towards inducting nuclear weapons into her armed forces. In the near future, India may give up her present force-in-being nuclear posture and assemble and operationalize her nuclear weapons.

The salient features of the Indian Nuclear Policy

1. India builds and maintains a credible minimum deterrent.
2. India would use nuclear weapons only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere. The civilian political leadership through the NCA can only authorize retaliatory attacks.
3. India would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
4. Against nuclear weapon powers, its strategy would remain one of "No-first use". But the nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy. Therefore, India would build a triad of nuclear forces and maintain a credible second-strike capability.
5. India will exercise its nuclear option, if her territory or her forces are attacked with biological and chemical weapons.
6. It maintains strict control over the export of sensitive technologies and materials.

7. It would continue the moratorium on further nuclear testing.
8. It is ready to join multilateral arms control agreements and a commitment to global disarmament. It seems that she will participate in negotiations of the Fissile Material Control Treaty.

India's Missile Capabilities

The above discussion reveals that India has been trying to develop and operationalize nuclear forces, which are enduring, diverse, and flexible. These forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, land-based missiles and sea-based assets. Therefore, India has been developing nuclear capable surface to surface short/medium range ballistic missiles. India also possessed nuclear capable aircraft—Jaguars, Mig-27, SU-30 and Mirage 2000. In addition India has plan to put some of her nuclear weapons at sea in order to protect them from attack. Therefore, India has been trying get an Akula II class nuclear submarine from Russia on lease and testing Brahmos missile.

In July 1983, under India's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), India launched a \$ 1 billion Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). The state-run DRDO employs approximately 30,000 people including nearly 7,000 scientific and technological personnel. It operates through a network of 50 laboratories, 70 academic institutions, 50 national science and technology centres and around 150 state-owned and private-industrial units.¹³ They make India self-reliant in both solid and liquid rocket fuels.¹⁴ The IGMDP today comprises five core missile systems. The Prithvi (Earth) short-range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) and the Agni (Fire) Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) were developed in close association with India's space industry. The other three missile programs are the Akash (Sky) medium-range Surface to Air Missile (SAM), the Trishul (Trident) short-range SAM and the Nag (Cobra) Anti-Tank Guided Missile. In addition to these five core missiles, the Indian scientists have been engaged in the development of the Surya (Sun) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the Sagarika (Ocean) Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and BrahMos—supersonic cruise missile.¹⁵

India's pursuit for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems

India's ABM defense systems capability has evolved after many years of clandestine research and development. Since July 1983, the Indian scientists have been engaged in fusing the foreign and domestic research and components for the development of the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD).¹⁶ India's other preference for augmenting its TMD potential is to buy these missiles from the friendly states. The Russian Federation and Israel had signed agreements with India, under which India has been receiving TMD components and technology from these states.

According to the published literature, the Indian scientists have successfully developed a limited capability of TMD, designed to protect Indian forces from the hostile theater and tactical missiles. Presently, they are conducting its verifying tests. While, its an open secret that their plan is not only limited to the development of the TMD, they have designs to extend or expand these capabilities, which could provide an effective defensive shield to entire India against the Chinese and the Pakistani theater and strategic ballistic missiles. In simple words one can say that their ABM scope is, more or less, identical to the US National Missile Defense (NMD) system.

Pakistan's Defense Policy: Nuclear and Missile Capabilities

India's far greater population, financial resources, military forces and strategic depth advantages have prompted Pakistan to seek qualitative solutions. Indeed, the issue quantity versus quality guided Pakistan for indigenous technological solution and consequently turned her to state-of-the-art weaponry. Modern weapons technology came to the fore as a force multiplier. Pakistan's drive for indigenous defense production not only established strategic balance between India and Pakistan, but also brought entire India in the striking reach of Pakistan.

Minimum nuclear deterrence is the preferred and announced strategy of Pakistan against India. On March 6, 2003 the President of Pakistan reiterated that Pakistan sought peace in South Asia but would not compromise its minimum Defence needs. He ruled out the pursuit of an arms race and emphasized the need to consolidate minimum deterrence as a cornerstone of Pakistan's security policy.¹⁷

Ironically, the major powers condemn Pakistan's indigenous missile programme and oppose alleged transfer of missile-related technology. On September 1, 2001 the Bush administration announced that it would levy sanctions on a Chinese privately owned Metallurgical Equipment Corporation for shipping missile equipments to Pakistan's state-owned National Development Complex, in violation of a pledge Beijing made last November.¹⁸ Significantly, the US has not condemned the successful test of India's BrahMos-supersonic cruise missile developed jointly with the Russian Federation on April 28, 2002.

Since February 1989, Pakistan has been testing its ballistic missiles. Despite it in 1993, Pakistan proposed for the establishment of 'South Asia Zero Missile Zone'. For avoiding missiles race, in October 1989, Pakistan again proposed Strategic Restraint Regime to India. It encompassed prevention of nuclear and ballistic missile race, risk reduction mechanism and the proposition that nuclear deterrence should be pursued at the lowest possible level. Regrettably all these proposals were rejected by India and largely ignored by the international community. Consequently, Pakistan has also not capped its missiles program.

Pakistan's Missiles

Name	Alternate Names	Range (km)	Payload (kg)	Test Firings	Developer	Status
Hatf-1		70-100	500	April 1989	KRL	In service since 1996
Hatf-1A		100	500	February 2000	KRL	In service?
Hatf-2		260-300	500	April 1989	KRL	In service?
Hatf-3		800		3 July 1997?	KRL?	Never deployed
Hatf-4	Shaheen-1	750	1000	15 April 1999	NDC	In service
Hatf-5	Ghauri-1	1100-1500	700	6 April 1998	KRL	In service
Hatf-6?	Ghauri-2	2000	500-700?	14 April 1999	KRL	
Hatf-7	Shaheen-2	2400-2500	1000	Declared ready for test	NDC	
	Ghauri-3? (Ghaznavi?)	3000		15 August 2000?	KRL	
M-9	CSS-8/DF-15	600-650	500		China	Supplied?
M-11	CSS-7/DF-11	300	500-800		China	30-80 supplied

Rationale of Missiles Development

Aircraft and missile are the important delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons. Though Pakistan maintains both, the recent developments indicate that Pakistan has given great importance to the ballistic missiles in her policy of minimum nuclear deterrence against India. Why use ballistic missile rather than aircraft? After all, aircraft are reusable, more versatile, and are capable of much better accuracy than first-generation of missiles.¹⁹ Despite it, as means of delivery, ballistic missile not only comprise an integral component of Pakistan's strategy, they are viewed as a cost effective means for both nuclear pre-emptive and second strike weapon against India. The ballistic missiles seemed optimum solution in Pakistan's deterrence strategy because of India's air supremacy, anticipated high rate of aircraft attrition, lack of strategic depth and failure to develop aircraft indigenous industry.

