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A JOURNAL OF POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE



**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB**

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A JOURNAL OF POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE



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CONTINUATION OF THE COLONIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS

Rashid Ahmad Khan

The arrival of Vasco da Gama on the West Coast of India in 1498 ushered in a revolutionary era in the history of South Asia. It ended forever the isolation of the region from other parts of the world, particularly the West, which had been in force for centuries due to the peculiar geographical features of the Indian Ocean. For the first time in the history of the Indian Ocean region a direct link was established with the West and the course of events in this part of the world was to be determined by the developments in the Atlantic.

The arrival of the Portuguese also paved the way for the establishment of British colonial rule in India which lasted for about two hundred years till the emergences of Pakistan and India as two independent countries in 1947. Between 1757 when the British won the Battle of Plassy to gain the control of Bengal and 1947 when the last British Viceroy left, the British colonialists laid the foundation of a rule in India, which was basically based on ruthless exploitation of human and material resources of India. For the sustenance of such a rule the British structured a political system whose economic, legal and other components strengthened its oligarchic character. For example, despite a shift towards decentralization and devolution of powers after 1857 the British preferred to maintain a highly centralized political system under a federal arrangement which allowed only marginal authority to the constituent units. The Government of India Act 1935 symbolized this system which although provided for a scheme for the financial, administrative and legislative relations between the Center and the provinces, yet, arming the Governor-General with vast discretionary powers and a clear priority of the former over the latter in legislative sphere. The purpose behind establishing such an order was to assure the protection of interests of the British

colonialism to the exclusion of interests of the vast majority of the Indian people.

The same theme underlay the economic and legal systems developed in India under the impact of British colonialism. Before the arrival of the British, there was no concept of private property in land. Rural life in ancient India was organized around village communities who had a common ownership of land under cultivation or use for other purposes. During the Moghul period the land belonged to the crown and the state recognized no hereditary right to the *Jagirs* granted by the kings to their subjects for their services to the court. The British, true to the spirit of mercantile imperialism, introduced private ownership in land, leading to the creation of hereditary feudal lords who still exercise a dominant influence in the political system of Pakistan. The British colonial rule also brought about a radical transformation of socio-economic life in India. Through a network of railroad communication system and building of seaports connected with hinterland, the British destroyed the self-sufficient economy of the village communities and made the countryside completely dependent upon the cities.

Through their industrial and agricultural policies, the British also created a rural-urban divide, which still permeates politics in Pakistan and India. Moreover, the external trade pattern established by the British, made India a complete appendage of metropolitan economy of England. We all know that before the arrival of European colonial powers, there was a flourishing regional trade in the Indian Ocean area. The Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea were great commercial highways through which India's trade with countries of Southeast Asia and, as far as, China in the East; and with the Persian Gulf and, beyond it, with the ports on the Mediterranean coast in the west; and Eastern African coast in the southwest, was carried on. The colonial powers, especially the British, destroyed this regional trade pattern and linked India with the West for trade and commercial purposes. This pattern has largely continued to-date, to the extent that intra-regional trade of South Asian countries is not more than 3 percent of their total trade. In case of Pakistan, for example, imports and exports to

SAARC countries constitute 2.5 percent of its total trade during 1996-97 period; whereas, during the same period, country's exports to and imports from developed countries have been 60.3 and 49.5 percent respectively.¹ The economic system developed in India during the colonial period impoverished the countryside, created wide gap between the rich and the poor and led to heavy dependence of India on the European and developed countries' markets. These features with all their implications for the independence and sovereignty of the South Asian countries continue to play an important role in determining the nature and direction of national development policies of these countries.

Similarly in order to perpetuate the interests of the colonial rule and those of the native groups coopted by the colonial administration for their collaborative role, the British designed a legal system, which heavily relied upon the use of coercive force for the maintenance of socio-economic *status quo*. Like other systems, the legal system developed by the British has also become outmoded and has proven its utter futility to cope with modern problem related to terrorism. Despite the fact that there are widespread demands for change in the old legal system and a number of attempts have also been made to bring about radical changes in this system, the colonial legal system still exists with all its ramifications. Rule of law and independence of judiciary are two concepts, which are counted among positive contributions made by the British colonialism in India. But it is a matter of common knowledge both in India and Pakistan; law favours the mighty and rich. So far as the ordinary people are concerned, they have no trust in the legal system because it seldom comes to their rescue. The "judicial activism" about which we have read and heard so much recently in Pakistan turned out be nothing but an attempt to blunt the increasing assertiveness of political forces released after long spells of suppressive Martial Law periods.

¹Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Adviser's Wing, Pakistan Economic Survey 1996-97 (Islamabad, 1997) p. 179.

In this paper an attempt is being made to argue a case that while more than 50 years have passed since Pakistan achieved independence, Colonial legacy on the political, legal, economic and other system still persists. This legacy is the principal obstacle in the way of full realization of democratic rights and freedom of the people of Pakistan. Time and again, political forces representing the democratic aspirations of the people have clashed with the forces who represent this legacy, i.e. the establishment which groups civilian and military bureaucracy, judiciary and feudal lords. While arguing this case only those features of economic and legal systems would be briefly mentioned which are relevant to the nature and direction of change in the political process of Pakistan. The aim of the paper is also to arrive at the conclusion, after examining the political and constitutional process in Pakistan, that after the end of Cold War and growing trends towards globalization, the colonial legacy is losing ground while the democratic forces bearing the banner of political supremacy of the people are advancing in a slow but sure way.

When Pakistan started its independent national life in 1947, it adopted 1935 Act with certain modifications as an Interim Constitution. Among many features of the 1935 Act retained in the Interim Constitution of Pakistan was the federal structure. The federal structure of 1935 Act was based on provincial autonomy which was the product of a long constitutional development extending from 1860 to 1919. The process of decentralization and devolution of powers started after 1857 in response to the needs for efficiency and discipline. It received greater impetus with the start of twentieth century. With the intensification of nationalist struggle in India and demands for greater public participation, the area of provincial autonomy was further enlarged. Although 1935 Act invested the provinces for the first time with a separate legal authority, there was little change in the scope of their legislative authority. The Act distributed powers between the Centre and the provinces on the basis of three legislative lists --- the federal, the provincial and the concurrent. The subjects contained in federal list fell under the jurisdiction of the Federal Legislature, while the provincial legislatures were competent to legislate on the subjects

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included in the provincial list; however, both were competent to deal with matters covered by the Concurrent List. The residuary powers were vested in the Governor-General. According to Section 104 of the Act, the Governor-General might, by public notification empower either the federal legislature or a provincial legislature to enact a law with respect to any matter not enumerated in any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Act, including a law imposing a tax not mentioned in any such act.

Although the number of items in the Provincial List was increased under the 1935 Act, all the important matters like military forces, defence, external affairs, currency, ports, banks, insurance, import and export, custom duties, income tax, capital levies and corporation tax were kept outside the reach of the provinces. The Act also provided for the priority of the law passed by the Federal Legislature over the law passed by a provincial legislature on an item contained in the Concurrent List. The Federal Legislature had also the power to make laws for a province even in respect of matters in the Provincial List under a state of emergency, which the Governor-General had the authority to proclaim under Section 102, in case, in his opinion, a grave emergency existed "whereby the security of India was threatened whether by war or internal disturbances." This clause, as G.W. Chaudhary observes was a limitation on provincial autonomy.²

After independence, Section 102 of the original Act was successively amended by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1947, 1948, and 1950, leading to an enlargement of its scope. Thus, instead of increasing the quantum of provincial autonomy as compared to provided in the original 1935 Act, the Muslim League Government in Pakistan further restricted the area of provincial autonomy. This looked very strange and perplexing in view of the fact that the Muslim League before 1947 was all along championing the cause of the provinces by demanding greater powers for them as compared to the All India National Congress which stood for a stronger centre.

² Chaudhary, G.W., *Constitutional Development in Pakistan* (London, Longman) p. 26.

In the area of financial relations, the extent of provincial autonomy was also further limited after 1947. The original Act of 1935 had allowed the centre to retain all the major sources of revenue; but there were certain taxes the net proceeds of which were to be shared with the provinces. These taxes were: (i) income tax (50 percent); (ii) jute export duty (62½ percent); central excise, salt duty and a few other items. After 1947 this arrangement was changed further in favour of the Centre, by suspending the policy of sharing the proceeds of some taxes with the provinces and abandoning the sharing of net proceeds of the income tax. Sales tax, which was in the provincial list, was taken away by the central government. This situation continued till 1952. When the financial position of the country improved, Pakistan began to conform more closely in respect of division of revenues between the Centre and the provinces to the general scheme imposed in the Government of India Act, 1935. But Centre's control over all the major sources of revenue and suspension of sharing the net proceeds of some of the taxes, like income tax and sales tax, led to dissatisfaction in the provinces. In East Pakistan, this dissatisfaction took the form of a province-wide agitation for extreme autonomy in legislative, administrative and financial spheres. It was largely this agitation, which forced the central government to revert back to the policy of sharing the net proceeds of income tax and handing over the sales tax to the provinces.³

The centralized character of the political system developed in India by the British was symbolized by almost unlimited powers of the Governor-General. This is why both congress and Muslim League targeted the Governor-General as a symbol of colonial authoritarianism. Under the original 1935 Act, the Governor-

³ In November 1950, all the major political parties held a Convention in Dacca (Dhaka). The Convention was held to protest against the constitutional proposals contained in the First Report of the Basic Principles Committee of Pakistan's Constituent Assembly. The proposals had drastically curtailed the area of provincial autonomy. While rejecting these proposals, the convention had demanded that only foreign affairs, currency and defence should be given to the Centre. (G. W. Chaudhary, *Ibid* p. 72.

General, as the representative of British Crown in India, was invested the final political authority, armed with discretionary powers and special responsibilities. The British had given vast powers to the Governor-General because they believed that a strong executive was necessary for the protection of their colonial interests in India. However, those discretionary powers and the special responsibilities were amended in the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Under Section 8(c) of the Independence Act of 1947, the powers of the Governor-General or any governor to act in his discretion or to exercise his individual judgement lapsed from August 15, 1947. The Governor-General was presumed to act on the advice of his Ministers. But yet under the Government of India Act 1935, as adopted in Pakistan, the Governor-General continued to enjoy wide and substantial powers. According to Section 7 of the Act, as adopted by the Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, as amended up to April 1955, the executive authority of the Federation of Pakistan was to be exercised by the Governor-General, either directly or through officers subordinate to him. The Governor-General was to choose his own ministers and they were to hold their office during his pleasure (Section 10). The Council of Ministers was to aid and advise the Governor-General in the exercise of his function, but such an advice was not binding on the Governor-General (Section 9).

Since the Governor-General was not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers and the ministers were to hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General, the role of Governor-General was, as G.W. Chaudhary observes, "unlike that of a constitutional head". Pakistan, thus, even after attaining independence continued to be run under a vice-regal system. In addition to the powers relating to the appointment of Prime Minister and ministers, the Governor-General also retained the emergency powers provided in the original Government of India Act, 1935, under these emergency powers, the Centre could take up the functions of the provincial governments (Section 102). Similarly Section 92-A which was inserted by the Governor-General Order in 1947, empowered the Governor-General to suspend a provincial government and direct the "Governor of a

province to assume on behalf of the Governor-General all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any provincial body or authority."

Thus, even after the removal of discretionary powers of the Governor-General and omission of the Ninth Schedule, the position of the Governor-General under the Provincial Constitution of Pakistan remained powerful.⁴ Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah became the first Governor-General and, as G.W. Chaudhary has remarked, his acceptance of this position had great impact on the relationship between the Governor-General and the cabinet as well as with the legislature in the first year of Pakistan's political career.⁵ During this period Jinnah dominated the decision-making and policy formation process of the government --- a function which is normally the responsibility of prime minister under parliamentary form of government. In view of Jinnah's contribution for the success of movement for Pakistan and his personality, neither the cabinet, nor the legislature nor the people of Pakistan challenged Jinnah's conception of the Governor-Generalship; on the contrary it was greatly hailed and welcomed. Pakistan, as Allen MacGrath writes had a political Governor-General who controlled the Executive, the Cabinet and the Assembly.⁶

Although Jinnah was justified in exercising such an authority due to the exceptional circumstances in which Pakistan was placed immediately after independence, the expansion of political and constitutional role of the Governor-General had serious implications for the development of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. Ambitious persons like Ghulam Mohammad were tempted to occupy the office of the Governor-General to wield almost unlimited powers. When Liaquat Ali Khan who served as

⁴The Government of India Act, 1935 (with Indian Independence Act, 1947, as adopted in Pakistan by Constitutional Order, 1947, and amended upto April 1955 (Lahore, The All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1955).

⁵Chaudhary, *op. Cit.*, p.31

⁶MacGrath, Allen, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996) p.41.

Prime Minister under Jinnah and Khawaja Nazamuddin, was assassinated in October 1951, Ghulam Mohammad became the Governor-General after persuading Khawaja Nazamuddin to vacate the office, because he (Ghulam Mohammad) realized that it was an office, which could fulfil his ambition. The game did not stop at Ghulam Mohammad who used the powerful office of the Governor-General to dismiss prime minister Khawaja Nazamuddin in 1953 and dissolved unconstitutionally the Constituent Assembly in the following year, it has been carried on through Iskinder Mirza, Zia-ul-Haque, Ghulam Ishaq to Farooq Leghari who used his discretionary powers and dismissed an elected prime minister Benazir Bhutto in November 1996 under Article 58-2(b) inserted by Zia-ul-Haque in the present (1973) Constitution of Pakistan.

The Constitution of 1956 had deprived the Head of the State -- President, many of the powers he enjoyed as Governor-General under the Provisional Constitution. The Constitution required the President to act in accordance with the advice of the cabinet. But still the President had a number of discretionary powers, the most important of which was to appoint from among the members of National Assembly a Prime Minister who in his opinion was most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of Assembly. In a situation where political parties are weak such discretionary power assumes great significance and becomes liable to be misused. During the debates on the draft constitution in the Second Constituent Assembly a suggestion was made that Prime Minister should be elected by the National Assembly so that the discretionary power assigned to the President was not misused. While making this suggestion an allusion was made to the fact that under Interim Constitution a Head of the State appointed somebody as Prime Minister who was not even a member of Parliament and who was flown from Washington without having any footing on the soil and planted "as our prime minister".⁷ The suggestion, however, was not accepted. However, President Iskinder Mirza who enjoyed strong support from the army and bureaucracy was strongly criticized for misusing this discretionary

⁷ Chaudhary, *op. cit.*, p.119.

power in choosing and sending home at his will the prime ministers of Pakistan during the period from March 1956 to October 1958. It was largely in view of the misuse of this discretionary power that the original 1973 Constitution provided for the election of the Prime Minister by the National Assembly. In yet another attempt to make the office of the Head of State more powerful once again, Pakistan's last Chief Martial Law administrator (1977 – 1985) reverted to the 1956 constitutional position and assigned to himself, on lifting Martial Law in 1985, the power to appoint Prime Minister from among the members of National Assembly till March 1990. It was under this provision that Benazir Bhutto during her first term (1988–90) was nominated as Prime Minister by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988–1993). However, after 1990 all the Prime Ministers, including Benazir Bhutto who became Prime Minister for the second time (1993–1996), were elected by the National Assembly.

The concentration of powers in the office of the Head of State reached maximum level under the Presidential Government of Ayub Khan (1958–1969). Ayub Khan abrogated the 1956 Constitution and imposed Martial Law in October 1958. He continued to exercise dictatorial powers as Chief Martial Law Administrator till June 1962 when he enforced a constitution based on the presidential form of government. The unique feature of this constitution was that it vested the executive authority of the Republic in the President who was indirectly elected by a limited electorate of 80,000 members of Basic Democracies (Local Council Bodies). The provision of investing executive authority in President according to Article 31 of the 1962 Constitution clothed the President, as observed by Mr. Munir, a former chief Justice of Pakistan, with a legally absolute power.⁸ Although 1962 Constitution, like the previous constitutions, declared Pakistan a federation, all the powers were concentrated in the centre. In Part VI of the Constitution powers between the Centre and the provinces were distributed. Unlike the 1935 Act and the

⁸ Munir, M., *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (Lahore, All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1965) p. 250.

constitution of 1956, the distribution of legislative powers between the Central Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures was based on the principle of only one, i.e. Federal List enumerating the items over which the Central Legislature had the exclusive authority to enact laws, while Provincial Legislatures had the authority to legislate in respect of all other matters. But the distribution of powers, remarks Justice Munir, was qualified in favour of the Centre in so many respects that as a matter of constitutional law and political science it was impossible to describe the Constitution (of 1962) as federal.⁹

The popular mass movement which started in 1968 against Ayub Khan's autocratic system rejected his Presidential Constitution and put forward demands for restoring parliamentary form of government and enlarged area of provincial autonomy. These demands were incorporated in the 1973 Constitution which made the Prime Minister the Chief Executive of the Federation (Article 90). Under clause(3) of the same Article, the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers were made collectively responsible to the National Assembly, thus, establishing political supremacy of the people through a directly elected Assembly. The Constitution also enlarged the area of provincial autonomy inserting Special Provisions on council of Common Interests and Article 161 which entitled the provinces to receive net proceeds of the federal duty of Excise and royalty on natural gas (clause 1) and net profits earned by the Federal Government from the bulk generation of power at a hydro-electric station situated in that province (clause 2). This system based on the supremacy of the people and genuine federalism was subverted by the authoritarian forces of Martial Law in 1977. The Martial Law period (1977-85) not only ended parliamentary democracy, it also set up, practically, a Unitarian system in which chief Martial Law Administrator wielded all the powers.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 448. Commenting on the federal character of the 1962 Constitution, Justice Munir opines that the system set under the 1962 Constitution "was not a form of Federation but a decentralized Unitarian Government." *Ibid.*, p.70

A survey of the last 50 years of Pakistan's political history would reveal that there has been a constant struggle between the forces representing colonial legacy and popular forces championing the cause of democracy and decentralization. The forces representing the colonial legacy, i.e. bureaucracy have always tried to concentrate all the powers in the hands of the Centre, particularly head of the state, be he a Governor-General or President, and curtail the limits of provincial autonomy. A centralized political system best serves the interests of bureaucracy and negates the principles of democracy. This is why the bureaucratic elements have always been comfortable with authoritarian regimes like that of Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul-Haque.

The centralized political system has not only caused a setback to democracy in Pakistan, it has also damaged federation and was, therefore, ultimately responsible for the break up of the country in 1971. The political history of Pakistan shows that the parliamentary democracy and genuine federalism are inextricably linked with each other. During the debates on the future constitution of Pakistan in the First constituent Assembly a few members belonging to the ruling Muslim League party had recommended unitary form of the state and a presidential (*Khilafat*) form of government for Pakistan, on the plea that these systems were nearer to Islam. Their views were opposed by those elements who believed that only parliamentary democracy could guarantee genuine federalism and liberal democratic culture. Thus, the 1956 Constitution which provided more provincial autonomy as compared to the Government of India Act, 1935, was also a parliamentary Constitution. Despite the fact that Objectives Resolution was made a preamble, the 1956 constitution guaranteed the supremacy of the Parliament and rejected Ulema's demand for establishing the supremacy of the *Shariat*.

Under the 1962 Constitution, Pakistan ceased to be a federal state because it replaced parliamentary form of government with a presidential form of government. Ayub Khan set up a highly centralized political system which made the provinces completely

dependent upon the Centre. The control of the centre over the provinces could only be ensured through a system based on a presidential form of Government. The opposition political parties who had supported the sister of the Quaid-i-Azam, Mohtrama Fatima Jinnah, had originally demanded the restoration of 1956 Constitution, which provided for parliamentary form of government. They had also opposed Ayub Khan's system of Basic Democracies and indirect elections. But they had not included the enlargement of provincial autonomy as one of their demands while launching movement against Ayub Khan's under Combined Opposition Parties (COP) and Democratic Action Committee (DAC). But the mass movement of 1969-70, which was joined by industrial workers, students, professional groups like lawyers, teachers, other government employees and shopkeepers made the increase in the quantum of provincial autonomy as the principal demand of their protest movement. It clearly shows that whenever masses had a chance to express their feelings, they have given their verdict in favour of parliamentary democracy and greater provincial autonomy. Similar were the demands of Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) which was launched in 1981 against the Martial Law of General Zia-ul-Haque. The MRD grouped all the major political parties of Pakistan including Pakistan Peoples Party, who demanded restoration of 1973 Constitution, end to Martial Law and election within 90 days. It also issued a charter of demands for greater provincial autonomy, suggesting that the Centre should retain only four subjects, namely defence, foreign affairs, currency and communication, while other subjects should be handed over to the provinces.

MRD could not mount a countrywide agitation against General Zia-ul-Haque, but in Sind the Movement created quite an important impact. It could not force General Zia to accede to its demands, but it definitely contributed towards finally ending the Martial Law and civilization of Zia regime in 1985.

A combination of domestic and external factors forced General Zia to lift Martial Law in 1985 and allow elections on non-party basis for the National Assembly. But before formally ending

the Martial Law, General Zia got the Assembly approve a package of amendments, popularly known as Eighth Amendment which put serious limitations on Assembly's ability to function as a sovereign body. The most important of the provisions added to the original Constitution through Eighth Amendment was Article 58-2(b), which gave the President power to dissolve the assemblies in his own discretion. There were other matters as well, in respect of which President's discretionary powers were increased. Zia-ul-Haque, thus, revived the concept of a powerful head of the state to act, in continuation of the colonial tradition, as bulwark against popular political forces. Behind this bulwark the entrenched powers of civil and military bureaucracy further consolidated their position to prevent the democratic process from reaching its logical conclusion, the political supremacy of the people.

It is not only in the political arena that colonial legacy vie with democratic forces for supremacy, in the economic realm the struggle is even more intense and visible. The British had kept India as a source of cheap raw materials and paid scant attention to industrialization, but Pakistan was even less industrialized than India. The post-independence political leadership did not pay sufficient attention to the tasks of economic development. The First Five-Year Plan was commissioned in 1955. The Plan did not receive formal approval of the Government till 1957. The country, which enjoyed surplus in food as late as 1952, moved to suffer a continuous and critical food shortage in almost every subsequent year.¹⁰ Writing about Pakistan's economic performance in early years, Gunnar Myrdal observes:

Towards the end of first decade of independence there was an all round decline in food production. The rate of growth of industrial production was slowing down, not least because of inadequate supplies of spare parts or raw materials. At about the same time, Pakistan experienced its largest balance of payments deficit. These symptoms of creeping economic paralysis, together with disaffection in the east wing, failure to initiate any effective

¹⁰ Myrdal, Gunnar, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Volume I (Penguin Books, 1968) p.322.

land reforms in the west wing, pressure of inflation, distrust of the new industrial class, and rampant corruption, produced a general demoralization in public affairs, and an even deeper mistrust of the professional politicians. It was in these conditions that the army and General Ayub Khan took over in October 1958 and imposed Martial Law.¹¹

The situation has not changed much after four decades. Despite impressive achievements in the industrial and agricultural sectors, the economy of Pakistan is still in precarious condition. Pakistan's economy is still heavily dependent upon agriculture which, according to *Pakistan Economic Survey 1996-97*, constitutes 24 percent of Gross Domestic Product, accounts for half of employed labour force and is the largest source of foreign exchange earnings.¹² In spite of the larger sphere of the agriculture, gross disparities in income and social indicators exist between the rural and urban areas. Pakistan's Economic Survey admits lower standard of living for rural population compared to its urban counterpart. This fact is attributed to its poor possession of productive assets, high under-employment and lack of socio-physical infrastructure.¹³ In education, especially in female education, with literacy rate of 38.9 percent (50 percent male and 27 percent female), Pakistan still lags behind many countries of the world. In the area of trade Pakistan has been suffering from an imbalance for most of the years. We have been having a trade deficit in almost all years except for the three years, *i.e.* 1947-48, 1950-51 and 1972-73.

The most serious problem is presented by external debt liability. According to *Pakistan Economic Survey 1996-97*, the disbursed and outstanding debts (medium and Long-term) in the year (1956-97) was estimated at \$23,016 million compared with \$22,275 million of 1995-96 which indicated a growth of 3.3 percent. As a percent of GDP it rose from 34.44 percent in 1995-96 to 35.85 percent in 1996-97. Likewise the debt service payments in

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

¹² *Pakistan Economic Survey*, op. Cit., p. 9.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

1996-97 were projected to increase by 8.10 percent to \$2,309 million against \$2,136 million in 1995-96. It may be around 3.60 percent of GDP in 1996-97 against 3.30 percent in 1995-96. Liability to disbursed and outstanding debt during 1990-91 to 1996-97 grew at an average annual rate of 6.28 percent and payments on debt servicing at an average annual rate of 9.47 percent.¹⁴

From growing trade deficit and mounting debt burden it can very easily be inferred that Pakistan like other developing countries is still a victim of old system of colonial relationships. Colonialism in the old form has been replaced by a new set of relationships which bind the poor with the rich countries based on loans with high interest rates and trade with extremely unfavorable terms for the former. On national level, the vast majority of the people continue to be without basic needs like health, education, sanitation and clean drinking water. Despite the substantial economic growth that has taken place during the last four decades, poverty remains widespread. According to Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haque, this is the result of "powerful inter-locking of feudal-industrial interests, which preempt most of the gains of development."¹⁵ Take, for example, the countries of South Asia. The region has 22 percent of world's population yet its share of global real income is meager 6 percent. The region has a massive share of the world's total illiterate population (46%) --- over twice as high as its share of the world's total population. Pakistan's position in terms of gap between economic performance and human development is one of the most unfavorable among a large number of countries. As Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haque observes:

There are few countries in the world which show a larger gap between their performance on economic growth and human development than does Pakistan. In economic terms, Pakistan's real per capita income is about 75 percent higher than India's. Yet

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87

¹⁵ Mahbub-ul-Haque, *Human Development in South Asia* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 37.

Pakistan lags behind India in adult literacy and most other social indicators. The comparison is even more stark with Sri Lanka which is comparable to Pakistan in terms of per capita income. Pakistan's adult literacy rate is 36 percent as compared to 90 percent in Sri Lanka, and its average life expectancy is ten years lower than Sri Lanka on the Human Development Index (according to the ranking in the *Human development Report 1996*), even though the difference in their per capita income ranks is only 22. In other words, the difference between the human development ranks of Pakistan and Sri Lanka is twice as high as the difference in their income ranks, showing how poorly Pakistan translated its income into an improvement in the lives of its people. Overall, Pakistan's real income per capita increased by 231 percent during the period 1970 to 1993, which was by far the highest rate of growth in South Asia. Unfortunately Pakistan's social progress during this period does not correspond to such an increase in economic prosperity.¹⁶

Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haque attributes this state of affairs to a number of factors, prominent among them, according to him, are: a very skewed income distribution; the absence of any meaningful land reforms; non-existence of income tax on agricultural incomes, an overwhelming reliance of fiscal policy on indirect rather than direct taxes; the heavy burden of defence and debt servicing on limited budgetary resources, political domination by a rentier class that pre-empts the patronage of the state in its own favour and a very corrupt ruling elite.¹⁷ All these factors are the product of the pattern of socio-economic relations which colonialism during its long rule fostered to serve its own interests and those of few who were co-opted for their collaborationist role in keeping the people of their region suppressed.

