

AL-SIYASA

السياسة

A JOURNAL OF POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB
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The Military Regime and Pakistan's Political And Administrative System: The Performance of Musharraf Regime in the First Year

Dr. Sohail Mahmood

As the Musharraf regime completes its first year in office, it faces a serious challenge on several fronts. Today, Pakistan's political and administrative system is faced with grave systemic failures and structural faults. Since these faults remained prevalent for too long, the political and administrative systems have seriously malfunctioned as a result. The Musharraf regime inherited a very bad political and economic situation. The past eleven years of democracy (1988-1999) had certainly failed to deliver. Obviously, the PML and PPP rulers were responsible for the failure. That much was certain and beyond any public disagreement. Personal failure was real and tragic, to say the least. Nevertheless, the political system had to be blamed as much as the rulers themselves. No doubt, there was great failure in the governance style of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. They both had developed paranoid personalities. Mediocrity, sycophancy, mismanagement had wrecked havoc with the administrative machinery of the state. There was complete confusion in the ranks of the top leaderships. Incompetence, sheer callousness, and reckless attitude of the federal ministers, and petty jealousy in the cabinet ranks had reduced the whole exercise of collective responsibility to a farce. Bickering over petty matters was the rule of the day. There was a lack of direction on the part of the two prime ministers. Both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto had turned into egomaniacs. They lived in a world of self-delusion. The scene at the highest level became comic, if not tragic. Cronies were awash with praise at their slightest "achievement". More and more state efforts were being made under their names. We had the Prime Ministers run a relentless election campaign from day one. It seemed absurd and uncalled for. However, there is more to the story than just that. The

people of Pakistan had chosen them as our leaders and should therefore share the blame for their failures. It is a universal maxim that you get the leadership you deserve. The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) also taught this.

General Musharraf claims that he is "completely committed" to the timetables for elections in 2002 given to him by the Supreme Court of Pakistan and that he "cannot visualize staying on beyond that deadline".¹ He has also talked about the need of a "checks and balance" on any future prime minister to prevent him or her from abusing power. The quality of politicians needs to be improved, as they had been a "dismal failure", says General Musharraf.² Pakistan has in the last eleven or twelve years "gone down in all important areas"; the economy had taken a nose dive, and all institutions were in "total disarray" and had been "politicized and corrupted", according to General Musharraf.³ The military regime claims that it is desperately trying to turn around the country. It says that it is on the right track. Given its makeup, reforming the political, economic, and bureaucratic systems is a daunting task indeed. Some progress seems to have been made. After a year of rule, the regime has now consolidated itself. Although losing popularity, it faces no sizeable political resistance yet. But it does not retain the massive public support of the early days of the coup. Apparently, the peak of its popularity has ended. This was expected though. What are the lessons learnt from Pakistan's not-so-glorious history? More importantly, what needs to be done in Pakistan now and how? Lesson number one is to carefully put in place the political system requirements. Only then can the military returns to the barracks. It simply cannot leave the matter to be completed later by the politicians. According to popular perceptions, the military regime alone can do a few things. Some people have argued that General Musharraf should stick to some sort of minimalist agenda and do only what is most essential.

¹ *Pakistan Observer*, July 28, 2000.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

Others counter argued that the restriction is based on a false premise as it is void of true comprehension of the situation. The General is required to do whatever is necessary and wherever, without any restrictions or limits imposed on him, because to do so is not wise. We need bold leadership to turn around the country. Maybe, General Musharraf can do it. The nation hopes for the best. The most crucial areas for reform in the political system of Pakistan are:

1. A Checks-and-Balance System:

A checks-and-balance system is badly required to stop future abuse of power. In addition, the political system must be put under a strong foundation. Today, in Pakistan we have a presidential system. That much is nice. A presidential system is more suited for our purposes than a Westminster parliamentary type. Our Islamic legacy points out to a powerful single office of the Emir or Sultan. There is no need of a fragmentation of power at the highest level as is the case in a parliamentary system. We have here both a premier and president, which is unnecessary. In a parliamentary system, a prime minister can become a "dictator". Many premiers have been accused of having dictatorial tendencies, such as Margaret Thatcher and Indira Gandhi. The only difference between a dictator and a strong leader is the ideological perspective of the person making the evaluation. Opponents paradoxically perceive what supporters see as "strong leadership" as "dictatorship". Simply meaning that one might agree or disagree with the accusation of dictatorship on the grounds of his own ideological moorings. If he is with the prime minister, then he will look up to him as a strong leader. On the other hand, if he opposes him, for whatever reasons, then he will think of the person as a dictator. The point is that it all depends on individual preferences and that the notion of "dictatorship" is relative. Only a strong presidential system with a built-in system to check abuse of executive power can possibly work in Pakistan. We must improve quality of the Cabinet. A move towards a permanent presidential system will take care of the mediocrity problem in the Cabinet. Personal failure of ruling

MNAs has hurt us the most. Very few of them were capable to handle affairs of state. Yet, they filled the ranks of the Cabinet. This was done at the cost of the nation. In a presidential system, we can scout for the best talent available. That is a necessary condition for the revival of democracy.

The military regime needs to revamp the Parliament. This is very essential for the future working of the political system. Strengthen the Parliament for better future performance. Require that the Senate be popularly elected. End Presidential Ordinances and require that all laws, even if of an immediate nature, be passed by the parliament. Provide full media coverage for the proceedings of the parliament to educate the citizens. Strengthen the committee system, especially the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Have a minimum education requirement for MNAs and Senators. Get rid of the Thirteenth Amendment, which was meant to stifle dissent within the ranks of the ruling party. Pakistanis have suffered from the results of this heavy handiness on the part of Nawaz Sharif. The people should not let it happen again. Let people in parliament speak their mind. After all, the people elected them for that very purpose.

II. Revamp the Political Party System

We badly need strong political parties that can deliver what they promise. Currently, it is well outright beyond the capability of an individual to deliver results. He or she cannot even comprehend the complexity of the age, let alone find appropriate solutions. Therefore, teamwork is a necessity. Groupthink can possibly work. A single individual just cannot. Pakistan has a weak political party system. It has been argued that political parties were weak simply because they were never given a chance to take roots in Pakistani political soil. Pakistan had been ruled by the military for nearly half of its history. There were two significantly long spells of military rule - General Ayub Khan (58-69) and General Zia's rule (77-88). Both are commonly considered as failures. General Musharraf current military rule had interrupted the growth of the system yet

once again. There is some weight in the argument. The counter-argument is that the military intervened only when the country was threatened from within and that the Army was a reluctant ruler of Pakistan. It was true this time also with General Musharraf seizing power in October 1999. Nevertheless, the military has cast a long shadow on the political party system in Pakistan. Most political parties owe their existence to the Army's Intelligence services. Such is the power of the Army that its support is widely thought to be indispensable for the establishment and continuation of political parties in the country. An underlying authoritarian culture in Pakistan makes this significant for politics. In other words, the democratic institutions, of which the political parties are one significant element, have never established themselves as they have done elsewhere, say India. Political parties, with very few exceptions, are undemocratic establishments with personalistic politics being the norm. Leadership is not chosen in democratic fashion nor is internal democracy practiced in any significant manner. There is mere lip service to democracy. Once in power they acted with authoritarian impulses and weakening internal democracy even further. Moreover, patronage politics and massive corruption in party ranks has eroded popular faith in the party system itself. Most seriously, parties in power have failed to deliver according to the expectations of the people, including their own ranks. Disenchantment with the two parties ruling Pakistan for more than a decade - the PPP and PML - was an all time high. Politics itself had been disreputed by the scandals of the main political parties. Popular perceptions about politicians as such were negative, at least more so than earlier. People felt that things had grown from bad to worse in the last period of civilian rule from 1988 (after Zia's death) to 1999 (when General Musharraf took power in October). Thus, politicians had political parties generally do not command the respect they might otherwise have commanded, in circumstances that were more positive.

General Musharraf has decided not to allow participation of political parties in the forthcoming local government elections. This is a mistake. Political parties are crucial to the whole exercise

of building true democracy through a "bottom-up" strategy. They cannot and should not be ignored. Political parties are useful mechanisms for the practical conduct of democracy. They fulfill essential functions to promote democracy in the nation. They recruit; mobilize public opinion for their cause. Parties educate public opinion and provide venues for its systematic orchestration. Most importantly, political parties provide platforms where serious discussion about political matters takes place and a consensus policy arrived at. One of the primary reasons for the failure of the democratic experiment in Pakistan can be attributed to the failure of its political parties. We need to rectify this shortcoming. What better place to begin than the Local Government. Political parties have a vital function in democratic governance. A political party is simply an aggregate of groups holding similar views that aspire to gain power over the state machinery to implement their priorities. They offer the public clear choices in the elections and are accountable to it. Upon winning elections, political parties form governments to implement their manifestos. Political parties offer the public with the means to participate in the political process. They serve as channels of communication between the people and government leadership. Political parties assist in recruitment of candidates for elections and canvass for them.⁴ Different parties can have different priorities but they have one thing in common: the appreciation of "politics as the art of the possible". Parties help to select candidates for elections, campaign for them, and provide winners with the support necessary to bring in tangible reform. Parties also help recruit members, articulate a program, and try to propagate it throughout the country. Thus, party politics is extremely important for a healthy democracy. Most importantly, local politics is the platform for entry on the higher levels. Future party leadership is nurtured at the local level. All strong political parties sponsor or have adjunct thinktanks to do research and provide like-minded intellectuals some space to use their abilities. The above account is theory only. Reality in countries like Pakistan

⁴ Phil Cocker, *Essential Topics in Modern British Politics and Government* (London: Tudor, 1994), 73-73.

is much different, however. The tragedy in the country is that its political parties are not even close to this requirement. Only the Jamaat-i-Islami has adopted this model somewhat. For a host of reasons, which need not detain us here, the Jamaat is not about to capture power in the country any time soon. We are therefore more concerned with the major parties, including but not limited to PML and PPP, have yet to move in this direction. No wonder they are ill prepared to implement their agenda. The required personnel are simply not there for the optimum use by the party. Hence the failure. Lesson number two is that only strong political parties can possibly deliver. By their very nature, political parties are tedious to build. The sooner the leadership begins the better for the country. Strong political parties are to be seen as essential institutions in any modern democracy. Next time around, let such parties compete against each other in a more sophisticated manner. The question is that can Pakistan's government afford to wait until they are built and then call for general elections. Obviously, building strong political leadership and political parties will take years not months. Then, what is to be done? Many feel that the Musharraf regime must do its best in the time allocated to it and pull out. Meaning that it should hold elections as planned – local in December 2000-May 2001 and provincial and national by 2002- in an impartial, fair and honest way and depart the political scene. Given its structure and makeup, the military is not suited for politics and can at best act as an interregnum or an interlude of sorts. The military regime's current disdain of political parties is largely unwarranted. This reflects the Musharraf regime's lack of comprehension of Pakistan's complexity. The argument that the party structures need to be reformed before allowing them re-entry into the political arena is not reasonable. Pakistan needs strong political parties and therefore their immediate & effective functioning is in the national interest. Since parties are by definition creatures seeking political office, their denial of adequate opportunity is tantamount of shunning them. Earlier experiments of building democracy undertaken by General Ayub and General Zia type were failures. Pakistan cannot afford to go on that road again. Remember conflict in politics is inherent. The

question is whether ideological conflict waged by political parties is any worse than conflict based on other grounds like ethnicity & faith. The critics of the regime warn that local government elections conducted on non-political basis will further fan the worst forms of ethnic and *hiradari* conflicts in the country. Pakistan cannot afford such a situation from building up. Therefore, it would be more prudent to allow political parties to participate in the coming elections. The Musharraf regime must ensure that the Islamic Republic's Constitution, specifically Articles 62 & 63, are enforced in its true spirit. Enforcement of these provisions shall eliminate the corrupt from seeking political office. Nothing more is needed and the military regime should not second-guess the choice of the people of Pakistan. Democratic governance demands this. A detailed analysis of political parties and their role in building democracy is beyond the scope of this report.

The Musharraf regime should enforce democratic norms in all political parties. In fact, very few political parties are democratic internally. When there is no meaningful practice inside the parties, then how can the people expect them to behave in democratic fashion once in power? They should be required by law to practice what they preach. At the minimum, the military regime must forbid parties that do not practice what they preach. These must be suspect and therefore shunned. That is also an Islamic dictum. The irony is that all the major political parties in the country, PPP and PML included, are bereft of internal democracy. The contradiction in what they say and do is too apparent. Hence, the failure to deliver any meaningful democracy. It should be required that political parties practice democratic values in their operation. The party membership should annually elect the party leadership in a fair and transparent manner. The example of Quaid-i-Azam is before the people. He being a true democrat insisted in contesting the post of president of the Muslim League as per constitutional requirements of the party. This was even when the nation had reposed in his person their complete and unflinching loyalty and support. To him these internal elections were the essence of democratic behavior. Pakistan must today emulate his examples.

Building of disciplined party machines to build strong parties and thereby build strong institutions for the nation, is imperative. The Musharraf regime must guide the political parties to build within them strong democratic norms and values. Only then can they become the vehicles of the required transformation towards "true" democracy. It should allow only those parties to contest the general elections to be held in 2002. It be understood clearly that strong vibrant political operates are crucial to putting the democratic experiment back on track. Again, the sooner Pakistan begins the better for it.

The Current Party System

The two-party system established by the PML and PPP, which lasted for over a decade has been largely discredited. This explains the public support of the new military regime. The two-party system is now in a shambles. Benazir had been out of the country for several years and Nawaz Sharif behind bars since October 1999. The exile or the incarceration of the leadership had demoralized the parties and decapitated their ranks. The PML and PPP chapter seemed to be over. The two other parties that had counted in the last democratic period were the MQM and ANP. Both have suffered politically for various reasons. The heyday of ethnic politics in Pakistan also seems to be over. It seems that a new chapter is opening in the country's history. The Musharraf regime claims that it will promote a new style of politics in the country. It envisions a clean government and political system. The political parties most likely to fill the vacuum of the decapitated PML and PPP ranks, and thereby improve their own fortunes in the near future, are:

- i. Jamaat-i-Islami,
- ii. Millat Party
- iii. Tehreek-i-Insaaf
- iv. Pakistan Awami Tehreek
- v. Tehrik Jafria Pakistan
- vi. Jamiat Ulema-e Islami.

i. Jamaat-e-Islami

The Jamaat-e-Islami is the biggest Islamic party in the country. In addition, it is perhaps the best organized and most disciplined political party in the country. Maududi founded it in 1942 in Punjab. The party had displayed street power on more than one occasion. It had a strong, relatively speaking, presence in the urban areas of Pakistan. The party had never had much success in electoral politics and was not expected to capture more than a few parliamentary seats in future elections. However, it had disproportionate political weight than its past electoral success would suggest.

This can be explained by the fact that the party sees itself as more of an Islamic movement with a global agenda than a political party in Pakistan. Its network has now spread to North America (ICNA in the USA and Canada) and Britain (Islamic foundations). The party has a thinktank - the Policy Institute in Islamabad headed by an eminent scholar. It also has links with several parties or Islamic movements in the Middle East, namely the Muslim Brotherhood based in Egypt and Sudan. The party's public relation exercises are comparatively sophisticated. Over the years it has built a modern media service.

The Jamaat has consistently advocated the cause of Islamic "revolution" in Pakistan. It believed that the Islamic world was a single *Ummah* united by religion. There was no separation between politics and religion in Islam. It had been consistent in its demand that the *Shariah* (Islamic law) was the guiding framework for all activity, economic and political. An Islamic "revolution" was legitimate but within the framework of the political system. The Islamic movement would usher into an Islamic state through disciplined activism. The movement would gradually take over the state apparatuses when the party itself comes into power.

ii. The Millat Party

The Millat party was founded a few years back and is headed by former president, Farooq Ahmad Leghari. It has not contested elections so far. A close associate of his, Javed Jabbar, was taken in the Musharraf cabinet. However, he had to leave the Musharraf government in October 2000. The party was supportive of the direction the military regime was taking. Now that the PML and PPP had been discredited, it is expected to do well in the coming elections. Ideologically it was centrist with emphasis on reforming the political and economic system of Pakistan.

iii. Tehreek-i-Insaf

Imran Khan founded the Tehreek-i Insaf some years back. The party stands for youth, reforming the system, Islamic moderation, clean politics, and end to exploitation and corruption. It contested the 1997 elections for the first time. It did not win any seat, however. The party is expected to do relatively well in the coming elections.

iv. Pakistan Awami Tehreek

Allama Tahirul Qadri founded Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) a few years back. Tahirul Qadri had an academic background in law and, about a decade ago, established the Minhaj ul-Quran Islamic Institute in Lahore focused on Quranic Studies. Today there were several Minhaj ul Quran branches in the country. Qadri has written several books on Islamic subjects. Later, Qadri ventured into politics by establishing the Pakistan Awami Tehreek. The PAT relied on the earlier religious network established for launching its political activity. It was a small but well organized political party.

v. Tehrik-i Jafria Pakistan (TJP)

Tehrik-i Jafria Pakistan is a very small political party of the Shiites in Pakistan. It is favorable of Iran and believed to have links with

the Iranian clergy. It believed in Islamic egalitarianism and social justice. It is well organized. The current head is Sajid Ali Naqvi & is considered a moderate. The TJP is a sworn enemy of the Sipah-i-Sahaba, the extremist Sunni organization. The two have opposed each other and several hundred killings have resulted from these clashes since the late 1980s.

v. The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam

The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam was a sectarian Islamic party based on the Debandi maslak (school of thought). It has influence in NWFP and Punjab. Today it is a regional player in NWFP where it had once been in power in a coalition government in the early 1970s. It is expected to win a few seats in its stronghold. The influence of the party is not from its electoral position but from its network of Islamic seminaries, known as *madrassahs*, running into the hundreds throughout the country. Some of these seminaries are imparting quality Islamic education. Others are more involved in sending volunteers for jihad in Afghanistan & perhaps Kashmir. The party has close links with the Taliban ruling Afghanistan.

III. Improve the Electoral System

The electoral system is faulty and needs to be overhauled. The country must discard the current FPTP system in favor of the Majoritarian system as practices in France and Australia.⁵ Many political parties like Millat Party, Jamaat-i-Islami, Tehreek-i-Insaf, etc. were in favor of a Proportional Representation type system, however. The Musharraf regime has strengthened the office of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) to enforce new rules for election campaigning in the coming local government elections. It is expected that the CEC would apply newly eligibility criteria, in accordance with Article 62 and 63 of the Constitution. Some of the new rules pertain to dismissal of incumbents upon finding of false personal asset declarations, criminal records, history of default in

⁵ For details of the argument see "Pakistan at the Crossroads", TPRF, 1998

payments to state utility services, and banks, etc. The Musharraf regime is making registration requirements more transparent and easy for the general public. The military government had already embarked upon a campaign to provide identity cards to eliminate bogus voting and thereby ensure fair and honest elections. It is also in the process of re-demarcating the electoral constituencies at the Union Council level. Although a good beginning has been made, further reforms are required. The regime should make the position of CEC even more powerful than now. The office should be equivalent to the power and prestige of its counterpart in India.

Other recommendations include:

- Enforce term limits for candidates. A maximum of three would do. This would ensure new blood in the country's political system.
- Make voting in all elections compulsory.
- The state should bear the expenses of all election campaigns at all levels - local, provincial, and national- at least partially if not fully.
- Invite foreign monitors to oversee elections and report in terms of fairness.
- Allow political parties to fully function in the coming local government elections. The Musharraf regime is making a mistake in banning the participation of political parties in the coming elections. The mistake be immediately rectified.
- Promote debate among candidates in the state media, especially television.