A comparison of aircraft and missile shows that it is much easier to defend against an attack by aircraft. The modern air defenses equipped with sophisticated radar systems and anti-aircraft guns or surface to air missile very easily identifies and hit the adversary's aircraft. Nevertheless, the technology of missile defense seems inadequate to cope with a sustained offensive attack. The lack of defenses against strategic ballistic missiles makes an attack virtually unstoppable. It is also much less expensive to keep a missile force on continuous alert. Thus, the desire to be able to deliver nuclear weapons quickly and surely may explain why Pakistan is developing ballistic missiles. The following discussion would further explain the rationale of missiles in Pakistan's nuclear strategy.

India has been engaged in procuring and developing a very sophisticated air defense system. For example, India had developed and tested a short-range surface to air missile—Trishul and medium range surface to air missile—Akash. It seems that in any future war between India and Pakistan, the Pakistani air force will be victim of high attrition rate—greater than 10 percent per sorties. Of course, attrition rates greater than 10 percent are rare and only occur when a combat is greatly overmatched or when targets are especially well defended.²⁰ The imbalance in the Indian and Pakistani airforces affirms that the combat not only be greatly overmatched but the balance will be in favor of India. In simple words, with increasing its air defense capabilities, India can easily render Pakistan's airforce

"impotent and obsolete". In addition, when the aircraft are shot down the Pakistan also loss highly trained pilots.

Pakistan's geographical narrowness or lack of strategic depth leaves her airfields/ airbases within range of Indian surface to surface missiles. Therefore, Pakistan's airfields are more vulnerable to preemptive attack of her belligerent neighbor. On April 2, 2003, the Foreign Minister of India, Yashwant Sinha said that India would go for preemptive operations again Pakistan. He stated "We derive some satisfaction ... because I think all those people in the international community ... realize that India has a much better case to go for preemptive action against Pakistan than the US has in Iraq."²¹ The geographical proximity and short distance make Pakistan airbases tempting targets for preemptive strikes by the Indians.

India with her preemptive conventional missile strikes can neutralize much of Pakistan's airforce capabilities, even before the war. As might be expected, Pakistan's lack of depth has exerted a powerful influence on the formation of its strategic doctrine. The credibility and effectiveness of the Pakistan's nuclear deterrent needs manifest capability of it to inflict unacceptable damage on India if it attacks. To be precise, in this sort of geo-strategic setup, credible minimum nuclear deterrence requires triad of aircraft, land-based missiles and sea-based assets. The survivability of Pakistan's retaliatory forces can only be enhanced by a combination of their multiple systems, mobility, dispersion and deception. Mobile ballistic missiles can be easily dispersed and thus can be difficult to destroy. Moreover, missiles have the advantage of not requiring visible facilities such as airstrips.

The arm embargoes taught Pakistan a self-reliance lesson. Much of this outlook was brought to Pakistan, which from her declaration of Independence experienced serious problems in strengthening her military muscle with the purchases from her Western allies. For example, the United States, number of times, imposed sanctions against Pakistan. Those sanctions not only hinder/ban the procurement of new weapons, but also cut off the supply of spare-parts during the crisis. For instance, the US imposed arms embargo against Pakistan in 1965. The arms embargo severely affected Pakistan armed forces, especially air force. Hence, the main emphasis of the Armed Forces of Pakistan has been to modernize its equipment without relying on any one external source.

Moreover, Pakistan's the Aircraft Manufacturing Centers are not advanced. Therefore, it is not possible for Pakistan to manufacture the indigenous nuclear capable aircraft in the near future. To be precise, missile is the optimum choice for Pakistan, which not only save its foreign reserves, but also end its vulnerability to the foreign suppliers.

Pakistan's Offensive Missiles versus India's ABM systems: Critical Appraisal

India's commitment to develop and procure ABM defense system holds a defensive inclination. Simultaneously, it has a potential to challenge Pakistan's offensive missiles and would upset the mutual deterrent relationship between India and Pakistan built on retaliatory capabilities. This generates apprehension that the Indian ABM would erode the strategic equilibrium and shift balance of power in its favor.

The calculus of real-politick holds that India behind the safe-missile shield might be more likely to adopt adventurous policies against Pakistan, especially when it would be simply relying on the missile as its nuclear weapons delivery vehicle. For instance, by neutralizing Pakistan's retaliatory capabilities with the deployment of anti-missile systems, India could launch a conventional war or nuclear pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, without fear of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. Such apprehensions have not only been expressed by Pakistani strategists,²² but also by the foreign security analysts. Michael Quinlan wrote, "sudden strike and the use thereafter of systems such as *Arrow* to ward off surviving retaliatory capability might give India a pre-emptive option".²³

The issue that India's ABM system would undermine Pakistan's nuclear deterrence or wear away its missile offensive missile striking capability is debatable. The development of foolproof ABM system is extremely costly and complex. The important question is that whether India will be able to develop and deploy an effective ABM system in the near future? Will it provide an effective defensive shield to India against Pakistan's nuclear strikes? These questions need serious considerations, before taking a final decision.

Importantly, India needs to master in the following components of weapons and sensors for deploying an effective ABM against Pakistan.

- (1) Battle Management Command and Control Centre. The center should possess advance technologies, which constitute appropriate the C4I system (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence)²⁴.
- (2) A Ground-based Ballistic Missile Interceptor Missile.
- (3) Warhead or exoatmospheric kill vehicle mounted on the interceptor.
- (4) High frequency land based early warning radar, for example, x-band radar and space based information gathering (satellites) systems. For identifying and detecting hostile missile (short, medium, intermediate-ballistic missiles) from its launch boost phase and its approximate flight course, tracking its path and forwarding its data to the Command Centre.

Whereas, Pakistani strategists must take into account the following five interrelated issues:

- (1) The nature of threat posed by the ABM system.
- (2) The technical feasibility of India's ABM capabilities and its likely effectiveness in addressing Pakistan's offensive ballistic missiles capabilities.
- (3) Short and medium ballistic missile flights time, i.e. three to eleven minutes.
- (4) The geographical terrain of Pakistan.
- (5) The nature of nuclear weapons and effects of nuclear explosion.

Theoretically, during the future Indo-Pakistan conflict, India could target and destroy Pakistan's offensive missiles at the four different stages. They are:

- (1) *Pre-launch stage*, meaning attacking the missiles before their launch.
- (2) *Boost-phase interception*, meaning attacking the missiles while their rocket booster is accelerating them. During the boost phase, booster burns and the missile move relatively slowly.
- (3) *Exo-atmospheric interception or in midcourse*, meaning attacking the missiles or their warheads during midcourse in the upper atmosphere or above it, when the attacking missile is traveling outside the atmosphere.

- (4) *Endo-atmospheric interception*, meaning attacking the missiles or their warheads during the re-entry phases in the lower, denser atmosphere. When the offensive missile is approaching its targets within the atmosphere.