The leading group in this regard is that of feudal lords who even after 50 years and a series of half-hearted, land reforms in 1959, 1972 and 1977, continue to dominate political process to the detriment of interests of the vast majority of the people. The

¹⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 37, 38.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 38.

successive land reforms have failed to break big land-holdings. According to the Federal Land Commission of Pakistan, only 1.8 million hectares (or less than 8 percent of the country's cultivated area) has been resumed so far, of which 1.4 million hectares have been distributed to 288,000 beneficiaries. Many large landowners managed to keep their holdings within an extended joint family framework and have given up only some marginal, least productive and swampy lands. The fatal flaw in these land reforms has been that the ruling class itself owned most of the land and it was not prepared to commit *hara kiri* by implementing any effective land reforms. Land ownerships still remain highly concentrated; over half of the total farmland is in the form of 50 acres or more.

The owners of these large land farms wield considerable influence in politics and dominate Pakistan's political culture. Their influence in electoral politics is especially decisive. For example, when during the first term (1990-1993) the government of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif made an attempt to impose an agricultural income tax through legislation in the provincial assemblies, he was frustrated by strong opposition from the provincial legislators, particularly Punjab where MPAs from feudal dominated southern part constituted the majority. In 1993 elections which were held after Nawaz Sharif was forced to quit over a row with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, southern Punjab's swing to Pakistan Peoples Party enabled Benazir Bhutto to become prime minister for the second time (1993-96) and capture Punjab --- the largest province of the country --- in alliance with a break-away faction of Pakistan Muslim League. After regaining power in February 1997 elections, the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif imposed Agricultural Income Tax, but its rate has been kept so low that it constitutes a very small portion of revenue income collection.

Conclusion

Even after 50 years of its independent political life Pakistan's political, economic, legal, social and other systems are overshadowed by colonial legacy. The main reason responsible for

lingering colonial legacy are: weak political forces and institutional instability caused by frequent breakdowns of the democratic political process and imposition of Martial Laws. Under the impact of colonial legacy, Pakistan's political system exhibits a strong tendency towards centralization and concentration of authority in few hands. Despite the fact that there has been a progressive enlargement of the area of provincial autonomy from 1947 to 1973, legislative, administrative and financial relations between the Centre and the provinces show heavy bias in favour of those forces whose interests are linked with strong Centre and limited area of provincial autonomy. These forces have not allowed a fair distribution of resources among all the four federating units and even prevent implementation of the provisions on provincial autonomy. This is evident from the persistent complaints from the smaller provinces that Centre has not released their share of funds, causing financial crisis in these provinces. Under the Constitution, the Province of Balochistan has been given a share in the proceeds from income from gas; while NWFP is entitled to get income from hydroelectric generation. Both these provinces, however, have serious complaints against the Centre for denying them their share of income from gas and electricity. The arbitrary and repeated dismissal of assemblies under (now omitted) Article 58-2(b) of the constitution also demonstrated the authoritarian trends of the political system of Pakistan. This lethal provision of the constitution was used four times (1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996) in eight years against the elected representative institutions. Each time, not only the National Assembly and the Federal Government but all the four provincial legislatures and provincial governments were also dismissed.

However, democratic transition and growing trends towards globalization hold bright prospects for greater decentralization and devolution of power which will ultimately dismantle the vestiges of colonialism. Pakistan's political history of the last 50 years shows that the main thrust of democratization process has been in the direction of decentralization and greater provincial autonomy. In fact democracy in Pakistan has been suppressed through frequent military interventions also to thwart the movement

towards decentralization and provincial autonomy. This is why whenever there has been a movement for the restoration of democracy, it has invariably and inevitably been linked with demands for decentralization and greater provincial autonomy. As the process of democratization surges ahead, the political system of Pakistan will become more decentralized and the area of provincial autonomy would be further enlarged.

The growing trends towards globalization is also bringing about a radical transformation in the outlook of power elite on all the major domestic and foreign policy issues, and causing re-adjustment of relationship between various components of Pakistan's political system. The end of the Cold War, disintegration of the former Soviet Union and globalization has forced the nations to re-define their national priorities and put greater emphasis on economic development and trade expansion than on the military build up. These changes have strengthened the process of democratic transition, which though may be faced with many hurdles and in some cases has suffered setbacks, has become irreversible. In Pakistan's case, the success of parliamentary democracy against the onslaught of authoritarian forces who wanted to re-assert the primacy of head of the state over an elected and representative parliament, is a clear illustration of strength and confidence of popular democratic forces in the back drop of democratization and globalization.

FUNCTIONING OF BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY: CASE OF PAKISTAN

Muhammad Zakria Zakar

Background

In recent years the scale of corruption in Pakistan, alone has risen to Rs 100 billion a year. Furthermore, the crisis of governance, corruption and mismanagement, bad governance, loot by "mafia", misery, growing poverty, malnutrition, lack of adequate education and medicare, are the hallmarks of Pakistan's political economy (Human Development in South Asia, 1999). This injurious poisonous mix of factors has rendered the whole socio-political system in shambles.

The gravity of the situation can be measured from the fact that on October 12, 1999, the military chief "unceremoniously" sacked the popularly elected Prime Minister, enjoying a parliamentary majority, on 'corruption charges'. As a follow-up, a number of senior civil servants were also arrested and others summarily suspended from their services for their involvement in unlawful political activities. This included the Inspector General of Police who was nabbed for his alleged involvement to subvert and undermine the institution of the Pakistan army by trying to kill its chief when the former disallowed chief's aircraft to land at Karachi Airport.¹

Such grave events are sufficient to conclude that there is a high degree of institutional decay in Pakistan and one repercussion of this degeneration is the virtual collapse of administrative

¹ The incidents of corruption and misuse of power by politicians and civil servants cited in this article are meant to demonstrate the gravity and magnitude of the situation. Notwithstanding the correctness of charges, these incidents decide the fate of a political government and could put the civil servants behind the bar; hence a qualitative change on the ground. The mere mention of any such incidence in this article cannot be used as an evidence of the correctness or factuality of the incident.

structures at different levels. The principle of separation of powers among various organs of the state is present in the law books and in the constitution but it does not exist in a real situation. The mechanism of checks and balance, which ensures automatic accountability, is lacking in the system. Such a set up logically undermines the operation of the rule of law and participatory governance.

At least, one logical consequence of this scheme of things is rampant and progressive degeneration of institutions - and the institution of civil service² is worst affected as it has lost its neutrality and impartiality, which are the basis of its legitimate authority and public trust. This situation has rendered the civil servants devoid of security as well as predictable and structured upward career mobility. For civil servants, there is no credible and institutionalized mechanism of judging their performance 'on the basis of merit' and competence. Rather, they are judged and rewarded (and punished) keeping in view their personal proximity and loyalty with the ruling politicians. All such factors pushed the civil servants to woo their political bosses. The resultant factor is that institution of bureaucracy has become 'partisan handmaiden of the government' (The News 27-10-1999). By indulging in power politics and partisan posture, civil servants have lost public confidence and moral authority.

The exact reason for this 'politicization of civil service' may be difficult to quantify. However like other social phenomenon, causes of the ill may lie in the unstable and weak political institution. Owing to this unsuitability, the society witnessed frequent breakdown of the constitutional institutions, crisis of credible leadership, absence of properly organized political parties,


² Here civil service does not exclude the military bureaucracy, which frequently involves in the civil structures. At various levels and frequent occasions serving military officials of various cadres are assigned tasks in the civil departments ranging from checking the absentee school teachers to electricity power theft or to curb corruption in some notoriously mismanaged organizations. Sometimes serving or retired senior military officers are appointed on some high profile positions like Federal Secretary or a Vice Chancellor of a politics ridden University with a mandate to put the house in order.

weak basis of democratic norms and disregard for human rights and civil liberties. Extensive rule of military further promoted the milieu, which was not conducive for the development and growth of civil society and its essential institutions.

Such a set up has various unpleasant offshoots. It hits the civil society in multiple and cyclical ways. By the degeneration of vital institutions like civil service, judiciary and effective legislative, the vulnerability of common person is increased and power is concentrated in the hands of rulers with ineffective mechanism of accountability. It further reduces the participation of 'common man' in the political process and the gap between the power elites and the citizens widens. Consequently the 'common man' never learns to participate in the state affairs. Citizens remain passive recipient of the services and never involved in the conceptualization, design and delivery of services (Kardar 1999). In the absence of such an environment, the civil servants become masters as there is no public check on them. They make decisions which suit them. At public level their authority is rarely challenged. The situation has been schematized in figure 1.

Here is the dangerous point. When civil servants 'rule' and indulge in politics and policy making, they enter the arena of politicians. Now, practically, they are not 'servants' nor they could maintain partiality or 'neutrality' in their conduct; the hallmark of the institution of civil service. They are in fact, in power politics, hence lose their "safe havens" like "job security and predictable structure of promotion and upward mobility". When they enjoy political power and proximity of politicians, they have to confront what the politicians are encountered with. And in developing countries especially in Pakistan, when government changes, the "dethroned" politicians go to jail and sometimes to gallows. Their favorite bureaucrats are also with them behind the prison bars.

Figure 1: Politicization of Civil/Public Service and its Impact on Development Output



Concept and Approach of this Paper

The central assumption of this study is that the ruling politicians, in the absence of any institutionalized mechanism of governance and accountability, use civil service as a tool to get things done according to their own interests which may clash with public interests and prevailing law of the land. Further, the politicians (and some times military elites who usually occupy also political slots) use the state power, resources and wealth to serve their personal ends. Frequent news in the press regarding huge kickbacks to the tune of millions of dollars from government contracts may serve to clear the point. To do this in relatively safe manner, the rulers need the "technical cooperation" and "good offices" of civil servants. Civil servants may be tamed by the attraction of their share in the kickbacks or possible punitive action if they "disobey" the "legitimate political authority". Both push and pull factors significantly suck the significant number of civil servants in this "political activity". Who ever is familiar with the Pakistani system knows that laws and rules rarely could create 'hurdle' for the politicians and bureaucrats, be they civil or military (as most of the times military is actively involved in civil affairs) to get the things done. They can readily amend the constitution, laws and rules accordingly and conveniently. They may also crackdown on the institutions if there is some fear of their accountability³.

Relentless assaults on the integrity and vitality of the institution of civil service) and its politicization by successive governments have left the bureaucracy in shambles and its morale has hit rock bottom. Shuffling the pack of bureaucrats to deck it according to the likes and dislikes of the rulers has become a norm and every government tends to treat civil servants as personal retainers. As a consequence the once elite institution of bureaucracy has been reduced to a mere tool in the hands of

³In 1998, some political workers attacked the Supreme Court of Pakistan and tried to physically throw out the Judges from their offices. The reason behind the attack was that the 'political workers' were unhappy as corruption charges against the ruling Prime Minister were re-opened for hearing by the Lord Chief Justice. It may be noted here that the Chief Justice subsequently lost his job as a consequence of his confrontation with the ruling Prime Minister.

whatsoever rules the roost and serves at the whims of the Government of the day (The News, 1999)

In the preceding pages, it was noted that the institution of civil service has become an instrument in the hands of ruling politicians and in case of military rule are subservient to the military high command. It reflects that there is some very serious defect in the overall system, which is adversely affecting the institutional network of the society and civil service.

How to make things better? From the prevailing situation, it seems that the solution lies in changing the role of ordinary people from passive recipients of services to the active participants in the conceptualization, design and delivery of services i.e. by empowering them. This will have to be achieved through restructuring of the government, reduction of the centralization of power and political economic and service delivery system be made more responsive to the common citizen's demand.

Civil Service in the Sociopolitical Context

As stated earlier, the basic norms of public service are neutrality, impartiality, accountability, representativeness, responsiveness, equality, justice, integrity and commitment which provide the institution rational and legitimate authority in the state power structure (Haque 1998). In Pakistan, if one looks at the rules and laws governing the affairs of civil service, one would find similar language, phrases and institutions there. For instance, theoretically, they are recruited on merit based on the competitive examination held by constitutionally autonomous Public Service Commission. On paper, civil servants have secure jobs and good opportunities for upward mobility based on performance and competence. They cannot be sacked arbitrarily and get the full opportunity to defend themselves. Superior courts are there to intervene if there is some executive authority to infringe their rights. However, the ground realities are different. It seems that laws and rules have been drafted and promulgated without

considering the social realities and system imperatives which in fact provide a pragmatic context for the functionaries to operate. Existence of laws and rules in the law books, does not constitute a "real system" on the ground unless they are implemented by the political authority with true political will and commitment. It is observed as follows:

Rewriting constitutions, laws, and regulations is the easy part. Far reaching institutional reform, also necessary, is arduous and slow. The primary obstacle to such reforms are not technical or financial, but political and human. Rule of law reform will succeed only if it gets at the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled by the law. Respect for rule of law will not easily take root in systems rife with corruption and cynicism, since entrenched elite cede their traditional impunity and vested interest only under great pressure. (Carothers 1998: 95-96)

As a part of the system, the institution of civil service intricately interacts with other social and political systems which determine the role of bureaucracy and provide a context for its functioning. What is happening in Pakistan? It seems that institutions are imported which have little or no relevance with the indigenous norms of governance and political culture. Owing to weak tradition of institutionalized decision making and participatory decision making, decisions are made by the powerful personalities on the basis of their personal understanding and interests. Institutions are then asked to put a rubber stamp on these decisions.

There is a tendency among the ruling elites to control every institution and interfere in the institutionalized decision making through influencing the public functionaries.

Asian Politicians focus on the regular, efficient application of law but do not stress the necessity of government subordination to it. In their views law exists not to limit the state but to serve its power. More accurately characterized as rule *by* law rather than rule of law, this narrow conception is built into what has become known as Asian-style of democracy. (Carothers 1998: 97)

Theoretically, civil servants are supposed to judge the case in accordance with the laws and rules as well as keeping in view the public interest, but practically, in Pakistani set up, they are constrained to do so. For example, in the regime of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, one billion dollar motorway construction project was launched without making any 'feasibility study' or its financial viability (whether a developing country really needs this or not?) No expert opinion was invited from hundreds of senior civil servants sitting in the ministry of finance or in the ministry of planning and development. Every rule and procedure was stamped by a "directive" issued from Prime Minister House (Burq 1999).

Here, the role of civil servants seems to be non-existent. They are presented with a choice; either, to ignore or get themselves transferred (or even suspended services) if they choose to be 'objective' and 'neutral' in their official conduct⁴.

At this level civil servants seem 'powerless' and subservient to political authority and their role is reduced to just a rubber stamp. A note of caution here. One should not jump to the conclusion that politicization of civil service is double edge sword. It may curtail the legitimacy and rationality authority of bureaucracy. But civil servants may in other domains get even more powers than their professional mandate. For instance, parliament's legislative role is nominal. Probably the parliamentarians are not "interested" or they cannot find time to concentrate on law making. Or simply they may not have training, competence or aptitude to do so. They may find more attraction in executing 'development schemes' in their constituencies or to supervise the local bureaucracy to 'get the work done'. In such a

⁴ Security of tenure of a civil servant at a particular position is not guaranteed by the law. Hence a bureaucrat, notwithstanding his seniority, suitability or competence to a particular position, may be transferred to some distant places even five times in a month. Hence transferring a civil servants of all cadres is an exclusive prerogative of the ruling politicians. Consequently "transfer" is considered a major stick to punish a "disobedient guy". Over the years, it has been an effective instrument in the hands of politicians to "sideline" a person who does not obey them and appoint a person of their own choice to get the things done smoothly.

situation parliament makes just sketchy laws and the civil servants interpret the laws. Here they are the virtual lawmakers. They tend to write the policies in a manner that even a highly professional member of society cannot understand. The lower government functionaries interpret them depending upon the personal benefit derived (Khan 1999).

To understand the actual role of civil service in Pakistan, one must first look at the real politic of the country. Civil servants do not function in a vacuum; they are part of the civil society and interact with the whole institutional network. Any dysfunctioning in other institutions especially in the polity and economics correspondingly influences the functioning of bureaucrats. The point here is that the institution of civil service cannot play its due role (in the language of Max Weber 'ideal role') unless all the normative and institutional structures of society harmoniously uphold and strengthen the norms of civil society and democratic dispensation for which the values like rule of law, equality before law, equal protection of law, freedom of expression and other civil liberties are of fundamental importance. And above all participatory democracy and stable political government with credible and honest leadership provide an automatic mechanism of accountability for civil servants. In short the role and status of civil servants are not determined by a set of laws and rules, but by the whole socio-legal and institutional structures of the society. Keeping in view the Pakistani setup, some areas are being identified where civil servants can exploit the institutional imbalance in their favor.

First, given the massive illiteracy and absence of organized political parties, a majority of parliamentarians in Pakistan are semi-literate and not trained enough to properly understand the technical affairs of the government departments, even if they get a cabinet slot. Usually ministers have little knowledge of the areas covered by the department. As a result, civil servants have a vast opportunity to exploit the "ignorance" of a minister and reduce him to just a figure head of the Department.

Second, given the Pakistani political milieu, ministers have other commitments --in parliament and their constituencies, for example. They therefore have less time to devote in decision-making. Time and again even the most powerful politicians have observed that the real decision-makers are the bureaucrats. Malik Amir Muhammad Khan, a Governor of the Punjab, used to say "*Iqtidar* (power) lies in the file and the file is with the secretary (a civil servant)". Since the civil servants hold and maintain files, write notes, interpret and apply rules and laws, cite precedence, make recommendations for approval and write 'draft for approval' --a web of intricate procedures which is usually beyond the comprehension of a minister who does not have an exposure or training for such a business. And worst, in case when a minister does not have proper college education. For this reason, the minister relies on the experience and administrative expertise of the civil servants. Often this advice is shaped by the internal culture of the department. While explaining the powers of bureaucracy, a section officer in a provincial secretariat observed:

We (bureaucrats) understand politicians. Notwithstanding their rhetorical claims, they cannot control bureaucracy. Though they wish every thing should be done with their approval, but lack sufficient skills to do so. They don't have ability and competence to understand what is going on 'in the files'. Bureaucracy has thousands of 'tricks' in its bag: if one does not work, it uses another. Ultimately bureaucrats are successful to tame the minister, even if he/she happens to be well educated and experienced politician. *System favors the bureaucracy.*

Third, civil servants, especially those belonging to the cadre of District Management Group (DMG) have strong social capital and net work of colleagues and maintain internal solidarity. Usually they occupy top "strategic" positions in various provincial and federal departments as well as important public sector organizations. They are considered 'jack of all trades', ranging from district magistracy to foreign diplomacy. These power elites are well wired with other powerful groups of society especially the politicians and feudals usually through matrimonial, cast or ethnic relations. It is widely reported that 'DMS class' protects its

collective interests and favor their colleague in case when they are in the "danger of accountability". Due to this internal cohesion, politicians usually avoid to have unnecessary confrontation with these people

Further bureaucracy has some other ways to maintain its grip on power despite the fact that minister or other ruling politicians try to move the things according to their wishes. In a complex decision making process, where a series of officers like section officer, under secretary, deputy secretary, additional secretary etc., give their "expert opinion" on the subject, it is difficult for a politician to go against this institutional advice unless the minister has strong personal interest in the 'case'. So the common culture in the corridors of power is that "cases of minister's interest" are decided "as desired by the worthy minister". In this manner the "routine cases" are decided in accordance with the laid down procedures, nevertheless as 'desired by the bureaucracy'. Understandably, both parties accommodate each other's interest very skillfully.

Fourth, civil servants often outlast ministers and can use various tactics to avoid having to implement a policy they do not like. According to Norton (1998) there are three ways in which civil servants can reverse a minister's decision. They can wait for a change of minister—new minister may be open to advice they are offering. In Pakistan, this tact is most effective as political governments frequently fail and even within the tenure of a particular government, ministers are frequently changed. Given the political instability in Pakistan and frequent down fall of political governments, the job of a minister is highly volatile and to a great extent insecure. And the bureaucracy knows this fact very well. Keeping this fact in view, minister usually avoids confrontation with the civil servants and tries to accommodate their desires.

Social Structure and Bureaucracy

The preceding discussion shows that the institution of bureaucracy in Pakistan is in paradox. Bureaucrats have to cope

with various pressures and structural handicaps. In a given situation they may, by virtue of their technical knowledge, have the ability to get the desired decisions approved by the political authority. However, at the same time, the institution lacks 'protective custody' of rules and organizational environment which encourages and ensures their 'ideal functioning'. If one uses cricket lexicon, civil servants in Pakistan has to come out of crease to play, thus facing very high volatility---to get clean bold or to have a sixer. Whereas the bureaucrats by their professional mandate are not trained to take any risk; they must play the game of their career with high degree of certainty. The administrative structure in Pakistan may not provide such an environment to the bureaucracy.

Further, non-participatory democracy, absence of democratic norms and protection of civil rights further makes the environment non-conducive for the ideal-bureaucracy. Worst, the concentration of unfettered political power in the hands of political elites without having any tradition of constitutionalism further aggravate the situation. In such an environment, the political elites develop a tendency to stampede any institution which prove hurdle in the fulfillment of their "wishes". They may share an iota of political power (and looted wealth) with them, but in this power sharing game, they loose their status and professional standing along with very high risk of going to prison on corruption charges⁷.

However this paper does not argue that only the politicians are responsible for sucking the 'innocent' bureaucrats into power-politics. A careful analysis of the present situation shows that both politicians and bureaucrats find it 'profitable' to "cooperate" with each other for their vested interests. Politicians try to implement their agenda with the help of civil servants by getting 'legal cover'

⁷Bureaucrats: circles are expressing their serious dismay over the fact that they are less secure and more vulnerable when political government changes. Corrupt politicians, having strong political clout has the power to by pass the accountability process. While the bureaucrat having no political force behind become the scapegoat for potential victimization.

and procedural legitimacy to the acts and wishes.⁶ Understandably the bureaucrats are "rewarded" for their 'competence', loyalty and cooperation. And this reward may be in the form of appointment to 'lucrative positions', out-of-turn promotion in some cases allotment of precious plots of land or straight percentage in the kickbacks. Hence this dove-tailing of polity and bureaucracy make them so powerful that conventional channels of accountability fail to check their activities and consequently politicians and bureaucrats become the virtual masters of the society.

The main interest if these power groups has been to keep a hold on power and exploit it for the purposes of amassing wealth through whatever means. In most of the cases the economic and political leaders have been influencing the administration of policy rather than making of policy decisions. They have been interested in the distribution of contracts, issuing import licenses, administration of industrial relations and acquiring business facilities. The means employed by them have, by and large, illegitimate. So the small powerful group, who has the means to corrupt the system, took advantage of the situation and offered rewards to government servants directly and indirectly (Anwar 1991:592)

Over the years, there is growing evidence of 'informal relations' between politicians and bureaucracy. In the Pakistani context, to be a government servant means an officer⁷, a symbol of power and society expects that he/she should use power in his and his/her peer's advantage. This is what the society expects. Since there is hardly any viable channel of accountability or an effective institution to confine the role of civil servants in their domain, they

⁶ For the last ten years new vocabulary has been introduced in offices and there are some novel ways to convert the straight illegal act into a legal one. For example various directives issued by bureaucrats start with sentences like "The Prime Minister/competent authority is pleased to relax the rules and orders in favor of Mr. XYZ". In such cases bureaucrats argue that they are innocent as they acted on the instructions of 'political authority' and on the other hand the 'political authority' may shun its responsibility by arguing if it orders were illegal then the civil servants should not have implemented them. Hence there is no fixation of responsibility nor any chances of accountability whatsoever.

⁷ In the indigenous culture, the word officer has different connotation. At popular level, an officer is largely supposed to be above the law, having unbridled authority and power to get the things done and help the people without any regard to the rules or laws.

see positive reason to 'overstep' from their jurisdiction. Such acts are hardly condemned at the social level as the norms like due process of law, equal protection of law and equality before law could be there in the law books but have weak social rooting. Hence to acquire rational-bureaucratic authority and to use it for one's own advantage is very much institutionalized and therefore a cultural goal set for most of the young people who aspire to be civil servants.

The corruption by public servants is an institution in itself. If a public servant regards his public office as a business, then he may try to maximize his income. In extreme cases the ethical values of work and public trust may not be able to compete with the cultural goals of maximal gain and thereby the public servant abuses his monopoly position for the exploitation of the public as a means to attain his goals. Due to non-availability of alternative source of service, unless one opts for going without, the public has to submit to the undue demands of the public servant. Meeting his undue demand amounts to corruption. (Anwar 1991:593).

The crux of the above discussion is that the whole sociocultural and political context contribute to the indulgence of civil service into power politics. Once civil servants are involved in this power game, they lose their *locus standi* and privilege of security of job and immunity of rules. They by involving in politics, may gain political power and sometime limelight, but at the same time they are open to the fire of public criticism, in press and judicial trial especially when their political masters are out of power. Additionally they lose trust of the public and people associate them with the politicians. This virtual degeneration of the institutions of civil service hits the society from its roots. It renders the very existence of civil society in a jeopardy. The collapse of civil services compel the people to seek recourse from innovative channels which are usually unknown to the laws of the land. One outcome of this situation could be the growth and establishment of parallel institutions: one is legal and other is semi-legal (or straight illegal). And sometimes within the state institutions, informal mechanism is developed "to get the things done smoothly". Such

development seriously undermine the very purpose of the governmental departments/institutions. The absence of any stable, properly functioning and trust worthy institutions leads to the creation of highly volatile and chaotic environment. This environment further undermines the functioning of state institutions and the situation has cyclical and multiplying effect. It gradually erodes the very fabric of society and irreparable damage to the various layers social system. The resultant factor is massive social unrest and civil war⁸.

The point here is that when state institutions, especially bureaucracy and polity, overstep their mandated jurisdiction, it cause corruption and inefficiency. These institutions gradually loose their relevance and public trust. A stage comes when, people have no more trust in these institutions nor they consider them as troubleshooter or mediator of the fundamental functions of the public institutions of a civil society. After disappointed by state institutions, people try to fulfil their needs by using their own resources (usually power) and whatever other channels they have at their disposal. This stage is called, an end of civil society and beginning of a civil war. Societies like Afghanistan, Zaire and Rwanda could provide ample empirical evidence to this theory.