IV. Restructuring the Federation

Pakistan, being a pluralistic society with significant social cleavages, needs to adopt the Canadian model of a decentralized federal setup. The military regime must plan for the eventual weakening of the Center and the strengthening of the regions or provinces. More provinces need to be created. The regime must begin now by the partition of Punjab into at least two parts - North and South Punjab. Later Sindh can be partitioned into two parts

also. One Muhajir dominated (Karachi) and the rest to be Sindhi dominated. Later, a Seraiki belt be carved out of South Punjab and a Potahar belt in north Punjab. Then, carve NWFP into two parts – one Pathan-dominated and the other non-Pathan (Hindko, Hazara, etc). The present FATA and Northern Areas will become full-fledged provinces. Ultimately, Pakistan shall have ten to twelve provinces. This shall happen in a span of about five or six years. Why do we advocate the partition of Punjab first? Pakistan is unlike any other federation in the world where one constituent part – Punjab – dominates all others both politically and economically. More importantly, other three provinces are now beginning to resent this domination and are increasingly voicing their concerns about it. These apprehensions were only accentuated in the last PML rule. In the months before the coup last October, 1999 there was already brewing a strong public sentiment against the Nawaz Sharif's "Lahore Takht" and Punjabi domination. Pakistan has suffered once before. Obviously, it does not have the luxury to avoid tough decisions any more. Only the military government can do this as it is considered to be above ethnic politics. The people trust the Musharraf regime to take such action in the greater interest of Pakistan. Also, obviously, a civilian leadership cannot take such measures because of the political backlash in Punjab. It should be remembered there is nothing sacred in the present step. After all, the British Raj, for their own strategic purposes created it more than a century ago. Plus, as the Russians dominated the Soviet Union (Russia was the biggest and most powerful of the 15 republics in the Soviet Union) the Punjab dominates the Pakistani republic. All know what happened to the Soviet Union. Let not history repeat itself in Pakistan. Therefore, a division of Punjab into two parts is in order.

V. Revamping the Public Services

The world is caught in a new era that is characterized by high rate of change. Governments have to keep pace with the great sea of changes enveloping them. These changes are taking place everywhere. These changes, highly complex in nature, have created

enormous problems for all systems of governance, especially in poor developing countries. Government systems can age and become irrelevant for solving current problems, or in benefiting from opportunities available of late. Restructuring of entire administrative systems is the need of the hour. Pakistan can learn from mistakes committed by others. Many countries have progressed remarkably in the march of re-engineering government systems. Experiments in altering public sector institutions have employed different institutional models. Re-engineering government involves restructuring public organizations and civil service systems. Organizational sizes, purposes, accountability procedures, authority distribution patterns, even organizational culture are changed. In order to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and fairness in public organizations fundamental change is required. In addition, these changes must be undertaken in such a manner which ensures the development process remains unhampered by lapses and shortcomings in present administration structures. There is increasing worldwide emphasis on restructuring of government because of its failure to deliver according to expectation of citizens. People complain that bureaucracies are behaving in an eccentric and haphazard manner. Thus, in many parts of the world, reorganization of civil bureaucracy has become an urgent need. However, it is not easy. Political forces supporting organizational status quo are usually stronger than those favoring the reorganization effort. Generally, bureaucrats and politicians the world over defend their turf and are reluctant to give up power and status.

Pakistan has a weak administrative apparatus. Problems with the administrative setup include poor planning, waste, mismanagement, inefficiency, and the absence of a work ethic. Malfunction is the norm and not the exception in the bureaucratic structure of the country. Overlapping of jurisdictions and the absence of clear-cut demarcations of authority and administrative control has wrecked havoc with government performance. Independent observers agree that the overall performance of the Government of Pakistan (GoP) is poor or lackluster at best. The

gap between policy-making and policy-execution is wide partly due to the politicization of the bureaucracy and the generally low quality of state personnel. Government restructuring is haphazard and ill planned. Even after more than fifty-three years of independence, the civil service has not been able to come out of the shadows of the colonial era. Colonial administration focused on law and order, the extraction of taxes, and export of primary commodities. The social and economic needs and desires of the 'native' population attracted minimum concern. Power was vested in the hands of a small elite. Although, the colonial legacy varied from country to country a common set of features can be identified: ambiguity about the roles and relationship of politicians and public administrators; a tradition that senior civil service appointments should be allocated to generalist administrators, rather than to those with some specialisations; limited consultations with the public and little recognition for a role for the media; a reluctance to provide information to those outside of the administration; an emphasis on written communication and processing paper; an undue emphasis on the role of the office, rules and procedures rather than accomplishment of assigned tasks. To some extent, the colonial style of administration is still in vogue in Pakistan. Thus, the country is falling behind the times. That is dreadful. Several previous attempts at reform failed to make a difference. Red tape and mal-administration is now legendary in public administration. The requirements of the contemporary era dictate the need for establishing an effective and efficient public administration. That much is obvious.

All agree that bureaucratic red tape in the civil service is now legendary. People are sick and tired of administrative inefficiency, unresponsiveness, and arrogance. As regards governance in Pakistan, the World Bank notes that the country faces problems, which includes the waning effectiveness and capacity of public institutions and weakness of local governments and other civil society organizations. These factors have severely reduced the effectiveness of public expenditures, undermined macroeconomic

management, debilitated the environment, and worsened the other structural problems.⁶

The efficiency and effectiveness of government departments are getting worse not better, with very few exceptions. The need for re-engineering the system of governance is being felt by many in Pakistan. It is unanimously agreed that the existing system is failing to deliver the services demanded by the public. Every one acknowledges this stark fact. Perhaps, never in the history of Pakistan has public perceptions been so negative about the bureaucracy. Problems have piled upon each other with no quick solution in sight. Obviously, there is some hyperbole in the print media that adds to public frustration and anger at government agencies. Nevertheless, public frustration is real and increasing. Pakistan needs serious civil service reforms. The previous Benazir and Nawaz Governments were not serious about the issue. The work of previous commissions, groups need to be consolidated, reviewed, and implemented. Unnecessary duplication must end. For example, the Nawaz Government had two organizations working on the same reform agenda – the Commission on Administrative Restructuring under Fakhir Imam, MNA and the Good Governance Group under Ahsan Iqbal, then Deputy Chairman Planning Commission. Such duplication of efforts needs to be avoided in future. Scarce resources must be prudently spent.

The military government should emphasize governance over every thing else. The failure here is apparent. Generally, capacity of state departments is weak. Public organizations are operating inefficiently. Most are malfunctioning. Red tape is legion. Policies are not effective and sometimes left unimplemented. Disillusionment and despair rules the corridors of the bureaucracies. The crisis is real. A serious problem for administrations, especially in the developing countries, is the widening gap between governors and governed and between the administrators and administered.

⁶ Country Brief: Pakistan (World Bank web page)

The Musharraf regime was expected to turn around the government bureaucracies soon. If left unintended, most will crumble. The Musharraf regime was expected to concentrate on a few vital institutions like the Advocate General, Election Commission, Accountant General of Pakistan, State Bank, and CBR, Military Intelligence services, and National Accountability Bureau (NAB), etc. But this did not happen. After a year of the Musharraf regime, the government apparatuses are still in a mess with no easy solution in sight. A careful study of the problems of governance may yield insights of what is wrong in government and why? A detailed analysis is needed for the purpose. It has not yet happened. The Musharraf regime has failed to stem the tide of bureaucratic malfunction in Pakistan. The country is actually racing against time.

A pertinent problem that needs to be addressed is the issue of downsizing. The present 30 or more divisions can be merged to create more viable and efficient units of government. For example, we need to merge the Education with the Science and Technology Division to create a new ministry of Education and Science as in Germany and Britain. In addition, the model of Japan's MITI can be adopted here also. We can and should combine Divisions of Commerce and Industry into one larger entity. We need to create a powerful Planning Commission under the Chief Executive to undertake strategic planning on a more scientific basis. The Statistics division can be merged into it. Other mergers can include the merger of Economic Affairs Division and Finance Division. Let the Pakistan Revenue Service (PRS) concept be implemented, as once planned during the second Nawaz Government. A powerful and independent PRS with a distinct élan is essential for successful revenue collection. The railways, airline, shipping, and land transport can all be combined into one powerful Transport ministry. In short, a detailed scrutiny of the entire government is required.

The Musharraf regime is expected to develop the human resources of the country on a priority basis. It should concentrate on training and capacity building of individual officers in the bureaucracy. Ensure adequate compensation to attract talent in the public service. Simply preaching for better performance without material incentives will not work. It seldom has. Therefore, compensate for hard and honest work. A system of rewards and incentives is needed. Personnel management reform to cater to the general problem of mismanagement, laxity, corruption, loss of work ethic and other related issues needs to be emphasized. For the operation of effective, efficient, and responsive public service a wide range of reforms are needed.

VI. Revamp the sprawling Intelligence Setup

Gradually merge existing intelligence agencies into just two-one with an external focus and the other with an internal one- like in the USA. We recommend this on the ground of greater efficiency because there is an urgent need to eradicate endemic corruption in the bureaucratic structures of the country. A strong intelligence system is extremely vital to achieve this aim.

VII. Reform the Subordinate Judiciary

The GOP is considering major reforms in the subordinate judiciary. A report by Asian Development Bank on the subject, plus proposals submitted by provincial law ministries and bar councils, combined in a final document has been submitted to the Chief Executive. The said document contains the following proposals:⁷

- (1) Resolve public complaints against negligent practice by lawyers through a formal Disciplinary Committee mechanism. The committee consists of a High Court judge and senior members of the bar.

⁷ *The Friday Times*, June 21-27, 2000, 4

- (2) Control mushroom growth of private law colleges. Improve entrance requirements to law colleges. Require a written bar examination for permission to practice the profession. Establish National Education Council for the purpose.
- (3) Advance promotion of subordinate judges. Half of the strength of the High Court should be judges elevated from the subordinate judiciary.
- (4) Improve quality of subordinate judiciary. No appointment of Additional District and Session Judges from the bar.
- (5) Tighten entry requirements for civil judges. Only advocates with a minimum of 2-4 years are eligible for appointments as civil judges.
- (6) Reduce the time-period for the decision of a case by reducing the number of appeals granted under normal case litigation.
- (7) Improve the salaries and other benefits of the subordinate judiciary.
- (8) Appoint a Judicial Ombudsman with all the powers to redress the genuine grievances of the litigant public and lawyers community against the judiciary. The Ombudsman is given powers to recommend action including termination of services of judicial officers.
- (9) The improvement of physical infrastructure of the court systems. Provide better housing facilities to the officials.

After approval of the program, the ADB shall presumably be involved in its implementation. Revamping of infrastructure facilities, including an IT component, has already been discussed in GOP forums. Implementation of the reform plan should not be delayed.

VII. The National Reconstruction Bureau's (NRB) Local Government Plan 2000

Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between a military government advocating democracy, the NRB plan, should be given

serious support. Given the past grave failures of all governments in Pakistan's history, the Musharraf regime must still be given the benefit of the doubt. The NRB plan can prove revolutionary, if properly and earnestly implemented. On the other hand, given the history of Pakistan, the implementation of the devolution plan can be easily doubted. The people have heard of this before. Nevertheless, it can be a real breakthrough for the country. The overall direction of the Local Government Plan (hence after the Plan) is correct. The approach is commendable. The "bottom-up" strategy is certainly workable. Other than a few minor problems, the Plan is indeed remarkable. We wish it be implemented not for the sake of the military regime but for the sake of the nation. Remember this is the most serious thrust at devolution yet. The people want real change in the country and the military regime has to deliver. Pakistan will be richer for the devolution exercise. Although the military regime is flexible on the final shape of the Plan. There are many complex issues still to be worked out. The Plan's briefness and lack of essential details is uncomfortable. As the popular saying goes, "the devil is in the details" and the details are surely missing. Thus, the main problem with the Plan is not what it contains but what it leaves out. In all fairness, the NRB faces a stupendous task well beyond its human capacity and limited means. Therefore, all the more reason for civil society and international agencies to lend a helping hand. The people owe the military regime their full cooperation because if it fails the country fails also. Ordinary people really do not have much of a choice in the matter. They cannot wish away the Musharraf regime any time soon. Therefore, make the best use of it and the opportunity provided to fill in the gap at this crucial juncture in the nation's history.

To analyze the Plan requires some general theoretical understanding of the concepts of local government, decentralization and devolution of power. Moreover, a historical background of Local Government in Pakistan and the context of the reform plans is also required.

Theory of Local Government, Decentralization, and Devolution

The current movement to decentralization has been fueled by disillusionment with the administrative and policy-implementing capacity of highly centralized governance systems. This has especially been the case in terms of efforts to promote economic development activities through centralized planning.

Local governments matter most for the daily requirements of the common people. From the perspective of the ordinary people what does the state do that will make a real difference in their lives? How do you bring them the fruits of good governance in a most effective manner? We are strongly convinced that we could do this by creating an effective third tier of government. This tier has to be provided sufficient resources and capacity to meet public needs. Kaelin explains that the

Too often, the central governments activities at the local level are not driven by demand from the local citizens, but rather are imposed on them by agencies that have developed ideologies within the context of the interests of the central government. The people at the local level do not feel any ownership of the activities and may even reject the "gifts" imposed on them. Such lack of responsiveness by the population may come less from the activity itself and from the way it is imposed.⁸

Centralized systems fail because of a number of factors. First, the problem faced is that of low response by the people. The government activity has been directed from above rather than from demand below. It is common that the local people reject these gifts from the central government simply because they have not been involved in the decision-making process and therefore do not feel that they own these projects. Second, officials employed by the

⁸ See unpublished report by Walter Kaelin, "Legal Aspects of Decentralization in Pakistan", Pakistan UNDP/SDC, 1998

federal government lack knowledge about local problems and needs. They do not understand differences in local needs and conditions because the knowledge happens to be thinly distributed across the entire community is not available to the central planning agency. Even the greatest central planning agency cannot decide whether, in a particular local village case, improving the irrigation system or expanding schooling is more significant at a specific time. Only the local government can decide these things.⁹

The Good Governance Imperative

Decentralization goes hand in hand with good governance. Without good governance, effective decentralization is not possible. What is good governance in the first place? The simplest meaning will be the ability to translate state policies into ground reality so that it makes a difference in the betterment of society. The term implies broadly issues of government effectiveness, accountability, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law. The idea of governance is a broader than that of government. The primary characteristics of government include first the constitution, then the government itself, meaning the three basic wings, which are legislature, executive and judiciary, while governance involves established connections between these formal institutions and the broader civil society. Good governance is also to be understood as having a normative connotation and includes the hopes, aspirations, and predilections of the governed. Increasingly, among international organizations, governance is used as a concept to both provide a broad overview of and describe the way societies manage themselves. Governance has also been described and dealt with in terms of how to improve the functioning of the actual political/administrative system extant in a particular country. The term used has been "good governance." This has typically meant concern about civil service reform; the encouragement of efficient

⁹ Ibid.

governmental organization (which frequently means the downsizing of government bureaucracies); and the strong encouragement of transparency and accountability in government. The concept of governance means the activities, manner and management through various modes of exercising the power of government. Simply put, the government is the authority and the governance is the process through which the policies of the government is executed and implemented. Thus, the term of government implies the exercise of authority in managing and controlling the functions of the members of the body politic and directing the total affairs of the state for promoting the causes of common welfare. In any democratic country, elected representatives of the people are meant to reflect the wishes and aspirations of the people in the governance of the country. The essentials of good governance are: transparency, free flow of information, community voice, an effective public service, and a commitment to fight corruption. Moreover, ownership is always an important consideration. Governments must be in a position of leadership; the people must be consulted and involved. For sustainable development to occur public participation must be ensured. In an age of scarcity, good governance has become the issue of our times. It is agreed that a state must achieve a high level of good governance because lack of capacity to carefully monitor and implement, otherwise good policy designs, will hamper and distort development. The essential components of a good government are:

- (a) Good governance, which is dependent upon the existence of a participatory process and the consent of the people.
- (b) Accountability of the government for its actions, which is dependent upon the availability of information, transparency of decision-making and the presence of effective mechanisms to call individuals and institutions to account. Competence of the government, which is the capacity to formulate appropriate policies, make sound and timely decisions, and perhaps most importantly implement them effectively.

(c) Rule of law and respect for human rights. The government has to guarantee groups and individuals their security and their basic human rights. It has to provide an enabling framework for economic and social activity and to permit and encourage all types of individual participation.

Governance plays a consequential role in enhancing productivity levels and better income distribution. It is dependent on the well functioning of public institutions. Setting the right priorities, formulation of appropriate policies and their effective and efficient implementation for public welfare is elementary to good governance. It is a given that only an effective, responsive, transparent, participatory and efficient public administration structure can possibly secure favorable implementation of government policies. The World Bank identifies four major components in governance. They are as follows:¹⁰

1. Public sector management: The government must manage its personnel and financial resources effectively through appropriate reporting, budgeting, and accounting systems and eradicate inefficiency.
2. Accountability: public officials must be held responsible for their actions. This involves effective auditing, decentralization, accountability to consumers and a role for non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
3. The legal framework for development: sets of rules, known in advance, that are enforced. Conflicts be resolved by independent judicial bodies and there should exist mechanisms for amending rules when they no longer serve their purpose.

¹⁰ Sources: ODA (Overseas Development Administration) (1993) 'Good Government', Technical Note no. 10 (London: ODA); World Bank (1992) Governance and Development (Washington D.C.: World Bank).

4. Information and transparency; there are three main areas for improvement, (i) transparency as a means of preventing corruption; (ii) publicly available information for policy analysis and debate and (iii) information on economic efficiency.

Generally, international donor agencies have come to emphasize that governance is the essential issue in project aid. For example, USAID has noted "the finest planning and budgeting system in the world are of little use, if there are not quick and accurate means to track progress and to know the relationship between the planned events and actual events".¹¹ James' Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, in an address to the Bank's Board of Governors said:¹²

We need a new development framework. What might countries look for in such a development framework? First, the framework will outline the essentials of good governance - transparency, voice, the free flow of information, and a commitment to fight corruption, and a well-trained, properly remunerated civil service... Ownership matters. Countries and their governments must be in the driver's seat, and, in our experience, the people must be consulted and involved. Participation matters - not only as a means of improving development effectiveness, as we know from our recent studies, but also as the key to long-term sustainability and to advantage.

There is no single model or form of good governance, nor is there a single structure or set of structures. It is a broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances. Although bound to respond to the specific requirements of different issue areas, governance must take an integrated approach to questions of human survival and prosperity. Recognizing the systemic nature of

¹¹ "The Effectiveness of Aid to Pakistan" (Islamabad: Economic Affairs Division, GOP and UNDP, 1990) 1998, A, 9.

¹² *The Nation*, November 9, 1998.

these issues, it must promote systemic approaches in dealing with them.

Local Government in Pakistan: Historical Context

Soon after the coup in October last, General Musharraf had elaborated a seven point agenda to address the institutional crisis and advance national reconstruction. One of the seven points pertains to devolution of power to the grass roots level. The military regime claims that the past top-down approach needs to be modified with a vital bottom-up segment duly incorporated in the development strategy. Accordingly, there is a need for an effective third tier of government backed by sufficient resources to meet public needs. The principle of subsidiary is to be practiced wholeheartedly for meaningful results. Thus, the regime realizes that decentralization and devolution of power is essential for the efficiency and effectiveness of public service. In addition, the development of the third tier of government is also vital for democratization and public welfare. The GOP recognizes the need to increase effectiveness and efficiency of its administrative system. Lack of timely, reliable, and accurate information is considered as a constraint in efficiency of government operations. The GOP is prepared to launch a major institutional reform initiative to introduce accountability in the administration. It is keen to provide information that is previously denied to the public. This is to ensure accountability and transparency in its administrative system. The GoP realizes that the on-going and planned interventions have to be designed and implemented within a strategic framework of reform initiatives.