India needs advance ABM technology for targeting and destroying hostile ballistic missile at its pre-launch stage, in its boost phase, mid-course/trajectory, and re-entry phase. The available literature concerning the Indian scientific research and development indicates that it's too difficult for India to acquire proficiency in ABM technologies in the near future.²⁵ At the same time, one cannot underestimate the Indian's commitment with the modernization of its nuclear and missile programme. During 1993 - 2000, military research and development expenditure by the India's Department of Defense Research and Development of the Ministry of Defense had increased by roughly 66 percent. In addition, the Indian Department of Atomic Energy increased its total budget by 24 percent in real terms over the period 1998/99 - 2000/01.²⁶ This indicates that India is spending a huge amount on its ambitious nuclear and missile programmes. Moreover, it is receiving missile technology assistance covertly/overtly from Israel and Russian Federation. The transfers of missile technology certainly enable India to overcome the shortcomings, which it is facing in the development of ABM system. But these developments do not provide India a foolproof missile shield against the Pakistani nuclear strikes.

The most feasible choice for India is that it destroys Pakistan's offensive ballistic missiles at their pre-launch stage or in their boost phase. In fact, there is one inflexible rule about missile defense - the later you detect and intercept an enemy missile, the closer it will be when you destroy it, and the smaller the area you can defend. Conversely, the earlier you can detect, and act, the farther away it will be when you destroy it and the greater the area you can defend. Therefore, farther is better. It gives you enough time to gain a chance for a second or third shot if you miss. In addition, during the pre-launch stage the missile is at static position and it is easier to hit it, instead when it is moving. For this strategy, India requires advanced surveillance and efficient intelligence systems for the identification of missile deployments. Secondly, its own missiles should have high degree of accuracy. Both are not available to India, as yet.

India's both Prithvi and Agni missiles have a large circular error probable (CEP). TS Gopi Rethinaraj argued:

Prithvi poses serious technical dilemmas. Even though India claims that it would use only conventional warheads with Prithvi, the high circular error probable of the missile is a serious deficiency in carrying out precise attacks. Deploying the short-range Prithvi with nuclear payloads, on the other hand, is fraught with other risks.²⁷

Thus, with these missiles India cannot initiate a disarming first strike in the present situation, though she is trying to overcome these drawbacks.

In boost phase the offensive missile travels at a relatively slow speed, the target is large as compare to mid-course and re-entry phase. It presents a high infrared profile. It also eliminates the problems of dealing with multiple warheads or sub-munitions.²⁸ But the problem with this option is that the reaction time is very limited. A boost-phase intercept would need to be conducted within the 250-second burn-time of an ICBM.²⁹ Therefore, in case of short and medium range missiles, the reaction time is even lesser than one minute. Secondly, a boost-phase defense can only work if the interceptor is stationed at a distance of 500km from the target.³⁰ Thus even if India would station an interceptor on its border with Pakistan, it would be incapable to target Pakistan's medium range missiles- Ghauri and Shaheen that could be launched sufficiently far away from the eastern border. In addition, India's boost phase interceptors, in principle, would be vulnerable to Pakistan's short-range missile- Hatf 1, Hatf 1A and Abdali or aerial attack. The alternative to the ABM Ground based boost phase intercept is the Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL) and Space based Laser. India's mastering in these sophisticated technologies will take many years.

In case of midcourse, the missile can be intercepted while it travels in the upper atmosphere or vacuum of outer space. In case of ICBM, mid-course is attractive because it is the longest phase. It permits more time for decision to the command and control centre for reaction. Secondly, it permits multiple chances to destroy a warhead.³¹ Thirdly, the warhead is destroyed when it is moving through the space; therefore, there is no risk of the nuclear explosion fallout. However, the most serious problem with a mid-course option

against Pakistan is that its short and medium range missiles make smaller trajectory curve. India, however, is reportedly receiving Israel's Arrow missile technology for its ABM systems. The Arrow-2 uses a mobile two-stage interceptor missile carrying a blast-fragmentation warhead. Its capabilities are identical to the Patriot PAC-3. Notably, Patriot PAC-3 is designed to defend limited areas from short and medium range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft.³² It seems that it can be an effective weapon against the tactical missiles or it can be used for defending counter force targets. The US, with usual restrictions, however, is funding this project

Technically, intercepting during the re-entry phase or within the atmosphere is easier for the ABM because warhead is highly visible to radar and to optical sensors. Due to very hot 'wake' produced by the Mach-23 RV as it enters the atmosphere, balloons and light chaff are no longer effective against sensors; they will be retarded or destroyed on re-entry. Though there is little time left at this point. Computers can calculate the trajectory of the warheads, making interception possible. A sophisticated attacker, however, can complicate the problem by making the warhead maneuverable and the interceptor may not be able to determine its path. In this case the warhead must be destroyed twenty miles above the earth, otherwise there would be fall-out damages.³³

Destroying nuclear warhead in the re-entry phase is not an appropriate defensive action. The fall-out damages associated with the nuclear explosion are inevitable. In fact, the nuclear devices result from nuclear fission, the splitting of large, unstable atoms, most commonly uranium-235 (a radioactive isotope of the element uranium) or plutonium-239 (another radioactive element, one that is essentially man-made). The immediate effects of nuclear explosion, at the instant of detonation are approximately 35 percent of the energy released in a typical thermonuclear detonation is emitted as heat, 50 percent as blast, and 15 percent as radiation. Unlike a conventional explosion, the heat from a nuclear explosion lasts for a relatively long time. And it creates a firestorm. The energy released as blast occurs in two forms. Dynamic overpressure is felt as strong winds of greater than hurricane force, but more remarkable and unique to nuclear explosions, is the static overpressure, which results from the rapidly expanding fireball and the compression it produce. Static overpressure is a force that presses on all surrounding structures like a great hand, maintaining its pressure for several

seconds. The energy released as radiation from a nuclear explosion appears as radioactive fallout. The major forms of this prompt radiation are X-rays, Gamma rays, and Neutrons.³⁴

The 15 percent of a nuclear explosion's energy that is released is in the form of radiation, one third – or 5 percent of the total release – appears as immediate radiation, the remaining 10 percent occurs as radioactive fallout. The intensity of fallout depends on many factors, among them whether the explosion is an airburst or a ground-burst. The airbursts are preferred for destroying relatively large, unprotected targets such as entire cities, because the blast and heat effects would be more widely distributed instead of being absorbed by the mass of the target itself.³⁵

Conclusion

Pakistan has to rely on the most advanced military technology as a force multiplier for her defense. Therefore, correct identification of and timely adjustment to the latest trends in weapons technology is very important. India's deployment of missile defenses would make imperative for Pakistan's offensive force modernization. So that it could guard itself and penetrate India's defenses. Thus, Pakistan's nuclear deterrence requires maintenance of an unmistakable, secure retaliatory capability, preferably unchallenged by quantitative or qualitative improvements of Indian missile defense systems.