Conclusions

This paper attempts to delineate various politico-legal, socio-economic and structural realities which intricately interact with the institution of civil service in Pakistan and determine its *locus standi*. Through a comprehensive stock taking of the contemporary history, this paper identifies that incentives and constraints that

⁸During the last two decades, there has been phenomenal increase in the incidence of sectarian violence, growth of well organized and armed militant groups and massive proliferation of arms and drugs. Law enforcing agencies visibly lack potency and institutional capacity to control these "extra-legal entities/activities". Normal channels of dispensation of justice frequently prove "ineffective and redundant" and there are credible reports that police is involved in extra-judicial killings on the behest of highest political authority to restore "instant peace and order". Hence law is stampeded by the both parties, by the criminals as well as by the state machinery itself. The logical consequence to this "double set back" to the rule of law is civil war and massive social unrest.

impinge upon the civil/public servants to discharge their duties. The politicization of bureaucracy in Pakistan has been explained by tracing the wide gape between the 'written rules' and markedly different 'indigenous political culture' and ethos of power politics, which frequently and ruthlessly trample with the rules and the laws. Hence, existence of rules and laws meant to restrict the role of bureaucracy may not necessarily have any bearing of their actual conduct; as the rules are frequently ignored in ruthless power struggle. When civil servants enter in the political arena and become the contenders of political power, they (civil servants) may lose many things: the public trust, job security, legitimate expectancy of due promotion, predictable career and permanency. In lieu thereof, they may have gains as well which include attainment of political power, 'patronage' of powerful politicians, immunity from accountability and out-of-turn rapid promotion or posting to a lucrative and 'profitable' position and last but not the least a fair share from 'looted national exchequer'.

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THE PROBLEMS OF RE-ADJUSTMENT: A CASE STUDY OF GULF ARAB SOCIETIES IN THE ERA OF RAPID TRANSFORMATION

Syed Farooq Hasnat

Between 1971 and 1978, the Gulf became an area of increased activity, and in spite of frantic efforts by the regimes to "stabilize" the socio-economic and political forces in their countries, a complete success could not be achieved. The rising expectations of the populations led by the new educated middle class became a strong pressure on the regimes for the implementation of ongoing development programs in their countries.

During the mentioned period, the entire complexion of the Gulf underwent a rapid process of change. The accelerated pace of development in social, economic and political spheres confronted the ruling elites with new forces with which they had to deal with new laws and adjustments. Their real concern remained that developmental process should continue without becoming a catalyst to further aggravate the divisions in the changing complexion of their respective societies. The ruling elites aimed at keeping the diverse forces in their societies satisfied and involved in the decision making process in accordance with their (i.e., the rulers) wishes.

The above-mentioned factors exposed the Gulf Arab countries to "revolutionize", when the oil revenues, especially after 1973, compelled the ruling elites to develop their semi-tribal societies in accordance with modern requirements. The clash between the old and new institutions called for striking a balance between the two.

In this paper we will focus our attention on the respective societies of the Gulf, scrutinizing the process of transformation of

the domestic institutions as a result of economic well being.

The ruling elite of the countries of the Gulf have been, since 1971, describing the changes taking place in their respective societies as a revolutionary condition. In fact during the era of rapid transformation, the societies of the Gulf were involved in a 'Revolution of Rising Expectations', which accelerated with each passing year.¹ An objective revolutionary condition as claimed by the local elite thus does not exist. No revolution has taken place in any of the Gulf societies within the time period prescribed for the purposes of this research.² The Persian Gulf region has encountered political change-over. Political power has been transferred to new ruling elite. There have also been shifts in social structure and of course, we can note a tremendous amount of economic development; but still, neither the men who rule nor their societies have been revolutionized. The societies have, been unable to do away with old "vices" such as rigid political control and have not expanded the policy-making involvements.³ Nevertheless, the old social habits and relationships seem to be in a process of disintegration; the living styles of the previous era have lost their original shape as a result of the immense impact of economic well-being brought about by oil-revenues.⁴

In spite of the fact that the achievements have been made in the form of expanded medical and educational facilities, housing projects, job opportunities and above all the extra-ordinary level of international prestige and status that they have attained - the countries of the Gulf are, in fact, in a state of uncertainty, unaware

¹William R. Polk, "The Economy of the Arab World", *The Middle East, 1974: New Hopes, New Challenges, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session, April 9, May 7, 14, 23 and June 27, 1974* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 165.

²After 1979, the basic reconstruction of the Iranian society can fall in the category of a genuine revolution.

³Bruce Mervin Bortolick, *Comparative Politics of the Middle East: An Introduction* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 57-58.

⁴Dale F. Eckelman, *The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1981), pp. 317-8.

of what lies in store for them in the future.⁵

After having made a brief generalization of the Gulf societies we now confine ourselves to the question of transformation in the respective countries. An attempt will be made to observe the economic well being of the region. Further, we will try to observe its impact on two dependent variables - social and political institutions (the economic benefits being an independent variable).

Our concentration on the analysis of changing internal economic and socio-political structures will contribute to the understanding of Gulf's relations with its external environment, which is one of the important factors for the achievement of Gulf security goals. Manfred Halpern's interpretation is valuable, when he writes:

International relations are today being profoundly transformed mainly through internal politics. The balance of power, and the orientation, health and stability of the international system, are vitally affected by the success or failure of local elites in dealing with the social, political, economic, intellectual and psychological modernization of their countries⁶

Another analyst on the Gulf, John Duke Anthony, while explaining the States of the lower Gulf, comments that little has been written on the "political transformation" or changes occurring within these states. This, he thinks is a serious gap "in light of the impact of internal pressures for political change on external relations in the Gulf."⁷

From the above observation it becomes logical to view the milieu in which policies are formulated, especially in a region, which has immense significance for the global monetary system as

⁵John Waterbury, Ragaei El Mallakh, *The Middle East in the Coming Decade: From Wellhead to Well Being?* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978), pp. 7-8.

⁶Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the East and North Africa* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. viii.

⁷John Duke Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1975), p. 21.

well as for the security considerations of the area.

(i) **Economic Development in the Gulf Region**

The pre Gulf war era (1971-1978) has its own significance. It was in this particular zone of history that rapid economic growth took place and started to impose a series of serious effects on the Political-Social institutions of the Persian Gulf societies. We can define economic development as a "rapid and sustained rise in real output per head and attendant shifts in the technological, economic and demographic characteristics of a society."⁸

It is appropriate here to make a distinction between economic development and modernization. We must be aware regarding the tendencies among various observers to use these two terms interchangeably. Modernization, according to our definition, is a wider concept and includes the development of social and political institutions, apart from the mere progress of economic structures. Thus modernization is not a function of fancy and shiny equipment, no matter how powerful these are as symbols. Certainly, modernization does not mean adopting European dress or hats. Nor does it mean to ignore and reject one's own cultural and religious values. In the Persian Gulf area it means proper distribution of oil money, correct policies leading towards food production and fundamental light industry. Also included are education, health and housing etc. Most important of all the involvement of population at large in the policy making process would only make the Persian Gulf nations as modern societies.

Confining ourselves to economic development, we can explain it as a phenomenon, which is accompanied by major shifts in the industrial, occupational and spatial distribution of productive resources and in the degree of exchange basis and monetization of the economy.⁹

⁸ Richard A. Easterlin, "Economic Growth", *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 4 (Carwell Collier and MacMillan Inc., 1968), p. 395.

⁹ *Ibid*

Dudley Seers has yet another interesting criterion to define economic development. He asks questions about a country's economic development in the following manner:

What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result "development", even if per capita income doubled.¹⁰

Keeping the mentioned discussion of economic development in view, we would look at the Gulf region, with special reference to the Arab countries, in order to observe whether or not the economic activities subscribe to our accepted description.

As explained above the Gulf region, from 1971 to 1978 had become a mixture of new and the old as a consequence of rapid monetary investments. For example, it can be observed that the latest airfields and superhighways had come into existence while the caravan routes and oasis way stations have not ceased to exist. In the urban centers, latest architectural designs are new neighbors of old styles of buildings. These contrasts represent the great changes that have been taking place in the lives of the large majority of the people of the area. Unemployment and absolute poverty have been wiped out as far as the efficiency of the government channels had permitted. In fact thousands of workers are being imported to fill the job deficiencies.¹¹ Within a decade, the region had been transformed from under-developed and

¹⁰Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development", in *The Political Economy of Development*, Ed., Norman T. Uphoff and Warren F. Ichman (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1972), p. 124.

¹¹M. Ali Fekrat, "OPEC: Bargaining for the World Product", *J. South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* (Spring, 1979), p. 34. "In 1977 there were an estimated 1,000,000 immigrants to Saudi Arabia, 400,000 each to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, 350,000 to Libya, and more than 100,000 to Bahrain and Qatar", *IMF Survey*, September 4, 1978, pp. 260-2, in *Ibid.*

poverty ridden into affluent societies with a rapidly growing impact on the economic world.¹²

Most oil producers in the Persian Gulf were unable to adjust their financial policies to deal with their rapidly growing oil revenues.¹³ Nevertheless, as Arab governments increased their knowledge and sophistication in handling these growing funds and recognize the need to build their societies, they started to review their investment options, (previously the trend was to deposit large amounts of oil wealth in a few large banks in New York, London and in the Euro-currency market) and moved towards the development of their own financial institutions.¹⁴ The evidence can be found in setting up of various financial schemes, such as the establishment of Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), in 1971, with the help of oil exporting Arab countries.¹⁵

The trends as seen in Table 1, show a rapid leap in oil revenues in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq etc. This also increased the amount of expenditures spent on arms-imports.

¹² Ramon Khamath, "The oil Producing Middle East States," *Current History* (January, 1979), pp. 10-14.

¹³ David E. Long, *The Persian Gulf: An Introduction to its Peoples, Politics and Economics* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), p. 130.

¹⁴ *The Persian Gulf, 1974: Money, Politics, Arms and Power, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second session, July 30, August 5, 7 and 12, 1974* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 76-77.

¹⁵ Gulf Arab oil producing countries also give a vital assistance in setting up of "the Islamic Development Bank (ISDB) in 1974, as a part of the activities of the 'Islamic Conference', Saudi Arabia contributed 40 million Islamic Dinar (IsDO), UAE 220 million, and Kuwait 20 million. The objective is to help the social and economic development of the Muslim societies. Traute Scharf, *Arab Development Funds and Banks: Approaches to Trilateral Co-operation*, Vol. 1 (Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1978), pp. 158-161. Also see pp. 195-239, for further information on financial activities of the Gulf Arab countries, i.e., on collective as well as individual basis.

TABLE 1

OIL REVENUES OF THE GULF PRODUCING COUNTRIES
(in billions of US dollars)

Country	Years						
	1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	
Saudi Arabi	0.35	0.66	1.20	2.15	3.10	5.50	23.00
Iran	0.29	0.52	1.14	1.95	2.38	4.50	18.00
Kuwait	0.47	0.67	0.90	1.40	1.66	1.94	7.30
Iraq	0.26	0.37	0.52	0.84	0.87	1.67	6.40
UAE	-	0.03	0.29	0.43	0.55	1.10	4.50
Qatar	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.20	0.26	0.42	1.75
Oman	-	-	0.10	0.15	0.16	0.30	0.80
Bahrain	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.25
Total	1.52	2.42	4.37	7.22	8.78	15.63	62.00

Source: The Persian Gulf, 1974: Money, Politics, Arms and Power; House Hearings; op., cit., pp. 77-78.

In Table 2, Saudi Arabia's foreign exchange assets increased progressively more than any other country of the region. The biggest gap came in between 1973 and 1977, when the international reserves increased from 3,877 to 30,034 million US dollars, while Iraq lagged behind Iran and Kuwait followed by UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar. The answer to the above increase in international reserves is to be found in Table 2, dealing partly with the increase of Petroleum production over time.

TABLE 2

INTERNATIONAL RESERVES OF THE GULF COUNTRIES

(U.S. \$ million at 31 December)

Country	Year		
	1970	1973	1977
Bahrain	71	74	510
Iran	208	1,236	12,266
Iran	462	1,553	6,996
Kuwait	203	---	2,990
Oman	127	501	427
Qatar	18	107	162
Saudi Arabia	662	3,877	30,034
UAE	*	92	824

* Not Available

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics: World Bank, World Development Report, 1978; as quoted in *The Middle East Yearbook, 1979*, op. cit., p. 67.

The Gulf Arab countries' impressive potential for development relies on its huge physical resources (i.e., man-land ratios) which distinguishes most of Asia (but) its economic structure is not as backward as that of Sub-Sahara Africa.¹⁹

Advance in economic development is relative. It serves little purpose to compare conditions in the developing countries to those in Europe and the United States. The approach of comparing developing countries with each other and thence to draw conclusions about the success or failure of development is also full

¹⁹Oded I. Renda, "Basic Conflicts of Economic Development in the Middle East", in *Modernization of the Arab World*, Ed. Jack H. Thompson and Robert D. Reischauer (Princeton, N. J. D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1966), p. 62.

of limitations. The best way, according to an American economist - Ramon Knauerhase, in order to evaluate the degree of progress in a particular country, "is to compare general conditions with those at some date in the nation's past."¹⁷

The Saudi government allocated a "major portion of its revenues to economic development, the budget for which exceeded (US) \$5 billion by 1968. Communications and education have received high priority."¹⁸ For example in 1954, there were less than 150 miles of hard-surfaced highways in all of Saudi Arabia. By 1974 there were about 7,000 miles of paved motor roads¹⁹ which were rapidly increased to 20,000 Kilometers by 1981.²⁰ Apart from the paved roads, Saudi Arabia also has 23,000 Kilometers of rural roads which connects 7,000 villages.²¹ or vocational institutions, 220 million riyals were allocated in 1973/74 to establish four new industrial schools.²² Important advances have been made in public education, yet another very important element of economic infrastructure. Girls' schools have been established and attempts are being made to expand secondary and higher education for both sexes. As a result the number of students on all levels rose 314 percent, from 143,010 in 1961/62 to 592,493 in 1970/71. The progress in girls' education is especially striking. It is estimated that

At the end of the five-year period three times as many girls were attending primary schools, and eleven times as many were enrolled in post-primary schools. In 1969 the enrollment in girls'

¹⁷Ramon Knauerhase, "Saudi Arabia's Economy at the Beginning of the 1970s", *The Middle East Journal*, 28 (1974), p. 126.

¹⁸David E. Long, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia", in *The Middle East: Its Government and Politics*, Ed. Abdul A. Al-Murayri (Belmont, California, Duxbury Press, 1972), pp. 262-63.

¹⁹John E. Metcalf, *Saudi Arabia: A New Economic Survey* (Place of Publication Unknown: First National City Bank, December, 1974), pp. 14-15.

²⁰"Filling a Void: A Survey of Saudi Arabia", *The Economist*, February 13, 1982, p. 30.

²¹Ibid.

²²*The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Land of Achievement*, Ministry of Information (Dammam, Saudi Arabia: Al-Mutawa Press Co., date unknown), p. 38.

primary schools increased by 19 percent, and that of secondary schools, by 54 percent.²³

As the oil money poured in, so did the educational facilities. In 1975, there were 246,606 female students in 1st level, out of a total of 686,108 students - which comes to 36 percent.²⁴ Allocations for the improvement of educational institutions rose considerably. For example in 1974-75, seven hundred and fifty billion riyals were spent on education, while in 1976-77, a total of nearly nine and a half billion riyals were spent²⁵ - a rise of two billion riyals.

The Technical institutions, which were necessary for future development of Saudi Arabia, showed an encouraged increase. From 1974/75 to the year 1977/78 - a span of three years, the increase was 250 percent. The target increase for 1979/80 was expected to be 32 percent (i.e., in one year)

In order to diversify their economy, the Saudi government planned a steel mill and a fertilizer plant, which were included in the First (1969-1974) and Second (1975-1980) Five-year Plans. Saudi Deputy Minister of Industries emphasis this need in the following terms:

The emphasis of the country's Second Five Year Plan is focused on the vital objective of diversifying the Saudi economic base by developing the agricultural and industrial sectors. A comparison of the financial appropriations of the two Plans devoted to the objective of diversifying the Kingdom's economic and agricultural structure reveals the predicament of the Saudi planners vis-a-vis their Second Five Year Plan. While financial allocations of the First Year Plan for industry, agriculture, education, vocational training and cultural affairs reached the US

²³Norman C. Walpole, et. al., *Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia*, prepared by the American University for U. S. Government (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. XI.

²⁴The percentage of female students however decreased with an increase in the level of education. For instance, at 3rd level, there were only 20 percent female students. *Statistical Yearbook*, 1978, United Nations Department of International Economics and Social Affairs, Statistical Office (New York: 1979), p. 921.

²⁵*Statistical Summaries on Education in Saudi Arabia, 1976/77*, Ministry of Education, Saudi Arabia. *A New Economic Survey*, op. cit., p. 21.

\$2.78 billion mark, financial allocations in the Second Five Year Plan devoted to these same purposes were \$ 31.4 billion. This is an increase of 112 percent over the First Five Year Plan allocations.²⁶

According to the official Saudi Arabian information bulletin, "A well-developed construction industry is a prerequisite for the success of a rapid socio-economic development program. Thus, the production of construction materials has been given one of the top priorities in the Development Plan"²⁷ Furthermore in the Second Plan period, a growth rate of 14 percent per year for that part of the industrial sector not based on hydro-carbon was proposed.²⁸

In the Second Plan, "...almost half the total economic resource development funds were allocated to manufacturing"²⁹ Regaei El Mallakh, a Professor of economics, while commenting on the Saudi planning wrote:

Non-hydrocarbon manufacturing recorded a 15.4 percent per annum growth rate during the Second Plan as compared to an 11.4 percent per year rate for the First Plan. Progress was such that a reasonable, secondary manufacturing base was successfully established. While all product areas showed expansion, this was particularly true in those areas serving the construction sector, such as non-metallic mineral products, fabricated metal products, chemicals, plastic and rubber. While progress was considered in diversification, emphasis will continue during the Third Plan in this area, which is considered to be of national interest.³⁰

Saudi Arabian planners realized that for meaningful industrial and economic development, there should be a heavy industrial base. For that purpose, the Saudi Arabian Basic Industry Corporation (Sabic) was established in 1976. The Corporation

²⁶ Fouad Al-Farsi, *Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development* (London: Stacey International, 1980), *Second edition with revisions*, p. 149.

²⁷ *Industrialisation of Saudi Arabia: Strategy and Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabian Office of the Commercial Attache, 1973), p. 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Regaei El Mallakh, *Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development; Profile of an Energy and Investment* (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 206.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

would either implement its program unilaterally or could indulge in foreign joint ventures.³¹

Although the Saudi government inspired for a well-balanced agricultural program but admitted its failures when pointed out in official document:

The labor force in agriculture was assumed to have declined by about 0.9 percent annually, from 445,800 or 40.4 percent of the national labor force in 1970 to 426,100 or 28.0 percent of the labor force in 1975. This decline is already reflected in abandoned farmland and partly depopulated villages, particularly in the South-western Region. Its main causes are low real incomes in agriculture and increasing opportunities for well-paid employment in other sectors.³²

A general description of the Saudi economy suggests that "the process of improvement in the quality of formal planning (continued),"³³ and the welfare of the people improved. However, as a result of the shortage of technical personnel, unequal distribution of wealth and other numerous factors such as acute inflation eroded some of the benefits of tremendous economic development.

Unlike, Saudi Arabia, (in 1971), Iraq was already exposed to the Western world, especially in education and technical skills. It should be remembered here that even in ancient times, Iraq had a well built irrigation system but never recovered fully after the Mongol invasions to its original heights.³⁴

From 1958 and 1971, the earnings from petroleum showed an increase to an average of 94.2 percent of Iraq's export earnings.

Ibid.

Outline of Second Five Year Development Plan, Ministry of Information: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Place and date of publication unknown, p. 12.

David G. Edens and William Smorely, "Planning for Economic Development in Saudi Arabia", *The Middle East Journal*, 24 (1970), p. 27.

David E. Long and John A. Hearty, "Republic of Iraq", in *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, Ed. David E. Long and Bernard Reich (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 120.

This accounted for an average of 62.4 percent of its total trade.³³ By 1977, 90 percent of the Iraqi oil was being exported, of got about 7 billion US dollars in revenues, "thus becoming the most important vehicle of the Iraqi economic development"³⁶ Along with revenues, allocation for development also rose tremendously. The increase from 1973-74 to 1974-75 was about 400.0 per cent, still further paving way for a huge developmental program for the Iraqi society.³⁷ One report pointed out:

Water from the Hindiyah Barrage irrigates this land by means of a 40 KM. Long main canal from which many sub-canals branch. Some 70 automatic dredgers work daily in cleaning up these canals. The project is not meant any more for irrigation, drainage and agriculture alone. There are other supplementary projects connected with it. Twenty ultra-modern yards which house some 1,315 various kinds of cattle are under strict observation in the animal husbandry station attached to the project.³⁸

According to the Baath Party's political report presented in January 1974:

Economic independence is a central aim of the Liberation Revolution. It is parallel in importance to political independence and also complementary to it. For without real economic important pillar and meaning and remains constantly threatened.³⁹

In spite of the fact that Iraq has a potential for developing its agricultural sector and, as seen above, it has been given a fairly high priority - the facts are far from the position as portrayed by the government circles. According to a non-Iraqi source, the

³³Michael E. Brown, "The Nationalisation of the Iraqi Petroleum Company", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February, 1979), p. 113.

³⁶Girgis B. Ghobrial, "OPEC: Its International Economic Significance, 1974-75", in *OPEC and the Middle East: The Impact of Oil on Societal Development*, Ed. Russell A. Stone (New York & London: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 77.

³⁷Ramon Kramerhase, "The Oil Producing Middle East States", *Current History* (January, 1979), p. 10.

³⁸"A Project is Re-Born", *Iraq Today*, Vol. 1, No. 22 (August, 1-15, 1976), p. 12.

³⁹"The Economic Independence", *Iraq Today*, Vol. 1, No. 9 (January 31, 1976), p. 8.

conditions of agriculture are still not favorable. For example, in 1968 Iraq imported agricultural goods worth U.S. \$ 86.7 million, which rose to 1,180.0 million dollars in 1970s.⁴⁰ It is thus by any standard a disappointing performance for a nation which declares its intentions to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural sector. According to the latest five-year plan (1976-1980) agriculture and industry received 3 billion Iraqi Dinars (ID) each, while education and transportation received ID 1 billion each.⁴¹ This is an indication to the fact that agriculture obtained top priority as shown in the official statistics of the Iraqi government.⁴² The feed back as noted above has been disappointing. According to the assessment of an author, Keith McLachlan, the failure in agricultural production in Iraq is due to the "frequent changes of policy towards agriculture and by a chronic inability of the administrations responsible for agriculture to claim and disburse the financial allocations made within the various plans for economic development."⁴³

Industrial out put was no better than agriculture sector. Since the reforms of 1964⁴⁴ "...the new organization required for the development of an efficient and dynamic industry in Iraq has not yet materialized after fourteen years (1978) and there is no sign that it will do so in the near future."⁴⁵ The main cause of the unsatisfactory results in industry, according to Edith Penrose, are two - "the heavy hand of bureaucracy and the lack of cooperation from a dissatisfied population."⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Keith McLachlan, "Natural Resources and Development in the Gulf States", in *Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf*, Ed, Tim Niblock (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 84.

⁴¹ Encyclopedia of the Third World, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 699.

⁴² Keith McLachlan, "Natural Resources and Development in the Gulf States", in *Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf*, op. cit., p. 84.

⁴³ Keith McLachlan, "Iraq: Problems of Regional Development", in *The Integration of Modern Iraq*, Ed, Abbas Kelidar (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 141.

⁴⁴According to the reforms of 1964, large industries, about thirty in number were nationalized, i.e., along with banks and insurance companies. Furthermore new "overall Economic Organization" was created to look after the newly nationalized industries. See Edith Penrose, "Industrial Policy and Performance in Iraq", in *The Integration of Modern Iraq*, Ed, Abbas Kelidar (London: Croom Helm, 1979) pp. 150-169.

⁴⁵Edith Penrose, "Industrial Policy and Performance in Iraq", op. cit., p. 151.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*.

The failure of Iraqi Economic policies is even admitted by the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. While replying (with reservations) to the question, that why it had taken the government so long to announce the new development plan, the Iraqi President replied: "Concerning industrialization...we are alright, not that we have achieved the best we could have done, since we believe we have a long way to go."⁴⁷

The Peripheral States Of The Gulf

In the peripheral states of the Gulf region - Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, oil was again the main source of revenue and therefore a major factor in the planning for a rapid economic development. Before its discovery, pearl fishing and boat building were the premier industries, which with time have shown a sharp decline.⁴⁸ Unlike Saudi Arabia and Iraq, these states are and will find it extremely difficult to diversify their economy. For example, Kuwait's prospects for industrial development "are hampered by a dearth of natural resources, except oil and natural gas, and the less intrinsic handicaps such as shortages of skilled labor."⁴⁹

During the span of our research period all Kuwaitis enjoyed the welfare system that is unparalleled elsewhere in the Middle East and in the world. Some of these benefits are reserved for the citizens, but "all residents enjoy free education and health care, no income tax, and bonuses such as free telephone services."⁵⁰ Even as early as 1963, a World Bank mission to Kuwait concluded that the country had reached a level of "affluence" where purely

⁴⁷Saddam Hussein, *Iraqi Policies in Perspective*, Text of President Saddam Hussein's Press Conference, July 20, 1980, Baghdad (Baghdad: Paldisling House, 1981), p. 14.

⁴⁸Rupert Hay, *The Persian Gulf States* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1959), p. 51.

⁴⁹Robert G. Lunden, "State of Kuwait", in *The Middle East: Its Government and Politics*, Ed., Abid A. al-Marayati, op. cit., p. 283.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 282.

economic improvement need not be an overriding objective of government policy.⁵¹

Since 1928, Bahrain was able to maintain its edge in educational sector. Forty years later it could boast 94 state schools serving 45,000 pupils, or almost a quarter of the entire population.⁵² Qatar also made rapid educational strides in the 1960s. By 1968 the school population had risen to 15,907, which represented nearly 20 per cent of the Shaykhdom's total population. The Gulf States' children are supplied with free books, stationary, food and even pocket money. It was estimated that the educational system will, "supply a literate labor pool with the technical skills necessary to operate a modern economy."⁵³

Agriculture occupies very little place in the economic structure of the peripheral states of the Persian Gulf. The topography of the area contains barren land with little or no rainfall thus making the efforts of the experts to grow more food a difficult proposition.

(ii) SOCIO - POLITICAL CHANGES

New economic pushes have always put pressures on the old structures, which tries to maintain itself in its original shape. "This mixture of old and new has given rise to social tension among groups, changes in the psychological orientation of the individual, economic dis-equilibrium, and political conflict."⁵⁴ As a result of the impact of rapid economic development along with its dynamic characteristics we can now observe things moving. As economic

⁵¹Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula, Prepared for the American University by Stanford Research Institute (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing Office, 1971), p. 117.