The Musharraf regime needs to decentralize and devolve power in a planned manner. Some experimentation is necessary. Failures are inevitable given the lack of capacity at the lower levels of government. The capacity at the local level is very inadequate. It will take time, resources, and great attention to build it. Elections at the local-level are to be held by May 2001. This is to be followed by provincial and then national elections. National

elections are to be held last by 2002. No date has been given for provincial and national elections yet. The Musharraf regime needs to do this exercise in phases by gradually consolidating gains at the lower level and then proceeding upwards at the next higher level.

Currently, the Plan does not include the following issues:

- (i) The manner of interaction between the districts and the provinces
- (ii) Financial autonomy issues. Exact working of the new provincial finance commission.
- (iii) Taxation issues in reasonable details. For example, the formulas for direct or other grants from provinces and the federal government.

Another weakness of the Plan is its penchant for fixing unrealistic quotas for various sections of the population in the Local Government councils. If the purpose is to empower henceforth disadvantaged groups then there are other methods like affirmative action available. Why does the USA not employ quotas to empower women and other ethnic minorities like the Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans? Quotas have been used in India for sometime for the empowerment of women, dalits, and other minorities but the question is whether the program has been successful or not? What evidence does the NRB have to suggest that quotas do the intended job? Quotas in principle are violations of the basic democratic rights of the people to choose whom so ever they desire. The State must not second-guess the public in deciding for them in whichever way, including quotas. If the people want to elect someone from one category only, say males and not females, then let them do it. Let the franchise be as wide as possible with no limitations, even those imposed for the sake of empowerment of a disadvantaged group. This is a basic philosophy of democracy and not subject to compromise. We need to explore this issue further. However, this task is again beyond the scope of the paper.

Proposals for the Reform of the State District Machinery

There is a general apprehension that good governance requirements are not being met. Governments in many countries, including Pakistan, are trying very hard to improve efficiency, transparency, and accountability of their personnel and agencies. What are the causes of government failures? How best to improve governance? How can the public sector be made more efficient and effective? These issues are being debated earnestly the world over. The contemporary challenge is to formulate a reform strategy in which sequencing and prioritization are carefully laid out in advance. For example, goals, objectives, and performance criteria of government agencies must be elaborated before any structural change is incorporated in the design of the system. Then, only a few critical agencies have to be taken up for detailed reforms. Early success, though modest, is critical for building credibility of government reform measures. At this late stage, it would be sufficient to make the following improvements:

(1) The women quota at 33 % is unrealistic and must be scaled down, at least in the backward rural areas. Despite what the GoP would have us believe, the simple fact is that there are not enough good women candidates available in many parts of the country to do the job. This is an observation of ground reality and should not be seen as discriminatory in any sense of the word. For various historical, religious and cultural reasons this quota is simply unattainable in most of Pakistan. Leaving the seats vacant until suitable candidates are found who contest to win the seat is a meaningless gesture. Why not to simply lower down the quota to make the desired possible?

(2) In addition, the 2% quota for minorities is unrealistic also. A very large part of Pakistan does not have enough resident minority population to warrant this quota. Here the quota be lowered further, say 1%, or even abolished altogether, depending on the situation. The Plan be down-to-earth practical and realistic about the changes that it desires to introduce in the country.

Utopian thinking will damage its credibility. Thus, a revision is desirable in the quota area. Again, the Provincial Governments and not the NRB shall decide.

(3) Similarly, the quota for peasants and workers seats is also unreasonable. Why have them? We can empower workers and peasants through other means like forming powerful workers and peasant movements, unions, and the like. Other than this quota proposal, what is the Musharraf regime to empower peasants and workers in the country? In fact, precious little. Let the military strengthen peasants and worker organizations through other direct action rather than this gesture of acknowledgement given in the NRB Plan. It is advisable to scuttle this one also.

(4) We do not need the post of the Deputy Nazim. The functions of acting as a stand-by and second of the mayor is unnecessary. Do we have deputies in other levels of government like deputy governor, or deputy chief executive? Then why at the district level? The argument that the deputy mayor would preside over the assembly is also unwarranted. The assembly can elect its own presiding officer for that matter. Why do we need an outsider to do the job? Wasting public money in creating unnecessary positions should be avoided. Pakistan cannot afford such extravaganzas.

(5) The job description of the Nazim be further clarified by including the following:

- (i) Translation of policy into specific action plans for delivery of services.
- (ii) Monitoring and evaluation.
- (iii) Networking across functions: formation of task specific teams that will facilitate work and not become victims of the "Departmentalism" phenomenon.
- (iv) Outside representation.

(6) There were 13 departments envisaged in each District Administration.¹³ Later, they were consolidated to just ten. The following adjustments are made to improve the working of the District Administration.¹⁴

(i) The Departments of Literacy and Education can be merged as they have tasks in the same functional domain. The new department is called Education Services. The Department shall also be responsible for public libraries and vocational or technical schools.

(ii) The term "social development" is vague. Moreover, the term development is used frequently elsewhere. The Department of "Social Development" is renamed as Social Services Department. Note this is only a name change for bringing greater clarity to the business of the department. The Department shall carry out the work of Institutional Development, Cultural development, Cooperatives, etc., as already given.

(iii) Add another new Department of Public Transportation and Engineering.

(iv) The Department of Environment should include public health, solid waste disposal and refuse collection services.

(7) A Departmental Committee System is set up. All Departments to have Departmental Committees, which will serve as a link between the Department and the public. These Committees shall report to the District Assembly and should meet monthly.

(8) The Plan is very sketchy in a number of areas. For example, it says that the district government shall "gradually move toward a

¹³ The departments are: Finance, Planning and Budget, Public Works, Health, Literacy, Social development, Information Technology, Revenue, Agriculture, Education, Commerce & Industry, Law, Environment, and Magistracy. See *Devolution of Power & Responsibility: Establishing the Foundation of Genuine Democracy - Local Government Proposed Plan*, Government of Pakistan, National Reconstruction Bureau, May 2000, 40.

¹⁴ See Para 4.2.5.2.2) in 40

corporate governance driven by an entrepreneurial approach"¹⁵ We assume that a corporate structure is envisaged as opposed to a bureaucratic Department structure. The details are missing here.

(10) The Office of the Nazim is the single most responsible entity at the district level. Therefore, the Nazim should be better equipped to handle his or her job. For the purpose, the Nazim's Office shall include a "Modernization of Public Services" Unit. The Nazim will be its nominal head. As the unit entails a lot of detailed work, the District Coordination Officer would head the day-to-day running of this unit, however. The purpose of the Unit is to create a more effective and efficient organizational structure to deliver public services by adopting known management principles. Within a reasonable time-period, the unit shall operationalize the following measures in all Departments: (a) mission statements, (b) departmental standards, (c) departmental targets, (d) Value for Money (VFM).

(11) There is a need to establish the management capacity at the local government level. For this training facilities have to be augmented.¹⁷

(12) A pluralist approach to government is preferable because each province is encouraged to try out various policy innovations at the level of the district. The NRB should establish a national forum where experiences of different local governments are discussed.

(13) The Constitution should be amended to give proper constitutional security to local government. The current constitutional provision for local government is extremely weak. Actually, it is hardly more than a mention in passing and no more. Local governments have to be protected from future dissolution and suspension in order to ensure continuity. Local governments cannot function properly if their very existence is in jeopardy.

¹⁵ See *The Devolution of Power & Responsibility: Local Govt. Plan, GOP, NRB, May 2000*, 39

(14) No excessive control by the higher levels of government. Planning procedures to be simplified and made quicker. Provide many opportunities to local governments to prioritize. Local governments will not be required to get approval for expenditures undertaken above a reasonable level. Local initiative is to be encouraged. Therefore, the possibility of independent deployment of resources is increased. The GoP will provide necessary support for tackling the issue.

Clear delimitation of powers and jurisdictions at the local level. No overlapping of primary jurisdiction between the local and other higher governmental levels. Demarcation of municipal, development, and other functions, especially in urban areas are undertaken on a priority basis. For example, in Lahore all agencies like ISA, TEPA, LDA will come under the Lahore Municipal Corporation under the control of the Lord Mayor. To the credit of the Govt. of Punjab, Lahore is already moving in the desired direction. Other cities need to follow the Lahore model.

(15) Strategic planning for the establishment of new cities and towns to commence immediately. The Planning Commission and all provincial governments should be involved.

(16) The merger of cantonment areas into city limits for better integration of public services. All military bases to be shifted well outside city limits. In future, there shall be no military bases inside city limits.

(17) Launch a District Roundtable Program to augment the capacity and competency of district and local governments in coping with newly assigned tasks, especially in the conservation area. This is explained further below.

(18) The required capacity could only be built gradually in a phased manner. A situation where local governments are given extended powers and responsibilities without the required capacity

building will lead to dramatic failure, which can and should be avoided. Therefore, great care is given to institution building when pursuing the parallel decentralization strategy.

(19) The GoP claims to give great importance to developing an Information Age government in Pakistan. Progress in the field is hampered because there is no central coordinating agency. The Government should create an Information Age government. It should employ new technology to meet the requirements of business and citizens, and not fall behind technological developments. The District Government shall seek to modernize the business of government itself. The District Government's goal is:

- Furnish modern, efficient, and appropriate means for business and citizens to communicate with government and to obtain services
- Make government a learning organization by developing a modern mechanism to store and disseminate information.
- Continue to work in partnership with business and the NGO sector to promote better IT use
- Establish a secure Internet within the government. Provide onward links to provincial and local authorities

The planned IT infrastructure will facilitate the provision of value-added services, enhancement of performance and improvement of decision-making. Tasks of the IT Departments should also include:

- Establish an efficient record management system in the public service. Information is now speedily retrievable by those requiring it. Unnecessary delays will be eliminated. At the federal level, computerized file management system is being introduced in key ministries like Finance and Planning. On-line records management system will be introduced in various Departments like transport, police, education, health, etc. Improved records

management systems will guarantee that a fast retrieval of records through "one-stop facility" is created for essential services.

➤ Make more uses of the Internet. The IT Department should have its own web page. The Government of NWFP already has one. This should be linked to all the districts. Some of the major functions of the Internet web page system are as follows:

- The public should be able to download all codes regulations from the Internet address. Citizens should also be able to access the following type of information: a complete profile of all government Departments and ministries giving their functions, top personnel, current laws governing their administration, service rules and regulations; various important publications of the Departments and their addresses including those of branch offices.

- The information should include description of the services, the relevant conditions, forms used, payments charged and the names, designations and telephone numbers of contact persons; latest tender advertisements issued by the big Departments; current news which are considered to be of importance to the public.

➤ Create a District Management Information System, which will carry information that will help the police and the line Departments to improve their working. The idea behind this initiative is to enable the district teams to work more efficiently and effectively by having timely access to all information related to their specific fields.

➤ A Development Communication System to fill the vacuum of information flows between various Departments, and between the provincial and district governments. There is a need for establishing a resource agency that will provide information on all activities in the area of development. The development communication system will collect, analyze, disseminate information relating to development issues, activities and processes. The objectives of the communication system are:

- (i) To promote debate on development issues among various target audiences
- (ii) To provide a unified, cohesive voice on development activities
- (iii) To develop linkages with current development communication systems employed by various Departments and agencies and to induct them into the new system in a phased manner
- (iv) To build an in-house technical capacity for developing communication modules, especially for the electronic media

Issue of Federal Funding

Local governments are usually dependent upon higher level funding to meet their requirements. In some cases, they receive money for general functioning and in other cases; they receive money for a specific service the local government agrees to provide for a higher-level government (provincial or federal).¹⁶ Much like its counterparts elsewhere, the GOP shall also make the following transfers:¹⁷

- Block transfer
- Matching grants
- Specific purpose grants

The details of these transfers have yet to be spelled out. A number of points are made here:

A) Block Grants

In the next few years, it is envisioned that most of the money for the district governments shall come from the federal government. It

¹⁶ Kurt Thurmaier, "Local Government Budgeting", *International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration*, *op cit.*, 1301.

¹⁷ NRB plan, 60

will take time for the districts to acquire the capacity to become self-sufficient. In the meantime, the federal government has to not only bear most of the burden of the district governments but also equip them with the technical capacity to become self-sufficient later on. Without the direct intervention of the federal government, districts will never achieve their goals. Therefore, every district should be given a minimum block grant of Rs. 500 million per year from the federal kitty. In addition, another block grant is based on population criteria to be worked out by mutual consultation of all provinces. Since Punjab has the biggest population and therefore can muster the biggest share of the funds, the voice and concerns of the minority provinces must be considered. Baluchistan and Sindh have felt neglected. What we are suggesting here is a framework to study the felt needs of the minority provinces. This is largely a political exercise and not a technical one pertaining to revenue sharing as such. A detailed analysis of the weaknesses in the federal set up is again beyond the scope of the paper. Sufficient to state here is that a simple formula based on population criteria alone may not be desirable.

As far as block grants are concerned, they are lump-sum transfers and only the Local Governments shall decide on how to use the money. At least, this is the theory. In actual practice, this money will be subject to a minimum number of federal guidelines, which will govern the spending. For example, the federal government can require that funding be released only when certain principles of good governance like transparency, openness in decision-making, and fairness have been met. In addition, the spending departments have complied with given Standard Operating Procedures and Rules of Business given by the federal government.

B) Categorical Grants:

Other than the block grants, the Federal Government should also make categorical grants in vital areas such as environment to augment the services in the field. The categorical grants are somewhat different than the specific purpose grants because they are given to a category of services and the local government has

some leeway to spend them. They are situated in between block and specific purpose grants.

These grants are not without attached conditionality, however. For example, the federal government shall give out directives or formulas to direct the Local Government's Environment Department to function in a desired way and more importantly to uphold certain minimum standards of service delivery. The federal government shall first prescribe maximum limits of air and water pollution tolerable. In collaboration with the local Environment Department, it also then measures the air and water in each locality to determine whether limits have been broken or not. The specified indicators are periodically checked by the Environment Department and reported to the federal government. The locality establishes a "need" when pollution levels exceed maximum tolerable limits. Only then, the funding is made for a specific program to clean up the air and water to the desired levels. It is up to the Local Government to decide how the actual clean up shall happen and who shall do it and what cost and period. Thus, the Federal government shall not interfere in the details of the actual working. The local Environment Department should be better equipped to carry out the task. The advantage of these categorical grants is that while the federal government channels funds to areas of high priority for human development, the local government controls actual spending without outside interference. Obviously, the Federal government shall provide technical services for the purpose as our local governments are not equipped to handle such highly technical tasks as environmental monitoring and clean up.

Local Revenue Sources

(a) Charges from the use of all local services. The World Bank suggests "the cost of providing local services should be recovered, to the extent possible, from charges on the beneficiaries".¹⁸ In

¹⁸ *World Development Report*, UNDP, 160.

addition, most of these service charges like water, sanitation, waste disposal, recreational facilities, health, education, are increased for growing the local revenue base.

(b) A Local Rate be imposed on property which be graduated. All the private property be placed in one of six or eight bands, and assessed by government valuers. Lahore city already has some valuation categories in place for fixing stamp duties. The richer neighborhoods shall pay several times more than the poorer ones. Specifically, for every Rs. 100 minimum per marla paid by the poorest areas, the richest areas shall have to pay Rs. 600-800 per marla. However, exempt the poorest of the poor from the local rate. Thus, slum-dwellers and other "katchi abadis" shall not be taxed for the time being.

(c) The Local Government is permitted to lease out land and impose a nominal tax on transfer of all real estate property.

(d) A motor vehicle license tax is imposed.

(e) A tax is imposed on permits of gun licenses.

(f) A tax is imposed on all building permits.

(g) The Local Government is able to borrow money from the capital market in the shape of public bonds. The World Bank and other international agencies can be tapped for assistance in the field.

(h) Tax all property transfers at the rate of 1% of value.

Obviously, one cannot foresee the specific agenda for various districts. The problems are diverse therefore, the solutions shall also vary. The actual work of the Roundtable shall have to ground in the concrete reality of the district itself. Moreover, the very concept of a Roundtable shall have to be popularized. Where the mechanism is very unfamiliar, much more effort needs to be undertaken to make the exercise fruitful. Most importantly, we do not have to reinvent the wheel. What is tried and tested must be implemented in all earnest. In addition, waiting for the district governments to be grounded will take some time. We cannot and should not wait for that to happen. The GOP in collaboration with IUCN should go ahead and institutionalize the Roundtable mechanism right now. As given above, the first roundtables are

scheduled for coming November. Let every district initiate the program. Any further delay would prove costly. Pakistan cannot afford to waste any more time.

Where next? After a year of the Musharraf regime, the government apparatuses are still in a mess with no easy solution in sight. A careful study of the problems of governance may yield insights of what is wrong in government and why? A detailed analysis is needed for the purpose. It has not yet happened. The Musharraf regime has failed to stem the tide of bureaucratic malfunction in Pakistan. The country is actually racing against time. Given the complexity of Pakistan's situation, only dedicated and persistent hard work can turn the nation around. The task is difficult and tedious. It requires a reasonable gestation period. Single-minded focus, dedication, sincerity, and courage are required. The people expect General Musharraf to lead the nation into a new era. History shall judge General Musharraf on what he made of a golden opportunity to turn around Pakistan. The performance of the first year in office has not been spectacular, to say the least.

THE POLITICS OF POPULATION GROWTH

DR.SALMA AHMAD

INTRODUCTION

With the exception of the spread of nuclear weaponry and threats to global ecological systems (although these are problems enough!), population growth is the most pressing and urgent issue currently faced by humanity (Giddens, 1994).

The population explosion, a problem in its own right, underlies and exaggerates all other problems (Hartley, 1972).

There is no pure population problem: the problem is one of population and resources. The well being of a population depends on the ratio of the size of the population to the magnitude of available resources' (Hardin, 1993).

These quotations from Giddens, Hartley and Hardin present that rapid population growth represents a major obstacle to development, as valuable resources are diverted from productive expenditure to the feeding of a growing population. On the contrary, some believe that the growth of population has the potential to stimulate economic growth and innovation (see Furedi, 1997). From this perspective, more people mean more problem solvers, since human creativity has the potential to overcome the limits of nature (Simon, 1981; Boserup, 1993, 1981). This paper is an attempt to contribute to the discussion whether population growth is a problem or not?

Throughout most of human history population grew very slowly. In the twentieth century the world has experienced an unprecedented increase in population. Prior to this century, mortality rates were generally much higher than they are today, and the fertility rates of the population tended to be correspondingly high. In the last few decades, this equilibrium has been disturbed, mainly due to a dramatic decline in mortality and gains in life expectancy. Explanations of this decline include the success of public health measures in controlling infectious diseases, advances in medicine, better nutrition, and the general improvement of economic conditions (Preston, 1980; Gille, 1985; Kuznets, 1980; McKeown, 1976). In any event, it is a universal phenomenon that mortality rates have declined. In most industrialized countries, the decline in mortality rates was eventually offset by parallel declines in the birth rate, so that population growth began to stabilize in what is called the 'demographic transition'. Many of these countries have now reached the 'replacement level' of fertility (Giddens, 1994) and in some - such as Italy, Germany and Hungary - the population is actually declining. Fertility remains at very high levels in much of the Third World, with a concomitant acceleration of population in such countries (Freedman, 1979).