Admittedly, state-of-the-art weapons systems have become prohibitively expensive, and it is too difficult for Pakistan's economy to carry this burden. Therefore, Pakistan should be very selective in developing and deploying cost effective weapons and gives proper attention to the non-material aspects of war such as the quality of planning and training of her armed forces.

NOTES

¹ "Indian -Pakistani Missile Activities, Accelerate As Bilateral Talks Continue", *Arms Control Today*, June/July 1997, p. 24.

² "US eases rules on export of dual-use tech to India", *Dawn*, February 7, 2003.

³ Geoffrey Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence Ideas and Practices in International Security* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 3.

⁴ Macgregor Knox, "Conclusion: Continuity and revolution in the making of strategy", in Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, edit, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1994), p. 614.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 640.

⁶ Wyne Q. Brown, *The Politics of Ballistic Missile Non proliferation* (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. viii.

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⁸ David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers", *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 87-119.

⁹ C. Raja Mohan, "Nuclear Command Authority comes into being", *The Hindu* (January 5, 2003). <<http://www.thehindu.com/stories/2003010504810100.htm>>.

¹⁰ Rose Gordon, "India Conducts Four Missile Tests", *Arms Control Today* (March 2003).

¹¹ C. Raja Mohan, "Nuclear Command Authority comes into being", *The Hindu* (January 5, 2003) <<http://www.thehindu.com/stories/2003010504810100.htm>>, Josy Joseph, "India sets up Strategic Forces Command", *Rediff. com* (January 4, 2003), <http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/04nuke1.htm>, and see Kerry Boyd, "India Establishes Formal Nuclear Command Structure", *Arms Control Today* (January/February 2003).

¹² "Abandon no-first use policy, Security Board tells govt" (January 9, 2003) <http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/09na.htm>.

¹³ Rahul Bedi, "Mixed fortunes for India's defense industrial revolution", *Jane's International Defense Review*, Vol. 32, May 1999, pp. 23-30. See also Bala Menon, "India: Mythology and Missiles", *The Frontier Post*, Islamabad, February 3, 1997.

¹⁴ Rear Admiral Raja Menon, *A Nuclear Strategy for India*, (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2000), p. 210.

¹⁵ "More tests for BrahMos cruise missile: Fernandes", *Hindustan Times.com* (May 8, 2002) <<http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/090502/dLNAT04.asp>> BrahMos—which derives its name from the Brahmaputra and Moscow rivers in India and Russia—developed jointly with the Russian Federation. It is designed for use with land, sea and aerial platforms. The BrahMos violated the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Missile Technology Control Regime MTCR is a voluntary regime of 33 states that restricts exports of missiles (and their components) capable of carrying a 500-kilogram

payload at least 300 kilometers. The development of Brahmos had not been condemned by the United States.

¹⁶ Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "India's Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme: Impact on Pakistan's Security", *IPRI Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer, 2002, p. 59.

¹⁷ Shashwati handed over to Army", *The Nation*, March 7, 2003.

¹⁸ These sanctions were imposed because China was selling missile components prohibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). China is not a member of the MTCR but agreed in 2000 to adhere to its guidelines.

¹⁹ Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction", *International security*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991.

²⁰ Steve Fetter, Op. Cit.

²¹ "Indian FM hints at pre-emptive strike against Pakistan", *The News*, April 3, 2003.

²² Brig. Naeem Ahmad Salik, "Pakistan's Ballistic Missile Development Programme-Security Imperatives, Rationale and Objectives", Op. cit. p38.

²³ Michael Quinlan, "How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence?", *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Winter 2000-01) p. 150.

²⁴ Information creation, communication, analysis, and exploitation have always played a key role in military strategy and operations. C4I systems designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control across the range of military operations and to generate information and knowledge about an adversary and friendly forces. *Realizing The Potential of C4I Fundamental Challenges*, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999) pp. 1, 27, and 28.

²⁵ In 1999, the Indian Ati-Farty Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense severely criticized the ordinance factory board for operating its 39 units in a 'sub-standard environment' and under-utilizing their capacity. So in order to overcome these drawbacks the Indian government has opened its monopolistic state-owned defence industry to private participation through licensing, with a direct foreign investment. See Rahul Bedi, "India's defence industry open to private investors", *Jane's Defence Weekly* (May 31, 2001) <www.defence.janes.com/New>.

²⁶ Elisabeth Skons, Evamaria Loosa-Weinttaub, Wuyi Omitoogun, Pelter Stalenheim and Reinhilde Weidacher, "Military Expenditure and arms production", *SIPRI YEARBOOK 2001- Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 253,254

²⁷ TS Gopi Rethinaraj, "Nuclear diplomacy returns to South Asian security agenda", *Jane's Intelligence Review* (May 2002) p 41.

²⁸ Intercepting an ICBM in its boost phase—that is, while the rocket motor is still burning—has other advantages over attempting a mid-course intercept. Instead of having to hit a small, relatively cool warhead that is traveling quickly, the target is a large, hot booster that is moving more slowly. See Richard L. Garwin, "Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative", *Arms Control Today* (September 2000).

< http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_09/bpisept00.asp>

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Dr. Ayesha Siddiqi Agha, "Facing threat of three-way nexus", *Dawn* (September, 7, 2001) p. 7.

³¹ Wade Boese, "Pentagon Seeks Missile Defense Budget Increase, Reorganization", *Arms Control Today* (July/August 2001) p21.

³² Shannon N. Kile, "Nuclear arms control and ballistic missile defense", *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (UK: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.445

³³ Mackubin Owens, *Bomb Blocking. The American Enterprise* (Washington DC: April/May 2001).

³⁴ David P. Barash, *Introduction to Peace Studies* (California: Wadsworth Inc, 1991) pp. 108, 109.

³⁵ Ibid. p 111.

WAR ON TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Nazir Hussain

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington commonly known as 9/11 created a far-reaching new security paradigm at the international level. The primary focus of the world, especially of the US security policy became to wipe out the menace of terror and terrorist hideouts in the world. The US target of 'war on terror' turned out to be Afghanistan, on the basis of 'either with us or with the terrorists' policy. The states around the world had to choose between supporting the US 'war on terror' or else face its wrath.

Pakistan, a country neighboring Afghanistan and itself a victim of terrorism for the last many years had to decide either to support the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or side with the US to join the international coalition against terrorism. Keeping in view the strategic realities in the East as well as in its Western fronts, and to safeguarding its national interests, Pakistan decided to be part of international coalition against terrorism.

Though Pakistan gained some tangible benefits and broke its diplomatic isolation but the continued US 'war on terror' in Afghanistan and possibility of its extension elsewhere in the world, posed severe challenges to Pakistan. Therefore the aim of this paper is to analyze the strategic implications of 'war on terror' on Pakistan. The paper would focus on internal, regional and international implications on Pakistan, and suggest some policy options for Pakistan in the light of contemporary regional and international political environment.