⁵²Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula, op. cit., p. 137.

⁵³Robert G.Lauden, "Gulf States", in Abdul A. Al-Marayati, ed., op. cit., p. 304.

⁵⁴Benjamin Rischin and Joseph S. Seydowicz, *The Contemporary Middle East: Tradition and Innovation* (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 10-11.

growth becomes rapid, peoples' aspirations outstrip their possibilities leading to adjustments in socio-political institutions:

In one study, dealing with a particular political aspect, it was found that there was no strong correlation (positive and negative) between rate of economic growth and either party competition, party institutionalization or party independence. But at the same time it was admitted that "if such a relationship does exist it must be over a longer time period (than covered in the study)...or in developing countries at a different stage of development than those covered..."⁵⁵

In another study it was argued that, "we are intuitively and logically aware that economic conditions have something to do with social and political upheavals. Students of the last two and a half centuries of history have noticed this effect."⁵⁶

Compared with the past, the modern economic growth involved acceleration in the rate of social change generally so marked that it frequently created, "a significant difference in the experience of only two successive generations. The rate of growth has varied substantially, however, among different economies undergoing development at a given time and within a given economy over time"⁵⁷ On the social and demographic side it involves significant alterations in fertility, morality and migration, in place of residence, in family size and structure, in the educational system, and in provision for public health. Moreover, the influence of economic growth extends into the areas of income distribution, class structure, government organization, and political structures.⁵⁸

The discovery of oil, and with that rapid economic growth

⁵⁵Barbara N. McLean and Robert D. Cantor, "Political Parties and Economic Development in Developing States", *Asia Quarterly*, 2(1973), pp. 190-191.

⁵⁶I. W. Zartman, et. al., "An Economic Indicator of Socio-Political Unrest", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2(1971), p. 293.

⁵⁷Richard A. Easterlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 395-396.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

(although delayed for considerable period of time), linked the Gulf countries abruptly to the world economy. Dr. Dawsari⁵ of Saudi Arabia, in his analysis is visibly concerned about the nature and direction of change in Saudi Arabian society. He describes this new change as a "Future Shock." The author writes:

Traditional economies are being integrated overnight with cosmopolitan ones. The effect upon the societies undergoing these influences can be summarized as future shock. Comprehensible and traditional modes of culture are in violent transition. Individuals in each affected area must learn not only to cope, but also to function perfectly within this phenomenon.

Saudi Arabia's national economy thrives on the multinational economic megastructure. The social system is reeling from its effects. Look outside - at the man on the street...his traditional values of survival and how to achieve it are far removed from those of his father. The Kingdom is riding a time bomb. Time has accelerated to such an extent that economically and socially chaos will be imminent if measures are not taken to safeguard the system and the people in it.⁶

Yet another writer, Manfred W. Wenner, has similar thoughts about change in the Saudi Society. He argues that, "it is essential to remember, for example, that it was as a result of the impetus of the development of the petroleum industry and the vast revenues which it provided that change came to Saudi Arabia, and not as a result of a direct colonial experience (Saudi Arabia never had any, at least not in the classical sense) or heritage."⁷

The traditional structure of Ibn Saud's government could not resist the pressures of the rapid economic activity and new aspiration and demands by the society. For example, in October 1953, King Abd al-Aziz ordered the formulation of a Majlis al-

⁵ Director of Administrative Services, University of Petroleum and Minerals.

⁶ Faisal Saqr Al-Harzan Dawsari, "The Challenge of Change in Saudi Society and the Potential University Role: Future Shock is Here", *Unpublished Paper presented on August 8, 1976 for the Saudi Studies Students* (University of Petroleum and Minerals, Saudi Arabia).

⁷ Manfred W. Wenner, "Saudi Arabia: Survival of Traditional Elites", in *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East*, Ed. Frank Tachau (New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), p. 181.

Wuzura (Council of Ministers). The preamble of the decree states that it was decided by the King to establish a Council of Ministers, in part, "because of the increase in the number of obligations and the diversification of the responsibilities placed upon the state."⁶²

Article 1 set forth the main provisions of this decree:

A Council of Ministers is to be formed under the presidency of our Son Sa'ud, Crown Prince of the Kingdom and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It shall be composed of all those Ministers of State charged by Royal decree with the conduct of the affairs of Ministers entrusted to them, so that they may look into all the affairs of the nation, whether foreign or domestic, and it shall decide what corresponds to the interests of the country in these matters in order to refer them to us.⁶³

The constitution of the Council of Ministers and the constitution of the Division of the Council of Ministers were approved by the King on March 17, 1954.

Faisal replaced Ibn Sa'ud in 1964. King Faisal, much more efficient and wise second son of Abdal-Aziz accepted the challenge to modernize his country while keeping within the traditional norms of the Saudi society. He assumed effective power as Prime Minister and with that, "the economy (was) stabilized, rational development policies...adopted, administrative procedures...improved and fiscal responsibility...developed in the bureaucracy."⁶⁴ In other words, the country was set on the right path, ready to adjust itself to the requirements of modern society resulting because of new economic development.

Socio-Political changes also occurred in much more profound ways. "Development in law and education, long the exclusive preserve of the conservatives, illustrate these fundamental

⁶² Royal Decree No. 5/19/1/4288, dated 1 Safar 1373 (9 October, 1953), Published in Official Gazette, *Umm al-Qura*, No. 1485, 16 October, 1953.

⁶³ Charles W. Harrington, "The Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers", *The Middle East Journal*, 12 (1958), p. 5.

⁶⁴ David G. Edens, "The Anatomy of the Saudi Revolution", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 5 (1974), p. 62.

adjustments"⁶⁵ According to Edens there is a remarkable similarity "between the process of (rapid change) ... in Saudi Arabia and those in the West. As in the Western cases, economic conditions appear to have been relatively good in the years just prior to onset of revolutionary change."⁶⁶

Changing fiscal conditions also resulted in the alterations of the legal framework. Although the Sharia is still the official law of the land, a substantial body of administrative law has emerged, created by *Marsum* (decree) or *Nizam* (ordinance). The use of motor vehicles, the conditions of employment, compensation for industrial injury and commercial practices are regulated by quasi-judicial agencies with the bureaucracy. The Grievance Board of the Council of Ministers established in 1955⁶⁷ serves as a high court to which any victim of an injustice may appeal. The above mentioned arrangements are the best examples of how Saudi Arabia's government has adjusted the Shariah court system, creating a modern government machinery while at the same time maintaining Islamic characteristics intact. To give an illustration, the *Diwan al-Mazalim* (Board of Grievance)⁶⁸ provides an excellent example of the adaptation of a classical Islamic Institution to modern needs⁶⁹. The modern Grievance Board generally limits its activities to cases of an administrative nature involving government operations.

In March 1956, the Grievance Board announced "its readiness to receive complaints against any government organization whatsoever and to take all necessary action in such complaints."⁶⁹

The Board practically came into action and decided some cases. One such complaint was against a surgeon who had operated upon a patient without his consent. Moreover, the Board's Chairman has been active in settling the disputes, which involved

⁶⁵ *Ibid*

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 63.

⁶⁷ Saudi Royal Decree No. 2/13/9759 of 9/17/1374 A.H. (May 10, 1955).

⁶⁸ David E. Long, "The Board of Grievance in Saudi Arabia", *The Middle East Journal*, 27 (1973), p. 71.

⁶⁹ Charles W. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

labor grievances. This sort of arrangement becomes helpful in providing an outlet for a good deal of dissatisfaction and thus fulfilling the new demands of a changing society.

It should be recognized that no effective government could avoid adjusting to changing reality. Since the traditional ruler has no means or know-how to legislate the new laws so as to adjust to the new needs, the usual way in the Saudi setup was through the use of administrative decrees. Government ministers and other administrative organizations, making numerous decisions of the day-to-day administrative type in fields under their jurisdiction, apply this new method. These decisions are multiplying as the society becomes more and more complex and thus is able to handle more demands from its populace. Such a situation is summed up when said:

Saudi Arabia is clearly a critical test case for Fundamentalism, for that country's experience will demonstrate whether it is possible to reconcile sudden and immense wealth, rapid technological change and strict adherence to the norms of traditional Islam. So far, one must admit, the Saudis have done rather well, but they still confront some serious problems. The most obvious of these is the corruption and demoralization among the elite inducted by the influx of oil revenues after World War II - a trend only partially checked by King Faysal... None of these things fatally weakens the country's religious foundations; indeed, the bulk of its institutions and the whole tone of its public discourse are witness to the integrity of its vision of Islam.⁷¹

The oil industry provided opportunities for acquiring money and training for nearly all sections of Saudi Arabia's society. "Those who have been most willing to move to take jobs in the oil industry have been nomads and semi-nomads."⁷¹ The character of the overall Saudi Arabian population has not only rapidly changed the cities but also the desert. Still, generally speaking, because of semi-planned development, although benefited, "the Bedouin

⁷¹ R. Stephen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria", *The Middle East Journal*, 33 (1979), p. 9.

⁷² Norman C. Walpole, et. al., *op. cit.*, p. 67.

remain(s) outside the main stream of development,"⁷² especially in the field of education.

The King and the princes continue to receive the Bedouins, giving them favored status in recognition of their past services, but the younger generation of bureaucrats and princes, most of whom have studied abroad hardly are knowledgeable about the affairs of the young Bedouin.

According to Donald Powell Cole:

Aside from their activities in transportation and as unskilled laborers, the Bedouin are experiences change in two major ways... Some of the Bedouins are increasingly settling down and abandoning pastoralism, while others are changing their pastoral activities in order to produce animals for sale on the market rather than mainly for their own subsistence.⁷⁴

The government of Saudi Arabia for the past number of years has been trying very hard to sedentarised nomads so that they can also benefit from the newly achieved oil wealth. In this respect one of the most ambitious, technically best planned, and most sophisticated agricultural settlement projects were developed within the tribal territory of the Al-Murrah near Ain Haradh in the Wadi Sobha. The plan was initiated during the early 1960s and is known as the King Faisal Settlement Project, an area of some 4,000 hectares (approximately 8,000 acres). This piece of desert was planned to have a self-watered, modern agricultural oasis, where 1,000 Bedouin families were to be settled in eight villages. The scheme did not work so well. Later on the government acted according to the needs, and tastes of Bedouin customs which rest upon herding activities. Professor Cole is of the opinion that, "it is still too early to judge how successful the Bedouin will ultimately be in switching from subsistence-oriented camel herding to

⁷² Donald Powell Cole, *Nomads of the Nomads: The Al Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1975), p. 141.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

market-oriented herding of sheep and goat".⁷⁴

The Saudi Arabian National Guard is composed almost exclusively of Nomads. Within a developing Saudi Arabia, the National Guard provides young nomads with an opportunity to learn new skills and to participate in the national society. It is also a means of improving the economic status of the tribes, at the same time making them feel that they are part of the progress oriented Saudi nation.⁷⁵

Perhaps the single most significant change that occurred in Saudi society on account of increasing economic activity has been in the field of occupational structure⁷⁶ - especially the emergence of a "New Middle Class". This development, however, is a widespread phenomenon in the Gulf region as a whole. The middle class consists of managers, administrators, teachers, engineers, journalists, scientists, lawyers, or army officers, etc.

The new emerging class structure in Saudi society consists of

UPPER CLASS:	Royal Family and its Collateral Branches A Few Leading Tribal Shaykhs Top Ulama
LOWER UPPER CLASS:	Handful of Wealthy Members of Successful Merchant Families
MIDDLE CLASS:	Merchants, Traders and Landowners Managers, Administrators and Clerks

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁷⁵Donald P. Cole, "The Enmeshment of Nomads in Saudi Arabian Society: The Case of Al Murrah", in *The Desert and the Sown: Nomads in the Wider Society*, Edited by Cynthia Nislow (Berkeley: University of California: Institute of International Studies, 1973), pp. 126-127.

⁷⁶Rustan M. Kayoussi, "Oil Exports and the Changing Occupational Structure in Saudi Arabia", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 6 (1984), p. 283.

Teachers including that of Religion and Arabic at all levels of the Educational System

Lawyers and Scientists

Army Officers and Members of National Security Guard
Bureaucrats

LOWER CLASS:

Nomadic Bedouin

Semi-nomadic Herdsmen

Unskilled and Semiskilled Workers in government and the private sector

The rapid growth of the Saudi financial system caused a sudden huge demand for skilled and semiskilled labor. This demand provided many new opportunities for the Saudis who were able to acquire skills and education, to move themselves into new jobs and consequently into new social groupings. It is estimated that out of six million population, two million are foreigners. The non-Saudis are engaged in different projects but Saudi government has taken pains to diversify the foreign labor forces. "Saudi government officials believe that by employing people who are culturally apart from the Saudis in language, religion and general culture, they will have less of problem in ensuring that their stays are temporary".⁷⁷

While some Saudis found opportunities in the petroleum industry, others joined the rapidly expanding government bureaucracy especially during the 1950s. During the reign of King Saud (1953-1964), employment in the public sector grew from a few hundred to more than one hundred thousand. Under King

⁷⁷T.R. McHale, "A Prospect of Saudi Arabia", *International Affairs*, 56 (1980), pp. 632-633.

Faisal it had increased by half as much.⁷⁸

According to a study made in 1979, there were about 33,376 scientists and engineers (Official figures). About one third of them were Saudis and their representation in research and development sectors was still low. The real problem revolves around the acute shortage of middle level manpower and "it is generally acknowledged that there are not enough technicians to meet current needs".⁷⁹ A survey made on the job situation in Saudi Arabia described the situation as follows:

Commerce is fun for Saudis; industry less so; and manual work is beneath their dignity. In the five years to 1980, according to the Saudi-tinted official figures, the local share of the work force fell from 92% to 57%. Most of them work in trade and local government, where thousands of well-paid, undemanding jobs are available.... The more educated Saudis become, the less inclined they will be to do industrial or manual jobs. Most Saudis prefer to study arts and administration rather than engineering or science.⁸⁰

The "New Middle Class" in Saudi Arabia gained access to higher levels of government in the 1960s as its members increased and more of them returned from university study abroad. In 1960, King Saud gave five ministerial posts (two of which had always been held by princes) to commoners from the first echelon of the "new middle class".

More changes were made between 1970 and 1972, which reflected "the gradual transformation of the Saudi Arabian Class and Power Structure".⁸¹ For instance in that period, for the first time Minister of Justice and that of Pilgrimage and Awqaf were appointed from Jiddah (these ministries were in the past held by the Al-Sheikh family). The second minister came from a prominent merchant family. In 1971 two new deputies appointed for the

⁷⁸William Ingh, "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia", *The Middle East Journal*, 27 (1973), p. 10.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 363.

⁸⁰*The Economist*, February 13, 1982 (Special Survey on Saudi Arabia), p. 33.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 14.

Ministry of Education were elected from the "new middle class".

The process of appointing the members of "new middle class" to important assignments in fact increased as time went on. The single most important appointment no doubt has been that of world known Ahmad Zaki Yamani who was appointed as late as 1962. Since that time he has been in charge of the decision-making process regarding oil - domestic and international.⁸²

It is interesting to note the role conception and attitudes among the new emerging bureaucrats, as Al-Awaji observed in his research findings that:

There is no doubt that many individual bureaucrats, who, because of their exposure to different moral standards, have developed their personal conception of their responsibility which might be substantially different from that of the society's at large. However, regardless of such isolated incidents, public bureaucrats in general reflect the overall value system of the society. Thus, while some may stand for their own personal beliefs and, hence, reject the irrational aspect of their social values, the majority usually act according to the demands of such values, except in situations where their own position might be jeopardized. His definition of his role towards his family, relatives, and intimate group vis-a-vis the general public is positively influenced by his perception of how the society expects him to behave towards these relations.⁸³

Saudi bureaucracy, as an emerging institution faced multidimensional problems. The factors involved in the malfunction of bureaucracy, "included external cultural and social pressures, non-productive work-group dynamics, and a variety of behavioral predispositions including the insecurity of many officials, their lack of professionalism and their minimal concern for the public".⁸⁴

⁸² Benjamin Sliwa, *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, Enlarged edition* (New York, Toronto, John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 381.

⁸³ Ibrahim Muhammad Al-Awaji, *Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation*, University of Virginia, 1971, pp. 179-180.

⁸⁴ Abdel Rahman Al-Hegelen and Marie Palmer, "Bureaucracy and Development in Saudi Arabia", *The Middle East Journal*, 39 (1985), p. 67.

Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iraqi history is loaded with coups and counter-coups. It was July 14, 1958 Coup d'etat that changed the complexion of the Iraqi political structure with the abolishing of the institution of Monarchy - it was, "a seizure of power by a small, determined group",⁸⁵ led by Abdul Karim Qasim, who at the time of the Coup was a brigade commander.

The efforts to improve the economic and social conditions of the Iraqi people were taken up in 1950 and "curiously enough, in Iraq, rich in land, blessed with an abundant supply of water, and with a fabulous, steady income from oil, poverty and general backwardness were widespread".⁸⁶

To maintain a particular form of society is not an easy job to be performed by the kind of political instability Iraq became accustomed to. Professor Majid Khadduri defines the prospects of reforms to bring social and economic change as follows:

Social and economic reforms, however, could not be achieved merely by 'overhauling' the system of government. It is true that the democratic system of Iraq existed only in 'form', not in operation, but democracy, like any other system of government, is only an instrument, which cannot operate in a vacuum - it functions in accordance with the existing forces in society. If democracy in Iraq were dominated by landlords, tribal Shaykhs, and a group of elder politicians forming a circle of 'oligarchs' it was not the fault of democracy itself that it functioned in Iraq as a virtual oligarchy, since it was bound to operate in accordance with the social milieu in which it existed.⁸⁷

From the above observations it can be gathered that within the power structure of Iraq even as it stands today, much cannot be expected to transform the Iraqi society like its neighbors during the peak era of transformation, i.e., 1971-1978. The main reason

⁸⁵ Waldemar J. Gallman, *Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 205.

⁸⁶ Benjamin Shwadrau, "The Power Struggle in Iraq", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, February (1960), p. 39.

⁸⁷ Majid Khadduri, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

behind such formation is that the Iraqi regimes were not able to encourage institution building outside their own power-base.³⁸ In fact, all resources were used to stabilize their rule. In real terms, "no contemporary Iraqi regime has been able to move ahead with the business of modernization and political development".³⁹

The benefits of oil wealth did not seem to create political confidence in the regime and reforms to that effect were not forthcoming. In fact close-knit Revolutionary Command Council replaced the bicameral Parliament that was abolished in 1958 at the time of the overthrow of the Monarchy. The provisional constitution of the Baathists desired to create a 100 member National Council - a promise that was not fulfilled till the end of 1978.⁴⁰

As the oil revenues are distributed by the functionaries of the Baath party, thereby for job and career development, more segments of the Iraqi society tend to join or at least support the party. This does not necessarily mean that genuine ideological commitments are also being made,⁴¹ thus implying that the mobilization of the masses in the affairs of the government remains thin. But the Iraqi regime can at least exploit the oil revenues for its support.

The process of change remained slow in nearly all fields of activities as "it was (found) that it was exceedingly difficult to erect a new political structure and carry out a reform programme".⁴² The progress to revolutionize the alterations in the Iraqi institutions remained slow and showed little signs of

³⁸James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *The Middle East: Politics and Power* (Boston, London, Sydney: Allyn and Bacon, 1974), p. 211.

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰On July 20, 1980, under the pressures of the Iranian revolution, elections were held for national Parliament. The participation took place under Baathist control.

⁴¹David E. Long and John A. Hearty, 'Republic of Iraq', in *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, Edited by David E. Long and Bernard Reich (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 124.

⁴²Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 63.

improvement for the future. The performance of the Baath regime is summed up as follows:

The Ba'ath takeover in 1968 did not, it may be asserted, initiate a qualitative transformation of society or the state. The major outward sign of change was in the style of government, characterised by a greater degree of astuteness in the application of government policies, a considerably higher degree of centralisation of power, and a greater emphasis on the ideological legitimisation of the regime in terms of Arabism and 'socialism'. At the same time, the Ba'ath made every effort to consolidate itself politically and institutionally both within the state apparatus and in the mass populist organisations, notably the trade unions, the women's union, the peasant union and the youth and student's union. In particular, the armed forces were gradually purged of non-Ba'athists. The consolidation was accompanied and indeed ultimately facilitated by the growing economic power of the state, particularly after the nationalisation of the Iraqi Petroleum Company in 1972 and the rapid rise in oil revenues after the price rise of 1973.⁸³

In other words, in spite of the fact that social and political changes could have been brought by the forces of increasing economic activity, the progress has been sluggish as already pointed above because of the Iraqi government lacked political cohesion. "Thus, despite oil wealth and other natural resources, a potentially productive agricultural sector, and a population that is out of proportion to its resources base, Iraq has been an extremely difficult country to govern regardless of the ideological professions of the regime in power (i.e., the Baathists)"⁸⁴ Another factor which has deprived the Iraqi society of the benefits of social and political upward mobility has been policies based on "unintelligent rigor with inefficiency".⁸⁵

Iraq, as has been observed before faced a chronic instability and one of the factors responsible for such a situation has been the

⁸³Marion Farouk-Sluglett, "Socialist Iraq, 1963-1978: Towards a Reappraisal", *Orient*, 23 (1982), p. 215.

⁸⁴David E. Long and John A. Hearty, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁸⁵Stephen H. Longrigg, *The Middle East: A Social Geography*, 2nd Edition (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1974), p. 266.

sharp ethnic and sectarian fragmentation. Iraqi society is "a very heterogeneous community."⁹⁶

The Baathists treated their financially poor Shia majority with harsh measures. According to a Shia source, from 1974 to 1980, the government has murdered five hundred Shias. That includes the widely respected religious leader Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, many ulama and the ex-Director of Atomic Energy Authority, Dr. Ala al-Shahristani.⁹⁷

The rate of sociopolitical changes in Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar and Oman states has been directly related to the discovery, development and exploitation of increasingly large quantities of petroleum during the 1970s.

In the mentioned Gulf States, the development was accompanied by a presence of a large number of foreign workers. It is demonstrated by the fact that over two-thirds of the labor force for example in Kuwait is non-Kuwaiti.⁹⁸

The expatriates became the overwhelming majority, of those with professional and technical training, and they have contributed significantly to the country's swift rise to affluence. Despite the fact that the number of Kuwaitis was roughly equal to the number of non-Kuwaitis,⁹⁹ the latter held over two-thirds of the jobs as mentioned above. The disparity is explained by the fact that the non-Kuwaitis came just for work. Many native Kuwaitis, on the contrary no longer are required to work as they have acquired additional sources of income. The Kuwaitis have never been comfortable about the influence wielded by the Palestinians who

⁹⁶The Middle East Yearbook, 1979 (London: IC Magazines, 1979), p. 117.

⁹⁷The Party of al-Dawa' al-Islamiyah, *Bayan al-Tafahum al-Sadiq min Hiqb al-Dawa' al-Islamiyah ila al-Ummah fi al-Iraq* (The Manifesto for Mutual Understanding issued by the Party of al-Dawa' al-Islamiyah to the Nation in Iraq), unplaced, 1980, pp. 7-8; quoted in Hanna Batatu, "Iraq's Underground Shi'a Movements: Characteristics, Classes and Prospects", *The Middle East Journal*, 35 (1981), p. 591.

⁹⁸Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula, op. cit., p. 102.

⁹⁹G. Etzel Pearcy and Elynn A. Stoneman, *A Handbook of New Nations* (New York: Crowell Company, 1968), p. 208.

are about one fifth of the population. But these fears seem to be not very valid because, after all, the Palestinians in Kuwait are prosperous members of the establishment and therefore highly unlikely to pose a serious political as well as security threat.¹⁰⁰

Social change in Kuwait society is substantial and as a result, we note a break—down of many of the social relationships.¹⁰¹ The bonds of tribes and family have been greatly eroded in the towns and only a fraction of the population continues to live in the deserts of the north and south. Class relationships have also changed—the merchants have lost much of their former pre—eminence and the native—born workers have begun to disappear as a class.

In response to public opinion the ruling family permitted the Assembly elections of January 1971 to be held on the basis of a free vote, though women, illiterates and all non—Kuwaitis, at least by the end of 1978 had no voting rights. There was a lively election campaign, with 184 candidates contesting the 50 seats, despite the non—existence of political parties, which are not allowed to function.

After the January 1971 elections, representation of the ruling family was reduced from five to three and for the first time, the Cabinet included two ministers belonging to the elected National Assembly.¹⁰²

On August 29, 1976, the ruler of Kuwait “partially suspended the country’s constitution and dissolved its parliament. . . . What really irked Kuwait’s rulers was that parliament, always fairly rambunctious, had showed increasing signs of independence and even claimed the right to initiate legislation”¹⁰³

The factors of economic progress installed a sense of rising expectations in Kuwait. The workers went on strike in the

¹⁰⁰ *The Economist*, 4-10 September, 1976, p. 42.

¹⁰¹ *Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula*, op. cit., p. 102.

¹⁰² “Kuwait”, in *The Middle East and North Africa, 1975-76*, op. cit., pp. 471-72.

¹⁰³ *The Economist*, 4-10 September, 1976, p. 42.

industrial area of Muhammadia for higher wages. "There had been a strike from 23 to 31 March in the Levivier company and 48-hour strikes were held on 9 and 10 April (1976) at Somex and Sogeta..."¹⁰⁴ The 1976 industrial strikes in Kuwait are indicators of the emerging of more complex relationship in the society a prerequisite for a 'modern' nation.

In general, Kuwait population has accepted the convergence of attitudes as sponsored by the government. Taking Kuwaiti students as an example, it is concluded:

Kuwaiti students are not alienated from their political system, nor are they more efficacious than the general public. Several factors account for these attitudes. The Kuwaitis have had a unique political experience in this part of the world. They have enjoyed a relatively 'democratic' experience. Freedom of expression has been to a great extent guaranteed. The system has been generous with its allocation of economic goods. When a Kuwaiti compares his lot to that of other Arabs, he realization he enjoys a superior position. This feeling is apparently translated into efficacious feelings toward the system by students and general public alike.¹⁰⁵

In the case of Qatar, a few changes took place in the political set-up as well as the improvement of links between the rulers and the ruled. Sheikh Ahmad bin al—Thani, the ruler, was deposed on February 22, 1972 by his cousin Sheikh Khalifa bin al—Thani, apparently for the reason that the deposed ruler could not move ahead fast enough to match the rapid rate of development in the economic sector.

The new ruler immediately made moves affecting salaries in the public sector, housing and royal appropriations, which indicated that he was about to introduce an era of steadier social and political reform. Sheikh Khalifa also decreed the first Advisory

¹⁰⁴*Arab Report and Record*, 1-15 April, 1976, p. 227.