Population experts believe that up to 1750, global population growth averaged considerably less than 0.1 percent per year and average life expectancy was only 27 years. Between 1750 and 1900, population grew at about 0.5 percent per year, with average life expectancy in Europe standing at about 35 years. From 1900 to 1950, population grew at about 1.0 percent per year. At that time average life expectancy was about 50 years. Today it is around 75 years in the developed world. In developing countries, life expectancy was about 40 years in 1950 and today has risen to over 60 (Understanding Global Issues, 1994). Between 1950 and 1960, the world population grew at about 1.7 per cent per year (Hartley, 1972) and the increase was 2.1 per cent per year by 1961. It remained steady for a while, and then began falling slowly, reaching 1.7 percent in the year 1979, where it seems to have stayed for ten years, until 1989 when it rose again to 1.8 percent

(Hardin, 1993). This aggregate percentage masks considerable diversity among and within different regions of the world. The rate of natural increase varies from one country and time period to another, depending on the combination of fertility and mortality levels. The well-off 'developed' countries have a rate of population growth much lower than that of poorer nations. Wealthy countries tend to grow at less than 1 per cent per year and poorer countries at more than 2 per cent per year. Moreover, among the poorer nations, population growth rates vary between 1.5 per cent to more than 3.5 per cent per year (Giddens, 1994). Even a small difference between birth rates and death rates can make a large difference to population growth. For example, if the natural increase (i.e., the difference between birth and death rates) is 0.1%, as it is in Europe, it takes over a thousand years for the population to double. If the annual rate of natural increase is 1%, the population doubles in about 67 years. At 2 percent per year, the number doubles every 35 years. If the rate is 2.9%, as in Africa and many Asian countries, the doubling time is only 24 years (Understanding Global Issues, 1994).

CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH POPULATION GROWTH

In 1900 the global population was 1.7 billion, by 1950 it had reached 2.5 billion, and in 1995 nearly 5.5 billion (Hartman, 1995) and in 1999 **6 billion** people inhabit the earth. Three quarters of them live in the Third World. The United Nations predicts that world population will reach 6 billion by the end of the century. Ehrlich (1968) calculated that, if the rate of population growth (at that period) continued, nine hundred years from now there would be 60,000,000,000,000,000 people on the earth. For every square yard of the earth's surface (including both sea and land) there would be a hundred people. Fremlin (1964) worked out that housing such a population would need a continuous 2,000-story building covering the complete planet. Even in such a stupendous structure there would only be three or four yards of floor-space per person. Such a picture, of course, is designed to drive attention to

the consequences of continued high population growth. The real issue is what will happen over the next thirty or forty years, because the earth is already seen to be burdened with two and half times as many people as it can support (Lean, 1994).

The causes and consequences of population growth and its relationship to available resources has been a matter for continuous debate since the onset of modern mortality control in the eighteenth century (Gould and Lawton, 1986). The debate has been pursued with renewed intensity over the past thirty years, particularly in the context of a feared depletion of resources as a result of accelerating population growth. Some favour population growth and argue that the productive capacity of people as creators of wealth has been underestimated (Simon, 1981). Indeed, Boserup suggested that population pressure may, in certain cases, promote economic growth and social change (Boserup, 1981, 1993). However, in the view of many pessimists, population growth threatens the very future of mankind and interacts with the economic development process in a number of ways.

For example, high population growth rate has been considered (McNamara, 1974) as a hindrance to the economic development of poor Third World countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In a population with zero growth (as in most Western countries) between 3 to 5 per cent of national income has to be invested to produce a 1 per cent increase in income per head. Where a population grows by 3 per cent per year (as in most Third World countries), up to 20 per cent of national income has to be invested in order to create a similar increase in living standards (Giddens, 1994). Internal investment is basic to the growth of a national economy. However, the poorer the nation, the more difficult it is to obtain investment capital internally - by savings, confiscation, or taxation. Population growth greatly exaggerates the problem by eating up potential investment funds merely to keep people alive (Hartley, 1972). As the regions where population is growing rapidly include most of the poorest countries in the world, sufficient levels of investment cannot possibly be achieved.

Inevitably these countries fall further and further behind the industrialized sectors of the globe, which exacerbates existing inequalities between countries (Giddens, 1994). All this reduces a nation's capability to feed itself and leads to underdevelopment, and the general lowering of standards of living.

The social implications of rapid population growth are profound. The rapid drop in mortality, with little or no decline in fertility, has produced a completely different age structure in Third World countries compared to industrialized ones. It creates an unbalanced age structure with a high dependency ratio. In the developing world, 36 % of the population is under 15 (Understanding Global Issues, 1994). In Mexico and Pakistan, 45 per cent of the population is under fifteen years old. In the industrialized countries, on the other hand, only about a quarter of the population is in this age group. The 'elongated pyramid' age distribution in the non-industrialized countries adds to their social and economic difficulties. For example, a disproportionate number of young or old people in the population may put an intolerable burden on those who are in work and who have to pay for education, health care and pensions. A youthful population needs support and education, and during that time its members are not economically productive. However, in many Third World countries large numbers of children are either employed or scratch a living as 'street children', begging for whatever they can get. When such children grow up, they become unemployed, homeless, or sometimes both (Ennew, 1986). A population that includes a large number of young people approaching reproductive age has a built-in momentum towards growth and will continue to grow even if the birth rate suddenly falls. If fertility declined to 'replacement level' - one birth for every living person in a population - it would still take seventy-five years before that population stopped increasing (Giddens, 1994). In agriculture, the effect among small farmers is often land fragmentation and growing landlessness.

Overpopulation is also considered an important cause of income inequality. The gap between richest and poorest is widening, with

the world's richest 20% getting 82.7% of global income and the poorest 20% only 1.4% (UN, 1992). The inhabitants of the affluent countries are, on average, 13 times richer than those of the poor capitalist countries (Bondestam, 1980). Where social services or job creation facilities are inadequate, lower income groups have less access to public services such as education and health, and being generally less skilled, suffer most from low wages and high unemployment.

Two solutions to cope with burgeoning populations have been suggested (Understanding Global Issues, 1994): a rapid technological fix and voluntary redistribution of wealth. Technological advance is unpredictable, so no one can be sure how large a population the world might eventually be able to support. Yet even at current population levels, global resources may already be well below those required to create living standards in the Third World comparable to those of the industrialized countries. Expansion of the global food supply is being made more difficult by water scarcity and soil degradation. The need to force the soil to produce even higher yields in the future is likely to accelerate the process of environmental damage. Genetic engineering may help with food supplies but probably not within the time frame needed. Unless there are major changes in patterns of world energy consumption - such as the large-scale harnessing of solar energy or wind power - there is no possibility of extending this level of energy consumption to every one in the world. There are simply not enough energy resources to go round.

The second solution for overpopulation suggested was the voluntary redistribution of wealth. The developed countries show little inclination to distribute their wealth among the poor or to curb their own affluent lifestyles. It is often stressed that the increase in population in the Third World is the result of unplanned and irrational behaviour and portrayed as the main cause of poverty in these countries. A reduction in fertility is suggested as a contribution to the eradication of the most serious manifestations of underdevelopment. Indeed it has been argued by Chege (1993)

that this attitude of blaming the poor for their own poverty by attributing it to over-fertility reflects parochial and ethnocentric Western attitudes, which are aimed at diverting attention away from the real political problems. Attempts to control the growth of the Third World population have been seen by some as one of many components of an upper class strategy to divert attention from the actual causes of poverty (Bondestam, 1980). As Hartman (1987) argues:

It is the consumption explosion in the industrialized world rather than the population explosion in the Third World which is putting the most pressure on natural resources.... A small rate of population increase in the industrialized countries thus puts much more pressure on resources than a rapid population increase in the Third World (Hartman, 1987:21).

Population growth in the United States in the next 30 years will have more effect on the environment than the increase in numbers in China and India combined (Lean, 1994). The main drain on the earth's resources and threat to the environment comes from the rich. Ehrlich writes in 'Our Planet' (1994) 'The relatively small population of rich people accounts for roughly two-thirds of global environmental destruction. From this perspective, the most important population problem is overpopulation in the industrialized nations. The consumption of energy, raw materials and other goods is vastly higher in the western countries than in other areas of the world (Giddens, 1994). These levels partly depend on resources transferred from less developed regions. A baby born in Europe or America will consume about 40 to 50 times as many resources during its lifetime (especially if it becomes 'gainfully employed') as its counterpart in Asia or Africa.

Moreover, those who live in the industrialized countries might feel Third World population expansion is not 'their' problem, and that the societies concerned should be left to deal

with their swelling populations as best they can. Europe's population is expected to grow by less than 4 million by 2025 while the population of North Africa is forecast to grow by 123 million and in Western Asia by 169 million. The pressure to migrate from poor and over populated nations to richer and less populated nations will be immense (Understanding Global Issues, 1994; Hardin, 1993). If world population growth continues at the present rate, it carries the risk of global catastrophe. The pressure on the world's resources may lead to bitter conflict, which could end in major wars. At this point, the three great issues humanity must deal with over the next few decades - the possibility of nuclear conflict, ecological dangers and population growth - merge with one another (Giddens, 1994). In this situation it is hard to expect any help from developed countries to those in the Third World and the only practical solution left will be to control population growth rate.

It has been recognized (Hardin, 1993) that if a society fails to control the size of its population, nature ultimately will. Nature's two great tools for population control are starvation and disease. Ehrlich (1968), nearly three decades ago was alarmed by the consequences of high population growth and wrote:

No changes in behaviour or technology can save us unless we can achieve control over the size of the human population. The birth rate must be brought into balance with the death rate or mankind will breed itself into oblivion. We can no longer afford merely to treat the symptoms of the cancer of population growth; the cancer itself must be cut out' (Ehrlich, 1968, p.166).

Perhaps partly because governments and other agencies heeded the warnings of Ehrlich and others more than twenty years ago, a variety of government and private interventions to influence population growth in the Third World have been attempted. During the past three decades, population programs have received

considerable funding. National and international population policies have been developed to counteract the negative effects of continued rapid growth rates. However, family planning campaigns up to now have had a relatively small influence on the birth rate in the developing world.

THE DEBATE ABOUT SOLUTION

Population growth and fertility have been researched, subjected to theoretical speculation and targeted by various kinds of social and economic policies for 30 years or more. Despite all this attention, there exists relatively little consensus on the underlying determinants of fertility behaviour or the policy measures that may affect population growth (Simmons and Farooq, 1985). The level of disagreement that still exists concerning fertility and its determinants can be illustrated by reference to the heated discussions that have ensued during the past few decades over alternative policy interventions in the area. In some measure, this controversy is part of a larger debate about the best means of achieving goals of material well-being and social justice for people living in the Third World. Even among those who support efforts to reduce fertility, there is disagreement about the most effective approach. The heated debate at the Bucharest World Population Conference in 1974 between the governments of the developed and developing world reflected this. The developed world argued that population control was a necessary prelude to economic growth, and specific interventions aimed toward regulating fertility could and would have a large impact on population change even before the onset of substantial development in other areas. The writings of Tsui and Bogue (1978), and Freedman (1979), represent this optimistic view, claiming that family planning programs have been a major factor in the recent decline in fertility experienced by a number of developing countries. On the other hand, governments of the developing world, argued that 'development is the best contraceptive' and that no form of intervention is likely to bring about fertility reductions unless there is immediate progress toward

the goal of general development and toward a fundamental revolution in living conditions. Demeny (1979a, 1979b) argued that the observed reductions in fertility were more logically attributable to fundamental social and economic forces rather than to family planning 'per se'. Subsequently the idea that 'development itself is the best contraceptive' has been discredited (Ahmad, 1998). Substantial falls in birth rates have been recorded even in very poor countries, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Understanding Global Issues, 1994).

Though birth control may well be a necessary part of population policy, it is not, in itself, sufficient to bring about a reduction in fertility (Lawton, 1986). However, it is difficult to improve living standards without some corresponding reduction in population growth (Brandt, 1980). At the Cairo Population Conference 1994, however, it was stressed by Pope (as mentioned in 'Independent', 28 August, 1994) that successful population policies result from economic development, education and health care - not from family planning programmes. He argued that family planning alone, without economic and social development will not reduce the very high birth rate of many developing areas. He suggested that the evidence indicated that social factors were indeed the most powerful factors in controlling population. Lean (1994) suggested that formal family planning programmes are also important, and that the most effective progress is made when both these elements are combined.

CONCLUSION

The causes and consequences of population growth and its relationship to available resources has been a matter of continuous debate since the onset of modern mortality control in the twentieth century. Some favour population growth and argue that the productive capacity of people as creators of wealth has been underestimated. In the view of pessimists, population growth threatens the very future of mankind. The pessimists view seems

stronger as the social implications of rapid population growth are profound. The rapid population growth is currently occurring in developing countries, and to utilize the manpower for productive purposes they require resources. For developing countries it is difficult to generate resources required for utilization of surplus labour. The only solution is left to control their population growth. However, different strategies should be adopted to control the population in different countries. Though birth control may well be a necessary part of population policy, it is not sufficient to bring about a reduction in fertility. A general prevalence of a desire to limit family size is essential for fertility decline with an acceptance of the idea that the practice of family limitation is socially legitimate.

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GHULAM AHMED PARWEZ: **His Islamic Political Views: A Critique**

M. Iqbal Chawla

Ghulam Ahmed Parwez (1903-1986) is one of the distinguished religious writers of Pakistan. He has produced over forty books and hundreds of articles. His writings cover almost every aspect of human life. He analyzed them in the light of Quranic injunctions. His interpretation of the Quranic verses and the traditions of the Holy Prophet are not traditional. Therefore he is termed as a modernist. He has chalked out a political program for the Islamic State. In this paper an attempt is made to throw light his political views and their significance in the society.

Parwez in order to substantiate his thesis analysis the views of different thinkers from Plato to modern philosophers. Among others, he examines the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, John Locke and Rousseau. Parwez concludes that their theories were useful to humanity but they failed to provide a political system, which could become panacea for all evils. Likewise Parwez believes that the western thinkers have been unable to develop a perfect political system. Theocracy was the fruit of Christian rule in Europe, which resulted in moral and social corruption. He maintains that if the moral code of Bible were imposed on society, it would cause a sudden death of it.

The impact of Christian sway on Europe was hazardous. It emphasized material concept of life, which persuaded man to concentrate on self-preservation, self-assertion and self-production, but made him devoid of all human emotions. Man crushed his self for material gains. He quotes Bernard Russell that the present problem of man was that he had discovered and conquered the external world but had not been able to explore the inner world or self. Parwez holds that similar is the case with democracy and communism. In democracy, there is no concept of sovereignty. In a

democratic system majority party assumes authority while in communism one party controls all matters, no one can protest against its decisions. As compared to these concepts, he says, the Islamic concept of life is a model for humanity, which guarantees physical as well as spiritual development of man. ⁽¹⁾

Parwez believes that if the political views as enunciated in the Quran are practiced could make a society an ideal one, which could not only motivate man to search hidden resources of the cosmos but also develop his personality. He argues that the Quran assures the success of the political system of Islam. By adopting the Quranic way of life, it is possible to create a new man who could acquire human merits to the maximum level. ⁽²⁾

Constitution

Parwez says that the concept of Islam about the constitution is different from democracy and socialism. In a democratic society, the elected members of the community frame the constitution while in a socialist society, the constitution is made by a congress or the ruling party, in democracy, sovereignty belongs to the assembly while in the socialist polity sovereignty vests in the socialist party. ⁽³⁾ But in Islam sovereignty belongs to Allah who enjoys supreme powers, and no one can amend His Decrees. The concept of Allah in Islam is quite different from that in other religion. ⁽⁴⁾ One can know Allah only through the injunctions of the Quran. The concept of Allah through 'why' is the real one. Other concepts are the creation of human mind, which are spurious and absurd because human intellect cannot perceive an abstract thing, which is beyond its observation. Like Allama Iqbal, he maintains that a finite thing cannot perceive an infinite thing. It is beyond the reach of human intellect to visualize the physical features of Allah. The Quranic God exists eternally. He was present when there was nothing and would exist when there would be nothing left. According to Parwez Allah is present with all his "Attributes". These merits are permanent and few facets of Absolute Reality are exhibited externally. These traits are called "Asmaa Hassana" ⁽⁵⁾. It

means Allah is perfect. ⁽⁶⁾ This concept of Allah gives a balanced personality to man which results in peace and prosperity in the society.

Parwez believes that through an evolutionary process man was created. Allah gave him divine energy. Humanity originated when the stage of "Nafakh-e-Ruh" was reached. Thus this stage is termed personality or ego. ⁽⁷⁾ Man can realize these merits or Nafakh-e-Ruh's. According to natural law, the aim of the creation of man is to develop these potentialities. Quran presents the personality of Allah as a model for mankind. Allah has 'Personal Attributes' and 'Ethical Attributes' the former is abstract and later is those which should be absorbed. To actualize these dormant potentialities is the function of man. The extent of their manifestation shows his closeness to Allah (God). This means that man has the potential to acquire all the qualities of Allah which have been given to him but God is infinite and man is finite, and finite cannot become infinite. He elaborates the impact of these. Attributes of God on a society. When a society adopts these 'Attributes', he maintains that it acquires cohesion. ⁽⁸⁾

In an Islamic society everybody's actions should be directed to win God's favor. Goal determines human action. Action is the name of the struggle to achieve objective. In 'Deen' (religion) there is no difference between 'means and ends'. Though God is Omnipotent yet, He has His own Law which is immutable and universal. Every action has reaction, and law of cause and effect goes on in the external world. Nothing except man in this Universe has its own will, or has the powers to disobey these laws. ⁽⁹⁾ Man has ego or self, which is independent and free in thought and action. God responds to man's action. According to universal law, the result cannot be changed---positive action results in positive reaction and negative action in negative reaction. ⁽¹⁰⁾ Like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) he argues that in the physical universe God's Law is in operation in its best form. Divine Mission is to operate this law in this world too. Parwez says that His Laws are practicable and should be practiced in this world. If a society

adopts His Laws it can attain its ideal form. His law is the best for the welfare of mankind and those who introduce it can succeed not only in this world but also in the hereafter.

Man can obey an abstract thing like God by "La-Ilaha-Ilallah" i.e. the enforcement of the Quranic System. The meaning of Kalamath-ul-Allah is to obey the principles of God. ⁽¹¹⁾ A Muslim cannot become Muslim until he believes in Klamath-al-Allah. Thus sovereignty of God means acceptance of His laws as enunciated in the Quran. ⁽¹²⁾ These laws are unamendable. ⁽¹³⁾ However supplementary laws, which are not repugnant to Islamic spirit, can be drafted to redress problems.

In a democratic system, parliament frames the constitution while in a socialist country Communist party drafts the constitution; in both cases, man obeys directly or indirectly other man. But in an Islamic state, laws are not man-made but are provided by God through revelation. To obey these laws means to obey God.

Caliphate (Ruler)

The position of a ruler in an Islamic state is very crucial. He is not a shadow of God but merely a servant of God and society. ⁽¹⁴⁾ His duty is to enforce Islamic laws in the state. During his caliphate, rightly guided, Caliph 'Hazrat Omar' enforced the Quranic political system. He enjoyed the same powers as a ruler or as the central authority, as were exercised by his predecessors, Caliph Hazrat Abu Bakr (673-632 A.H.) and the Holy Prophet. ⁽¹⁵⁾ A central authority is that which has the power to accept or reject any by law or a proposal. Parwez believes that after the "Four Pious Caliphs" the central authority was not operative because Islam was no more a Deen but has assumed the form of a religion. Any government that enforces Islamic Order is an Islamic one and its head, whether one or more than one, will be the central authority. ⁽¹⁶⁾

He presents the life of the Holy Prophet and his successors as the model for the ruler of an Islamic state. Parwez proposes that the salary of a ruler should not be more than that of an ordinary worker. He should be a good administrator, judge, and 'protector' and foster. His position in the law-making process should not be higher than that of an ordinary member of his "shura"(parliament). His life-style should be such that no one can distinguish between ruler and slave; no one is superior or inferior, all human are equal.⁽¹⁷⁾ Parwez amplifies the significance of the central authority, which he regards as a binding force for all Muslims. If they do not value this, they will disintegrate. It provides the nucleus for the political machinery. Therefore if the center is removed culture and civilization will be eliminated.