Conceptual Framework

Regardless of the presence of academic literature on terrorism, it would have been easier and simpler to define terrorism before the September attacks but it has now become a complex and complicated issue because it involves judgment values, political connotations and specific mindset. Even the UN General Assembly session, which was convened in the aftermath of September attacks, could not arrive at a consensus definition. However, for objective analysis, it is important to discuss both political and non-political definitions of terrorism.

The term terrorism usually applied to 'organized acts or threats of violence designed to intimidate the opponents or to publicize grievances. It frequently involves bombing, kidnapping, airplane hijacking, the taking of hostages and assassinations'.¹ The term dates from the French Revolution but has taken additional meaning in the 20th century. Walter Laqueur, a well known authority on political violence, states that terrorism is the sub-state application of violence intended to sow panic in society, bring about some desired political change, and has even become a substitute for war between states. It operates at dual levels; its 'political arm' provides the means of social contact to make it widely acceptable and its 'military wing' engages in acts of violence. However, Laqueur finds both conventional features and postmodern distinctive features in modern-day terrorism from aggressive movements to religious fundamentalism.²

Bruce Hoffman, an expert on terrorism, defines it as an 'ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent or, equally important, threatens violence; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim of target; conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial structure perpetrated by a sub-national or non-state entity'.³ However, a more comprehensive definition is given by Jonathan White;⁴ 'In simple terms it is violence or threatened violence intended to produce fear or change; In legal terms it is criminal violence, violating legal codes and punishable by the state; Analytically, specific political and social factors behind individual terrorist acts; State-sponsored, terrorist groups used by small states and the Communist bloc to attack western interests; and lastly the state terrorism, which is power of the government used to terrorize its people into submission'.

Over the years there have appeared many non-academic and political meanings of terrorism but the study would take only a few. The UK prevention of Terrorism Act 1976 describes it as 'the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear'.⁵ The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as 'the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological'.⁶ The European Union

Justice and Interior Ministers have also evolved a definition, which describe it a 'series of acts committed with the intention of seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country'.⁷ The list includes the same crimes, which have been sighted by other sources, but it makes a distinction to the legitimate demonstrations involving trade unions and anti-globalization protests.

Though these definitions differ in their thrust and context, but there is a common factor of psychological impact which terrorism is aimed at. Before evolving a framework for the present study it is important to make distinction between terrorism and movements of self-determination. Terrorism is intended to make political gains whereas movements of self-determination fight for their political cause (enshrined by the UN, and these people are subject to state terrorism) which is denied by the respective states. At this juncture it is also pertinent to distinguish between terrorism and religion. No religion preaches violence neither propagates terrorism, infact terrorism has no religion. However, the religious extremism, which got momentum at the end of 20th century, may espouse and adopt many methods and techniques of terrorism.⁸

Therefore, in the light of above discussion, the present study would adopt the meaning of terrorism, which is intended to create psychological effects in order to gain political, economic and military objectives, whether that act of terrorism is committed by an individual, a group, or the state itself. In the context of US 'war on terror', the meaning of the term would be any act of violence or actions intended to jeopardize the interests of the US, anywhere in the world.

War on Terror and Pakistan

The 9/11 terrorist attack in America posed severe psychological and security challenges to the US administration. Initially it was extremely difficult to take any major decision as the country was passing through immense insecurity crisis. As the identity of the culprits behind this act of terrorism was unknown, the US was unable to take immediate action. However, the US president George Bush announced that,

The search is under way for those who are behind these evil acts, have directed the full resources of our intelligence and law

enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.⁹

The entire world condemned these acts of terrorism and pledged their support to the US for any possible action against the terrorists and their hideouts. Pakistan, being a victim of religious and sectarian terrorism itself for the last many years due to the Afghan crisis, also condemned the terrorist attacks and promised to join the international community to wipe out terrorism. In this regard President Pervez Musharraf issued a statement on September 12, 2001,

We regard terrorism as an evil that threatens the world community. Concerted international effort is needed to fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The carnage in New York and Washington has raised this struggle to new level. Pakistan has been extended cooperation to international efforts to combat terrorism in the past and will continue to do so. All countries join this common cause. I wish to assure President Bush and the US Government of our unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.¹⁰

Though in the beginning the US adopted a very cautious attitude and maintained ambiguity about the expected culprits but it was not too late that it declared Osama Bin Laden as the prime suspect and formulated its policy to eliminate Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and their sanctuaries, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. At one hand the US put demand to handing over Bin Laden, while on the other hand started to mobilize international opinion in order to win support of all other states of the world to successfully undertake any action against the terrorists and their hideouts. For this purpose President Bush announced on September 20, 2001 that, "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make, either you are with us or with the terrorists."¹¹

By stating earlier that the action would not be confined to the terrorists alone but will also include those who support them, the US left the world with two options, i.e., either they are with the US or with

Implications for Pakistan

Though, what Pakistan demanded was not fully met yet the Pakistani decision to join international coalition against 'war on terror' brought some economic relief for her, which was passing through severe economic crisis as the country had accumulated \$40 billion foreign debt. Washington lifted its economic sanctions against Pakistan and wrote off \$1 billion loans, Japan also followed the US and wrote off its \$1 billion loan. Several European countries also rescheduled various loans. Concerned about the illicit supply of arms and ammunition to the Taliban regime from Pakistan, US announced \$73 million emergency aid to Islamabad to strengthen security on the country's porous borders with Afghanistan.¹⁸

A few days later, on the eve of President Pervez Musharraf's meeting with President George Bush in New York, Washington pledged \$1 billion in aid to Pakistan, doubling the earlier proposal to give \$500 million. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) announced to increase economic assistance to Pakistan from the planned \$626 million to \$950 million. The UNDP also joined the ADB for enhancing its economic assistance to Islamabad.¹⁹

The real gain for Pakistan came in ending country's international isolation. Events that occurred since 1998 nuclear tests, like Kargil and the military coup, had led Pakistan towards international isolation. The various Commonwealth Committees had kept Pakistan out of their meetings. Pakistan had also lost sympathy in the US Congress. But these were reversed. Leaders and high officials from Europe to Japan and America to Australia made visits to Pakistan. Moreover, President Pervez Musharraf won continuous appreciation for the role he played in the war against terrorism.

These were some of the few positive implications for Pakistan by becoming a partner of global war against terrorism. However, the other, much graver implications that followed were more alarming and disturbing for Pakistan's security.²⁰ The following paragraphs would discuss some of these.