¹⁰⁵Tawfic E. Farah and Faisal S. A. Al-Salem, 'Political Efficacy, Political Trust, and the Action Orientations of University Students in Kuwait', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 8 (1977), p. 326.

Council, to complement the ministerial government. Its 20 members, initially appointed were planned to be eventually elected representatives.

Bahrain with its earlier development of institutions as noted in part i of this chapter, was able to hold elections for the National Assembly in 1973. This venture to achieve democracy did not last long. "The Amir, Shaykh Isa bin Sulman, dissolved the National Assembly on August 27 (1975), transferred its responsibilities to the Cabinet and suspended the constitutional provision which called for new elections within 2 months of the Assembly's dissolution."¹⁰⁶

According to John Anthony's discussion of countries of the lower Gulf, an important social factor in these states has been the "interaction between the indigenous and immigrant population." The immigrant population according to Anthony is from widely divergent cultural backgrounds. Moreover, there is discrimination against immigrant labor, especially in jobs for which foreigners and natives are competing. For example, in the oil Emirates, "the lowest salary for local workers, often averages between (US) \$ 5 & 6 a day; the foreign—born unskilled worker, by contrast, typically averages between \$2.50 and 3 a day"¹⁰⁷

Although the immigrants are outside the local political and social structures they nevertheless are crucially important to the economic development and maintenance of the Shaikhdoms. Anthony quotes an official, responsible for development planning as saying:

Were the Egyptians to be removed, many of the school systems would have to close; were the Palestinians to be forced to leave, the media would cease to function; were the British, Jordanian, Pakistani, Baluch, Yemeni and Omani soldiers to be expelled, the defence and internal security network would

¹⁰⁶Middle East Monitor, 5 (September 15, 1975), p. 1.

¹⁰⁷John Duke Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum*, op. cit., p. 15.

collapse; were the Iranian, Baluchis and Pathans who make up the bulk of the labour force to be sent back to their homelands, progress on such vital development projects underway as the building of roads, ports, irrigation schemes, housing projects, schools and medical clinics would all come to an abrupt halt.¹⁰⁹

Although the immigrants tend to keep to themselves and are reluctant to mix with other groups, still their presence in large numbers from different countries and cultures have had great influence in breaking down, "conservatism, old habits, and prejudices against other ways of life, such as might have been felt in more isolated communities".¹⁰⁹

A revolutionary change in the life styles and aspirations of the coastal people including that in Oman became apparent. One of the changes has been in the life style of the Bedouin, which has resulted in moving to the towns in increasing numbers. In order to discourage such pressures on big cities, "Oman's national development policy has the stated goal of erasing the differences between the coastal and the more backward interior. This policy includes the development of towns in the interior with an eye to prevent further rural—urban migration and establish good road links to the capital".¹¹⁰

Another important factor to be noted is the gap between the middle class and the rulers. According to an opinion:

The oil revenue accrue not to the merchants but to the Rulers, and as the revenues grow increasingly large, the Rulers will have the economic as well as the political power to rule without having to seek the consensus of this class. Moreover, until recently there was little distinction made in most of the Shaykhdoms between a Ruler's personal funds and those of his

¹⁰⁹Ibid. p. 21.

¹¹⁰R. G. Ferebin, *The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey* (Bungay, Suffolk, U.K.: Longman, 1973), p. 18.

¹¹¹Michael E. Bonine, "The Urbanization of the Persian Gulf Nations", in *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey*, op. cit., p. 270.

Amirate, giving the Rulers and their families, in comparison with all other social classes, tremendous economic power indeed.¹¹¹

In other words the oil revenue provided the ruling elite with a tool to consolidate their position and at the same time play an important role in the development process. The ruling families in the Peripheral States of the Gulf region are "an important link in the area's transition from tribal societies to modern states"¹¹²

Oman paid a heavy price for not utilizing the official resources and potential for the improvement of the conditions of its people. Although the oil income started coming in 1967 but the Sultan Said bin Taimur, a paranoid tyrant... hoarded gold from oil revenues... It was against the law for an Omani to wear spectacles or ride a bicycle"¹¹³ In these circumstances the rebels in the Dhofar province had taken control and established their strongholds.¹¹⁴

His son Sultan Qaboos overthrew the 'outdated' Sultan in 1970, which not only rearranged the priorities regarding the development of his country but also was able to crush the rebellion in the south.¹¹⁵ Sultan Qaboos' achievements can be described in the following words:

From 1970 (onwards)... the challenges of open rebellion in the south and of creating a better life for all Omanis are being met. The Dhofar rebellion was effectively quelled through a combination of military force and, more importantly for the long term, through the sustained commitment of the government to use the country's resources to improve its standard of living and to

¹¹¹John Duke Anthony, *Arab States of Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum*, op. cit., p. 13.

¹¹²J.E. Peterson, "Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia", *The Middle East Journal*, 31 (1977), p. 312.

¹¹³*Time*, June 4, 1979, p. 42.

¹¹⁴D.L. Price, *Oman: Insurgency and Development*, *Conflict Studies*, No. 53 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1975).

¹¹⁵Matthew Salisbury, "End of a Rebellion?" *Middle East International*, March (1976), pp. 18-20; Penelope Treanway, "End of a Ten Years' War", *RUSI*, March (1977).

involve Omanis from all backgrounds in the country's government and development.¹¹⁶

Sultan Qaboos bin Said established a Council of Ministers to deal with matters of public interest. Till 1978, an impression was created that the foundations of a parliament was still to be laid, however, a number of advisory councils functioned. These councils were not given the responsibility to conduct themselves in a comprehensive manner. Instead the Sultan relied heavily on his "inner circle".¹¹⁷

The rulers of the Gulf States share a common interest to improve the socio-political well-being of the local people which in turn could keep away any radical movements in the area.¹¹⁸

Conclusion

One of the most striking phenomena to be noted in our discussion of the Gulf region and its changing process, has been the emergence of professional middle class, "composed of individuals whose goals include a transformation of power relations and authority structures".¹¹⁹ Large numbers of them are interested in professionalism over personalism, justice over wealth, intellectual freedom over imposed stability, and affective political participation over political co-optation.

In short according to Halpern, "(The) salaried Middle Class constitutes the most active political, social and economic sector from Morocco to Pakistan".¹²⁰ These people are the first group in

¹¹⁶ Dale F. Eckelman, *The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 312.

¹¹⁷ Dale F. Eckelman, "Kings and People: Oman's State Consultative Council", *The Middle East Journal*, 38 (1984), p. 54.

¹¹⁸ Julian Duke Anthony, "The Impact of Oil on Political and Socio-Economic Changes in the United Arab Emirates", in *The Middle East: Oil, Politics, and Development*, Edited, John Duke Anthony (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 98.

¹¹⁹ James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *The Middle East: Politics and Power* (Boston, London, Sydney: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), p. 87.

¹²⁰ Manfred Halpern, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

their countries who are not automatically members of class because of family ties; they are in the new middle class primarily because of their personal qualifications. In fact, members of this new educated class hold formidable weapons of knowledge, competence, and educational training, weapons that are surely needed in all societies embarking upon developmental program.

We should recognize, that any traditional system, which refuses to adjust itself in a rapidly transforming world inevitably, crumbles under the demands of new social forces. Another aspect to be acknowledged is that environmental change is planned and controlled by those in authority and moreover its magnitude can also be decided by the society as such.¹²¹ We should also "note that a process which took three or four centuries in the West is being collapsed, into three or four decades in the young countries. All the shocks, tensions and neuroses which go with change, then, are likely to be multiplied by the rapidity of the effort".¹²²

One has to take notice of the fact that like any other social units in the Gulf region, internal divisions also divide the middle class. These divisions are along the basis of kinship, ethnicity, occupation, social origins, geography (urban-rural), and educational background.¹²³

This class still lacks any political power but with a dramatic growth in their population in the near future, its political influence is bound to grow, although not necessarily in the right direction. Nevertheless, the younger, better-educated group has convinced themselves that fundamental changes must be made in their society. Also, there is a small but growing group of influential government officials who recognize the need for reforms and are attempting to bring them about. There is a tendency among this

¹²¹Aaron W. Warner, Dean Morse, Thomas E. Cooney, "Introduction", in *The Environment of Change*, Aaron W. Warner, et. Ed. Eds., (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. xiii.

¹²²Everett M. Kassalow, "Change and the Less-Developed Countries", in *The Environment of Change*, op. cit., p. 144.

¹²³James A. Hill and Carl Leiden, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

class to run ahead of their capacities and time, and the same instance we can also observe some overreaction concerning some of the issues.

Ahmad Baha'eddine wrote that this middle class is "the greatest hope we have for progress..."¹²⁴ At the same time a considerable number of this class survived because of manipulation and thus can be easily susceptible to corruption. Jabra I. Jabra wrote, "If you think the Sheikh grinds the faces of his tribesmen you should wait and see the Ph.D. grind the faces of all and sundry, without even a touch of the magnanimity we pride ourselves on"¹²⁵

Perhaps, Jabra was talking about that section of the new educated class which James A. Bill categorized as "maneuverers"¹²⁶ and therefore should not be generalized for the purposes of analysis.

¹²⁴Ahmad Baha'eddine, "Feudalists, Capitalists, and Intellectuals", quoted in James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

¹²⁵Jabra I. Jabra, "Hunters in a Narrow Street, London, 1960", quoted in James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

¹²⁶James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-132

GLOBALIZATION, GOVERNANCE AND ISLAM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Sohail Mahmood

In the new millennium, the world is faced with several challenges, the most important of which is globalization of the economy. This is occurring partly because of sharp declines in telecommunications and transport expenses. Deregulation, interacting with accelerating changes in communications and computer technology, has reinforced the movement towards an integrated global market.

Globalization has increased capital flows and trade worldwide. Some developing countries that opened their economies appropriately have been successful in achieving prosperity in less time. Since 1990, capital flows to developing countries have increased six-fold, according to the World Bank. This development has been linked with another important global change – a paradigm shift towards development of a global knowledge economy. The two coupled are perhaps the single most significant change of our times.

We are living in an era that is characterized by rapid change due to various technological, economic and social changes. Countries have jumped from poverty to world economic power in a single generation. Technological advances in telecommunication and computers proliferate in an ever-increasing stride. Great changes have come about as a massive transformation of the global economy is taking place right before eyes. History is being squeezed as never before, so to speak. The report of the commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* argues:¹

¹ See commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* available on the Internet.

The term 'global village' captured the impact of the electronic conquest of space. Technology, by telescoping distance and time, has made the world smaller. Photographs from space confirmed the insignificance of terrestrial frontiers. But much has happened since satellites first girdled the globe, and advances in transport and telecommunications are only one set of factors making neighbors of far-flung people.

Global developments are even shifting the meaning of traditional terms and rendering many of them less useful. There is no longer an East to be juxtaposed against the West. With the abandonment of communism, capitalism has become even more of an omnibus term that hides important distinctions between different ways of organizing market economies. Similarly, the North-South dichotomy is becoming less sharp. And the problems of Africa are now strikingly different from those of South-east Asia or South America. More and more, it is disparities within the nation and the regions, both North and south, no less than the disparities among nations and blocs that reveals injustice and cause insecurity.

Technological advances have made national frontiers more porous. States retain sovereignty, but governments have suffered erosion in their authority. They are less able, for example, to control the trans-border movement of money or information. They face the pressures of globalization at one level and of grassroots movements and, in some cases, demands for devolution if not secession at another. In the extreme case, public order may disintegrate and civil institutions collapse in the face of rampant violence, as in Liberia and Somalia.

There is an on-going debate about "globalization". Is it a good thing or a bad thing and whether to embrace it or resist it? However, every one agrees that international market forces have indeed emerged as powerful. Rapid development of telecommunications and global trade has created a global economy of truly staggering proportions. Globalization has created a global media, which has both good and bad points. The report of the

Commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* argues:²

Innovations in communications technology, in addition to driving economic globalization, have also transformed the media world and the spread of information, with important consequences for national as well as global governance. This began with radio broadcasting in the 1940s and has since been extended through television and satellite transmission to give even those in remote places immediate access to sound and images from a wider world. In some countries, new communications systems have even brought people news of domestic events that is not available locally. Direct-dial international telephone and fax services have swelled the trans-border flow of news and other messages. Another important development has been the sharing of information through links between computers around the world.

Exposure through the media to foreign culture and life-styles can be both stimulating and destabilizing; it can inspire both appreciation and envy. Concern that the dominance of transnational media could result in cultural homogenization and could damage indigenous cultures is not limited to non-Western countries. Many people are worried that media images would strengthen the consumerist ethos in societies in the early stages of development. There are questions about distortion and imbalance as the world's news is filtered predominantly through Western prisms, and dissatisfactions that information flows from and within the developing world are inadequate. Apprehension about concentration in media ownership is linked to worries that this sector's power to shape the agenda of political action may not be matched by a sense of responsibility. These varied concerns have given rise to the suggestion that civil society itself should try to provide a measure of global public service broadcasting not linked to commercial interests.

The wider access to information has been healthy for democracy, which gains from a better informed citizenry, as well

² See commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* available on the Internet.

as beneficial for development, scientific and professional collaboration, and many other activities. The wide linkages now facilitated can also help pull the world's people closer together. Media images of human suffering have motivated people to express their concern and their solidarity with those in distant places by contributing to relief efforts and by demanding explanations and action from governments. The media's influence on the shaping of foreign policy is considerable in many countries.

Although there has been a spectacular expansion in the reach of some communications media, serious imbalances remain in access to information and in the distribution of even the most basic technology. Two billion people – more than one in three individuals in the world – still lack electricity. In 1990, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria together have fewer telephone connections than Canada, which has only 27 million people. These disparities are repeated in the ownership of communications satellites, the key to media globalization.³

The *World Economic Survey* notes that the demand of economics shape both culture and politics. It says:⁴

Perhaps the history of the nation state has come to a turning point after all. In the future, it might be argued, it is the need for mobility and communication between economics, rather than within them, that would gain the upper hand. This demand would give rise to an increasingly homogenous global culture, just as its predecessor give rise to homogenous national ones. This in turn would not only promote economic integration but would also, however slowly, blur the political boundaries between nations.

Political scientists recognize that "information power" is becoming just as important in international affairs as a country's other strengths like military, economic, social and political. Meanwhile, corporations are going through a managerial revolution of their own as they apply new Information Technology to all stages of production and distribution. Some transform

³The *World Economic Survey*, The Economist, 1997

themselves into "virtual corporations" that are essentially networks rather than classical hierarchical organizations. Individuals and NGOs too are becoming "citizens" or a new information-based civil society that is finding ways to harness IT for more participatory, open democracy. However, the world is changing quickly and unexpectedly, its also changing events. The Information Age would mean an altered lifestyle, some say it would be – the Web lifestyle.

The transformations being brought by globalization is also bringing about a major change in the domain of ideas, starting with the Cold War and the collapse of communism. The wider access to information has been healthy for democracy, which gains from a better-informed citizenry as well as beneficial for development, scientific and professional collaboration, and many other activities. The wide linkages now facilitated can also help pull the world's people to express their concern and their solidarity with those in distant places by contributing to relief efforts and by demanding explanations and action from governments. The media's influence on the shaping of foreign policy is considerable in many countries.

New values of accountability, public participation, and openness have gained a high profile in the last decade or so. The rise of democracy is perhaps the single most important event of this century. The benefits of democratization are beyond doubt. Formal democratization is being deepened through more meaningful public participation in politics. Better accountability is commonly seen throughout the world as the key to better governance. The report of the Commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* argues.⁴

The information and communication revolutions are helping to diffuse power throughout society, often transferring it from hierarchical structures to small groups, and increasing the ability of dispersed groups to communicate. Indeed, computer-based networking capabilities are giving new form and strength to civil

⁴ See commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* available on the Internet.

society and facilitating partnerships with intergovernmental institutions. The spectacular changes of the few past decades have created a new value system, the participation of people in governance is now thought to be more critical than ever. Governments that do not have the support of their people can hardly survive. Democracy is more than just a matter of voting. It is a dynamic process, involving a commitment to democratic principles and institutions that meet the needs of citizens routinely and in times of crisis. Truly democratic institutions continuously engage people directly in a multiplicity of ways. The gap between governments and citizens needs to be narrowed. A viable democracy requires an active civil society. At its best, civil society is citizens acting in pursuit of a range of interests, many of which have implications for public policy. There is at the same time, a need to ensure democratic functioning in the many institutions of civil society. Their leaders should be held to the same standards of accountability as political leaders.

The process of creating a stable democracy in the developing is always a cumbersome and challenging task. As the most essential preconditions are gradually met the process takes hold. Whether an experiment in democracy is successful or not is dependent upon a complexity of variables. It is also a truism that a successful democracy requires a society dominated by an educated and enlightened middle class. A sustained effort is needed to strengthen democratic institutions in any developing country.

New approaches to accountability and development have gained a high profile in the last decade or so. They can be powerful, but they should not be regarded as the new panaceas. In truth, the history of development studies shows a recurrent tendency to put exaggerated faith in new approaches only for these to result in disappointment: national planning, administrative reform, basic needs, market-led development, and so on. We should avoid perpetuating this tendency. The lesson for us here is this: in development, there are no magic wands.

Development also means a process of social mobilization in whose course old economic, social and psychic links are destroyed. The developing world cannot be regarded as concocted or

homogeneous societies therefore the present cultural and political variety must be assessed individually. No two societies are the same. It is absolutely necessary that each country build its own future according to its own requirements. Each nation has to chart its own destiny. In short, a new model has to be invented.

For the past twenty years, information and communications technology have developed in a way unparalleled in history. The only certainty is that more change is over the horizon. In this century no aspect of human activity shall be able to escape the influence of the new global technologies. Humanity is caught in a new era that is characterized by a high rate of change. The world has never changed so fast before. To cope with this change is a daunting task.

The second global challenge is that of good governance, especially in the developing countries. Without it all other efforts at sustainable development shall surely fail. What is governance in the first place? The simplest meaning would be the ability to translate state policies into ground reality so that it makes a difference in the betterment of society. The term implies broadly issues of government effectiveness, accountability, transparency and adherence to the rule of law. The idea of governance is a broader than that of government. The primary characteristics of government include first of all the constitution, then the government itself, meaning the three basic wings which are legislature, executive and judiciary, while governance involves established connections between these formal institutions and the broader civil society. Good governance is also to be understood as having a normative connotation and includes the hopes, aspirations and predilections of the governed.

The concept of governance means the activities, manner and management through various modes of exercising the power of government. Simply put, the government is the authority and the governance is the process through which the policies of the government is executed and implemented. Thus, the term of government implies the exercise of authority in managing and

controlling the functions of the members of the body politic and directing the total affairs of the state for promoting the causes of common welfare. In any democratic country, elected representatives of the people are meant to reflect the wishes of the people in the governance of the country.

Governance is the ability to translate state policies into ground reality so that it makes a difference in the betterment of society. The term broadly implies issues of government effectiveness, accountability, transparency and adherence to the rule of law. The idea of governance is broader than that of government. The concept means the activities, manner and management through various modes of exercising the power of government. Governance rests on the existence of participatory processes and the acquiescence of those who are governed. Thus, good governance is also to be understood as having a normative connotation and includes the hopes, aspirations and predilections of the governed. The essential components of a good government are:

- ❖ Good governance, which is dependent upon the existence of a participatory process and the consent of the people.
- ❖ Accountability of the government for its actions, which is dependent upon the availability of information, transparency of decision-making and the presence of effective mechanisms to call individuals and institutions to account.
- ❖ Competence of the government, which is the capacity to formulate appropriate policies, make sound and timely decisions, and perhaps most importantly implement them effectively.
- ❖ Rule of law and respect for human rights. The government has to guarantee groups and individuals their security and their basic human rights. It has to provide an enabling framework for economic and social activity and

to permit and encourage all types of individual participation.

The essentials of good governance are well known: a well trained, properly remunerated civil service, the free flow of information, transparency, voice and a comment to fight corruption. Plus, ownership is always an important consideration. Governments must be in a position of leadership; the people must be consulted and involved. For sustainable development to occur public participation must be ensured. In an age of scarcity, good governance has become the issue of our times. Governance would imply issues of government effectiveness, accountability, transparency and adherence to the rule of law. Good governance is also to be understood as having a normative connotation and includes the hopes, aspirations and predilections of the governed. It is agreed that a state must achieve a high level of good governance because lack of capacity to carefully monitor and implement, otherwise good policy designs, would hamper and distort development.

Achieving objectives of good governance requires a long-term political commitment to make the system work. As administrative systems have become increasingly complex, procedures and structures have created red tape and inefficiency. Reinventing government is needed simply to keep up with the rapid change. Essentially, it involves a broad restructuring of public service systems. Organizational structures, purposes, incentive systems, accountability procedures, authority distribution patterns, even culture is changed in the process. To achieve efficiency and effective-ness, change undertaken must ensure that the development process remains unhampered by lapses and shortcomings in current structures. Thus, governance would be best in a society with an effective production and delivery of jobs and services in an efficient way and in legitimate conditions.

A major problem for administrations, especially in the developing countries, is the widening gap between governors and governed and between the administrators and administered.

Following the law of increasing entropy, governmental and administrative systems have become increasingly complex. Their procedures and structures have created red tape and inefficiency. More importantly, a distance between the rulers and ruled is being created. This has been partly solved by a traditional answer: decrease the level of complexity of society in general and of the public services in particular. Deregulation not only has a positive potential for flexibility and thus for efficiency. It also intends to narrow some disparities of excess bureaucracy. This may cause an improvement in legitimacy of government services.⁵

Some countries have adapted to the requirements of the new age while others have not. Some are clearly behind the times, so to speak. The success of East-Asian economies poses a challenge to the rest of the developing countries. There is an active debate about the appropriate lessons to be learned from the experiences of these country. No doubt, good governance played a critical role in their success. Their emphasis on strategic planning, education and good governance practices is being studied to see that could be duplicated in other developing countries.

A primary business of government pertains to development, both societal and economic. The challenge is to translate sound development goals into effective plans and then implement them. We are talking of good governance here. The report *Our Global Neighborhood* argues:⁶

Development is increasingly seen as having a wider definition – more than simply the transition from poor to rich. Development means human dignity and political participation by segments of society previously excluded. The elimination of existing strong inequalities within society is central to a successful development process. Equality then is not meant equality in poverty, but above all equality of opportunity. In sum, with globalization the name of the game has changed. Transparency is now a universal value. All governments are expected to adhere to

⁵Modern Governance: New Government - Society Interactions, ed. by Jan Koolman (London: Sage, 1993), 146

⁶Our Global Neighborhood, op. Cit.

these new international standards. Today, it is impossible to be successful without being clean, participatory, open and transparent.

The developing countries face a deepening financial crisis because of rising interest rates, adverse shift in trade and increasing national debts. Most developing countries find it necessary to negotiate with the international financial institutions for resources to keep their economies functioning. They are seeking economic stabilization loans from the IMF, and structural adjustment loans from the World Bank. These requests for international support coincided with the rise of neo-liberal thinking in the West. The World Bank and IMF heavily influenced by neo-liberal thought, made loans conditional on recipient governments agreeing to their economic targets. Central amongst such conditions are targets for lower levels of public expenditure, reduced government intervention in economic, industrial and financial policy and parasitical divestiture. The focus of this early structural adjustment programs is economic. Although the measures have profound implications for the public sector and social welfare, such second order effects are not given much attention. While many developing countries signed up such loans very few fulfilled all of the loan conditions. Wherever reductions in the size of public bureaucracy occurred, these are arbitrary or based on the award of "golden hand shakes" rather than a systematic review of priorities.⁷

Given the scarcity of multilateral and bilateral aid today and the fact that developing countries have substantial debts to service, it seems probable that future resource flows to developing countries would decline. Meanwhile, donors are insisting on more "conditionalities" being met in order to access funds. There is evidence to suggest that the setting of conditions, demanding certain policy changes, would remain a significant aspect of foreign aid in the coming years. Most common conditionalities include the observance of economic policy conditions like devaluation of currency, floating interest rates, and reducing public

⁷ Ibid., 224-225

expenditure. Other institutional requirements for change are commonly - public enterprise divestiture and opening of the banking system. Currently, some of this conditionality also includes political matters, such as election and media freedom and human rights. Western advocacy groups are also pushing conditions to be set in terms of an environmental management, cut in military expenditure and balance in gender opportunities.

The World Bank has become an important think tank for policy formulation and augmentation of institutional capacities in the developing countries for development. It is significant not simply in terms of the grant and loans, the bank disburses, but also in terms of the way its actions shape the behaviour of domestic policy makers and other donors. Many analysts blame the bank for development failures in the developing world. In response, the World Bank has begun to put emphasis on issues pertaining to poverty alleviation, good governance and environment conservation. Issues of good governance have considerable implications for public administration in the developing countries. Achieving the objectives of good governance requires a long-term political commitment to make the system work.

Generally, international donor's agencies have come to emphasize that governance is the essential issue in project aid. For example, USAID has noted "the finest planning and budgeting system in the world are of little use, if there are not quick and accurate means to track progress and to know the relationship between the planned events and actual events"⁸ James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, in a very recent address to the Bank's Board of Governors said:⁹

We need a new development framework. What might countries look for in such a development framework? First, the framework would outline the essentials of good governance - transparency, voice, the free flow of information, a commitment

⁸ "The effectiveness of Aid to Pakistan" (Islamabad: Economic Affairs Division, GOP and UNDP, 1990) 1 A.9.

⁹ The Nation, November 9, 1998.

to fight corruption, and a well-trained, properly remunerated civil service... Ownership matters. Countries and their governments must be in the driver's seat, and, in our experience, the people must be consulted and involved. Participation matters – not only as a means of improving developing effectiveness as we know from our recent studies, but as the key to long-term sustainability and to leverage.

What is the most appropriate strategy of development for various countries given their particular historical legacy, culture and values system? How best to accelerate the democratization process? How and why does democracy strengthen democratic governance? Development and modernization also encompasses democratization in the sense that old structures, the ones inherited, are broken up. Clearly, effective organizational structural reforms have to be entrenched in order to improve performance of the state services. How can it be done? These governments in the developing world must realize that that they have to move quickly to overcome the most serious ailments in the delivery of public services. Good governance reforms have to be implemented on a priority basis. Some developing countries have embarked on the path of reform while others are left behind because of various reasons.

Everyone wants his or her country to develop. The issue is what does development really imply? An interesting debate current in social science circles pertains to calculating the real worth of nations taking into consideration new set of standards. A recent thought-provoking report by the World Bank has ranked nations by what is known as "greener" set of standards. Traditional measures such as GDP have been downgraded and new weightage is given to national resources, education, social flexibility, environmental protection, and other assets of a country, which have been undervalued but can be significant instruments of long-term growth. The system has challenged conventional comprehension of development by looking not only at income but a country's wealth also. Today the World Bank is trying to be more environmentally conscious and people-friendly. It recommends that the best way for

a country to develop and grow is to change attitudes towards the subject. Growth must not only be vigorous but sustainable also.