Majilis-e Shura (Assembly)

In democracy the constituent assembly occupies prime importance in the governmental structure. Its value for government is similar to that of blood in the body. Since Quran has provided constitution, the function of parliament is to draw by-laws to meet the new challenges of changing times. Like Rousseau (1712-1778), Parwez believes that all the Muslims in the state should have the right to make supplementary laws. The basic difference between a western democracy and an Islamic democracy is that in the former parliament has the right to frame or amend the constitution while in the latter; the whole community has the right of 'Ijtihad'. In this sense, Islamic democracy is 'a controlled one.'⁽¹⁸⁾

He paraphrases that the Holy Prophet was the focal point of the Islamic Ummah. Submission to him by following his sayings and deeds in letter and spirit was meant submission to the Quran. In fact he implemented Quranic injunctions. But for practical application of the Islamic order he used to consult his companions. The Quran endorses the principle of consultation.⁽¹⁹⁾ The Holy Prophet who had a consultative assembly enforced the Quranic laws.⁽²⁰⁾ The community obeyed the Islamic laws, and not the Holy Prophet. Thus in an Islamic State obedience should be to the

law, not to the ruler. The "Majilis-e-Shura" is necessary but the Quran leaves the mechanism of this Majilis to the Muslim community. Like Iqbal he confers powers to constituent Assembly to make supplementary laws. However its members should have deep knowledge of the Quran and modern development. The laws framed by the assembly should become the laws of Pakistan. ⁽²¹⁾ No party should have the monopoly of power and the community should exercise its right of consultation through its elected representatives. These decisions are revocable and subject to amendment, if needed. Like Maulana Maududi he believes that there some permanent values in Islam. These permanent values, or the constitution, are like a frame of body to the Islamic government. The 'Majilis-e-Shura' cannot alter or amend these values because these are irrevocable.

Quranic Basic Principles

Parwez strictly believes that fundamental right that Islam has given to the society is practicable, best and useful for the modern society. He enumerates basic rights of man. God has gifted every human being with physical body and energy or ego equal, however much they may differ in respect of caste, creed or race. ⁽²²⁾

Verify We have honored every human being (17170)

This verse is recognition of the dignity of man as man because God has bestowed 'self' to every human being. Therefore, the first principle of an Islamic order is that one should recognize other's ego. Secondly when one is anxious to develop one's self; he is bound to value other's ego too. Thus in a society based on this principle there would be no distinction between the ruler and the ruled because no one likes to deform his personality by exploiting other in order to further his personal interests. The corollary of this principle if it practices will be that no man would compel others to obey him. God will alone be obeyed.

The third principle is commitment to "Adl' and Ehsan" ⁽²³⁾. These ingredients form the basis of the social order of Islam. By 'Adl' is meant giving each man his due, and 'Ehsan' means actively contributing to make good the deficiency of others to enable them to develop their ego without any hindrance. If the conviction in 'Adl and 'Ehsan' is developed, no one would carry other's burden, and every body would get his due. This would lead to elimination of all exploitation.

Another outstanding principle of Quran is 'Justice' that is different from Adl and Ehsan. It means that in public dealings no distinction should be made between friends and a foe even if it might be detrimental to one's own interests. Devotion to justice means much more than being just to oneself. Therefore, he believes that justice should be administered at all cost.

On one hand Parwez is in the favor of democracy and on the other he contends that there is no scope for political parties, sects, and factions in an Islamic State. In Quran it is called 'Shirk'. He quotes Quran:

And be not of Mushirikin i.e. of those who split up their 'Deen' and become schismatic, each rejoicing in whatever they have (30/31-32).

To Parwez an ideal Islamic State is party-less and faction-less. But history does not endorse his this assumption. Even in Islamic history. One finds factions. Sects and parties, demanding political share in the state, right from after the death of the Holy Prophet. ⁽²⁴⁾

Another important basic right of the mankind is to receive basic necessities of life. The Islamic economic system ensures to all human beings, healthy as well as handicapped, basic necessities of life. The aim is achieved with the co-operation of the whole community. He developed a new meaning of 'Zakat'. According to him, 'Zakat' means growth and development. One of the duties of an Islamic government is to assume responsibilities that are in the

domain of God. God is 'Rabb-e-Alemin' ⁽²⁵⁾ Rabb means to develop a thing from beginning to its end. God orders:

Those who if we give them powers in land,
establish worship and pay the poor due and
enjoin kindness and forbid iniquity. (22/41).

In this system all the state revenue is 'Zakat' which should be distributed not only for the welfare of the Muslim society but, if possible also for the whole mankind.

The formation of the constituent assembly is another primary right of man. The constituent assembly of the state is a permanent body. The mode of its election is not fixed but its members should have vast knowledge and be of sound character and intelligence. Unlike Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958) he does not endorse theocracy or democracy, but reluctantly concedes controlled democracy. ⁽²⁶⁾ Like Rousseau he suggests participation of the whole community in governmental affairs but is vague about the methods of achieving consensus on any issue. ⁽²⁷⁾

Another unalterable value is that all human beings form one community. There are two nations i.e. one, which believes in Islam, the Muslim, and other that does not believe, the Kafirs' (infidel). As far as basic rights are concerned, believers and non-believers are equal in Islam; no one can take away these rights. Within these limits, the state can frame by-laws to encounter new problems but these must not be repugnant to Islamic 'spirit'. The representatives of the people can revise these supplementary laws by mutual consultation.

Islamic Jurisprudence

The Quran is the primary source of Islamic jurisprudence and it is the only foundation of the 'Deen-e-Islam' (Religion) because it is genuine and original in its form and content. The Quran is the

revelation of God to Muhammad (P.B.U.H.). No man except the Prophet can have direct link with God. ⁽²⁸⁾

Parwez argues that it is debatable that a committee arranged the Quran in a book form after the Holy Prophet. Controversies among Muslims were reported during the process of its compilation. Hazrat Omar is reported to have complained that one verse that he used to recite was not included. Some other parts of the Quran written on leafs were reportedly eaten by Hazrat Aysha's she goat. Then there are reports that some other collections of the "Quran also survived till the time of Hajjaj bin Yousaf (661-692). Some people are of the opinion that Quran, in its present form is not according to its context. One cannot understand it unless one knows the background of its verses. According to another view, "Wahy" (Revelation) is of two kinds; one is the Quran and the other is "Ahadith" (traditions of Holy Prophet) of which enable man to comprehend the former. Another view is that one cannot understand Quran through its text of Hadith. It has hidden meanings that have been transmitted through heart to heart from Hazrat Ali to his disciples.

Parwez refutes all aforesaid conceptions and believes that the present text of the Quran is in its original form and has been altered.

'Lo! We, even We, reveal the reminder and Lo!

We verily are its Guardian (15/9).

Parwez advocates that how can one doubt its originality when God himself has guaranteed to preserve it? He argues that many companions of the Prophet had learnt the Quran by heart. Therefore he concludes that its present form is the original one. No verse of the Quran was deleted and that its meanings are easily comprehensible. Thus it is a genuine and authentic revelation of God. ⁽²⁹⁾

One problem in understanding the real meaning of the Quran is the quality of the commentaries on it, which were written about 250 years after its revelation when Greek influence was

immense in the Muslim society. The first commentator, Ibn-e-Jareer Tabri, who substantiated his commentary with unauthenticated traditions and the subsequent commentator's heavy dependence on his commentary, further complicated the matter. Parwez stresses the need of knowing the real meaning of the Quran and the terminology used in it, for the better understanding of the Quran in the modern times. As a step in this direction he embarked upon the preparation of the lexicon of the Quran after consulting leading contemporary Muslim Scholars.⁽³⁰⁾

Ahadith (Traditions)

The second source of Islamic jurisprudence is Hadith that represents the sayings and deeds of the Holy Prophet. Parwez critically examines the origin and process of compilation of the Hadith. Some people believe that 'Deen-e-Islam' is name of the Quran and Hadith. There is no doubt about the originality of the Quran. Almost all the researchers of the world accept its validity. But this is not the case with the traditions. Therefore before announcing the traditions of the Holy Prophet as 'Deen' one should carefully probe into the matter. Parwez argues that in order to avoid any confusion between the Quran and Hadith, the Holy Prophet himself forbade that copying of Hadith. His successors strictly followed his advice. Accordingly the first Caliph of Islam Hazrat Abu Bakr (573-634) destroyed the five hundred traditions that he had preserved. Hazrat Omar also followed the same course and burnt all the doubtful traditions.⁽³¹⁾

The 'Ahle-Sunnah' (The Sunnis) considers the "Sihah-e-Sitta"(the six collections of Hadith i.e. Sahih Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sahih Tirmidhi, Sahih Abu Daud, Sahih Ibn-e-Maja, Sahih Nasai) as an integral part of the 'Deen. But one has to be careful about the authenticity of these texts. All the Muhaddithin of these collections were non-Arabs. (Ajm). Of these Muhaddithin, Imam Bukhari was born in Bukhara and died in 256/260 A.H. He collected traditions from every nook and corner of the Muslim World and after rejecting approximately 6,000.00 traditions, collected about 7300

authentic Ahadith in book form. If we delete the repeated traditions from his book only 2762 or 2630 are left. ⁽³²⁾

Imam Muslim bin Hijaj (209-279 A.H.) belonged to Nishapur ⁽³³⁾ and Abu Daud (202-275 A.H.) came from Sistan in Iran. Ibn-e-Maja (209-273 A.H.) was from Qazveen in north Iran and Imam Nasai were born in Nisa Khurasan in Iran. Parwez presents following table of Ahadith rejected by these Muhaddithin:

| Name | Total | Accepted |
|------------|----------|----------|
| Bukhari | 6,000,00 | 2762 |
| Muslim | 3,000,00 | 4348 |
| Tirmidhi | 3,000,00 | 3115 |
| Abu Daud | 5,000,00 | 4800 |
| Ibn-e-Maja | 4,000,00 | 4000 |
| Nisei | 2,000,00 | 4321 |

These Muhaddithin collected Ahadith in the third century of Hijra from people who had preserved these in memory. They made selections on the basis of their own judgement. May be, they set aside many genuine traditions. Since they collected these Ahadith by their own effort, they had no documentary evidence to check their authenticity. Therefore, these traditions have to be taken carefully. Albeit the memory of the Arabs is exemplary, nevertheless it is possible that the wording and theme of a tradition might have changed because Hadith teller would interpret a tradition according to his own language and understanding. Again it was very difficult for the Muhaddithin to examine all those from whom the Hadith teller had received a Hadith. ⁽³⁴⁾

Another point of concern is that Imam Bin Munabbih (d.110 A.H.) a student of Hazrat Abu Huraira (d.56 A.H.) was able to collect only 138 traditions. Imam Zahri (d.124 A.H.) compiled not more than 100 traditions whereas the aforementioned six Muhaddithin were able to compile more than six lakh (six hundred thousand) Ahadith. Though they had failed to dig out written record of these two Imams. External criticism of these Ahadith shows that one

should be skeptical in accepting any tradition at face value as a source of jurisprudence.⁽³⁵⁾

More important thing in this regard is the authenticity of the text of these Ahadith. He agrees with Maulana Maududi that these six collections should not be accepted without inquiry. They however, disagree about the criterion of judgement whether a particular Hadith is spurious or not. Maulana Abul Ala Maududi believes that anyone familiar with the personality 'of the Holy Prophet (Rasul Shanas shakhs) can assess a Hadith,⁽³⁶⁾ while Parwez maintains that it is difficult for a person to know all aspects of the Holy Prophet's mission. Hence, one can judge a Hadith better through a study of the Quran. He says that an analysis of some of the texts of the Ahadith reveal their absurdity and cites examples from the six collection. In fact he asserts that these collections are historical documents and should be dealt with as such. These are not 'Deen' but these should be considered as a secondary source, moreover, traditions are sayings and deeds of the Holy Prophet. These are not transcendental or commanded by God. One should study the life of the Holy Prophet to understand this point.

Parwez contends that no human being can become a Prophet by his personal efforts. God chooses a Prophet. He is instinctively trained for his great mission, of which he might not be aware, until God speaks to him. A Prophet's duty is to transmit the message of God. For this purpose, the Holy Prophet established an Islamic State in Arabia and practiced the principles of the Quran. His revelation caused threefold impact on humanity; firstly it changed the scenario of transitional civilizations. The Holy Prophet bridged the old and the new ages; in other words, he is the pioneer of the modern age. Secondly he was the last in the chain of Prophets, because with him human intellect reached the most refined point; it does not need further guidance from a new messenger. Human mind can find guidance by pondering over the Quran, which has complete information and permanent values. Thirdly, the personality of the Holy Prophet represents the best human being who ever emerged in world history. What he has performed as a

human being is a model for the whole community. He quotes Bergson, Lamertine and Ouspenski who held that no other person in the history of mankind was so great a genius as the Holy Prophet as a person, reformer, or prophet who brought light in the darkness of the world.⁽³⁷⁾

The Holy Prophet had two capacities. One was of a messenger of God. When he used to receive revelation. The second was of a human being⁽³⁸⁾ and in that capacity, he was not infallible as Quran says:

Say: If I err, I err only to my own loss,
And if I am rightly guided it is because
of that Which my Lord hath revealed
unto me. Lo! He is Hearer Nigh. (32/50).

His companion knew about these capacities and used to inquire from him whether a specific order was in his personal capacity or a revealed one. If he said that was his own opinion, the people could argue on that. For instance, once the Holy Prophet in his personal capacity advised his slave, Zaid bin Harith not to divorce his wife, but the latter did not accept that advice and divorced his wife. This vindicates the point that there is no truth in Hadith-e-Kudsi or traditions being as authentic as the Quran.⁽³⁹⁾

He pleads that the six collections do not comprise totally real traditions of the Holy Prophet if these traditions are made an essential part of jurisprudence as the Quran these would disintegrate the Muslim Community. Conflicting traditions would promote sectarian division, as different sects already hold on certain books of traditions for the justification of their separate existence.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Parwez holds that all traditions should be judged in the light of the Holy Quran. That compatible with it should be accepted and others should be rejected. Islamic Government as had been done by Hazrat Omar could do this.⁽⁴¹⁾

To Parwez Hazrat Omar was the masterpiece of the Holy Prophet. In his reign he established Nizam-e-Rububia. Like Muhammad

Hussain Haikal he believes that Hazrat Omar heard a verse of the Quran from the Holy Prophet near Kaba and was great impressed by it. After that, he embraced Islam. ⁽⁴¹⁾ Like Shah Wali Ullah, he appreciates Hazrat Abu Bakr's decision to appoint Hazrat Omar as his successor. ⁽⁴²⁾ During his caliphate Hazrat Omar practiced the Shariat-e-Quran and Hadith or the Sunnah (tradition) of the Holy Prophet. His socio-economic system was an ideal one. The obedience of the citizens was to law, not to the ruler. He amended the political system in the light of changing circumstances. These innovations were just supplementary laws. For instance, during the time of the Holy Prophet and Hazrat Abu Bakr, if a person divorced his wife thrice at one time, it was counted one divorce. It was changed by Hazrat Omar and it was taken as a final divorce. This step was to stop frequency of divorce. In many other cases, new rulings were given. From this Parwez deduces that if required by circumstances, an Islamic ⁽⁴³⁾ Government can temporarily suspend an order of the Quran. Thus a lawful thing can be suspended for a short time but can't keep suspended forever. Likewise, an Islamic government can also amend the past decisions, abrogate past innovations and enact new orders to meet new problems. ⁽⁴⁴⁾

Ijma (consensus)

The third source of Islamic axiom is Ijma'. Technically Ijima' means that if the Mujtahidin (Islamic scholars), after the demise of the Holy Prophet consider a problem and give their decision unanimously it becomes law. Its second form is that if a few Mujtahidin frame supplementary laws and no other scholar oppose it after its declaration, it also becomes part of the Shariat. It is called 'silent' Ijma' ⁽⁴⁵⁾

The first kind of Ijma' according to its opponents, does not have historical validity. They oppose its inclusion in the Shari'at in toto. The second type of Ijma' is possible only among the ulema of one sect.

Qias (Analogy)

'Qias' means analogy, a kind of Ijtihad. When one person does not find a clear-cut injunction in the Quran and Hadith about some problem, he exerts to find a solution keeping in view the spirit of the Quran and Hadith. For example, wine is proscribed in the Quran while there is no specific instruction about Hashish or Heroine, which are also, intoxicants. Now one can infer that since wine is forbidden because, it intoxicates, therefore anything that has the same effect, is forbidden in Islam. Thus Hashish or any other intoxicant is forbidden.⁽⁴⁶⁾

There are protagonists and antagonists of 'Qias'. Its opponents plead that Quran covers all spheres of life that leaves no justification for analogical reasoning. 'Zahri' in Middle East and Ahl-al-Quran in the South Asia belonged to this school of thought. But both these groups had no appeal for the Muslims and died their natural death. Its supporters cite the Quran and Hadith in support of their contention but they differ as to the situation where it can be used. The Ahl-e-Hadith, are those who prefer their weakest Hadith to 'Qias'. They also ignore Ijtihad over Hadith. The Hanafi school of thought appreciates its immense importance. According to Parwez it is reported that Imam Abu Hanifa did not cite more than twenty-three Ahadith while compiling his jurisprudence. It is quite surprising that this school of thought, which enormously valued 'Qias', closed its door after some time. They concluded that the decisions given till that time were applicable and sufficient for all time.⁽⁴⁷⁾

He agrees with Allama Iqbal that after the fall of Baghdad Muslim Philosophers abandoned the process of reasoning to avoid further social chaos. Thus Islam, which is the champion of movement, was fossilized. Unfortunately although Qias was a secondary source of jurisprudence, it was accepted as a basic source after its closure.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Administration

A responsible administration is indispensable for making any political system effective. He discusses the executive branch of government. He mentions Omar's method of selection of bureaucracy. The following qualities were looked for in the selection of a civil servant:

1. He should have a profound understanding of the Quran and a reputation for practicing its injunctions.
2. He should be well known and prominent among the people before his selection, and he should have the appearance of an ordinary person.
3. He should be affectionate and kind to everybody.
4. He should not be ambitious for any office. Parwez cites the example of a companion who came to Hazrat Omar and requested him for appointment as governor - Hazrat Omar refused to oblige, although, before this request, he wanted to appoint him as governor. But when he expressed his desire, he considered him misfit for the office.
5. He should be an intelligent and a well-balanced person.
6. He should neither be cruel or strong or weak. In either case, he would become unsuitable.
7. He should not be the one who projects his own kith and kin, because such a quality makes a system corrupt.
8. Preferably, he should not be a poet because in that case he would not act upon what he says.

After a scrupulous selection detailed guidelines should be laid down for them for the discharge of their duties. Some of these instructions, Parwez spells out in detail for the guidance of an *Islamic State*.⁽⁴⁹⁾

The 'Ehtisab' is cleansing of pollution from the administration. Accountability makes officials more vigilant and dutiful.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Hazrat Omar applied this principle not only to his own officials but also to his own person and his family. If an allegation were brought

against an official, he would provide him a chance to defend himself. If accused was found guilty, he was punished indiscriminately for his misdeeds.