Internal

Pakistan, which was an important neighboring country of Afghanistan, had already suffered the religious and sectarian terrorism for the last many years due to the nature of Taliban ideology and the Pakistanis being influenced by this. This influence had

created local Talibans in Pakistan, who after the end of Taliban government in Afghanistan made Pakistani territory for their continued 'jihad' against the US and its worldwide interests. Infact Pakistani territory became the safe heavens for the Al-Qaeda remnants. Therefore, the fall of Taliban and 'war on terror' produced increased terrorist activities in Pakistan. Now the sectarian terrorism was replaced with religious terrorism and the US/Western interests in Pakistan became the ultimate targets of Al-Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan. The murder of Wall Street Journalist, Daniel Pearl, attack on the US consulate in Karachi, suicide attack on French engineers in Karachi, attack on foreign tourists near Mansehra, attack on churches and Christian communities in Islamabad, Bahawalpur and Sialkot are some of the cases highlighting this trend.

The local Taliban and their supporters in the outfits of religious-political parties of Pakistan created extreme religious and sectarian divide in the country. The slogan of 'Nifaz-e-Sharia', the threat of political and religious marches towards the capital and the unprecedented surge in religious extremism across the country made the government of the day hostage to religious rhetoric.²¹ The situation reached to such an alarming level that three reported attempts were made on the life of President Musharraf himself.²²

The increased Al-Qaeda activities and their safe-heavens in Pakistani territory²³ produced another implication for the country in the shape of counter-terrorism activities of the US intelligence agencies especially FBI in Pakistan. Now the FBI could go anywhere to catch the wanted people of Al-Qaeda network and their local sympathizers in Pakistan. The capture of Ramzi al-Shaiba and Shiekh Muhmmad Khalid alias SMK, the alleged master-mind behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks and many local Talibans not only embarrassed the Pakistani government but the open activities of FBI antagonized the Pakistani people, which was reflected in severe law and order problem in many cities across the countries, specially in the provinces of Baluchistan and NWFP.

Another grave security concern for Pakistan was the local sympathizers of Taliban regime in the Tribal areas along the Afghan borders. The Al-Qaeda activities against the US and Karzai administration in Afghanistan found the Tribal areas as safe sanctuaries. This led the US forces in Afghanistan to go for hot pursuit in Pakistani territory against the Al-Qaeda people. There were

several reports of missiles and bombs being dropped in Pakistani territory to wipe out the Al-Qaeda hideouts in the tribal areas. The US forces also claimed that they have a right to go for hot pursuit into the Pakistani territory, which infuriated both the Pakistani government and the people. There emerged alarming tension between the local commanders of the US and Pakistan in the Tribal areas and the statements issued by the Pakistani officials and politicians. Eventually the matter was soled at the very highest level between the two military commanders.²⁴ The situation was controlled but the incident revealed the precarious implications for Pakistan.

Regional

The Taliban regime in Afghanistan had the regional agenda for its activities, which infuriated the regional friends of Pakistan, especially China and Iran. The Pakistani support to the Taliban was also instrumental in creating bad taste with its regional friends.²⁵ Now with the 'war on terror' and the Pakistani support to the US activities in Afghanistan, it further strained the relations with Pakistan's regional friends. The US designs to permanently station their troops in Afghanistan and Central Asia were in direct conflict with the security interests of China and Pakistan. The Chinese access and financial support for the Gawadar Port was also of serious concern to the US. This led to the delaying of Chinese financial assistance for the project.²⁶ Although, Pakistan was able to restore its confidence with China²⁷ but it could not do so with Iran. And in return Iran became friendlier with Pakistan's erstwhile rival India at the cost of Pakistan.²⁸

A more serious regional implication, which Pakistan had to suffer, was the reversal of its Afghan policy. Pakistan, since long had been looking for a friendly government in Afghanistan, found the opportunity with the installation of Taliban regime, 'secured her backyard' and forestalled a 'two front scenario'. But the 'war on terror' undid everything for Pakistan in Afghanistan. It not only had to completely reverse its Afghan policy but also had to accept a 'not so friendly' Northern Alliance government in Afghanistan, a government, which proved to be friendlier with India than Pakistan. As Pakistan had been sidelining the Northern Alliance during the past many years.²⁹

However, a much more serious and dangerous implication occurred on Pakistan's eastern borders. India, which was looking for any eventuality to malign Pakistan and undermine the Kashmir

freedom struggle, found the opportunity in the wake of 9/11 and the US 'war on terror'. India termed the movement for the right of self-determination in occupied Kashmir, as Pakistan sponsored terrorist movement and constantly accused Pakistan of 'cross border terrorism'. A phrase, which became readily acceptable to the international community in the wake of American 'war on terror' in Afghanistan.

Several incidents in India, staged or created by the Indian government like the attack on Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001, led to the increased tension and hostilities between India and Pakistan. India squarely blamed Pakistan for the parliament attack and concentrated half a million forces against Pakistan along the Line of Control (LOC). What followed next was the lowering of diplomatic relations, cutting off the air, rail and road links between the two countries, apparently with the quite encouragement of the US. As the US wanted to keep Pakistan pressurized for its Afghan operation.

The US put pressures on Pakistan to stop 'terrorist' activities from its territory and curb the terrorist outfits, especially to put ban on Laskar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. In a situation, where Pakistan against her longing, was really confronted with a two front scenario, and serious pressures from the US was in no position to stick to its 'gun powder tactics' in Kashmir and had to change her policy regarding Kashmir.³⁰

Subsequently, India kept the ante high in order to keep Pakistan under pressure and leading the US to put pressure on Pakistan continuously and asked her to halt 'infiltration of guerillas' into occupied Kashmir.³¹ Moreover, in the wake continued 'war on terror' in Afghanistan and the blurring of term self-determination with terrorism, despite Pakistan's best efforts at the international forums, and the continued Indian hostilities, it became severely difficult for Pakistan to maintain a distinction between terrorism and Kashmir's struggle for the right of self-determination. A scenario to the delight of India at the cost of Pakistan's security interests.

International

Despite Pakistan's joining the international coalition against 'war on terror', and its best efforts to curb internal terrorism, the international image of Pakistan, as a country supporting and harboring terrorism could not vanished. The internal implications of

'war on terror' discussed above, and the continued Indian propaganda of 'cross border terrorism' further deteriorated Pakistani image at the international level.

On the other side Pakistan was taken for granted by the US to support its expanded 'war on terror' elsewhere in the world. A more worrisome situation occurred with the developments in the Gulf, when the US opened its case for attack on Iraq in the UN Security Council. Pakistan being a non-permanent member of the UNSC at this crucial juncture was taken for granted to support the US position at the UNSC. The public sentiments in Pakistan were all opposing the US unilateral action on Iraq. The government was really in a fix in the face of strategic dynamics unfolding simultaneously at internal and external fronts. Such was the serious situation that President Pervez Musharraf while giving interview to ABC television had to say,

One keeps saying in Pakistan that we were happy when we were elected a member of the Security Council. But now we really are thinking whether we should have been happy. This is not really a moment where we should have been member of the Security Council to be in such a difficult position.³²

Pakistan was saved by the withdrawal of second resolution at the UNSC but the incident revealed the precarious implications for Pakistan.