There is clear evidence to suggest that globalization does not benefit everyone. Many developing countries are caught in a debt trap, unable to maintain interest payments, let alone repay debt, public or private. Investment and imports are curtailed, exacerbating the difficulties of growing out of debt. Growth rates fell sharply, with average income per head actually falling on the two continents. Africa is today poorer than at the start of the 1970s. Everywhere, the poor suffered greatly from falling real incomes and rising unemployment. The report of the Commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* argues:¹³

The 'lost decade' of development – for some, actually a 'lost generation' – has roots both in domestic conditions and the international economic environment. Economic policies that are too inward – looking left countries unable to respond to external shocks, and proved unsustainable. Inadequate global economic governance both contributed to the crisis and, perhaps worse, postponed its resolution. Most countries have faced up to the crisis by introducing difficult and often painful structural adjustment programs. Some, but not all, have as a result reversed economic decline. With policies for macro-economic stability and a market-driven recovery, a number of middle-income countries are experiencing a revival in economic strength. The crisis, especially in terms of human development, are still far from over, but most countries have a better sense of what could lead to sustainable economic development.

What is extremely disturbing is the fact of persistent poverty in a world of increasing affluence. How do you justify this situation? The report of the commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* argues:¹⁴

¹³ See Commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* available on the Internet.

¹⁴ See Commission on Global Governance entitled *Our Global Neighborhood* available on the Internet.

The dazzling performance of several developing countries in Asia has tended to blur a less admirable aspect of the economic changes of the post-war world: the relentless growth in the number of the very poor. Though the global economy has expanded fivefold in the last four decades, it has not rooted out dire poverty or even reduced its prevalence. Even some otherwise successful countries have not managed to eliminate poverty.

The entrenchment of poverty is borne out by the fact that the number of people falling in the World Bank's category 'the absolute poor' has climbed to 1.3 billion in 1993. This level of poverty spells acute destitution; it is life at the edge of existence. For the absolute poor, for example, a nearby source of safe drinking water is a luxury; in several countries – Bhutan, Ethiopia, Laos, Mali, and Nigeria – less than half the population has even this. Geographical, gender, and age distributions of poverty also deserve attention. By the late 1980s, the chronically undernourished in Asia has fallen to 19 percent of the population, half the level of two decades earlier. But the same twenty years saw little change in Africa, where undernourishment continued to afflict about a third of a rapidly growing population. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand out as the poorest regions in the world today. In all, about 800 million people do not have sufficient and regular supplies of food.

Not everyone has benefited from globalization trend. Some are clearly worse off than before. Cook says:

Globalization would widen inequality, exacerbate poverty and increasingly lead to social 'exclusion'. These costs would mound even as globalization succeeds in its own terms, at a time when government's capacity to respond is draining away. Its failure to act would undermine the foundation of the democratic states, challenging its very legitimacy.¹⁵

¹⁵ Clive Cook.

Furthermore, globalization has been very selective in offering its benefits. While foreign capital flows to the Third World has increased substantially, only a small set of countries has been recipients, and these are all middle-income countries except for China. Globalization's beneficial effects on trade have also bypassed many developing countries, whose trade as a proportion of their GDP has indeed shrunk... Higher growth is necessary in poor countries and as many as 1.6 billion people are poorer than they are 15 years earlier, and people in 19 countries poorer than 35 years earlier... But if raising total world consumption means running down the world's ecological capital, the poor can have a large slice of the pie only if the rich accept a different share out and adjust to a smaller share for themselves... The present crisis of the world economy strengthens the case for a representative world forum to address such issues as the adverse effects of globalization, and renews the call made by the commission on Global Governance for an Economic Security Council. Such a Council would not be able to offer quick remedies but "would ensure not only that important economic issues and trends, including those associated with globalization, received attention but also that they are considered not just from the perspective of rich countries but by a representative body that can bring all perspectives to bear and respond to the widest global interest"

A painful finding of the *World Bank Development Report 1999-2000: Entering the New Millennium* is that the number of people living below the poverty line will continue to rise, reaching 1.5 billion by the start of the next century. It is indeed tragic that poverty persists despite a half century of sustained development efforts. The lesson learnt from the past practice, according to the World Bank, is that "a comprehensive approach is needed and sustained development must be socially inclusive".¹⁶

The gap between the rich and poor has reached "grotesque proportions" says that UNDP Development Report 1999.¹⁷ In

¹⁶ The News, Sept. 21, 1999.

¹⁷ Financial Post, September 21, 1999.

1960, the countries with the wealthiest fifth of the world's people had per capita income 30 times that of the poorest fifth. By 1990, the ratio had doubled to 60 to 1, and by 1995 it stood at 74 to 1. Globalization has taken a merciless price in the developing countries. According to the UNDP Report, in developing countries nearly 1.3 billion people do not have access to clean water, one in seven children of primary school age is out of school, 840 million people are malnourished, and an estimated 1.3 billion people live on income of less than \$1 a day.¹⁸

More than 80 countries still have per capita incomes lower than they were a decade or more ago. And some of the countries that are worst off are those that are most integrated into the global economy. Within nations, the income gap has been growing as well. One major source for the growing inequality and the global suffering is the spread off the markets.¹⁹ Clearly something is wrong here!

ISLAMIC NOTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT – THE PARADIGM SHIFT

It is required that the world undergoes an urgent paradigm shift towards the Islamic notion of development. Islam calls for a world order beneficial to all not just a few. The future must be good to each and every one of us. We have the capability and we can do it, provided we make the resolve. There is no better than this to turn things around. Islam is the future. The cardinal values of Islam most relevant to our age are its emphasis on peace, equality, community, social justice, tolerance, fairness and service to humanity. Social justice would imply equitable distribution of wealth and opportunities to all and the removal of global scourge of poverty. Today, in a world of plenty poverty is morally wrong and completely unjustifiable.

The Islamic notion of development benefits from all that is good and useful in human achievement. The strategy calls for

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

simultaneous growth and distribution. The Quran assigns a high priority to a fair and equitable distribution of a community's income and wealth. The Islamic State is to raise the poor and the needy to a reasonable standard of living and a wide sharing of material benefits of life. Islam calls for moderation in all what we do, including consumption. Therefore, wasteful consumerism (*al-israf*) has been regarded as a satanic activity. Since, complete sovereignty over the world belongs to Allah alone, therefore, the interest of the community surpasses that of the individual. Islam calls for tolerance and peace between nations. The root word of the Arabic word Islam is "Salam" meaning peace. God abhors killing and commands Muslims to seek peace everywhere.

God is the Sustainer of the Universe and orders the rich to be kind to the poor all and share with them from what he has gifted them. Thus there is a strident call to take care of the needy and the weak. The Quran is emphatic about it. Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said:¹⁰

He who endeavors to mitigate the needs of the poor, the desolate, is one who endeavors in the service of God, is one who stands up to pray all night, and does not relax and rest (while in prayer), and who fasts and does not break it.

At another time, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said that:¹¹ "God is kind, and loves kindness". He often commanded his companions to feed the hungry and visit the sick. He himself set the example that was lovingly followed by the early rulers of Islam. Later on, the Islamic caliphate throughout the centuries established "poor houses" and shelters for the needy in the tradition. Although it was a state responsibility now forsaken, but even today the community fulfills the responsibility of feeding the hungry in the Muslim world. This is in the grand tradition of Islam.

¹⁰ Reported in *Bukhari and Muslim*.

¹¹ Reported in *Alaslim*.

The most crucial goals of an Islamic state are:

1. Security of the person and his or her property.
2. Eradicating of poverty by mandatory giving to the poor and needy.
3. Attaining social justice, in the sense of a wider meaning that includes equality both social and economic.
4. Limits on conspicuous consumption. It is here that Islam departs from capitalist consumption.
5. Distinction between permissible (halal) and forbidden (haram). For example, gambling, intoxicants, what goes by the name of "rock", "metal", "hard" music or any drugs of any kind, prostitution, pornography, etc.
6. Banning extravagance and compelling a moderate standard of living or lifestyle.
7. Building the sense of community, as espoused in the ideal of the Ummah-i-Islam.
8. Justice for all.
9. The rule of law.
10. Fair display and honesty.
11. State guarantee that economic disparity between various classes of society must not grow. The methodology to ensure this is that of the Baitul mal, sadaqa, khairat, ushr, other charity and alms.

These values of Islam are by no means exclusive. Some other religions, even some secular thinkers have long espoused them. Today, James Wolfensohn, President World Bank, was echoing the Islamic desire of social justice when he said in the *World Bank Development Report 1999-2000: Entering the New Millennium that*: "What matters most is, moving beyond traditional concepts of economic growth, to putting people first – their health, welfare, education, opportunity and inclusion – to the heart of the agenda of the 21st century".¹²

¹² *The News*, Sep. 21, 1999.

It is Islamically reprehensible and intolerable that we have poverty admits plenty in the world today. This is against the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and the early caliphs who created just and equitable societies where poverty was banished by state interventions. History is witness to the glory of the early period of Islam. The values still beckon Muslims worldwide.

The gap between the rich and poor within nations and between them must be narrowed. Islam requires the establishment of an egalitarian society and moderation in the use of wealth. It is Islamically required; that the world pays more emphasis on human development is the need of the hour. The governments should increase resources for social sector development. Islamic scholars feel that a fundamental change of direction is needed. The social sector is to be emphasized along with that of national security. Hunger, poor health and illiteracy posed an internal threat to the security of all nations. People matter over everything else. Islam would require a shift towards a philosophy of humane development. Political participation by segments of society previously excluded is a central element of democratization. Development is increasingly seen as having a wider definition – more than simply the transition from poor to rich. According to Islam, development also meant human dignity, safety, and justice of equality. The elimination of existing strong inequalities within the society is central to successful development processes starting. Equality is the value, which is considered as very important to successful modernization. Equality then is not meant equality in poverty, but above all equality of opportunity.

Since the developing world – for the most part – has been left behind in the field of sustainable humane development, therefore, a firm resolve be made to rectify past failures and turn things around for the better. For this to happen a new global agenda has to be pursued. From the Islamic point of view this is an imperative.

Islam and the Global Agenda for Governance

The Islamic paradigm would call for the following actions:

1. International efforts to eliminate corruption and reinforce concepts of accountability and transparency, especially in the third world.
2. International agencies, especially the UN, to help developing countries to deal with thorny problems of governance and corruption. Outside help and commitment is needed to make a real difference. Give the situation in many developing countries where powerful vested interests are firmly entrenched, the fight against corruption needs to go global. Without massive outside assistance, little actual difference can be made. That is the grim reality. Such is the tragic state of affairs in most developing countries.
3. External cooperating agencies (UN, and others) need to compile and disseminate information on good practices in improving governance and combating corruption. Often governments do not know how to actually go about their plans in the area. They do not know how to plan, execute or even sequence actions or interventions that may make a crucial difference in the crusade.
4. The UN should undertake a monitoring role of the whole process. It should encourage and develop further existing initiatives, especially by the UNDP and World Bank.

The Islamic world must learn to stand on its own two feet. With assistance from the UN and other agencies that is indeed possible. The inertia must be broken. It is a requirement of Islam that Muslims first get their act together and then seek outside help. After all, God only helps those who help themselves. This generation of Muslims owes it to their children to do their best. They have to make their contribution in bettering the world. Hard

work and striving to make this world a better, more secure and peaceful world is incumbent upon the Muslims. They have to create the knowledge base that will realize their collective dreams. For this they have to emphasis education and research. The Muslim world has been left behind already. There is no more time to waste.

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بھی دور کرنا چاہتے ہیں جو اقوام عالم کے مابین تصادم یا مخالفت کا باعث بنتے ہیں۔ تیز روی سے بدلتے ہوئے حالات سے نبرد آزما آج کی دنیا میں یہ انداز فکر اس اعتبار سے مفید ہے کہ یہ مسائل کو حل کرنے کے ساتھ ساتھ عالمی حکومت کے قیام کے اصل ہدف کو بھی نظر انداز نہیں کرتا۔

ہمزہ مندرجہ بالا مختلف مذاہیر اور تجاویز کے تجزیہ سے یہ بات عیاں ہوتی ہے کہ قیام عالمی امن و سلامتی اور اشتراک و تعاون کا فروغ ایسا موضوع ہے جس کا کوئی ایک رخ نہیں اور نہ ہی یہ کوئی مسل کام ہے۔ درحقیقت متعلقہ مسائل اور معاملات نہایت حساس اور ہمہ گیر نوعیت کے ہیں۔ امن و سلامتی پر قائم عالمی نظام کی تعمیر ایک نہایت مشکل کام ہے جس کے حصول کے لئے سنی مسلسل 'جانفشانی' عزم مصمم اور زبردست اجتماعی جدوجہد ناگزیر ہے۔ اس طرف پیشرفت کے لئے جہاں حقیقت پسندی سے کام لینا ہو گا وہاں بلند تھیمات اور مثالیات کی بھی بلور تحرک اہمیت مسلم ہے۔ یہ مقصد اس قدر ارفع و اعلیٰ ہے کہ تمدن انسانی کی بقا کے لئے اس جانب استقامت سے پیشرفت جاری رہنی چاہئے اور کسی بھی مرحلہ پر حوصلہ اور صبر کا دامن ہاتھ سے چھوٹنے نہ پائے۔

☆ فعالیت پسندوں Functional Approach کا کتبہ فکر قیام امن و سلامتی یا سیاسی تعاون سے بھی زیادہ معاشی اور سماجی شعبوں میں بین الاقوامی اشتراک و تعاون پر زیادہ زور دیتا ہے۔ ان کے نزدیک سرکاری سطح پر ریاستوں کے مابین تعاون کے پہلو پر زور دینے سے زیادہ موزوں یہ بات ہے کہ دوسرے شعبوں میں تعاون کو فروغ دیا جائے۔ اس طریق کار سے ریاستوں کے مابین سیاسی طور پر اشتراک و تعاون میں خود بخود اضافہ ہوتا چلا جائے گا۔ نیز تصادم و کھنچاؤ کی کیفیت میں کمی واقع ہوگی۔ عالمی حقائق اس بات کے شاہد ہیں کہ اقوام متحدہ کو تنازعات کے تصفیہ اور تصادم کی کیفیت میں کمی کرنے جیسے مقاصد میں اتنی کامیابی حاصل نہیں ہوئی جتنی کہ ثقافتی و معاشی شعبہ میں عالمی تعاون کے فروغ کے سلسلہ میں حاصل ہوئی ہے۔ ایسی ہی وجوہات کی بنا پر اس انداز فکر کے حامی متحدہ شعبوں میں عالمی تنظیموں کی تعداد بڑھانے اور انہیں مزید موثر بنانے پر زور دیتے ہیں۔ بنا بریں اقوام عالم کے مابین معاشی و سماجی تعاون سیاسی یکجہتی کے حصول کا پیش خیمہ بن سکتا ہے۔

☆ ایک اور کتبہ فکر ان بنیادی انسانی مسائل کو حل کرنے پر زور دیتا ہے جو اقوام عالم کے مابین تنازعات کا اصل محرک بنتے ہیں۔ سماجی و معاشی برائیوں کے تدارک کے لئے وہ زیادہ موثر اور منظم اقدامات رائج کرنے کے قائل ہیں۔ نیز حصول مقصد کے لئے وہ وسیع پیمانے پر عالمی اداروں کے قیام کے حق میں ہیں۔ اس انداز فکر کو پیش کرنے والے قومی افواج پر کثیر اخراجات مختص کرنے کے بھی مخالف ہیں۔ وہ قومی دولت کو بحالت 'غربت'، 'بھوک'، 'افلاس' اور نسلی امتیازات جیسی برائیوں کے تدارک کے لئے خرچ کرنے کی حوصلہ افزائی کرتے ہیں۔ بلاشبہ دور رس نتائج حاصل کرنے کے اعتبار سے ان کی تجاویز قائل قدر ہیں۔ اس انداز فکر کو اصطلاحاً Curative Approach کہا جاتا ہے۔

☆ عالمی امن کے قیام کے ضمن میں ایک نکتہ نظر حقیقت پسندی سے کام لیتے ہوئے اس بات پر زور دیتا ہے کہ اہداف کی طرف بہتر توجہ پیشرفت کی جائے اور اس ضمن میں ترجیحات کا پہلے سے تعین کر لیا جائے۔ تاہم اس قسم کی سوچ سے عبارت منسوبہ بندی میں وقت کی تیز رفتاری سے مات کھا جانے کا احتمال ہوتا ہے۔ نیز معترضین اس بات کی بھی نشاندہی کرتے ہیں کہ عالمی سطح پر وسیع تر منسوبہ بندی حالات کے جبر کے سامنے بالعموم بے بس ہو جایا کرتی ہے۔ تاہم اس نکتہ نظر کی اس اعتبار سے افادیت سے انکار نہیں کیا جاسکتا کہ اس نے عملیت پسندی Pragmatism اور حقیقت پسندی پر جہی سوچ کو جاگرایا ہے۔

☆ مختلف النوع مسائل کے تناظر میں امن کی طرف پیشرفت کرنے کے حامی دانشور اس ضمن میں ترجیحات کا تعین کر کے آگے بڑھنے کے قائل ہیں۔ یعنی وہ فوری حل طلب مسائل اور طویل الیادز سرے میں شمار کئے جانے والے توجہ طلب مسائل کے مابین امتیاز کر کے منسوبہ بندی کرنے کو ترجیح دیتے ہیں۔ ان کا متنازع مقصود بھی عالمی حکومت کا قیام ہے۔ لیکن ساتھ ہی وہ ان اسباب کو

دور حاضر کے مسلمان دانشوروں نے اسلامی تعلیمات کو قابل عمل اور موثر حیثیت سے پیش کیا ہے۔ نیز تحقیق و تجسس کا عمل تیزی سے جاری ہے۔ ایران، سوڈان، افغانستان، ملائیشیا، پاکستان اور بعض دوسرے ممالک میں اسلامی اقدارات کے سلسلہ میں ماڈل استوار ہوئے ہیں۔ جب کہ خود مغربی دنیا میں مسلمان علماء و دانشوروں کے منظم کردہ فعال ہیں۔ یہ حالات مغربی تہذیب کے مد مقابل کے طور پر اسلامی دنیا کے مستحکم ہونے کا اشارہ دے رہے ہیں۔ لیکن ضروری نہیں کہ تہذیبوں کے باہمی تعلقات آئندہ تصادم کی کیفیت ہی کے مظہر ہوں۔ عالم اسلام اور اہل مغرب کے مابین مسابقت کے امکانات کے ساتھ ساتھ پر امن بتائے باہمی کا زیادہ امکان ہے۔

بین الاقوامیت کے فروغ کے لئے تدابیر

بین الاقوامیت یعنی عالمی امن و سلامتی و اشتراک و تعاون کا فروغ ایک عرصہ سے اقوام عالم کی دیرینہ خواہش ہے۔ یہ الگ بات ہے کہ ہر قوم اپنے قومی مفادات اور اپنی قومی سوچ و فکر کے تناظر میں اس کے حصول کی خواہاں ہوتی ہے۔ دانشوروں اور محققین نے اس مسئلہ سے متعلق تجزیوں اور تدابیر کی شکل میں لاتعداد تصانیف مرتب کیں اور مقالے لکھے۔ تاہم عالمی مسائل استدراگرے، ہمسستی اور حساس نوعیت کے ہیں کہ انہیں حل کرنے کے متعلق بیشتر تدابیر و نظریات محسوس تھیاتی، نظری اور کاغذی منصوبے معلوم ہوتے ہیں۔ کسی مکتبہ فکر نے پر امن بتائے باہمی اور تنازعات کے پر امن حل پر زور دیا تو بعض نے اسباب جنگ دور کرنے پر توجہ مرکوز رکھی۔ بعض دانشوروں نے مختلف النوع تحفظاتی طریقے متعارف کرانے کی تجاویز دیں۔ جارحیت کے تدارک کے لئے بعض مثبت تجاویز دیکھنے میں آئیں۔ تحلیلات پر مبنی بعض تجاویز تو موجودہ ریاستی نظام کا خاتمہ کر کے عالمی حکومت کی طرف پیشرفت کی حامی ہیں۔ بعض تجاویز کے مطابق موجودہ قومی حکومتوں پر مشتمل عالمی نم وفاق قائم کرنے کو مسئلہ کا قابل عمل تصور کیا گیا۔ جب کہ بیشتر تجاویز میں بین الاقوامی قانون کے نفاذ اور اسلحہ پر کنٹرول سے متعلق فیصلوں کو پوری تہذیبی سے نافذ کرنے پر زور دیا گیا۔ مختصر اس ضمن میں پانچ مختلف قسم کے مکتبہ ہائے فکر کو پنے پرانی حاصل ہوئی جنہیں ذیل میں دیا گیا ہے۔

☆ بعض دانشوروں کے نزدیک بین الاقوامی تعاون کے فروغ اور قیام امن و سلامتی کے سلسلہ میں عالمی سطح پر تنظیمیں قائم کرنے کا روجہ طریق کار کافی بار آور ثابت ہوا ہے۔ مختلف شعبوں میں عالمی اداروں، ایجنسیوں اور تنظیموں نے بین الاقوامیت کا شعور بیدار کیا ہے۔ چنانچہ اقوام متحدہ، اس کے ادارے و ایجنسیاں، تنظیمیں، عالمی تجارتی معاہدات، علاقائی اتحاد و معاہدات جیسے کہ عرب لیگ، یورپی کمیونٹی، ASEAN، SAARC وغیرہ کا قیام تذکرہ مقاصد کی طرف پیشرفت کے سلسلہ میں مفید ثابت ہوا ہے۔ دانشوروں کی اس قسم کی سوچ کو Institutional Approach کا نام دیا گیا ہے کیونکہ اس کے حامی عالمی تنظیموں کے قیام اور انہیں مزید موثر بنانے پر زور دیتے ہیں۔

کی عدم موجودگی کو بھی محسوس کیا جاتا ہے۔ عالمی تنظیم کو درپیش چیلنجز کی نوعیت حکمین ہے جب کہ یہ ریاستوں کے باہمی تنازعات کو سلجھانے میں بری طرح ابھی ہوئی ہے۔ اسے تعمیر نو اور آباد کاری کے امور بھی سرانجام دینا ہوتے ہیں۔ صومالیہ، روانڈا اور بوسنیا کے اندر حالیہ واقعات نے اس کا ربا سا بحریم بھی ختم کر کے رکھ دیا ہے۔ علاقائی گروہ بندیوں کے قیام کے بعد سے تجارتی مقابلہ بازی کے باعث اب اقوام متحدہ کے مفادات کی پروا نہیں کی جاتی۔

تیسری دنیا کے ممالک مغربی ممالک کی امداد واری ختم کرنے کے لئے حفاظتی کونسل کی تشکیل نو کا مطالبہ کر رہے ہیں۔ حفاظتی کونسل میں بھارت مستقل نشست حاصل کرنے کی تمک و دو کر رہا ہے جب کہ پاکستان کا اسلامی بلاک کی طرف سے مستقل نشست حاصل کرنے کا حق ناقص ہے۔ چارٹر میں موجودہ تمام مسائل کے حل کی گنجائش موجود ہے لیکن اس کے لئے رواداری اور خیر سگالی کے جذبات کا موازن ہونا ضروری ہے۔ بڑی طاقتوں پر اس ضمن میں زیادہ ذمہ داریاں عائد ہوتی ہیں۔ عام آثر یہ ابھر رہا ہے کہ اقوام متحدہ کے ادارے اور ایجنسیاں امریکی سرپرستی میں قائم عالمی نظام کے مقاصد کے حصول کے لئے بطور آلہ کار فرائض سرانجام دے رہی ہیں۔ ان حالات میں عالمی عدل و انصاف کے حصول کی جو توقع عالمی تنظیم سے وابستہ کی گئی تھی اسے نقصان پہنچ رہا ہے۔

زیر سطح تبدیلیاں Underlying Changes: مستقبل میں قومی قوت کے عناصر میں تبدیلی کے ساتھ سیاسی تبدیلیوں کو بھی

اہمیت حاصل ہوگی۔ کل کو ممکن ہے دنیا میں طاقت کا نیا توازن پیدا کرنے کے لئے چین روس اور جاپان اکٹھے ہو کر مغربی دنیا کی بالادستی کو چیلنج کر دیں۔ یہ بھی ممکن ہے کہ خود مغربی طاقتوں کے اندر ٹوٹ پھوٹ کا عمل پوری طرح شروع ہو جائے۔ ادھر افریقہ بھی جاگ رہا ہے۔ بیداری کی یہ لہر کیا صورت اختیار کرتی ہے وقت آنے پر ہی پوری طرح معلوم ہو سکے گا۔ بہر حال تبدیلی ناگزیر معلوم ہوتی ہے۔ اس بات کا امکان غالب ہے کہ مذہب خصوصاً اسلام کے نام پر تمام مسلمان متحد ہو جائیں جس کے واضح شواہد محسوس کئے جا رہے ہیں۔ یعنی دو ارب تیس کروڑ نفوس پر مشتمل مسلم دنیا میں امت واحدہ کی حیثیت سے بیداری کا امکان پایا جاتا ہے۔

تہذیبوں کا تصادم کے حوالہ سے مغربی دانشور بھی اس قسم کی صورت حال کے رونما ہونے کا امکان ظاہر کر رہے ہیں۔ درحقیقت سوویت یونین کے تہزل کے بعد جس طرح عالمی سطح پر "توازن طاقت" کے حوالہ سے غلا پیدا ہوا ہے خیال ہے کہ یہ صورت حال مستقل طور پر قائم نہ رہ سکے گی۔ اگرچہ بیشتر مسلم حکومتیں لادینیت کی راہ پر گامزن ہیں لیکن مسلمانوں کے اندر بحیثیت مجموعی تیزی سے ملی شور بیدار ہو رہا ہے۔ مسلم دنیا میں دسائیل کی کمی نہیں۔ تعلیم اور سائنس کے میدان میں بھی وہ آگے بڑھ رہے ہیں۔ مغربی تہذیب کی زیادتیوں کے رد عمل کے طور پر ان میں ملی تشخص مستحکم ہوا ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ساتھ اسلامی فکر میں جدید علوم سے استفادہ کی بنا پر گھما پیدا ہوا ہے۔

تعاون اور معاشی نوعیت کے ترقیاتی پروگرامز میں اضافہ کے باعث معیار زندگی بلند ہو گا۔
 ☆ قومی قوت میں فوجی قوت کا تعلق سیاسی، معاشی اور ٹکنالوجیکل استطاعت سے مزید گہرا ہو جائے گا۔ نیز جوہری طاقت کی اہمیت مزید بڑھ جائے گی۔ سمندروں، فضا اور نلاء میں فوجی تحصیلات قائم کرنے کی دوڑ میں اضافہ ہونے کی توقع ہے۔ آئندہ اجتماعی تحفظ Collective Security کی مختلف صورتوں کے رونما ہونے کی توقع ہے نیز فوجی قوت کی اہمیت بدستور موجود رہے گی۔