Justice

The administration of justice is a divine mission. Parwez amplifies Quranic concept of justice. A ruler is responsible for the implementation of the Quranic laws in consultation with the Majilis-e-Shura. A Muslim's submission is to the laws, not to a ruler. These laws should work in the society as natural laws work in the universe. Justice prevails in the society.

In an Islamic state judiciary is independent. Parliament appoints the chief justice. In the Islamic judicial system there is no discrimination on the basis of social standing of person. In fact there is no class stratification, ruler and the ruled are equal before law. Parwez states that it is becoming increasingly difficult to recognize a felon in our society. Influential people give protection to convicts but on the day of judgement they would not be able to camouflage themselves.⁽⁵¹⁾

A person, who is ashamed of his actions and apologizes, he should be forgiven if he has not committed any serious crime. 'Toba' and 'Ufw' connote regret and repentance over one's actions.

The Quranic system of education brings about a society that is based on justice. Every person receives his basic necessities without any fear that reduces the ratio of crimes in the society to almost zero.⁽⁵²⁾ In such a society, man becomes so cultured that if he does something wrong, he feels guilty and presents himself before the court and requests for penalty.

The Legislature, executive and judiciary are considered the pillars of the state. Their cadre of officials should be well qualified. They

should have freedom to work independently because they play crucial role in the enactment and success of the Islamic jurisprudence.⁽⁵³⁾

Pakistan and Parwez's views

Parwez highlights Iqbal's idea of a separate Muslim homeland. According to Iqbal, the Islamic State functions under the Quranic system, in which the legislature makes supplementary laws.⁽⁵⁴⁾ In the Muslim State proposed by him, Islam was to be the 'Deen'. Politicians like Mohammed Ali Jinnah adopted his perception of an Islamic State. He discusses Quaid-I-Azam' and the All India Muslim League's objectives for the achievement of a separate state for the Muslim. He maintains that the program of the Muslim League was to establish Islamic Shariat in the new state. Quaid-I-Azam repeatedly spelled out this objective. Parwez himself started publication of a journal "Tulu-I-Islam" in 1938 for the propagation of Islamic Ideology. Parwez claims that it was launched on the persuasion of Quaid-i-Azam.⁽⁵⁵⁾

After independence, Parwez suggested ways and means to enact Quranic laws in Pakistan. He chalked out a detailed plan of different rules and regulations of an Islamic state. He continued to prorogate his views in his journal.

He says 'Al-Deen' connotes law, or constitution, in Islam. Islam does not approve of anarchy. Quran preaches law and order in the state. The person who accepts this law is a Muslim. When one accepts Islam, he must follow its principles. In an Islamic State the people cannot aspire for any law other than Islamic law. Those who do not adopt Islamic values are infidels. It is impossible to imagine that a Muslim will choose an un-Islamic constitution. The implementation of this constitution is the responsibility of the whole community.

In an Islamic state, the distribution of duties is done on merits as Allah has given different potentialities to different men. He puts

Muslims in different categories. *Muslims are those who are Muslims in name. 'Mominin' are those who have conviction and devotion to Islam. 'Salehin' are those Mominin who take part in the activities of the society and in modern terminology, can be called executives. And 'Muttiqin', are those Muslims who believe in Allah, the Day of Judgement, Angels, Scriptures and Prophets and who spend their money on the needy for the sake of Allah, they are true to their words, and fight for the cause of Islam. The best among the Muttaiqin would be selected as head of the Islamic State.

In the Quranic State, the center occupies a pivotal position. Its functions are to enforce Quranic laws. They Holy Prophet were the first central authority. After him his successors enjoyed the powers and duties of that authority.

The state, or the central authority, consists of a group of people, the advisory council for the maintenance of law and order, the center appoints officials who are called * Sahiban-e-Hakum; their decisions are subordinate to the center. The following qualifications are to be kept in view in the selection of an official.
(56)

1. He should be competent and suitable person for the post.
2. He should be healthy and learned.
3. He should be adult and wise.
4. A judge should be of 40 years of age.
5. Any official, who deviates from the work of 'Sahibin', should be removed from office.

Justice prevails in an Islamic state so that each citizen gets due share. Every one gets equal opportunities for his developments. Each attains position according to his ability and gets job according to his merit. The court punishes any male-factor; however, his punishment can be suspended or dropped if there is hope for his improvement. Every one shares his own burden. Decisions are made according to rules laid down in the Quran. In an Islamic State, judiciary is independent. Parliament appoints the Chief Justice. *Adl is provided to the people free of cost.

The objective of an Islamic State is to work for the advancement of human beings. It is not an end in itself but a means to an end. It helps an individual to build his ego and his qualities. The Islamic State establishes the "Nizam-e-Rububia" (Quranic economic order). The objectives of the Islamic State are:

1. To enact Quranic Constitution in the State.
2. To create conditions so that every citizen feels secure.
3. To establish a society in which a person is enabled to obey the laws.
4. To bring all the resources of the country under state control.
5. To provide basic necessities of life first to the citizens of that state and then to the whole humanity.

Hazrat Abraham constructed the house of Allah, "the Kaba", as the center, or the capital, of the Muslim community. The 'Hajj (pilgrimage) was also a political gathering where the problems facing the Ummah were considered. He gave 'Kaba the status of an emblem capital of the Islamic States.

The fundamental human rights in Islam are applicable to Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Quran announces.

God honors the children of Adam. (17/70)

The Quranic society makes no distinction between man and woman. All human beings male or female, belong to the same species, no one is superior to the other. Biological dissimilarity is due to natural expediency; otherwise the female has all the gifts a male possesses.

In almost all societies, class stratification is based on wealth, power or occupation but in an Islamic society such a criterion does not exist. The nobility of character determines class. Anyone can attain the highest station by building up his character.

Man could not settle the conflict between freedom and obedience to the law. Quran has resolved this dilemma. In an Islamic state,

submission is to Allah through Quranic orders, not to the ruler. Laws have already been enunciated in the Quran and the state is bound to implement them. Thus no one can take advantage of man-made rules and suppress other's freedom. Secondly these laws are reliable. Freedom of thought, action and speech is an individual's birthright and Islam ensures it.

Everyone must receive full wages of his labor; no one can reduce or take away his earnings. There is no place for parasites in the society, except those who are physically handicapped. The Islamic concept of 'Adl' in its broader sense is to provide due rights to everybody, along with justice.

A man cannot live without food. Every system binds man to support his family but in the Quranic society it is the function of the state to provide for the basic needs of its citizens, including educational and other facilities. One of the basic functions of an Islamic government is to protect the lives of its citizens from internal and external threats. In a Quranic society, no one can control or amass excessive wealth. However it allows private property to individual. An Islamic government protects individual's property and punishes those who steal, usurp or misuse it. Everyone is provided with shelter and no one can be deprived of his housing facilities.

An Islamic government guarantees freedom of religious belief. Non-Muslims can practice their religious ceremonies without interference. They are not forced to accept Islam because Islam essentially demands rational acceptance. Above all, Islam forbids Muslims to criticize other religions.

A majority of the Muslim scholars hold that if a Muslim deviates from Islam, he should be awarded death punishment⁽⁵⁷⁾. Parwez on the other hand maintains that there is no compulsion on any Muslim to remain in the fold of Islam. In other words that he has a right to give up Islam. He would not be given death punishment for

this act¹⁵⁸⁾. Because in Islam no one can be compelled to accept, or remain, in, Islam, (2:256-Al-Quran).

Conclusion

Ghulam Ahmad Parwez was a product of his age. To him Islam is the name of progress and therefore he tries to interpret it according to the needs of the time. He believes that the principles of the Quran lay foundation of a system that builds a welfare society. He disagrees with this notion that a ruler is a 'shadow of God on earth'. This misconception caused dictatorships. He holds that in an Islamic state there are no divine powers that are delegated to a ruler. An ordinary man, by dint of his services, can rise to the position of a ruler without influencing people by his wealth, power, caste, class or race. Allah has revealed the constitution of Islamic State in the shape. Man-made constitutions are always fallible because man himself is imperfect and an imperfect being cannot formulate a perfect constitution.

Parwez advocates controlled democracy. "Majilis-e- Shura" (an elected body of the society) where all people has the right to send their representatives through the exercise of their right to vote, has the right to frame by-laws. However those should not be repugnant to the spirit of Quran. These supplementary laws are revocable but the Quranic principles are irrevocable. The sources of jurisprudence should be scrupulously integrated because except for the Quran, their validity is not beyond doubt. The authentic Ahadith have been mixed with weak Ahadith. Only those Ahadith should be included in the shariat, which are not abhorrent to the Quranic spirit, and should be rejected. The by-laws, formulated by previous jurists, who are useful to the modern society, should be accepted but others should be ignored.

The object of the state is to work for the physical and spiritual development of all human beings, irrespective of religion. Its first and foremost duty is to provide basic necessities of life to its

citizens. There is no discrimination on the bases of religion, race and caste. The minorities enjoy equal fundamental rights. They can perform their religious duties without any fear. Their sacred places are under the protection of the state.

Male and female enjoy equal status in an Islamic state. Man does not have superiority over woman. Both have equal rights and duties to perform. They should get the post for which they qualify. Every person benefits freedom of thought, speech and action. There is no one extraordinarily wealthy or powerful; therefore there is no exploiter or exploited.

Ghulam Amed Parwez was greatly impressed by the ideas of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Allama Iqbal and many others. He has quite skillfully tried to synthesize the Western democracy with Islamic democracy. But his ideal Prophet is Holy Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) who had implemented the principles of the Quran in letter and in spirit. Rightly Parwez declares him the benefactor of the humanity. Nonetheless 'Hazrat Omar' is his ideal ruler whom he considers the masterpiece of the Holy Prophet. During his rule "Nizam-e- Rububia" (Islamic system) worked in its best form. But problem with prevalent society is that it does not have the services of the Pious Caliphates and also its members are not Sahabis (companion of the Holy Prophet). Therefore problems of the present society can be resolved not only by citing the golden period of Islamic history but also going through their day-to-day problems.

Most significant aspect of his views is that he does not claim himself an authority on Islam. Therefore he belongs to that school of thought that strictly believes that society always needs reconstruction of religious thought to cope with new challenges.

FOOT NOTES

1. Whitehead. Alfred North, *Adventures of Ideas*, quoted in Parwez, *Firdaus-I-Gungushta*, Karachi, 1954, p.74.
2. Parwez "Jihan-e-Nau." *Tulu-I-Islam*, (TIK) Karachi, September 1958, pp. 25-38
3. Parwez, "Jamhuriyyat", *Tulu-I-Islam*, (TIL) Lahore, July 1966 pp.20-29 and also Parwez, "Islami Nizam-I-Hukumat nah mughibi jumhuriyyat nah shakhsi, hukumat," *TIL*, April 1981, PP 41-64.
4. According to Parwez no word in the English language can reflect true meanings of Allah;
5. Parwez, *Tabwib-al-Quran*, vol. ii, Ed. ii, Lahore, 1984, pp. 637-639
6. It means Allah's attributes are exhibited in perfect balance and proportion.
7. Parwez, *Tabwib-al-Quran*, vol. II, P. 836-838
8. Deen is the way of life prescribed by Allah, 5:3 al-Quran.
9. Parwez, "Mun-o-Yazdan", *TIK*, July 1958, PP/ 17-41.
10. Parwez, *Kitab-al-Taqdir*, Ed, III, Lahore, 1986, pp. 96- 126.
11. Parwez, *Tabwib-al-Quran*, vol. III, Ed. II, Lahore, 1984, PP, 1197-11-99.
12. Parwez, *Quaid-I-Azam aur Quran-e-Majid: Pakistan Ki asal bunyad* *T.I.L.*, April 1977, pp. 9-51.
13. These laws are comprehensive, UN-amendable and unalterable (6:115 Quran)
14. Parwez "Khuda Ki badshahat", *Tulu-I-Islam*, Delhi (T.I.D.) 1939, pp. 25-27.
15. See also, Parwez, *shahkar-e-Risalat*, Ed, III, Lahore, 1974.
16. Parwez, *Qurani Faisalay*, vol. I, Ed, II, Lahore, p. 335-341.
17. *Ibid*, p. 40.
18. Islam put an end to the institution of slavery.
19. Parwez says that all the members of the Muslim Umm are part of its consultative machinery- 'Shura'.
20. Parwez, "Jamhuriat Haqumat aur Islamic Haqumat", *T.I.L.*, June 1978, pp. 17-28.

- (21) Parwez "Yeh Thu Nizam-e- Mustafa", *T.I.L.* March, 1979 pp. 25-56.
- (22) Parwez, "Azadi ka Payamber Azim, *T.I.L.* March, 1978 pp. 9-36
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- (24) Parwez, *Tabwib-al-Quran*, pp. 1019-1023. And Parwez, *Lughat-al-Quran*, Vol. III, Lahore, 1961, pp. 1139-1140.
- (25) Parwez, *Tabwi b-al-Quran*, pp. 829-905.
- (26) Syed Amir Ali, *A short History of the Saracens*, Karachi, 1975, pp. 11-55, and P.K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, Ed. Ed. V, London, 1953, pp. 139-146, and Bin Jareer Tabri, *Tarikh-e-Tabri*, urdu translation by Syed Rasheed Ahmad Rashid, Vol. II, Karachi, 1967, pp. 27-35. (Parwez believed that this is distorted history because the followers of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) could possibly not go against his teachings i.e. injunctions of the Holy Quran. *Saleem Kay nam*, vol. III, Idara Tulu-e-Islam, December 1959.
- (27) Parwez, *Lughat-al-Quran*, vol. II, pp. 713-717. And also, *Tabwib-al-Quran*, vol. I, pp. 844-874. (The referenced meaning is one who provides means of nature from the beginning of a thing to its destined end.
- (28) Aziz Ahmad, and G.E. von Gruneaum, *Muslim self-statement in India and Pakistan 1857-1968*, Wiesbadon, 1970, pp. 120-128. And also Parwez "Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Marhum", *T.I.L.*, September 1984, pp. 17-32.
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- (30) Parwez firmly believed that Rasool-Allah (peace is upon him) gave the complete Quran to the Ummah in book form before his death *Muqam-e-Hadith*, Idara Tulu-e-Islam chapter Quran-e-Karim Riwayat Kay Ayena Main.

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- (32) Parwez "Ahadith ka Sahih Tarin Majmuwa", *T.I.L.*, September 1968, pp. 57-80.
- (33) Parwez, "Fihi Quwanin Qui Dini Hayaiyat", *T.I.L.*, April, 1979, pp. 41-60
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- (46) *Ibid.* pp. 140-151.
- (47) Parwez, "Islamic Qanun Kay Ma'akhiz", *T.I.K.*, June, 1956, pp.

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- (51) Parwez, "Islam Mien Ijtihad Ki Ahmiyat", *T.I.L.*, October 1978, pp. 33-63.
- (52) Parwez, *Tabwih-al-Quran*, Vol., II, pp. 923-24.
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- (54) Parwez, "Fikr-e-Iqbal kA Sarchashma: Quran", *T.I.L.*, May 1985, pp. 34-64. And also Parwez, Iqbal or Quran, *T.I.L.*, November 1960 pp. 25-53.
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Dual System of Education and Poverty Persistence in Pakistan

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Abstract

This article investigates the duality of institutions (official versus indigenous) in the area of education in Pakistan. It is assumed that some poor people, due to various structural reasons, cannot afford to get their children enrolled in official schools. Instead, they send their kids to *Madrassas* (indigenous institutions) which provide free education, food and boarding logistics. However, these *Madrassas* impart the type of education hardly relevant for the increasingly competitive job market. Further, *Madrassa* education heavily influences the lifestyle and worldview of its students. Consequently these students remained socially excluded and have minimum participation in the economic activities. For empirical evidence, field data were collected from the district of DG Khan. Randomly selected teachers of *Madrassas*, students and their parents were interviewed.

It was found that *Madrassas* not merely provided free religious education but also had their specific agenda to implement. Further, as a part of the social system, these institutions had multiple functions to perform---ranging from imparting political socialization to cultural orientations. Students were indoctrinated that modern innovations and cultural globalization were inherently dangerous for their religious tradition and would corrupt their value system. The curriculum and training of these institutions laid a great emphasis on theological issues and sect-specific character building. Such a training and personality development might have its own virtues but, practically, rendered the *Madrassa* graduates ineligible to compete for the rewarding jobs available in the public and private sector. However, to be on positive side, *Madrassas* were giving relief to the poor children by providing them free

education, food, and shelter----such facilities might not otherwise be available to them. Hence, in the functional perspective, *Madrassas* were performing some function to maintain the social equilibrium and tranquility in a highly volatile condition. In a way, the institution of *Madrassa* was acting as an instrument in reproducing and transmitting poverty from one generation to another; if not creating poverty itself. The empirical data also provided evidence that *Madrassa* students, by virtue of their training and worldview, did not feel the pinch of social exclusion, non-participation and consequential poverty.

Introduction

The study evolved from the assumption that there is duality of institutions in the area of education in Pakistan. There are two types of institutions, though not mutually exclusive in some respects, operating in the same setup. One system can be termed as official system (run by the state: the official schools) while other has been named as indigenous system (run by the local population: the *Madrassas*).

Both systems operate under different philosophies and pedagogical parameters. The official schools impart education and training according to government policies. In this system, the teachers are appointed and paid by the government's education department and as such they are accountable to the government. The school curricula are designed by the government. The certificates/degrees issued by these schools are accepted for various public and private sector jobs. The students of these schools have the opportunity to get integrated with the institutions of higher learning within the country and abroad.

The indigenous system is operating in the country for centuries. This system is not under the control of the state education department. *Madrassas* are established by religious circles and funded by the private individuals/organizations. The teachers of these *Madrassas* are not paid by the government nor do they follow

the government prescribed curricula. These institutions are usually attached with the mosques and impart religious education and training. Many of them do not issue diplomas/degrees and where these are issued, most of the degrees are not recognized by the state institutions. Further in addition to education, these institutions have wider agenda to implement. Usually students are provided accommodation and food 'free of cost' and *Madrassa* has stronger leverage to influence the behavior and life style of its students.

The central assumption of this study is that the existence of indigenous institutions tends to create social exclusion and consequential poverty. The argument is that the individuals who are educated from a *Madrassa* lag behind and lack capability to compete with the individuals who are educated from the official schools. For instance, a graduate of official school learns English, mathematics and other basic science subjects and therefore has better prospects to work for government or private enterprises. Whereas a graduate of *Madrassa* who, except memorizing Koran and some knowledge of Persian and ancient Arabic, has no training or orientations to work in a modern commercial Organization. Hence a person who depends on *Madrassa* education could be doubly disadvantageous: he comes up with education having little functional utility in the job market plus his exposure towards life is restricted and he is indoctrinated to perceive the things in a way that makes him largely isolated from the society.

The point here is that the duality of institutions provides two different categories of people in terms of their training and orientations; they are different in terms of 'worldview' aspirations, ideology and life style. A graduate of official school is trained keeping in view the job requirements in the market. The curricula is designed and developed by the state-controlled institutions. Whereas the graduate of *Madrassa* is taught the syllabi designed by the clergy, which has its own specific aims and objectives. These objectives may not necessarily be in line with the objectives of the state and state sponsored education system.

It is assumed that this duality of institutions is creating two distinct classes in the society. First, the people who depend on the official institutions develop more potential and have better prospects to occupy rewarding positions and other social resources. Second, the people who depend on indigenous institutions (especially *Madrassa*) cannot acquire necessary skills, training and orientations which are essential to compete for various rewards in the society. Because of their incapacitation, they cannot get integrated with social mainstream, remain non participant, socially excluded and consequently poor.