Challenges and Option for Pakistan

The events unfolding at the international level, especially the war in Iraq pose severe challenges to Pakistan's security in every direction. A polarized and terrorist breeding society confronted with Indian constant terrorist allegations and now threat of a pre-emptive strike and a possible surgical strike in Azad Kashmir,³³ and the danger of a possible next target of the US, as stories appearing of nuclear smuggling to North Korea and terrorist sponsored activities by Al-Qaeda entities in Pakistan, are serious scenarios.

The most serious challenge to Pakistan's security emanates from India due to long standing problems. As many believe that after the US 'war on terror' is over, India is a strategic prize for the US in Asia than Pakistan.³⁴ Therefore, there is a strong possibility that India

may be encouraged by the US to initiate action against Pakistan. In this eventuality, as Pakistan would be unable to count any support from outside, and the internal scene highly unfavorable, Pakistan would be faced with a challenge to its survival.

In this situation, various options to Pakistan are; first and foremost, to wipe out the menace of internal terrorism. Not for the sake of external considerations but primarily to be a progressive and balanced nation to prosper and progress in the world. Secondly, make concerted and practical efforts to stop 'infiltration' in the occupied Kashmir and apply 'hold for a while on Kashmir' policy. Thirdly, in order to forestall any pre-emptive action from India, normalize relations with India, not from a position of weakness but from a position of strength, through friendly countries, especially Russia by conveying the second option as discussed above. Fourthly, capitalize upon the new changing strategic environment at the international level and increase contacts and cooperation with European countries, especially with France, Germany and Russia besides our traditional friends like China.

It is feared that many Pakistani experts and analyst may not agree to this but the opposite would be real disaster, as the perceptions about Pakistan, including our friends and allies, are changing very fast. Pakistan may have to take this hard decision for the security and survival of Pakistan, as it did by deciding between 'suicide and surrender' during its decision to join 'war on terror.'

Conclusion

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US engulfed the entire world. The subsequent US 'war on terror' as a response to the 9/11 attacks created severe consequences for Pakistan both at the internal and regional levels. In the current international strategic scenario, with war in Iraq, Pakistan is faced with renewed threats and challenges to its security. This requires a complete overhauling of Pakistan's policy both at internal and external fronts. Pakistan needs to act immediately in order to meet the new challenges; otherwise it would be too late and too serious if Pakistan adopts the policy of 'wait and see'.

NOTES

- ¹ *The Columbia Encyclopedia*, pp. 839-40
- ² See Walter Lacqueur, *Age of Terrorism*. London: Bath press, 1987
- ³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (1998) at www.polisci.home.mindspring.com/ptd
- ⁴ Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: an Introduction* (1991) at *ibid.*
- ⁵ Scruton Roger, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, London: Mac Millan, 1982.
- ⁶ www.defenselink.mil/terrorism
- ⁷ www.tehrantimes.com 03. 12. 01 and *Times of India*, 07.12.01.
- ⁸ For detailed analysis see, Nazir Hussain and Ahmed Abass, "Dialogue Among Civilizations: An Alternative Paradigm of International Relations" *Strategic Studies*. Vol. XXI no.3 Summer 2001.
- ⁹ Address to the Nation by George W. Bush on September 11, 2001 at www.whitehouse.gov
- ¹⁰ Address to the Nation by General Pervez Musharraf, President Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad September 19, 2001, Published by Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
- ¹¹ Address to the Nation by George W. Bush on September 20, 2001 at www.whitehouse.gov
- ¹² *Dawn*, (Daily Islamabad) September 14, 2001.
- ¹³ *Dawn*, (Daily Islamabad) September 15, 2001.
- ¹⁴ Address to the Nation by General Pervez Musharraf, President Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad September 19, 2001, Published by Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
- ¹⁵ Address to the Nation by General Pervez Musharraf, President Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad January 12, 2002, Published by Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
- ¹⁶ See www.ipcs.org.html

- ¹⁷ "September 11, 2001: Attack on America", State Department daily Press Briefing of September 18, 2001 see www.yale.avalonproject.com
- ¹⁸ Chintamani Mahapatra, 'Pakistan's Role in War against Terrorism: Cost and Benefits', at www.ipcs.org of November 26, 2001.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰ Dr. Jasim Tagui, "Impact of Afghanistan war on Pakistan", *Nation* (Daily Islamabad), October 22, 2001.
- ²¹ See for details, Rizwan Zeb, "War Against Terror: Lessons for Pakistan", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. XXV, no. 3, Spring 2002.
- ²² "Musharraf's life still in danger", Moin, *Daily Times* (Lahore), July 23, 2002 and "Plot to kill Musharraf: Geo TV report confirmed", *News*, September 21, 2002.
- ²³ "Clash in Tribal area", Editorial *The News*, June 22, 2002 and Rahimullah Yousafzai, "Clash with al-Qaeda-a worrying scenario", *News*, July 5, 2002.
- ²⁴ Shireen M. Mazari, "Increasing cost of cooperation with the US", *News*, January 8, 2003 and Rahimullah Yousafzai, "It's Durand Line Again", *News*, January 4, 2003.
- ²⁵ Tarique Niazi, "The horrific cost of Pakistan's Afghan Policy", *News*, November 21, 2001.
- ²⁶ "No difference with China over support to US", *Dawn*, (Daily Islamabad) October 19, 2001.
- ²⁷ "Musharraf to visit China to save Gawadar Plan", *Nation*, (Daily Islamabad) October 26, 2001.
- ²⁸ See for details, Nazir Hussain, "Pak-Iran Relations in post 9/11 Period: Regional and Global Impact", *Regional Studies*, vol. XX, no. 4, Autumn, 2002.
- ²⁹ Dr. Babar Shah, "Geo-Strategic Patterns of a Post-Taliban Afghanistan", *Strategic Studies*, vol. XXII, no. 1, Spring 2002.
- ³⁰ Nasim Zehra, "Islamabad seeks new approach on Kashmir", *Gulf News*, June 20, 2002.
- ³¹ "Bush assures India of pressure on Pakistan", *The News*, (Daily Islamabad) March 5, 2003.
- ³² As quoted by *The News*, March 7, 2003.
- ³³ "India warns Pakistan of pre-emptive action", *The News*, April 3, 2003, and "India mulls surgical AJK strikes", *Daily Times*, (Lahore), April 4, 2003.

³⁴ Hussain, "Pak-Iran Relations in post 9/11 Period: Regional and Global Impact", op cit., p. 52.