قومی قوت کے غیر مرئی عوامل Intangible Factors یعنی ڈپلومیسی، قیادت، سیرت و

کردار، حوصلہ و جرات وغیرہ کو اہمیت حاصل رہے گی۔ بین الاقوامی تعلقات میں ریاستوں کے باہمی تعلقات کو بحسن و خوبی استوار کرنے کے سلسلہ میں ڈپلومیسی کو اہم مقام حاصل رہے گا۔ تاہم آئندہ یہ عالمی سطح پر زیادہ رو بہ عمل ہوگی کیونکہ اب غیر مغربی دنیا بھی اہمیت اختیار کر چکی ہے۔ تاہم اس کی سمتیں اور جہتیں بھی وسیع ہوں گی۔ قیادت کی اہمیت اور حسن کارکردگی عالمی حالات کا رخ متعین کرنے میں بدستور قائم رہے گی۔ سیاسی قیادت اور سیاسی فیصلہ سازی، بین الاقوامی تعلقات کے شعبہ کی تحقیق کے میدان میں اہم موضوعات ہوں گے۔ قومی سیرت و کردار، عزم و حوصلہ کو جس طرح ماضی میں اہمیت حاصل رہی آئندہ بھی قوموں کی تقدیر بدلنے میں اس قسم کا جذبہ زیادہ اہمیت کا حامل ہو گا۔ اسے بروئے کار لانے کے لئے حکومتیں فروغ تعلیم اور پراپیگنڈہ کا زیادہ استعمال کرنے پر زور دیں گی۔

عالمی تنظیم کا کردار: خیال ہے کہ اقوام متحدہ کے زیر سایہ عالمی فعال تنظیمیں زیادہ سرگرم عمل رہیں گی۔ ان کے ساتھ ساتھ ریاستوں کی علاقائی دھڑے بندیوں بھی جاری رہیں گی۔ نیز علاقائی دھڑوں کی تعداد میں اضافہ ہو جانے کے امکان کو رد نہیں کیا جاسکتا۔ جہاں تک بین الاقوامی قانون کا تعلق ہے، اس میں مزید وسعت اور نکھار پیدا ہونا چاہئے گا۔ لیکن کسی بھی مرحلہ پر وہ ملکی قانون Municipal Law کی طرح موثر نہ ہو سکے گا۔ عالمی تعلقات میں عدم استحکام دکھنچاؤ کی کیفیت سے بچنا تو ممکن نہیں لیکن جوہری خطرہ سے بچنے کے لئے اقوام عالم میں متعدد شعبوں میں تعاون بڑھانے کا امکان غالب ہے۔ لیکن طاقت ور اور امیر ممالک کو عالمی امور پر بالادست حیثیت حاصل رہے گی۔

سرد جنگ کے خاتمہ کے بعد خیال تھا کہ اقوام متحدہ موثر و مثبت کردار کی حامل ہوگی۔ مئی ۱۹۹۳ء میں خاتمی کو نسل نے قیام امن پر مشتمل کارروائیوں کو موثر بنانے کے ضمن میں واضح طور پر چند رہنما اصول بھی پیش کئے۔ تاہم ماضی قریب کے واقعات کا جائزہ لیا جائے تو اقوام متحدہ اپنے مقاصد کے حصول میں کامیاب نظر نہیں آتی۔ فنڈز کی کمی اس کی کارکردگی کی راہ میں بڑی رکاوٹ ہے۔ علاوہ ازیں اپنے غیر معمولی فیصلوں کو نافذ کرنے کے لئے اس کے پاس اپنے مستقل فوجی دستوں

یعنی ہر چیز کا ستا اور آسان نعم البدل تلاش کرنے کا عمل جاری رہے گا۔ چنانچہ نئے Alloys اور Synthetics کی تیاری سے معدنیات کی کمی کو پورا کرنے کا عمل تیز تر ہو گا۔ نیز جوہری قوت اور شہمی توانائی وغیرہ جیسے سرچشموں سے استفادہ کر کے موجودہ وسائل کی کمی کو پورا کیا جائے گا۔

مستقبل کے عالمی نظام میں غریب و امیر اقوام کے مابین وسائل کی تقسیم کے اعتبار سے عدم مساوات موجود رہے گی۔ فی کس آمدنی کے اعتبار سے تھوڑی بہت کمی بیشی واقع ہوگی لیکن بنیادی طور پر عالمی معاشی صورت حال میں کسی بڑی مثبت تبدیلی کی توقع نہیں کی جاسکتی۔ یعنی دنیا کے وسائل پر چند امیر اقوام کی بالادستی بدستور برقرار رہے گی۔

☆ تکنیکی ترقیوں اور سائنسی ایجادات میں پیشرفت کا سلسلہ تیزی سے جاری رہے گا۔ بعض اشیاء اور خام مال کی اہمیت میں بھی کمی بیشی کا سلسلہ جاری رہے گا۔ اس ضمن میں مستقبل کی تصویر جو زمین میں ابھرتی ہے وہ متعدد سوالات کو جنم دیتی ہے۔ مثلاً سوال یہ پیدا ہوتا ہے کہ کیا آئندہ تیل کی جگہ جوہری توانائی یا شہمی توانائی پوری طرح لے سکے گی؟ افراد کی عمر میں اضافہ کے سیاسی مضمرات کیا ہوں گے بالخصوص اگر یہ بڑھ کر ۸۰ یا نوے سال تک پہنچ گئی؟ اسی طرح اس قسم کی ترقیوں کے مضمرات کیا ہوں گے؟ مثلاً اگر زرعی پیداوار میں بہت زیادہ اضافہ ہو گیا؟ زیادہ بارشوں پر قابو پایا گیا؟ سمندری پانی کو زیر استعمال لانے کی وافر سولت حاصل ہو گئی اور زمین کی پیداواری صلاحیت میں اضافہ کے لئے نئے ٹیکنیکل ایجاد ہو گئے؟ یا پھر مصنوعی ریونے قدرتی ریونے کی اہمیت ختم کر کے رکھ دی؟ تو ان سب عوامل کے متعلقہ ممالک کی معیشتوں پر کیا اثرات مرتب ہوں گے؟

ترقی کا اس قسم کا رجحان جاری رہا تو پرنیچ مسائل مزید خطرناک مضمرات کے حامل ہوں گے۔ مثلاً اون ریشم اور کھالیں برآمد کرنے والے ممالک کی معیشتوں کا کیا حال ہو گا اگر ان سب کے نعم البدل بنائے گئے؟ اگر سائنس دانوں نے کیپول کی صورت میں انسانی خوراک تیار کر دی تو زرعی اجناس کا انفراسٹرکچر کس حد تک متاثر ہو گا؟ ایک آفاقی زبان کی نشوونما کے سیاسی مضمرات کیا ہوں گے؟ اگر ہر خطہ میں بہتر معیار زندگی قائم ہو گیا اور پراپیگنڈہ کی مزید ترقیاتی ٹیکنیکس اجاگر ہو گئیں تو موجودہ اداروں کی نوعیت کیا ہوگی؟ اگر کل کو معاشی جنگ و جدل کے حوالہ سے نئے طریقے اور زیادہ موثر ہتھیار پیدا ہو گئے؟ ظاہر ہے مستقبل میں توانائی کے وسائل میں بہت اضافہ ہو جائے گا اور اس کے ساتھ ساتھ توانائی کے سرچشموں کی اہمیت میں بھی تبدیلی رونما ہوگی۔ مثلاً ماضی میں انسانی اور حیوانی توانائی کو اہمیت حاصل رہی لیکن کل کو اگر شہمی یا جوہری توانائی پوری طرح توانائی کا سرچشمہ بن گئی تو کیا صورت حال پیدا ہوگی؟ ظاہر ہے اس سے انسانی زندگی اور اس کے سماجی و معاشی اور عالمی تعلقات میں تبدیلیاں واقع ہوں گی۔ اگر آئندہ انسان کی تباہی پھیلانے کی قوت میں مزید اضافہ ہو تو خیر و شر کی قوت میں بھی اسی تناسب سے اضافہ ہو گا۔ لہذا ان تکنیکی ترقیوں کے پس پشت یہ سوال زیادہ اہم ہے کہ خود انسان کے عزائم کیا ہیں؟ تاہم یہ بات مابین ہے کہ تکنیکی

رہے گی تاہم اس کے مختلف عوامل کی اہمیت میں کمی بیشی ہوتی رہے گی۔ ذیل میں مختصر طور پر ان کی نشاندہی کی گئی ہے:

☆ جہاں تک "توازن طاقت" Balance of Power کا تعلق ہے اس سلسلہ میں متعدد نکتے ہائے نظر پائے جاتے ہیں۔ بین الاقوامی سیاست کے بعض دانشوروں کا خیال ہے کہ سرد جنگ کے خاتمہ کے بعد موجودہ دور میں اس کی اہمیت نہیں رہی اگرچہ یہ اصول یورپ کی حد تک عالمی سیاست کے حوالہ سے ایک عرصہ تک کامیابی سے ہمکنار رہا۔ لیکن آج کے عالمی منظر پر بت سے عوامل یعنی ایکٹرز کی موجودگی کے باعث یہ غیر اہم اصول بن چکا ہے۔ تاہم بعض دوسرے دانشور اسے اب بھی اہم اصول سمجھتے ہیں۔ یعنی یہ کہ علاقائی تصادموں کو روکنے میں یہ اصول آئندہ بھی کارگر ثابت ہو گا۔ خیال ہے کہ اقوام کے مابین توازن طاقت کو اپنے حق میں کرنے کی تک و دو جاری رہے گی۔ نیز تنازعات کے پر امن تصفیہ کی طرف رغبت بڑھے گی۔ روایتی ڈیپلومیسی کو بھی استعمال کیا جاتا رہے گا۔ تاہم ڈیپلومیسی کا ایک اہم مقصد تجارتی و صنعتی مفادات کا فروغ ہو گا۔

☆ قومی قوت کے حوالہ سے جغرافیائی تبدیلیوں کی اہمیت کو ہر دور میں اہم سمجھا جاتا رہا ہے لیکن دور حاضر میں مواصلاتی اور ذرائع نقل و حرکت کی محیر العقول ترقیوں کے باعث ان کی اہمیت کا نئے انداز سے تعین کرنا ہو گا۔ آج پوری دنیا ایک وحدت بن چکی ہے جب کہ سائنس دانوں کی سیاروں اور خلائی تعمیر میں دلچسپی بڑھ رہی ہے۔ پیرسویک طیاروں کی موجودگی اور گائیڈڈ میزائل کے اس دور میں جغرافیائی عوامل کے حوالہ سے سیاسیات کے مطالعہ میں پہلی سی دلچسپی مفقود نظر آتی ہے۔

☆ انسانی تاریخ میں کبھی بھی آبادی میں اس قدر تیزی سے اضافہ نہیں ہوا۔ اس حقیقت کے عالمی تعلقات پر گہرے اثرات کو نظر انداز نہیں کیا جاسکتا۔ ترقی یافتہ ممالک کی شرح پیدائش و اموات میں کمی واقع ہوئی ہے جب کہ پورے افراد کی تعداد میں مسلسل اضافہ ہو رہا ہے جو بذات خود ایک مسئلہ ہے۔ جب کہ غیر ترقی یافتہ ممالک کو بڑھتی ہوئی آبادی کے دباؤ اور وسائل کی کمی کا سامنا ہے۔ چنانچہ تقریباً سب ممالک کو آبادی میں شدید تبدیلیوں ان کے مضمرات اور اثرات کا سامنا کرنا پڑے گا۔

☆ قدرتی وسائل کی اہمیت میں کمی بیشی ہوتی رہتی ہے۔ اس ضمن میں نئی نئی ایجادات بھی اہمیت کی حامل ہیں۔ ترقی پزیر ممالک زرعی ترقی پر توجہ مرکوز کر کے فائدہ میں رہ سکتی ہیں۔ تاہم خام مال اور تکنیکی ترقیوں کی اہمیت برقرار رہے گی۔ مغربی دنیا کو معدنیات میں فوقیت حاصل ہے جب کہ اس حوالہ سے ایشیا بھی بہت پیچھے نہیں۔ خیال ہے کہ پیداوار کے حوالہ سے خطوں کے مابین زیادہ فرق نہیں رہے گا۔ افریقہ اور قطبین میں وافر معدنیات موجود ہیں جن سے پوری طرح استفادہ نہیں کیا جاسکا۔ لہذا آئندہ تکنیکی ترقیوں اور سائنسی مہارتوں کو اولیت حاصل رہے گی۔

نظام کو مستحکم اصولوں پر استوار کرنے کے لئے ضروری ہے کہ تمام اقوام کے اندر یکجہتی و یکجہت کی فضا کو فروغ حاصل ہو تاکہ باہمی اعتماد بڑھے۔

۷۔ آفاقی فکر اور اس کی جہتیں: ماضی میں بعض اقوام نے اپنے قومی مقاصد کے حصول کی خاطر اپنی قومی آئیڈیالوجی کو آفاقی رنگ کی صورت میں پیش کیا۔ قدیم دور میں سکندر اعظم، اس کے بعد جیولس سیزر وغیرہ نے ساری دنیا پر حکومت کرنے کا عزم کیا۔ اسلام آفاقی مذہب ہونے کی بنا پر عالمی اسلامی انقلاب کا داعی ہے۔ قرون وسطیٰ میں اسلام افریقہ اور ایشیا میں تیزی سے پھیلا جب کہ سلطنت عثمانیہ کے دور میں اس کی حدود مشرقی یورپ تک وسیع تھیں۔ نپولین نے بھی سلطنت کی حدود کو وسعت دینے کے لئے اپنے جارحانہ عزائم کی تکمیل کے لئے فکری اساس استوار کی۔ بیسویں صدی میں مارکسی انقلاب کو پذیرائی حاصل ہوئی۔ دنیا کے بہت بڑے حصہ میں مختلف ممالک کے اندر یہ انقلاب رونما ہوا جس کے پس پشت عالمی پروٹاری انقلاب کا ہمہ گیر تصور کارفرما تھا۔ تاہم سوویت یونین کے حزل کے بعد مغربی لیبرل ازم اور اشتراکی ممالک کے مابین سرد جنگ کی سی کیفیت ختم ہو گئی اور اس کی جگہ اب امریکہ کی سرپرستی میں نیا عالمی نظام مسلط ہو گیا ہے۔ نیو ورلڈ آرڈر کے لبادہ میں عملی طور پر مغربی فکر، مغربی تمدن اور اس سے ہم آہنگ پالیسیوں کو دوسرے ممالک کے اندرونی معاملات میں بھی اثر و نفوذ حاصل ہوا ہے۔ آزاد معیشت، بنیادی حقوق اور جمہوریت کے تحفظ جیسے خوش کن نعروں کی آڑ میں ایک منفرد نوعیت کا سامراجی عالمی نظام روپ عمل ہے۔ تذبذب کے ٹکراؤں کے پس منظر میں اب مغربی تہذیب کو اسلامی تمدن سے ٹکراؤ کا خطرہ درپیش ہے جسے وہ اسلامی بنیاد پرستی کا نام دیتا ہے۔ چنانچہ مسلمانوں کے متعلق خارجہ پالیسی سازی میں اسی پہلو کو اہمیت دی جا رہی ہے تاکہ مسلمانوں کی طرف سے متوقع رد عمل کی صورت میں پہلے سے پیش قدمی کی جاسکے۔

بین الاقوامیت کا مستقبل: خدشات و امکانات

سوال یہ پیدا ہوتا ہے کہ عالمی امن و سلامتی اور اشتراک و تعاون کے حوالہ سے مستقبل کے امکانات و خدشات کیا ہو سکتے ہیں؟ ذیل میں امکانی پیشرفت اور تہذیبوں کا جائزہ لیا گیا ہے۔ اس ضمن میں ایسے موضوعات کا احاطہ کیا گیا ہے: مثلاً یہ کہ مستقبل میں قومی قوت National Power کے عوامل کون سے ہوں گے اور ان کی نوعیت کیا ہوگی؟ مستقبل کے عالمی معاشرہ کو درپیش مسائل کی عمومی نوعیت کیا ہوگی؟ وہ کون سے حالات اور کیفیات ہوں گی جو ان مسائل کو جنم دینے کا باعث بنیں گی؟ چنانچہ عالمی اشتراک و تعاون کے فروغ اور امن و سلامتی کے قیام کے ضمن میں چند نکتہ ہائے نظر کا احاطہ کیا گیا ہے اور پھر آئندہ کے امکانات کا اجمالی خاکہ مرتب کیا گیا ہے۔

قومی قوت کے عوامل: قومی قوت کو بین الاقوامی تعلقات میں بدستور مرکزی حیثیت حاصل

ممالک سے بری طرح متکھا جاتے ہیں۔ دوسری طرف عالمی مالیاتی اداروں کا کردار بھی ان کے خلاف انتہائی منفی رہا ہے۔ مختلف قسم کے جھکنڈوں اور ترغیبات کے ذریعہ وہ نئی اقوام کو اپنی شرائط پر قرضوں کے جال میں جکڑ لیتے ہیں۔ قرضوں میں جکڑی ہوئی معیشتیں امیر ممالک کی صنعتوں کا مقابلہ کرنے سے قومی دامن نظر آتی ہیں۔ سرمایہ کاری کے ضمن میں جدید جھکنڈوں کے مضمرات کا مشرقی ایشیا کے چند ممالک کو حالیہ میں تلخ تجربہ ہوا ہے۔ امیر ممالک کے سرمایہ کار بڑی ہوشیاری سے پہلے وسیع پیمانے پر سرمایہ کاری کرتے ہیں اور پھر یکدم سرمایہ نکال کر سٹ بازی کے ذریعہ بازار حصص کو الٹ پلٹ کر رکھ دیتے ہیں۔ پھر اپنا سرمایہ کئی گنا بڑھا کر یہ لوگ واپس لے جاتے ہیں جب کہ کمزور معیشت والے ممالک کو کساد بازاری اور منطوک مالیاتی کا سامنا کرنا پڑتا ہے۔ واضح ہو کہ بنکاری کی جدید سولتوں کے باعث سرمایہ کاری کرنے اور نہایت سرعت سے سرمایہ نکالنے کا عمل موصلاتی ترقیوں کے باعث ممکن ہو چکا ہے۔ معیشتوں کی گلوبلائزیشن کا یہ عمل مستقبل کے لئے قوموں کے استحصال کے لئے نئے نئے مضمرات کا حامل ہو تا چلا جا رہا ہے۔ اس سے ترقی یافتہ امیر ممالک اور پسماندہ ممالک کے مابین دنیا کے وسائل و دولت کی تقسیم کی تلخ وسیع سے وسیع تر ہوتی چلی جا رہی ہے جو بین الاقوامیت کی فضا کی راہ میں بڑی رکاوٹ ہے۔

۶۔ جدید سامراجیت اور نوآبادیاتی نظام کی باقیات: اگرچہ تیسری دنیا سے نوآبادیاتی نظام کا خاتمہ ہو چکا ہے لیکن اس کی باقیات

کسی نہ کسی شکل میں موجود ہیں۔ نتیجتاً ان لوگوں کو گونا گوں مسائل کا سامنا ہے۔ علاوہ ازیں سامراجیت اب نیو ورلڈ آرڈر کی صورت میں ایک نیا روپ و حارے ہوئی ہے۔ چنانچہ غریب ملکوں کے اندرونی معاملات، ان کی پالیسیوں بالخصوص خارجہ اور تجارتی پالیسی سازی پر طاقتور امیر ممالک کو اثر و نفوذ حاصل ہے۔ نتیجتاً تیسری دنیا کی ترقی پذیر اقوام کے لئے استحصالی نظام کسی نہ کسی شکل میں اب بھی موجود ہے۔

بین الاقوامی تعلقات میں نسلی، لسانی اور تمدنی امتیازات کی بنا پر اقوام کا استحصال ہوتا رہا ہے۔ سیاہ فام افریقی ریاستوں اور جنوبی افریقہ کے باشندوں کو سفید فام اقلیتی حکومت کے خلاف ایسی ہی شکایات رہی ہیں۔ سیاہ فام حکومت کے قیام کے بعد اب وہاں حالات تبدیل ہو رہے ہیں۔ لیکن اب بھی افریقہ کے بیشتر ممالک میں سفید فام اقوام کے طاقتور مفاداتی گروہ مقامی مسائل پر قابض ہیں۔ خود امریکہ کے اندر ماضی قریب میں سیاہ فام باشندوں کے خلاف امتیازات روا رکھے جاتے تھے جس کے رد عمل کے طور پر وہاں حکومت کو امن عامہ سے متعلق مسائل درپیش رہے۔ سفید فام اقوام کو موجودہ عالمی نظام میں برتر حیثیت حاصل ہے جب کہ سیاہ فام اور رنگ دار اقوام مقابلہ کمزور ہیں۔ چنانچہ سفید فام اقوام کے اندر احساس برتری موجود ہے جس کا اظہار مختلف شکلوں میں ہوتا رہتا ہے۔ کمزور اقوام اپنی عموماً کو بالعموم نسلی امتیازات پر مبنی پالیسیوں کی طرف منسوب کرتی ہیں۔ عالمی

۵۔ صنعت و تجارت و ترقی: گلوبلائزیشن کے اس دور میں کوئی قوم بھی کھل طور پر معاشی اعتبار سے خود کفالت سے ہمکنار نہیں۔ معاشی شعبہ میں بالخصوص اقوام عالم کے مابین باہمی اشتراک و تعاون فروغ پذیر ہے۔ صنعتوں کے لئے خام مال کی فراہمی تیار مال کی کھپت، کوالٹی کنٹرول اور باہمی مسابقت جیسے پہلوؤں کے باعث نئے نئے عالمی ضابطے، طور طریقے اجاگر ہوئے ہیں اور بااختیار ادارے قائم ہو چکے ہیں۔ آج ترقی پذیر ممالک کے اندر بھی معاشی ترقی، ملکی وسائل سے استفادہ، وافر سولتوں کی فراہمی اور خوشحال زندگی کے حصول کی شدید خواہش بیدار ہو چکی ہے۔ چنانچہ کم ترقی یافتہ ممالک کے لوگ اپنی مارتوں کو بڑھانے اور تکنیکی ترقی سے استفادہ کرنے کی خاطر ترقی یافتہ اقوام کے دست نگر ہیں۔ گلوبلائزیشن کے اس عمل میں عالمی معاشی جتیں نیاروپ اختیار کئے ہوئے ہیں۔ سامراجیت ایک نیاروپ اختیار کرتی جا رہی ہے۔ کثیر قومیتوں پر مبنی بڑی بڑی کارپوریشنیں ملکی سرحدوں سے پار معاشی سرگرمیوں میں فعال ہو چکی ہیں جب کہ ان کے وسائل اور اثر و رسوخ عام ممالک کی حکومتوں سے بھی زیادہ ہے۔ گٹٹ اور اس کے بعد ورلڈ ٹریڈ آرگنائزیشن WTO جیسے عالمی تجارتی معاہدوں نے ایک ایسا نانا بنا ترتیب دے دیا ہے جس کے تحت دنیا کے ملکوں کو مجبور کر دیا گیا ہے کہ وہ درآمدی محصولات Tariff میں کمی کریں تاکہ ملکی اشیاء کا ملکی سرحدوں کے پار آزادانہ تبادلہ ہو سکے۔ اس مقصد کے لئے دنیا کے مختلف خطوں کے اندر تجارتی معاہدات کروائے گئے ہیں جیسا کہ ASEAN, NAFTA, OPEC, LAFTA, CACM, ECM, EC, SAARC, وغیرہ

معاشی ترقی کی خاطر ہر ملک اپنی معیشت کو گلوبلائزیشن کے اس عمل سے وابستہ کرنا چاہتا ہے اور اس طرح وہ ترقی یافتہ امیر صنعتی ممالک کی بالواسطہ سرپرستی کے نظام کا امیر بن جاتا ہے۔ بیرونی سرمائے سے پابندیاں ہٹانے، زر مبادلہ کا کنٹرول ختم ہونے اور بیرونی سرمایہ کی آمد کے باعث ترقی پذیر ممالک کی معیشتیں مغربی ممالک کی صنعتی اشیاء کے سیلاب تلے دب کر رہ جاتی ہیں۔ مشرق بعید کے بعض ممالک کے حالیہ معاشی بحران کے پس پشت ایسے ہی سامراجی عزائم کار فرما رہے ہیں۔ چنانچہ نیا عالمی معاشی ڈھانچہ جو گلوبلائزیشن، 'بھکاری'، 'آزاد روی اور منڈی کی معیشت پر استوار ہے' ترقی پذیر معیشتوں پر اس کے تندہی، سیاسی و ثقافتی مضر اثرات سے پہلو تھی نہیں کی جاسکتی۔ بلاشبہ کھلے پن اور مسابقت کے اس معاشی نظام میں اشیاء کی کوالٹی بہتر ہوتی ہے، پیداوار اور کارکردگی میں بھی اضافہ ہوتا ہے اور لاگت میں بھی کمی واقع ہوتی ہے۔ نیز اقوام ایک دوسرے کے مادی اور انسانی وسائل سے استفادہ کر سکتی ہیں۔ لیکن بدل و انصاف پر مبنی مسابقت اور آزاد روی کا نظام چند تحفظات کا تقاضا ہے جو کہ اس نظام میں مفقود ہیں۔

پسماندہ اور غریب ممالک درآمدی محصولات سے مستثنیٰ خطوں Tariff-free Zones کے قیام کے باعث اپنی ملکی اشیاء کو تحفظ نہیں دے سکتے اور کھلے مقابلہ کی اس فضا میں ترقی یافتہ صنعتی