Methodology

Theoretical Assumptions

It is commonly reported that the official schools are insensitive and non-responsive to the indigenous 'felt needs'. The official institutions offer services which may not be affordable to some sections of the local population. Consequently the local population may develop institutions which could address their needs. To put in functional perspective, society develops parallel institutions when state institutions render dysfunctional.

More precisely, the assumption is that *Madrassa* is functioning in response to the various needs of the local population—the needs which are not met by the official institutions. Hence in addition to education, *Madrassa* is filling the services vacuum especially in the areas of health care, social security and care for destitute children. This could be the reason for the persistence and growth of these institutions in society.

In the absence of viable and well functioning schools combined with the inefficient and ineffective government's social sector services system, poor people find no option but to revert to the alternative option—the *Madrassa* system. *Madrassa* not only provides free food and accommodation to the students but promises some services which are affordable and understandable to the people. Hence the *Madrassa* has deep roots and greater

influence in the local community. However the type of education and overall training in *Madrassa* produce personalities which do not possess requisite qualifications and competencies to adjust with the larger social mainstream. As a result *Madrassa* graduates fail to get integrated with the official structures and are systematically excluded and 'disqualified' to hold rewarding positions and statuses.

The underlying assumption is that socio-economic system and institutional network of a society create 'felt needs' of the people. To fulfil these needs, people develop and support institutions which, according to their perceptions and understanding, are 'doing well'. Rest of the institutions, no matter how strong official legitimacy they have, are considered redundant at 'ground level'. Their choice ought to be understood within the overall social matrix wherein an individual operates. His/her choice may not be perceived as sign of 'illiteracy' and ignorance'.

Respondents and sampling

The field work was conducted in DG Khan: a Southern district of the Punjab province. The district consisted of rural (Tehsil *Tounsai*) and urban (DG Khan city) areas. And from the selected *Madrassas*, all the teachers who were willing to talk with the researcher were interviewed with the help of a semi-structured interview schedule. Randomly selected students were also interviewed from each of the selected *Madrassa* with the help of an interview guide. The parents of the students and *Madrassa* managers/financiers were also interviewed. Where possible, focus group discussion was conducted to elicit the spontaneous responses of the stakeholders. The researcher also spent sometime in *Madrassa*, so that he could observe the overall system in its totality.

Field Experiences

The researcher was stunned to see some ground realities in these *Madrassas*. Quite unexpectedly, there was an ultra orthodoxy being indoctrinated in these institutions with a great zeal and

fervor. Surprisingly, in some localities these *Madrassas* attracted more students than official schools.

Ninety percent of these *Madrassas* wanted to stick with the style and curricula developed in 11th century. They were not only determined to pursue the same but wanted to resist any move that could change it. Almost all the *Madrassas* had very unsatisfactory hygienic conditions and overall environment was very depressing. It was shocking to note that 17 students were supposed to sleep in 14x18" room and that very room was also used as class room in the morning. Only two percent of the students and ten percent of the teachers regularly brushed their teeth.

It was noted that the *Madrassas* were situated in very poor localities where the living standard of the population was extremely low. However the administrator of *Madrassa* enjoyed some facilities like telephone and carpeted office with electric fan. In some cases they had refrigerator in the office as well. However, this did not mean that the students had the access to these facilities. Only the *Madrassa* administrator and some senior teachers were allowed to use these facilities. Overall, the living conditions of the students were very poor.

It was also noted that every *Madrassa* had an expansion plan; construction work was going on which reflected the continuous financial support of the community for these institutions. Every *Madrassa* has a history of expansion and progress; not even a single *Madrassa* was ever closed down. Once established, it continued to function. Number of *Madrassas* has sharply increased during the last ten years and so is the number of students.

Interestingly there was mushroom growth of *Madraus-tul-Binat* (*Madrassa* for daughters/females). It was, however, not possible for the researcher to contact with any teacher/student of these institutions on cultural reasons. The teaching staff of these *Madrassas* was only females. The female *Madrassas* worked under the direct supervision of the associated *Madrassa*. The reason for

establishing these *Madrassas* was to 'prepare good wives/mothers in accordance with religious model of a particular sect.

Findings

Randomly selected students of both rural and urban areas of the district DG Khan were interviewed with the help of a semi-structured interview schedule. The main points of the interviews with the students are given below.

A. Students

1. A majority of the students of *Madrassas* were from extremely poor families. Most of them had no clear career planning or high aspirations. They seemed satisfied with the living conditions and food provided by the *Madrassa*. The students were discouraged to establish contact with their age fellows in the community especially with those who were school-students. Generally the students were confined to the four walls of *Madrassa*.
2. Students had deep sense of fear from the teachers who used to give them severe corporal punishment in case they showed any negligence to their studies or violated the disciplinary code of *Madrassa*. No *Madrassa* had any sports facility and the students were discouraged to participate in any game; cricket, hockey or foot ball were considered undesirable activities and a wastage of time.
3. About 20 percent of the students were from destitute families; their father or guardian seldom visited them. They were completely at the disposal of *Madrassa*. It was also noted that such students had relatively longer stay there and were deeply involved to assist the day-to-day administration of the institution. It was noted that there was some division of labour among such students. For instance, some were responsible to collect cooked food from neighboring homes, others had to look after the cleanliness, water supply and sanitation.

4. About 15 percent of the students were physically or mentally impaired/handicapped. These students were not given any type of special treatment, rather they were humiliated by calling their names by referring to their disability. There was no arrangement of proper light in the classrooms. Many students complained that they had low vision problem, but it was never properly diagnosed nor *Madrassa* had any arrangements to get their students medically examined by a qualified doctor.
5. Majority of the students was convinced that religious education was the "real education" which ensured salvation in the next world and was an instrument to "please God". For them worldly education (e.g. education of science, technology, medicine, liberal arts etc.) was not an education in its real sense. Such an education was a tool to 'earn wealth' and was 'ultimately destructive for humankind'. The students were exposed to carefully selected literature produced by their respective sectarian think tanks.
6. Some senior students expressed their strong will to work for the promotion of their sect/religion no matter how odd the circumstances may be. It was also noted that the students were allowed to read only few prescribed books written by the senior *Ulema* (religious scholars) of their particular sect. The students were also discouraged to study any newspaper/magazine which deals with 'worldly things'.
7. Some students compared *Madrassa* with school and considered the former a better institution for education and character building. For them *Madrassa* education was the source of salvation not only for them but also for their parents and even for the parents of the parents. In the local cultural context, the school was not honored with any such blessing.

8. Some senior students of *Madrassa* viewed that the school has lost its traditional importance because of very high incidence of unemployment. One student said "people go to school only for one reason i.e. to get education which could help them to get a job. Now there are no jobs. If there are no job then what is the benefit of school". Hence the conventional argument that "school education is job-oriented while *Madrassa* is not" could not convince many students.
9. Almost all the students were physically beaten by their teachers if they could not understand/remember the lesson at proper time. Some students showed prominent scars on their back caused by the physical beating by their teachers. For a majority of the students, teacher had every right to give physical punishment. The junior students were beaten more frequently and violently than the senior ones.
10. It may also be noted here that a *Madrassa* was not just a knowledge imparting institution but it had its own agenda to preach and implement. There were various religious sects which run these institutions. The primary focus of the *Madrassa* highups was to shape and mould the personality of their graduates according to their ideal *Imams* and saints. To achieve this objective, each *Madrassa* had clear-cut instructions to its students as to what should be the color of their cap, length of their beard and trouser and over all dressing and presentation. Any deviation to these 'codes of conduct' was punished and could lead the summary exclusion from the institutions.

B. Teachers

In order to understand the functioning of these *Madrassas*, randomly selected teachers were interviewed with the help of a semi-structured interview schedule. The core issues discussed in the interview were their ideas about education, religion and other socio-economic issues which had bearing on the training and

education of their students. The main points of the interviews with the teachers are given below.

1. Almost all the teachers had their education from *Madrassas*. Most of them never studied in the official school. Those who reported that they were enrolled in the school, their stay in the school was not more than two to three years. There was not even a single teacher who could write or understand simple text in English language. Their knowledge was restricted to Koran, *Hadith* (saying of Holy Prophet) and selective study of some Persian literature written in the 11th century.

2. The average salary of a *Madrassa* teacher was Rs. 1800 (equal to \$ 34) per month. It was quite low even in Pakistani standards. The married teachers had average five children. Not even a single teacher was in favor of birth control practices. For them, any human effort to control birth was a great sin: "it was a war against God", one teacher observed. Despite the fact that they had very low level of income and large family size, they never complained of 'financial problems'. One teacher commented on the situation: "Our life is simple, we do not indulge in wasteful and extravagant life style. We work for God and we trust in Him: He is responsible for the fulfillment of our needs" (from field notes).

3. A close observation of the system revealed that the teachers had intimate relations with the local people. They were 'with the people' in every aspect of life, in every moment of joy and sorrow. They provided guidance and help to the people in the time of trouble by interpreting the Islamic *Sharia*. They were also involved with the local community and provided variety of services: for example, to negotiate the matrimonial contract, lead the funeral prayer when some one died, recite Holy verses when one is ill, offer special prayer when there was some natural calamity like flood or earthquake and other events of social significance. People may also seek their guidance from them whom to vote in the public elections. They were also leaders of public opinion on various issues.

4. It was noted that a majority of the teachers were not happy with the functioning of state departments. They considered them the 'remains of colonial history'. While commenting on the judicial system one teacher observed. "Judges and magistrates are trained in the British law and not in Islamic Law. The whole judicial system is an imitation of a foreign system. This system is not applicable to Muslim country. That is why, there is no justice, and injustice and corruption are every where" (from field notes). Another teacher lamented the performance of the state social welfare department where employees were getting salaries without doing any work for the public. The teacher was proud of his *Madrassa* which was providing free food, accommodation and education to more than 300 poor students without any help of the government. In short all the teachers considered that government departments were not working for the welfare of public.

5. Almost all the teachers were fiercely against the prevailing socio-political system specially the propagation of values like democracy, liberation, freedom of expression, toleration, equality of women. They considered these values against their religious order and major source of corrupting the society. One teacher believed that *Madrassa* was the only institution which was fighting against this flood of 'foreign values'. He argued that in the name of democracy, the corrupt, lawbreakers and 'infidels' are getting political power. The teacher observed "Those who deserved jails, sit in the parliament. All sorts of sins are rewarded and legitimized in attractive language. *Madrassa* would continue to fight against it. It is a true *jihad*. We are committed to continue this *Jihad*. We do not mind if we are called fundamentalist or terrorists" (from field notes).

6. All the teachers believed that physical punishment was necessary for the proper and effective learning. Without the fear of physical punishment, a child cannot learn properly. It was regrettable to note that even the disabled/handicapped children were physically punished and scars of corporal punishment were

visible on their bodies. Not even a single teacher had any formal professional degree/training for teaching.

7. There were very few teachers who were dissatisfied with their extremely low paid jobs. Surprisingly one teacher in DG Khan was highly dissatisfied with his job as well as with the whole *Madrassa* system. He considered the system as out dated and was not serving its intended purposes. He commented: "The input of *Madrassa* is extremely sub-standard. The kids of poorest families who have lowest IQ or suffering from some disability are usually sent to these institutions to 'please God'. This is hypocrisy; no one is sincere about religious education. The output of these institutions is narrow-minded *Mullahs* who are not trained to address the contemporary social, economic and political challenges" (from Field notes).

8. It may be interesting to note that *Madrassa* was deeply involved in the matters relating to health and illness of the local population. Teachers of *Madrassa* were providing healing services to the local population by applying spiritual healing techniques. An overall observation of *Madrassa* system revealed that these institutions had their peculiar culture specially in the matters relating to health and illness. They had their own explanatory model which helped them to understand illness. Usually illness was attributed to some sort of deviant behavior. At the same time, good health was directly linked with one's conformist behavior. The basic idea was largely based on the assumption that 'If you commit sin you would be ill, if you follow the principles of religion you would remain healthy'. Majority of the teachers of *Madrassas* was involved in religious healing to some degree. Overall *Madrassa* did play a role in shaping the health care related behavior of its students in particular and the community people in general. *Madrassa* provided services in the following fields

- Usually the teachers provided spiritual treatment based on the verses of Holy Quran and other sacred methods. Normally they did not charge any fee for the service. Some teachers had good

reputation to treat some incurable diseases like diabetes, infertility and cancer with the help of spiritual therapy.

- In case of serious illness, some people invited the students of *Madrassa* with the request to recite Holy Koran many times, so that, with its blessings, the disease could leave the house and the ill person could get well.
- Some of the teachers of *Madrassas* were also providing herbal treatment by charging nominal fee.
- The teachers were well versed about the knowledge regarding good health. For instance problems of liver and anemia were thought to be caused by masturbation, homosexuality rendered kidneys dysfunctional, breast cancer and vaginal cancers were due to the use of contraceptives. Illegitimate wealth led to cardiac failure and high blood pressure or diabetes.

C. Parents of the Students

1. About 80% of the parents who send their children to *Madrassas* were poor and had larger size of family. Almost all the parents professed that their decision to enroll their children to *Madrassa* was based on their "first preference" to religious education. For them, it was the duty of every Muslim to sacrifice for the spread of his/her religion. Some of the parents were conscious of the fact that *Madrassa* education cannot promise good career. But at the same time, they viewed that getting good job was not the sole purpose of life. For them, the tremendous benefit of *Madrassa* education was that it ensured the salvation in the next world.
2. Most of the parents thought that the official school was not 'feasible' for them keeping in view their social and financial resources. They were of the view that their child would not get any job even if they educate him in the school for years. There were various readily available examples which substantiated their fears. Hence in the eyes of the parents, the money and time invested in school education was not worth. One father of a *Madrassa*-student observed: "See, there is no job; not even for highly technically

trained people. Secular knowledge is useless if there is no job as its sole purpose is to get job. But if one has *Madrassa* education, one is successful even if one does not have a job. *Madrassa* education is a source of blessing and eternal success" (from filed notes).

Most of the parents were not happy with the school education. Their dissatisfaction from school was due to various reasons. Many parents believed that if one is successful in religious education, he would be successful in this world and the world hereafter. It was perceived that religion teaches simplicity, honesty and contentment. These are the keys to success. Most of them did not see many benefits from school education. For them, it was expensive and long-term exercise which they could not afford.

Majority of the parents expressed their satisfaction that *Madrassa* was providing free education, accommodation and food to their kids. "What else we need; our kids are getting religious education and other facilities free of cost. This is a great blessing of God", commented a poor peasant whose three children were studying in a *Madrassa*. "No student of *Madrassa* ever committed suicide, no matter how poor, chronic jobless he may be", the father added.

Some parents reported that they first contacted the official school but they were frustrated from the institution because of various reasons. They expressed their displeasure over the "irresponsible education" being imparted by the official schools. There was a realization that the school was serving the end of the powerful and rich but not the poor. One parent observed: "There are thousands of doctors, engineers, judges and bureaucrats---all educated from expensive modern schools. But for us (the poor people) they are useless: doctor's services are not available, engineer is not constructing for us, there is no justice and no rule of law. They may be professionally competent and well qualified but not good human beings. They are not doing any service to the poor. They must be given religious education. Only then a just society could be established" (from field notes).

6. There were some cases, where child was forced to leave the school and was admitted to *Madrassa*. Pathetic conditions in the official schools was the main factor which compelled the parents to withdraw their kids from the schools. There were widespread complaints that the schools lacked basic facilities like furniture to sit, drinking water, toilet and even rooms and boundary walls. However these facilities were provided by *Madrassa*, though the quality of services/facilities was below the reasonable standard.
7. It was interesting to note that some parents made career planning of their kids in "collectivity": keeping in view the interest of the family and not the future needs of the individual kid. For instance, some parents wanted to send at least one of their kids to *Madrassa* so that he could provide guidance/services to the family after completing religious education. For some families it was desirable to maintain a balance between religious education and secular education.

Analysis and Conclusions

Role of Madrassa in the local Institutional Network

Madrassa and Local Poor

Data showed that the role of *Madrassas* was not restricted to impart education and religious training to the students, but these institutions were deeply involved in providing various services to the local population especially for the poor. These services include spiritual health care provision, guidance and advice to the local population on day to day problems and providing solution usually in the religious context. Hence these institutions provided psychological security to local people and tranquilize the poverty ridden and troubled sections of society in various ways. One old man in the district of DG Khan observed: "When I am ill, I get spiritual treatment from *Madrassa*: the Koran is the fundamental source of healing. When my kids and grand kids suffer from 'evil eye' Shah Sahib (the head teacher of *Madrassa*) provides treatment. The whole day, students learn Koran and with the blessings of this Book, we are safe from natural calamities" (from field notes).

In the field, it was observed that there was an elaborate catalogue of religious beliefs, practices and superstitions which guided the people as to what to do in a particular social situation specially when one is in trouble. For instance, when a family member was seriously ill and could not be recovered by the 'worldly treatment', it was a norm that the family should buy a black color sheep and offer to the local *Madrassa*. It was believed that when the *Madrassa* students would eat the meat of the sheep, it would be a great source to get the blessings of God and the ill person would get recovered. Similarly an old person near to death was persuaded to donate his sizable chunk of wealth to *Madrassa*. By doing so he would ensure permanent and everlasting source of blessing of God even after his death. The appeals of *Madrassa* for financial help were so powerful that some ladies offered their jewelry and other valuables to these institutions.

Madrassa and Modernity

There were various types of *Madrassas* representing half a dozen Muslim schools of jurisprudence. Each sect fiercely differed with others in the interpretation of various religious injunctions and some times had bloody clashes more conspicuously between *Shia* and *Sunni* sects. However, one thing was common in all *Madrassas*: all were against foreign cultural innovation (Ahmad 1986). It was observed that these institutions were more interested to maintain continuity of religious and cultural traditions. For them, after all, modernity symbolizes the victory of the enemies of Muslim power. This kind of teaching started to keep modernity at bay (Rehman 2000).

Madrassa students also learnt how to refute anti-Islamic doctrines. As to what is anti-Islamic varies from sect to sect. Western ideologies such as socialism, Marxism, liberalism were refuted in all *Madrassas*. However, in some there were texts refuting the doctrines of other sects and sub sects. The basic role of *Madrassa* was to provide ideologically committed people who could purify society (Hoodbhoy 2000). One administrator of a *Madrassa* while explaining the role of the institutions argued: "Our society is

running blindly after wealth, status and power. Every one wants to accumulate more and more wealth. Powerful are sucking the blood of the poor. This is the sole purpose of modern education and this is the 'spirit of capitalism'. This race leads to total catastrophe. However these institutions (referring to *Madrassas*) show the right path—to work for the humanity and have sympathy for the poor" (from field notes).

It was found that these institutions skillfully inculcated these values to their students. Since most of the students belonged to poor families, therefore they were dependent on these institutions for food and shelter (and may not have any other option to fulfil their basic needs). Consequently these students have to follow the 'instructions' and 'code of conduct' provided by these *Madrassas*.

Madrassa and Politics

As noted above that there were various types of *Madrassas* and each type was supported and financed by a particular religious sect. The curricula of these *Madrassas* were designed according to the philosophy and 'world-view' of that particular sect. In this way, *Madrassas* were streamlining and reinforcing the sectarian division in the society (Lefebvre 1999). Additionally, the outlook and out fit of the students of (e.g. the type of dressing, shape of cap and the way they offer the prayer) each *Madrassa* was conspicuously different. Some of these *Madrassa* were playing an active role in the local power politics. Most of the time, these *Madrassas* provided 'street power' to the political organizations of their choice. *Madrassa* has also bearing on the local politics in many ways. For instance, financial aid to a *Madrassa* was a symbol of pity and religiosity. In the times of national or local elections, competing political candidates provided sizable donations to *Madrassa*. The bigger the donation, the more the projection of candidate as religious and generous person. Such an image naturally enhances the vote bank of the investing candidate.