Salient Governance Issues and the Musharraf-Jamali Government: A case study of Pakistan

Sohail Mahmood

Introduction

Governance, as defined by UNDP, is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs. The term governance implies issues of government effectiveness, accountability, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law. Good governance involves the constructive interaction of state, market and civil society. It is also characterized by several important values: effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, the rule of law, participation, consensus orientation, responsiveness, equity, and strategic vision. It is dependent on the well functioning of public institutions. This brings us to the second question: How do public institutions function well? Setting the right priorities, formulation of appropriate policies, and their effective and efficient implementation is a basic requirement of a well functioning public institution. Achieving objectives of good governance requires a long-term political commitment to make the system work. Accountability of the government for its actions is dependent upon the availability of information, transparency of decision-making and the presence of effective mechanisms to call individuals and institutions to account. Competence of the government is the capacity to formulate appropriate policies, make sound and timely decisions, and perhaps most importantly implement them effectively. Public officials must be held responsible for their actions. This involves effective auditing, decentralization, accountability to consumers and a role for non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Good governance and social development for sustainable human development are indivisible and developing the capacity for good governance is a primary means of eradicating poverty. It ensures the establishment of right policies and strategies to support the activities of people to enable them to earn a decent livelihood, ensure access for all state resources and opportunities, and help people achieve a minimum set of capabilities to lead a long and productive life.

Good governance depends on public participation, ensuring that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the poorest and most vulnerable populations can directly influence and participate in policy decision-making, particularly with respect to allocation of development resources. 1

The emphasis on good governance is a prerequisite of sustainable development and national prosperity. Firstly, we need to briefly explain the concept of governance. Governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised by the government in the administration of a country's social and economic resources. Governance is the ability to execute state policy. Good governance has a normative connotation, which also includes public aspirations. Good governance, at whatever level, is effective, honest, equitable, transparent and accountable. Emphasis must be on broad participation and inclusiveness, especially through the involvement of a strong civil society. The government must play the role of a catalyst and bring together all stakeholders on a policy matter. It is also believed that the importance of forming these broad partnerships for better governance will only become stronger in this century, as awareness grows that development is not really development unless it is sustainable. The essentials of good governance are well known:

- Accountability
- Voice
- Rule of Law
- Transparency
- Effective Devolution and Decentralization

Accountability

The most important principle of good governance across space and time is accountability. It is itself dependent upon many factors, such as: Availability of information; Transparency; Designed mechanisms; a vibrant media fulfilling its "watch-dog" function; Effective auditing services; a strong judiciary and legislature; and a strong civil society. Accountability inside the public -sector institutions can be strengthened by better management practices.

Voice

Democratic practices promote good governance. The consent of the people is included. Voice also improves ownership of the state

policies. The people must see that the policy is in their own interest. Plus, the state's responsive mechanisms are strengthened.

Rule of Law

The rule of law is fundamental to civilization. No nation can develop without it.

Transparency

A trained public service properly remunerated. Countries do not have to re-invent the wheel. They must adopt knowledge from solutions available. The contemporary development literature has already noted the long-term benefits of the participatory governance approach. When the process is open, and all parts of society have say in developing a policy, it is much less likely to be bad or unrealistic. Decisions that take varying perspectives into account, and reflect a broader range of experience, shall produce policies that are better balanced. They will be more widely accepted, because more of society will 'buy-in' and feel a sense of ownership. There will be fewer unpleasant surprises, unforeseen consequences, and subsequent reversals.

Devolution and Decentralization

Devolution is the transfer of power and responsibility to lower tiers of government. The operational principle applied is subsidiary: namely that decision is taken at the lowest level possible where it can be conveniently executed. The World Bank has a more elaborate definition. It defined devolution as a process of shifting power and responsibility down to the regions and localities away from central planning and bureaucratic govt. agencies to community-based participatory systems that use the full-range of local, public and private institutions.

Issues in Devolution and the Institutionalizing of Participatory Approaches for Sustainable Development

The concept of decentralization refers to the devolution of both responsibilities and resources to relatively independent and autonomous sub-national authorities that are accountable not to any central national leadership of the country but to the citizens of the region and/or community. Local governments are concerned essentially with providing services for the local communities like municipal services, primary education, and health care. Decentralization has successfully worked in various places around

the world. The following are the distinct advantages of decentralization:

- (i) **Efficiency:** Decision-makers who live locally are more likely to be knowledgeable about the conditions prevailing in the locality. Therefore, only they are likely to match resources and local needs in a more precise fashion.
- (ii) **Accountability:** Decision-makers are exposed to closer scrutiny only when they live and work in close contact with the citizens. It is only here that they face a great amount of pressure to deliver the goods.
- (iii) **Opportunity:** The local people get more opportunities to participate in planning the services and also in their monitoring.

In practice, decentralization strategies have been reasonably successful in India, Malaysia, Chile and Indonesia but not in Brazil, Bangladesh and Argentina. Why is that the case? There are a number of factors that are responsible for the failure. Some of them are listed below:²

- (i) **Capacity:** The local government does not have sufficient capacity to deliver the goods. The officials are not sufficiently trained for the purpose.
- (ii) **Seizure of power:** This is a political issue. Local elites often seize power that has been devolved at the local level. This happens to the detriment of the poor.
- (iii) **Reluctance of central government to devolve power and provide adequate funding:** The central government is reluctant to release either funds or real decision-making power to the localities.

The concept of decentralization refers to the devolution of both responsibilities and resources to relatively independent and autonomous sub-national authorities that are accountable not to any central national leadership of the country but to the citizens of the region and/or community. Effective decentralization is synonymous with effectiveness, openness, transparency, accountability, and predictability. An elected district administration is surely a right step but is insufficient if not run effectively. Strong local governments mean strong local financial base.

The Case Study of Pakistan

In October 1999 Pakistan was currently at the brink of comprehensive mismanagement. The Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf staged a military takeover on 12 October 1999, suspended Pakistan's constitution and assumed the additional title of Chief Executive. Given the failures of the earlier civilian era, the people had high hopes from General Musharraf. For many of the poor and starving, the new military regime represented their hope for the better. The question arises as to what the military did to alleviate the problems and stem the collapse. In a referendum held on 30 April 2002, General Musharraf's presidency was extended by five more years. General Musharraf was then both chief of state and head of government. After the general elections of 10 October 2002, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali was elected as Prime Minister. The Musharraf-Jamali Administration is faced with a daunting challenge to overcome the daunting crisis of governance in Pakistan. Currently, the following governance issues appear to be the most significant:

- Accountability
- Fragile Economy and Foreign Dependency
- Weakening state capacity and poor public sector management
- Devolution Issue
- The LFO controversy and the Issue of Constitutional Amendments
- Weak Political parties
- Sustainable Development

Accountability

In 1999 General Musharraf established the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The NAB is a powerful agency headed by serving Lt. Generals. The incumbent is the third to serve the institution. The bureau showed a good start but subsequently became controversial, as it was perceived to be tolerant of corruption in the armed forces.³ Thus, the supposed clean NAB was suspect of being biased. However, the reality remains that:

- There is massive corruption at all levels. This means that a large portion of national wealth has been stolen from the poor. No wonder, the country is unable to lift itself out of the quagmire of poverty and hunger.