Each *Madrassa* had an attached Masque. In Muslim society, and specially in relatively underdeveloped area, the Mosque was a

central and sacred institution and a nucleus of various social activities. The local community remains closely in touch with the Mosque as most of the people have to visit Mosque five times a day to offer prayer. Usually, the managers of *Madrassa* were also the administrators of the attached mosque. Hence they were closely in contact with the local people and understand their psychology. They usually got the people involved in the affairs of the *Madrassa* and underlined the importance of religious education in pre-prayer Friday sermon every week. Hence the repeated preaching and continuous projection of *Madrassa* effectively motivated the public to provide the financial and social support to these institutions.

Madrassa and the State Institutions

It was found that the *Madrassa* had multiple roles in Pakistani society. Ground realities suggested that *Madrassa* was not functional equivalent to the official school. Basically the official school had a narrow and specific role whereas the *Madrassa* had comprehensive and multiple roles. A closer look at the functioning of *Madrassa* revealed that these institutions were in fact filling the vacuum created by low key functioning of the state controlled departments in the areas of (1) education, (2) social security and (3) social welfare.

People in abject poverty combined with illiteracy had restricted access to seek recourse to the state institutions to solve their problems. Additionally, the state institutions were notoriously insensitive to the needs of the local population. Consequently poverty-ridden people were left with no option but to develop their own institutions which could cater to their felt needs (Jalil 1993). *Madrassa* was an obvious example of this model.

Empirical data showed that people extended their consistent and generous financial support to these institutions. Voluntary funding could be an indicator of deep trust in the ability of *Madrassa* to deliver. It may also be noted here that in Pakistan, tax-paying culture has not yet been developed and there is massive evasion of taxes (Malik 1997; Banuri and Kemal 1997). At popular level,

paying tax to the government was usually considered penalty and wastage of money. One teacher of *Madrassa* while seriously questioning the credibility of Government said, "Why should people pay tax to the corrupt and cruel Government officials? They waste public money on useless foreign trips, holding seminars in expensive hotels and other wasteful activities. Poor do not get anything from these taxes. If they give money to *Madrassa*, it goes to poor children who get religious knowledge. *Madrassa* also provides them free food and shelter: no governmental institution can do this. Government collect taxes, but provide no service" (from field notes).

Madrassa and Life Style of its Students

During the fieldwork, one thing was quite conspicuous in *Madrassa* and that was "the culture of contentment". There was no sensitivity about the living standard and quality of life. *Madrassa* students had least planning about their financial future and career and the challenges that might come in the future. It was also noted that they had their own ideology and 'integrated thought system' which provided the guidance in decision-making in almost all the spheres of life including the decisions related to their selection of food, quality of housing, sanitation, attitude towards women and children, attitude towards innovation, personal and social hygiene, work ethic, leisure time spending and so on. In all aspects of social life their vision and approach towards "social affairs" was usually at odd with the society at large. Their indoctrinated Knowledge helped them to rationalize their decisions and justify the sufferings they usually face as a consequence of their relative social isolation.

The researcher stayed in the *Madrassas* for some time to observe the things closely. It was found that the main focus of these institutions was to resist the social change and convince the students that a departure from the traditional lifestyle was dangerous and destructive. Drinking Coca-Cola or eating ice cream or listening to music, seeing movies---all are harmful for the body and soul. They were taught to stick with the lifestyle adopted by the founding fathers of their religious sect. Tynbee (2000) while

analyzing the inhibitions in the 'globalization of culture' arrived to similar conclusions.

The most dangerous thing they are told is the globalization of culture. For them globalization of culture is a jumble of deep-seated alarms---moral, intellectual, political, spiritual, artistic and nationalistic, melting into great pot of 'globalization panic'. It causes great panic about cultural future of a world turning homogeneously horrible (Tynbee 2000)

New Opening for Madrassa Students

After interviews with some alumnus of *Madrassas*, the researcher concluded that the graduates of these institutions have carved out their own place and role within the existing social and political system. Over the years, they were able to find some role in the power-politics ranging from the local political activist to the cross boarder export of ideology (Rashid 2000). In *Madrassas*, the students were also given sensitivity to political and ideological issues and were also trained to act as active political workers. They were also "schooled" to seek solution to the problem by their own system of knowledge and strategies which could not be necessarily in line with the "official philosophy of progress and development". It was also noted that there was a high sense of self-righteousness and they rarely admit any discussion or objective analysis of their thoughts and actions (Zakar 1999).

During the interviews from senior students, It was noted that the geo-political environment of the region had provided various "openings" and new opportunities to *Madrassa* graduates. Although administrators of the *Madrassa* refuted that they had any intention to directly involve in power politics, but various alumni revealed that they were deeply interested in the cross boarder political developments.

Keeping in view these 'openings' and prospects, the senior students of these *Madrassas* did not feel socially 'isolated'. Rather they felt that their future was quite bright and hoped that one day

the system based on injustice would be replaced by the "true system". They had in their mind the practical example---the *Taliban* in Afghanistan majority of whom were educated in the *Madrassas* situated in North-West regions of Pakistan. Rashid (1999) in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* also predicted some nexus between *Madrassa* education and rise of *Taliban* in Pakistan.

The *Taliban's* purist ideology and Pakistani recruits it has nurtured have had immense cross boarder repercussions in Pakistan. An already fragile nation in the midst of identity crisis, economic meltdown, ethnic and sectarian division, and suffering under a rapacious ruling elite unable to provide good governance, Pakistan could easily be submerged by a new Islamist wave---one led by not established mature Islamist parities but by neo-*Taliban* groups (Rashid 1999:27)

Madrassa: a Rational Choice for the Poor

During the field research, it was noted that the institution of *Madrassa* had deep roots into the religious, cultural and historical layers of society. Hence just to pick one or two variables to explain the complex and culture specific phenomena of duality of institutions could be both artificial and non-scientific. Given the complexity of the situation and interplay of countless variables, it seems advisable to study the phenomena in a holistic perspective.

The basic question was that why did people send their kids to *Madrassa* instead of official schools. It may also be noted here that most of the parents were well aware of the fact that *Madrassa* education had least value in the job market. Despite knowing this, how could their behaviour be interpreted? This is the core question addressed by this study. For instance, when a person decides to send his kid to *Madrassa* and not to school, it could be a rational choice ---rational within the available opportunities and ground realities. In ethno-methodological context, his decision to send his kid to *Madrassa* may have strong logical foundations and

pragmatic social context. He may calculate the cost and benefit of sending his kid to *Madrassa* vis-à-vis official school. The point here is that it is the socio-economic context which forced parents to send their kid to *Madrassa*. And the similar social factors provided sustainability of the very system of *Madrassa* as well.

Parents may face various inhibitions to send their kids to official school. For instance given their resources and need urgencies, the official school may be irrelevant for them. They might have seen various persons disappointed from official school. The official school may not have capability to change the 'status quo' in the foreseeable future. Or the parents have already been disappointed from the official school. So they found it appropriate to send their kid to *Madrassa*. One father of *Madrassa* student explained the situation well: "I enrolled my eldest son to the official (public) school. He studied there for five years. Due to chronic and habitual absence of the teacher, there was no learning environment in the school. But, all the time, my son used to ask for money to buy school dress, books, stationary articles etc. I could not afford that. Now I have enrolled my son in *Madrassa*. He has learnt three *Sparas* (chapters of Holy Koran). Every thing is provided by *Madrassa* free of cost and I am happy with the performance of this institution (from field notes)

Most of the respondents thought that official school was expensive and they did not have enough resources to bear the expenses for a long period of time. Technically, official school needed long term investment. It was difficult for extremely poor people to make such a long-term investment. They may be more concerned with the fulfillment of their immediate needs.

People had every legitimate doubt about the future of their kids even if they educate them in the school. Could the child get reasonable job after completing the education? Chances were rare as good jobs went to those who were educated from the more expensive private 'English medium schools'. Any way, even if a person completes his school education, there was remote

possibility of getting jobs. So it was quite rational if people send their kids to *Madrassa*.

During the course of informal talks with the *Madrassa* students and teachers, it was noted that, due to their restricted social exposure, persistent economic hardships and other system generated incapacitation, they had developed an approach towards life which was dominated by pessimism and fatalistic overtones. Their ability to make a long term planning (and its implementation) was severely crippled. They were more concerned to fulfil their immediate and short term needs and hence were unable to come out from the vicious circle of poverty and powerlessness. It was also noted that their pessimist and fatalistic approach was not only restricted in the area of education but extended to other domains of social life which encompassed their fertility behavior, attitude towards women, development of social capital, acceptance and adoption of innovative ideas and artifacts, spending and saving as well as health care utilization. For instance, a father of ten children who did not have any regular and reasonable income to feed them observed: 'This (child) is God's property and it is His responsibility to feed him' (from field notes). The only responsibility the father felt was to get the child enrolled in the *Madrassa* where he would not only get education but boarding and lodging free of cost.

Is Madrassa Creating Poverty?

It would be an oversimplification to state that *Madrassas* are producing poverty. In fact, the existence of these institutions seemed to be a reflection of distrust the people had in the official institutions as their ability to deliver has progressively disappointing. Understandably, *Madrassa* thrived as the overall condition and functioning of the government controlled schools declined to the lowest ebb. Visibly low key performance of schools provided sufficient justification to the people not to get their kids admitted in *Madrassa* by bypassing the mainstream official school system. Dr. Tariq Rahman (2000), a prominent social scientist arrived at similar conclusions.

Contrary to some stereotypes about *Madrassas*, most of them do not have children in chains. Indeed they provide free board and lodging to say nothing of education, to poor children who might otherwise be murdered by perverted criminals. Indeed the *Madrassas* are doing what the state should have done in the first place---provide education, food, security and comfort for all children. If for providing free services, if *Madrassa* teach young people what they think necessary, the fault is not of the *Madrassa* but of our ruling elite which has never bothered to teach poor children at all (Rehman 2000).

Data showed that *Madrassa* was attracting more poor students as it seemed more 'viable institution' for them. Hence, they come to *Madrassa* because of their poverty and remain in poverty because of their 'programmed incapacitation' as *Madrassa* imparts education which may not help them to integrate with the social mainstream. The process is cyclical and self-perpetuating. The overall institutional arrangements and social milieu plus 'ideological indoctrination' further reduce their chances of social inclusion. Hence poor people find it perfectly rational and pragmatic to develop their own social-system and *Madrassa* is a part of that system. Through the system dynamics, they are socialized in such a way that they get some insensitivity to the pains of poverty and relative deprivation. Poverty may be undesirable 'academically' but may not be dysfunctional for all. Poor may serve the interests of some sections of the society as well. So the institutions which 'help' the people to remain poor may be supported by the 'vested interest'. It was also noted that *Madrassas* were funded by the feudal and big landlords who were the political bosses of that particular area. Their interest to support *Madrassa* could be many-fold. First, *Madrassa* education resists social change and sustain conservative social order. Second, it restricts social mobility as well as political and social awareness. Hence, such conditions pose least threat to the local political establishment. However, the official school may create political

and social awareness which could be detrimental to the existing political forces (Malik 2000)

There is a tendency among the policy makers in Pakistan to readily label the choices of the poor people "as outcome of illiteracy and ignorance" (Nadeem-ul-Haq 1991). However, there is need to understand their behavior within the larger institutional and structural context. People make decisions keeping in view the available choices and ground realities. Their exclusion is not by chance, it is by design.

However it is difficult to pass an explicit judgement whether *Madrassa* is increasing, decreasing or maintaining social exclusion and non-participation. The contribution of *Madrassa* in providing food and shelter to the poor students may be an instant relief to the students as well as their families. However, it would not be justified to say that this help from *Madrassa* could reduce their poverty or help them to come out of the poverty cycle. Rather, they may further sink into the deep waters of poverty by exposing to such a system of knowledge/ideology which not only rationalizes the status quo but also further incapacitate their ability to participate and get integrated with the existing socio-economic system. These students are brain washed in such a way that poverty becomes less painful for them and they learn the art to live with it peacefully.

Conclusions

1. *Madrassa* was providing education, food and accommodation to poor students free of cost. In this way, the institution was providing some instant relief to the poor children who otherwise might face worst conditions. To this extent, this institution was functional in the local setup and that was why the community continued to support it financially. The number of new *Madrassas* and children desirous of taking admission in these institutions were on the rise.

2. Despite the fact that *Madrassa* was providing temporary relief to the poor students, but the type of education the institution was providing had no value in the job market. After completing education, *Madrassa* graduates were not eligible to compete for any well-paid and prestigious job in the private or public sector. Consequently, they remained socially excluded and poor.

3. The role of *Madrassa* was not confined to education but to train its students for specific religious purposes which included preaching and propagation of particular religious sect. Hence the real aim of *Madrassa* was not to impart scientific and technological education which was required in the job market but to train ideologically committed zealots for specific purposes.

4. *Madrassa* students were discouraged to have an access to the newspapers, Radio, TV and other mass media of communication. Such a 'closed-training' led to develop the personalities who rarely admitted discussion and tolerance to the others view point.

5. *Madrassa* system seemed totally alienated from the state institutions. *Madrassa* did not follow the 'government's education policy' rather the objectives of *Madrassa* were at cross-purpose with the state. In some issues, like women status, attitude towards minorities, freedom of expression and religion and other democratic values, *Madrassa* was uncompromisingly hostile to government. Accordingly, *Madrassa* graduates were vigorously trained and deeply 'indoctrinated' to refute the official viewpoint. Hence they seemed more interested to dismantle the existing socio-political system rather than getting integrated with it.

6. Worsening economic conditions of the country and consequential high incidence of unemployment led the poor people to conclude that "long term investment on school education was not rewarding". Hence, they preferred 'free and convenient' *Madrassa* education which was surely rewarding in the 'world hereafter'

7. Massive corruption and virtual failure of the state institutions to cater to the needs of the local population had alienated the people from government. *Madrassa* readily offered people a "contingency plan": offering them an alternative system and ideology which could solve their problems. However principal strategy of *Madrassa* was to justify and rationalize the abject poverty by using religious explanations. They were told that poverty is in fact a blessing of God and they should bear the sufferings with high degree of contentment.

8. Through a systematic indoctrination, the *Madrassa* students were 'schooled' to undermine the importance and significance of various scientific achievements and innovations. Their analytical ability was impaired and their vision was tainted: they remained suspicious and always smell some 'conspiracy' behind every new idea.

9. In some localities, *Madrassa* and official schools were competing with each other. The official schools were notoriously mismanaged and substandard especially in the rural areas. Poor people, by getting frustrated from these schools and having no money to pay for the expensive schools, sent their kids to *Madrassa*.

10. Due to cultural globalization, the local people perceived threat to their indigenous values and traditional institutions. *Madrassa* challenged this 'cultural imperialism' and promised to resist this invasion by reinvigorating the 'glorious past'. The poor people who were extremely dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions, reverted to *Madrassa* with the hope to change their lot.

11. *Madrassa* had multiple functions to perform. In addition to education, the institution provided various services which made the people socially and psychologically tranquil in a highly unsatisfactory socio-economic conditions.

Based on the empirical data this research concluded that *Madrassa* was not 'creating poverty' rather it was providing temporary relief to the poor children. However, *Madrassa* was "reproducing poverty" as the poor children did not get any relevant education, hence, they stood ineligible to occupy any reasonable job. As a result, they remain in the vicious circle of poverty. The empirical data substantiate the theoretical assumption that dual system of education was contributing to the persistence of poverty in Pakistan.

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Documents: Pakistan pulls back Loc troops as India extends truce

In a tit-for-tat peace initiatives, Pakistan announced it was withdrawing troops from the line of control as India offered to extend by one month a ceasefire with Islamic militants waging a struggle for an independent Kashmir or one united with Islamic Pakistan.

"We think this is a very positive and courageous move," Gen. Rashid Qureshi, army spokesman told The Associated Press in an interview.

"We can't say how many troops are on the border or how many are being withdrawn because that is classified information, but it is indicative of our desire to move things forward," he said.

The unilateral troop withdrawal from a border that has seen two all-out wars between India and Pakistan in just 52 years is the second since the military took power in Pakistan in October 1999.

One of the first gestures of Pakistan's military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf was to withdraw some of his soldiers from the border, a gesture that was intended to ease India's concern about having an army man at the helm in Pakistan.

"Those soldiers never returned to the line of control and this is more that we are withdrawing," he explained.

Pakistan called on India to reciprocate by withdrawing some of its soldiers to try to move peace forward," Qureshi said.

The withdrawal has already begun, said an army statement.

"Troops have started moving toward the cantonments," said the statement.

Pakistan had earlier declared a ceasefire along the disputed border.

BBC quoted Qureshi saying there was no foreign pressure on Pakistan and India to maintain peace in the region.

He said Pakistan was prepared for talks to solve Kashmir problem. "China and other world countries have pressured India into talks."

Whether the two neighboring countries are in contact with each other at some level, Qureshi said the efforts were always being made at the individual level. "India was hesitant from talks but now it seems from the latest statement of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that New Delhi is also prepared for talks. It is hoped that the talks would begin soon," Qureshi said.

Indian statement on extension of Kashmir truce

New Delhi: Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced on Wednesday that India's ceasefire in Kashmir would be extended for another four weeks beyond the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

Following is the text of his statement in the lower house of parliament: " Before the winter session of the parliament concludes, and the house rises for the festival of Christmas, I wish to take this opportunity and share with all honourable members the government's assessment of the situation in J&K (Jammu and Kashmir), also along the LOC (Line of Control).

"Following my announcement of 19 November, that during the holy month of Ramadan our security forces would not initiate operations against the militants, also expressing a hope that along the LOC, too, infiltration would cease, there have been some encouraging developments. Certain other aspects, however, remain as our continuing concerns.

"The government is greatly heartened by the response of the citizens, political parties and other organizations in the state of J&K. Our peace initiative has been widely welcomed there. A distinctly different and ore optimistic mood now prevails in that state. The constituency for peace has expanded significantly.

"There has also been a decline in incidents of terrorist violence in that state. Activities, however of organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen continue resulting in most unfortunate and regrettable loss of innocent civilian lives, also of the personnel of our security forces. The Government remains firm in its resolve to combating these and other challenges, also to defeating their inhuman and nefarious designs.

"There has been a recognizable decline, too, in attempts at cross-LOC and cross-IB (international border) infiltration of terrorists. This must cease entirely. The government is committed to achieving this end.

"Along the LOC, we have witnessed a marked improvement in incidents of exchange of fire. Relative peace has prevailed all along the LOC, ever since my announcement of 19 November, barring some incidents in the early stages.

"After careful consideration of all aspects the government has, therefore, taken a decision to extend the period of 'no initiation of combat operations' by another month. After Republic Day 2001, the Government will review the position again.

"As the initiator of the dialogue process with Pakistan, India remains committed to it. The existence of a suitable environment for such a process is self-evidently necessary. As part of continued commitment to the Shimla agreement and the Lahore Declaration, the government will initiate such exploratory steps as are considered necessary by it, so that the composite dialogue process between the governments of India and Pakistan can be resumed.

"Let me inform the house that the government's unwavering commitment to meeting the challenge of terrorism remains undiluted. Whereas we will continue to exercise maximum restraint in the face of grave provocations, national interests will never be compromised.

" I wish to assure honourable members that we remain steadfast in our commitment to restoring lasting peace and to enabling all our citizens from J&K to join as equal partners in India's march to prosperity."