رکھنے کی بجائے اپنے عالمی مفادات کو ی پیش نظر رکھتا ہے۔ کشمیریوں کے حق خود ارادیت کے حصول کی جدوجہد میں تو اقوام متحدہ کی منکور شدہ قراردادوں کے مطابق وہاں رائے شماری نہیں کرائی جاسکتی۔ جب کہ مشرقی تیمور کی انڈونیشیا سے علیحدگی کے لئے حال ہی میں وہاں رائے شماری کروا کر علیحدگی کی راہ ہموار کر دی گئی۔ اس سارے عمل میں مغربی طاقتوں کا کردار قابل اعتراض تھا۔ اقوام متحدہ کو مغربی دنیا کے مفاد میں مالیاتی ایجنسیوں اور NATO کی قوت کا بے دریغ استعمال کرنے کا لائسنس حاصل ہے۔ المختصر اس قسم کی صورت حال میں ریاست کے اقتدار اعلیٰ کا تصور عمل نظر ہو چکا ہے۔ ترقی پذیر ممالک کی بیشتر سیاسی قیادتیں جائزیت Legitimacy یعنی اپنی قانونی و اخلاقی حیثیت کو تسلیم کرانے کے سلسلہ میں امریکہ کی سرپرستی کے حصول میں سرگرم عمل رہتی ہیں۔ اس قسم کی صورت حال میں اقوام متحدہ کے چارٹر کے تحت اقوام عالم کی مساوی حیثیت کو تسلیم کرنا یا انہوں کے اندرونی معاملات میں عدم مداخلت کا اصول اب قصہ ماضی بننا نظر آ رہا ہے۔ تاہم اس ساری صورت حال کے باوجود مستقبل میں قومی ریاستی نظام کے اپنی ڈھیلی ڈھالی صورت میں موجود رہنے کا امکان ہے۔ نیز بین الاقوامی تعلقات میں ریاستوں کے ساتھ ساتھ غیر ریاستی ایکٹرز یعنی پھر پیشل گروپ بھی فعال رہیں گے۔ جب کہ اقوام کے مابین باہمی اشتراک و تعاون اور رابطوں کی نئی نئی شکلیں ابھرتی رہیں گی۔

۳۔ آبادی کا دباؤ: بڑھتی ہوئی انسانی آبادی اپنے ساتھ متعدد مسائل اور نئے نئے تقاضوں کو جنم دینے کا باعث بنتی ہے۔ بین الاقوامی تعلقات پر آبادی کا دباؤ کئی پہلوؤں سے اثر انداز ہوتا ہے۔ بعض صورتوں میں آبادی کا پھیلاؤ سامراجی عزائم کی تکمیل کا پیش خیمہ بنتا ہے۔ جیسا کہ دوسری جنگ عظیم سے قبل جرمنی اور جاپان نے اپنی آبادی کی دوسرے علاقوں تک دسترس کے لئے دوسرے ممالک کے خلاف جارحیت پر مبنی اقدامات کئے اور اس طرح دنیا کو تباہ کن عالمی جنگ کی بجلی میں جمونک دیا۔ دور حاضر میں ایشیا میں یہ مسئلہ گھمبیر صورت اختیار کرنا جا رہا ہے جہاں قومی وسائل پر بڑھتی ہوئی آبادی کا بوجھ مسلسل بڑھ رہا ہے۔ جب کہ دوسری طرف ملکی وسائل نئے تقاضوں سے عمدہ رہ آہونے اور وسیع آبادی کی کفالت کرنے کی صلاحیت سے عاری نظر آتے ہیں۔ تیسری دنیا کے متعدد ممالک جہاں 'انفلاس' خوراک کی کمی اور بیماریوں کی روک تھام جیسے مسائل سے دوچار ہیں۔ امیر صنعتی ممالک کی طرف آبادی کی منتقلی کی راہ بھی تیزی سے سدود ہو رہی ہے۔ چنانچہ اہل اود شمار مستقبل کی گمنامی تصور پیش کرتے ہیں۔ تنگ دستی اور حالات کے جبر کے تحت ترقی یافتہ ممالک کے خلاف فریب اقوام کی طرف سے نظروں اور کھنچاؤ کی کیفیت میں اضافہ ہو گا۔ خدشہ ہے کہ قومی مفادات کا اس قسم کا انکراؤ کس اندوہناک عالمی منظر کی کیفیت کا مستقل طور پر آئینہ دار نہ بن جائے۔

آزادی سے ہنستار ہوئیں۔ بلاشبہ قومی یکجہتی، قومی تعمیر نو اور جذبہ یکجہت کے فروغ میں بیٹھنے کے اہم کردار ادا کیا۔ لوگوں کو ان کی اجتماعی شناخت اور قومی مقاصد کے شعور سے ہنستار کیا۔ لیکن یہ تصور کا ایک رخ ہے۔ اقوام عالم کے مابین قومی مفادات کا ٹکراؤ، جنگوں، تصادم اور ظلم و استحصال کا پیش خیمہ بھی بنا۔ طاقتور اقوام نے دوسری اقوام پر اپنی بالادستی قائم کرنے اور جوغ الارض کی خواہش کی تسکین کے لئے دنیا میں سامراجی و نوآبادیاتی نظام مسلط کئے رکھا۔ وطنی قومیت کے معنر اثرات کی علامہ اقبالؒ نے اپنے ان اشعار میں یوں وضاحت کی ہے:

اقوام جہاں میں ہے رقابت تو اسی سے تغیر ہے مقصود تجارت تو اسی سے
خالی ہے صداقت سے سیاست تو اسی سے کزور کا گھر ہوتا ہے عارت تو اسی سے

رنگ و نسل اور قومی مفادات کے حصول کے نام پر تصادم کے باعث دنیا کو اسی صدی میں دو تباہ کن عالمی جنگوں کا سامنا کرنا پڑا۔ مزید برآں ملکی سرحدوں کے اندر بھی قومی اقلیتوں کے حقوق کے تحفظ کا مسئلہ بھی لادینیت پر قائم بیٹھنے کا ہی شاخسانہ ہے۔

دور حاضر میں اگرچہ قومی مفادات کے حصول کی حیوانی و فطری جبلت کو قابو کرنے کے لئے عالمی اقدار اور شعور کی نشوونما ہوئی ہے۔ نیز اس مقصد کی خاطر عالمی ادارے اور طور طریقے بھی اجاگر ہو چکے ہیں۔ تاہم طاقتور اقوام مردجہ عالمی نظام میں بالادست ہیں اور انہیں بہت سی مراعات حاصل ہیں۔ عالمی نظام اور قومی مفادات کے دائرہ عمل کا تعین کرنے کے سلسلہ میں انعامت و وابستگیوں کے تانے بانے میں اعتدال برقرار رکھنے کا مسئلہ ہنوز توجہ طلب ہے۔ مستقبل میں بیٹھنے بین الاقوامیت کی حقیقی روح کی بیداری کی راہ میں حائل رہے گا۔ نیز قومی مفادات کے حصول کی دوڑ دھوپ میں سامراجیت نئی نئی شکلیں اختیار کرتی رہے گی۔

ریاست کے اقتدار اعلیٰ کا ایسا رواجی تصور جو خود

۳۔ قومی ریاستی نظام اور اقتدار اعلیٰ: کفالت اور لائقیت پر مبنی ریاستی نظام کے شاخسانہ کے

طور پر ابجرا' دور حاضر کے آفاقیت Globalisation اور بین الاقوامیت کے دور میں قابل عمل نہیں رہا۔ تدریجی بالخصوص مواصلاتی ترقیوں اور واحد سپر طاقت کی بالادستی سے عبارت Unipolarity دنیا میں ریاست کے اقتدار اعلیٰ کا رواجی تصور نظر ثانی کا محتاج بن کر رہ گیا ہے۔ دور حاضر میں ہر ریاست کے ہر ذی دنیا سے تعلقات اور لین دین میں تیزی سے اضافہ ہوتا جا رہا ہے۔ اس نئے عالمی نظام کے اندر امریکہ قومی حق ارادیت، جمہوریت اور بنیادی انسانی حقوق جیسے اصولوں کے تحفظ کا علمبردار بنا ہوا ہے۔ ان اصولوں کی خلاف ورزی کے دعوے کی آڑ لے کر وہ ملکوں کے خالصتاً اندرونی معاملات میں مداخلت کرنے سے بھی نہیں چھوکتا۔ چنانچہ کانگریس کے بنائے گئے پالیسی قوانین کے تحت امریکہ مختلف اقدامات کرنے میں اپنے آپ کو حق بجانب سمجھتا ہے۔

جب کہ ان اصولوں کی پاسداری کرنے میں بھی امریکہ غیر جانبداری اور عدل و انصاف کو مد نظر

فوری طور پر توجہ طلب ہیں۔ ان مسائل کا تعلق بالواسطہ یا بلاواسطہ بین الاقوامیت کے ان پہلوؤں سے ہے، جنگ و جدل، نیشنلزم، ریاستی نظام اور اقتدار اعلیٰ کا روایتی تصور، افزائش آبادی اور اس کا دباؤ، صنعت و تجارت اور ترقی، سمارجیت اور نوآبادیاتی نظام اور اس کی باقیات، لسانی و نسلی امتیازات اور آخری پہلو آفاقی فکر کی ترویج اور اس کی سمتوں سے متعلق ہے۔

۱۔ جنگ و جدل و تصادم: اقوام عالم کے مابین ابتدائے آفرینش سے ہی جنگ و جدل اور باہمی تصادم کی کیفیت کسی نہ کسی شکل میں موجود رہی ہے۔ مستقبل میں بھی اس کے امکانات کو یکسر نظر انداز کر دینا حقیقت شناسی نہیں بشرطیکہ اس کی کوئی غیر معمولی متبادل صورت اجاگر ہو جائے۔ جنگ کے مقاصد خرید و فروش اور حق و باطل دونوں پہلوؤں کے آئینہ دار رہے ہیں۔ دور حاضر میں اس کے رونما ہونے کی صورت میں فوائد کے مقابلہ میں نقصانات کہیں زیادہ ہیں۔ موجودہ جنگ کو چھوٹے پیمانے پر محدود رکھنے کی ضمانت نہیں دی جاسکتی۔ مقامی یا علاقائی سطح پر لڑی جانے والی کوئی بھی جنگ کسی بھی وقت عالمی امن و سلامتی کے لئے خطرہ بن سکتی ہے۔ نہ کلیائی و کیسائی ہتھیاروں اور دور مار بلاسٹک میزائٹوں کی ایجادات کے باعث جدید جنگیں ہلاکت خیزی اور تباہی و بربادی کے اعتبار سے لامتناہی ہو چکی ہیں۔ یہی وجہ ہے کہ ان کے سدباب کے لئے ہر ممکن اقدام کیا جا رہا ہے۔ بلاشبہ اب اقوام عالم کو ایسی جنگ کی تیاری کرنا پڑتی ہے جو کوئی بھی لڑنا نہیں چاہتا۔ ہر قوم کو اس بات کا پورا پورا اور اک ہے کہ جو ہری جنگ کی صورت میں تباہی و بربادی سب کا مقدر بن جائے گی۔

جنگوں کو محدود اور کنٹرول کرنے کے لئے اگرچہ اقوام عالم عالمی اداروں اور دیگر تنظیمات رائج کرنے کے ذریعہ پوری طرح سرگرم عمل ہیں۔ تاہم مقامی اور علاقائی سطح پر تصادموں کو مکمل طور پر روکنے کی ضمانت نہیں دی جاسکتی۔ خیال ہے کہ قومی مفادات کے حصول کے لئے اقوام کی طرف سے بین الاقوامی قانون کی خلاف ورزی کا عمل کسی نہ کسی شکل میں جاری رہے گا۔ مثلاً مشرق وسطیٰ میں آئندہ آبی وسائل کی تقسیم کے بارے میں تصادم کی کیفیت پیدا ہو جانے کے امکان کو مسترد نہیں کیا جاسکتا۔ واضح ہو اس خطے میں بیشتر دریا مثلاً نیل، دجلہ و فرات وغیرہ مختلف ممالک میں سے گزر کر ان کی زرعی آبپاشی کی ضرورتوں کو پوری کرتے ہیں۔ روز افزوں ترقیوں، آبادی کے دباؤ میں اضافہ اور زرعی ضرورتوں کے پیش نظر جوں جوں زیادہ پانی کی طلب پیدا ہوگی تو اس کے مضمرات کے طور پر قومی مفادات کا ٹکراؤ جنگوں کا پیش خیمہ بن سکتا ہے۔

۲۔ نیشنلزم: دور جدید میں نیشنلزم محض ایک سیاسی تصور ہی نہیں رہا بلکہ اسے ایک سیاسی و روحانی عقیدہ اور جدید ریاستی نظام کی ٹھوس اساس کی حیثیت حاصل ہو گئی ہے۔ مثبت پہلو کے اعتبار سے دیکھا جائے تو نیشنلزم تیسری دنیا کے لوگوں کے لئے حصول آزادی کا پامبر بن کر ابھرا۔ بیسویں صدی میں قومی حق ارادیت کے اصول کی بنا پر تیسری دنیا میں متعدد اقوام

بین الاقوامی نظام دورا ہے پر

International System at the Cross Roads

پروفیسر ڈاکٹر محمد سرور

روایتی قومی ریاستی نظام پر استوار عالمی نظام دور حاضر میں اپنی انتہائی شکل میں رو بہ عمل ہے۔ ماضی میں یہ نظام "توازن طاقت" Balance of Power کا آئینہ دار رہا ہے جس کا ڈھانچہ سرد جنگ کے خاتمہ کے بعد زیر و زبر ہو کر رہ گیا۔ تاہم تیزی سے بدلتی ہوئی دنیا میں آج بھی قومی ریاستوں کا وجود اس نظام کے اندر ایک اہم حقیقت کی حیثیت سے قائم و دائم ہے۔ تکنیکی ترقیوں اور عالمی اشتراک و تعاون میں فروغ نے اس کے بنیادی ڈھانچوں میں زبردست تبدیلیاں برپا کی ہیں۔ حتیٰ کہ ریاستی اقتدار اعلیٰ State Sovereignty کا تصور بھی اب بدلا بدلا سا نظر آتا ہے۔ پرانے مسائل نئی شکل میں ابھر رہے ہیں۔ انسان کے پاس علم، وافر وسائل، سوتیلیں اور نئی نئی مہارتیں آگئی ہیں جن کے ذریعہ وہ کروڑوں زندگیوں کو آسودگی سے ہمکنار کر سکتا ہے۔ لیکن اس کے ساتھ ساتھ انہی کے توسط سے تباہی و ہلاکت کا سامان بھی کیا جاسکتا ہے۔ بعض مسائل دن بدن گھمبیر صورت اختیار کرتے چلے جا رہے ہیں جب کہ درپیش خطرات میں اضافہ ہو گیا ہے۔ یعنی جوں جوں دنیا ایک وحدت کی طرف گامزن ہے مسائل بھی اسی تناسب سے گہرے اور وسیع لا اثرات بننے چلے جا رہے ہیں۔ جوہری پھیلاؤ کا خطرہ الگ سردوں پر لٹک رہا ہے۔

بین الاقوامیت کے مسائل

بین الاقوامی معاشرہ کو مختلف النوع مسائل کا سامنا ہے جو ہر آن بدلتے ہوئے عالمی حالات میں انسانی گرفت اور عمل و خرد کے لئے چیلنج بنے ہوئے ہیں۔ اوتھانٹ جو جنوری ۱۹۷۲ء میں اقوام متحدہ کے سیکرٹری جنرل بنے 'انہوں نے چار بڑے درجوں کی صورت میں ان کی نشاندہی کی ہے۔ اس کے مطابق پہلے درجہ میں ایسے مسائل آتے ہیں جو اقوام عالم کے مابین فکری یا سیاسی نوعیت کے اختلافات کا نشانہ ہیں اور اس بنا پر وہ تصادم اور کھنچاؤ کا باعث بنے ہوئے ہیں۔ جب کہ معاشی عدم مساوات اور طبقاتی امتیازات سے پیدا ہونے والے سماجی و معاشی نوعیت کے مسائل تو لاتعداد ہیں جو دنیا کے لوگوں کے مابین تصادم اور محاسنت کی ہی کیفیت پیدا کرتے ہیں۔ اقوام عالم کے مابین نسلی، لسانی اور تہذیبی امتیازات کے باعث بھی کھنچاؤ کی ہی صورت حال پیدا ہوتی ہے جس سے غلط فہمیاں اور محاسنت کو فروغ ملتا ہے۔ اوتھانٹ کے خیال میں نوآبادیاتی نظام کی باقیات بھی اقوام کے مابین تعلقات میں کشیدگی اور امتیازات میں اضافہ کا باعث بنتی ہیں۔

تجزیہ و تحقیق کی خاطر دانشوروں نے اس ضمن میں آٹھ خصوصی مسائل کی نشاندہی کی ہے جو

International System At The Cross Roads: An Overview

Muhammad Sarwar

In this work, the writer depicted his views on the future world order. According to the author:

In the new world order, traditional problems are emerging in new guise with different dimensions. Man has been endowed with tremendous resources, skills and refinement. On the negative side, he has developed equal potential to improve weapons of total destruction. Emphasis is increasingly placed on the refinement on unconventional weapons and effective methods of delivery by piloted planes or guided missiles, improvement of early warning systems, interception devices of key equipment and variety of armaments.

The advancement has been paralleled with equal number of new thorny problems with wider ramifications. These include: The treatment of imminent warfare and that of nuclear proliferation, issue of destructive nationalism, state sovereignty and its compatibility with a global order and socio-economic problems emanating from population explosion. The wealthy nations have developed a new form of imperialism.

The disparities between the rich and the poor nations have reached at alarming point. Technological factors are proving decisively important, involving the use of substitutes, the development of synthesis and alloys, the utilization of inferior ores and the use of different new sources of energy. These have given, of course, an edge to the developed nations in the distribution of the world resources.

The underlying changes that are bound to occur in future within the elements of national power and thereby the future give way to "Clash of civilizations". The contention is that the future clash between the civilizations may take the form of rivalry between the western and the Muslim Civilizations. Nevertheless, it

does not rule out the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the West and the world of Islam.

In the last portion of this article, the author suggested certain steps that can help promote international peace and tranquility. In this context, he hinted the enforcement of international peace and the promotion of global cooperation as a multi-dimensional phenomena which should be addressed through continuous efforts with full vigor, devotion, commitment and missionary zeal. This needs a subtle combination of an attitude of moderation, idealism and realism.

Documents

Text of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, (NPT)
Washington; 01 July 1968.

The States concluding this treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the treaty".

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Undertaking to cooperate in facilitation the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Impressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear or non-nuclear weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in atmosphere, in outer space and underwater in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all tests explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and continue negotiations to this end.

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Recalling that, in accordance with the charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the dependence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the World's human and economic resources, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear weapons State Party the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

Each non nuclear weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy to peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principle nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:

- a) source or special fissionable material, or
- b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapons State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the States in accordance with the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180-day from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence no later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and unconformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas for the world.

Article V

Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used would be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary Government which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. There upon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Government shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty to consider such an amendment.

Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five

years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depository Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratifications and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.

This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositories of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instrument of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 01 January, 1967.

For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight

Source: United States Information Service (USIS).

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY, UNITED NATIONS; September 10, 1996

PREAMBLE

The State Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the State Parties")

CONVINCED that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such measures.

AFFIRMING the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security.

ARTICLE I BASIC OBLIGATIONS

1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

ARTICLE IV VERIFICATION

THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM

The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities for seismological monitoring, radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories, hydroacoustic monitoring, and respective means of communication, and shall be supported by the International Data Centre of the Technical Secretariat.

The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the Technical Secretariat. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be owned and operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them in accordance with the Protocol.

Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre. Each State Party shall cooperate with the International Data Centre through its National Authority.

ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

REQUEST FOR AN ON-SITE INSPECTION

34. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Part II of the Protocol in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State.

35. The sole Purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear ex-

plosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any fact which might assist in identifying any possible violator.

36. The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-site inspection request within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request information in accordance with paragraph 37. The requesting State Party shall refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests.

37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a combination thereof. The request shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.

38. The requesting State Party shall present the on-site inspection request to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for the latter to begin immediate processing.

Follow-up After Submission of an On-site Inspection Request

39. The Executive Council shall begin its consideration immediately upon receipt of the on-site inspection request.

40. The Director-General, after receiving the on-site inspection request, shall acknowledge receipt of the request to the requesting State Party within two hours and communicate the request to the State Party sought to be inspected within six hours.

ARTICLE VII AMENDMENTS

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Any State Party may also propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto. Proposals for amendment shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 to 6. Proposals for changes, in

accordance with paragraph 7, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 8.

2. The proposed amendment shall be considered and adopted only by a Amendment Conference.

3. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and the Depositary and seek the views of the States Parties on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Director-General no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Director-General shall convene an Amendment conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

4. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless all States Parties that support the convening of an Amendment Conference request that it be held earlier. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment.

5. Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.

6. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.

7. In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, Part I and III of the Protocol and Annexes I and 2 to the Protocol shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8, if the proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. All other provisions of the Protocol and the Annexes thereto shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph

8. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 7 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary information to the Director-General. Additional

information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any state Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary;

(b) No later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions of this Treaty and its implementation and shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council;

(c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7. No later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;

(d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;

(e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet the acceptance required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session;

(f) The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph;

(g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.

ARTICLE VIII
REVIEW OF THE TREATY

1. Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into force of this Treaty a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Treaty. On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article VII.

2. At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Conferences may be convened with the same objective, if the Conference so decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year. Such Conferences may be convened after an interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference as a matter of substance.

3. Normally, any Review Conference shall be held immediately following the regular annual session of the Conference provided for in Article II.

ARTICLE IX
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

3. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XII RATIFICATION

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States according to their respective constitutional processes.

ARTICLE XIII ACCESSION

Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

ARTICLE XIV ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.

2. If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification on the request of a majority of those States. That Conference shall examine the extent to which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 has been met and shall consider and decided by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.

Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty part
1. The International Monitoring System and International
Data Centre Functions

PART II

ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

4. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The procedures in this part shall be implemented pursuant to the provisions for on-site inspections set out in Article IV
2. The On-site inspection shall be carried out in the area where the event that trigger the on-site inspection request occurred
3. The area of an on-site inspection shall be continuous and its size shall not exceed 1000 square kilometers. There shall be no linear distance greater than 50 Kilometers in any direction
4. The duration of an on-site inspection shall not exceed 60 days from the date of the approval of the on-site inspection request in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 46, but may be extended by a maximum of 70 days in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49
5. If the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate extends to the territory or other place under the jurisdiction or control of more than one State Party, the provisions on on-site inspections shall, as appropriate, apply to each of the States Parties to which the inspection area extends
6. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State Party but is located on the territory of another State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the inspection area requires transit through the territory of a State Party other than the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations concerning such inspections in accordance with this Protocol. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory the inspection area is located shall facilitate the inspection and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the inspection team to carry out its task in a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to reach the inspection area shall facilitate such transit.

Indian Nuclear Doctrine

- ◆ Will pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
- ◆ Won't be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
- ◆ Won't use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons or are not aligned with nuclear weapons powers.
- ◆ Will maintain sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces as part of deterrence.
- ◆ Will put into place a robust command and control system, vesting the release nuclear weapons for use in the Prime Minister or the designated successor(s).

The Hindustan Times, New Delhi. 18-08-1999

Text of the Lahore Declaration signed between India and Pakistan, Lahore; 21 February 1999.

The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and prosperity for their people;

Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;

Recognizing that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;

Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence,

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit,

Committed to the objectives of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment;

Recalling their agreement of 23 September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose,

Have agreed that their respective governments:

- shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
- shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.
- shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
- shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.
- reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realization of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development. Reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.
- shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee
Prime Minister of the
Republic of India

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Text of the joint statement issued at the conclusion of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan, Lahore; 21 February, 1999.

1. In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Pakistan from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus Service.
2. The Prime Minister of Pakistan received the Indian prime minister at the Wagah border on 20 February, 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Minar-i-Pakistan, Mausoleum of Allama Iqbal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House.
3. The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that,
 - a) The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.
 - b) The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.
 - c) The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2k.
 - d) The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalizing the visa and travel regime.

- e) The two sides shall appoint a two-member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWS.
4. They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a bus service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports.
5. Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21 February, 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries.
6. The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.
7. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif to visit India.
8. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee thanked Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.

Reproduced from *Dawn*, 22 February, 1999.

Text of Memorandum of Understanding signed between Pakistan and India, Lahore; 21 February, 1999.

The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan:

Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the UN charter;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23 September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following;

1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their

respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests.
5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.
6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.
7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors-General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.
8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues

within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.

Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements.

(Shamshad Ahmad)
Foreign Secretary
Of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

(K. Raghunath)
Foreign Secretary
Of the Republic of India

Reproduced from *Down*, 22 February, 1999.

MILITARY TAKEOVER IN PAKISTAN

October 12, 2000

Text of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pervez Musharraf's Speech

My dear countrymen, Assalam Alaikum

You are all aware of the kind of turmoil and uncertainty that our country has gone through in recent times. Not only have all the institutions been played around with, and systematically destroyed, the economy too is in a state of collapse. We are also aware of the self-serving policies being followed, which have rocked the very foundation of the Federation of Pakistan.

The armed forces have been facing incessant public clamor to remedy the fast declining situation from all sides of the political divide. These concerns were always conveyed to the Prime Minister in all sincerity, keeping the interest of the country foremost. It is apparent that they were never taken in the correct spirit. My singular concern has been the well-being of our country alone. This has been the sole reason that the army willingly offered its services for nation building tasks, the results of which have already been judged by you.

All my efforts and counsel to the Government it seems were to no avail. Instead they now turned their attention on the army itself. Despite all my advices they tried to interfere with the armed forces, the last remaining viable institution in which all of you take so much pride and look up to, at all times, for the stability, unity and integrity of our beloved country. Our concerns again were conveyed in no uncertain terms but the Government of Mr Nawaz Sharif chose to ignore all these and tried to politicize the army, destabilize it and tried to create dissension within its ranks.

I was in Sri Lanka on an official visit. On my way back the PIA commercial flight was not allowed to land at Karachi but was ordered to be diverted to any where outside Pakistan, despite acute shortage of fuel, imperilling the life of all the passengers. Thanks be to Allah, this evil design was thwarted through speedy army action.

My dear countrymen having briefly explained the background, I wish to inform you that the armed forces have moved in as a last resort, to prevent any further destabilization. I have done so with all sincerity, loyalty and selfless devotion to the country with the armed forces firmly behind me. I do not wish to make a lengthy policy statement at this moment. I shall do that very soon. For the moment I only wish to assure you that the situation in the country is perfectly calm, stable and under control. Let no outside forces think they can take advantage of the prevailing situation.

Dear brothers and sisters, your armed forces have never and shall never let you down, Inshallah, we shall preserve the integrity and sovereignty of our country to the last drop of our blood. I request you all, to remain calm and support your armed forces in the re-establishment of order to pave the way for a prosperous future for Pakistan.

May Allah guide us on the path of truth and honour.

Allah Hafiz.

Complete Text of President Bill Clinton's address to the people of Pakistan

March 25th, 2000

As-Salaam-o-Alaikum

It is an honor to be the first President of the United States to address all the people of Pakistan and the first to visit your country in more than thirty years.

I am here as a great admirer of your land's rich history, of its centuries of civilization that stretches long as the Indus river. I am here as whose own nation has been greatly enriched by the talents of Americans of Pakistani descent.

But most of all, I am here as a friend. A grateful friend who values our long partnership, a concerned friend, who cares deeply about the future course of your country. A committed friend who will stand with the people of Pakistan as long as you seek the stable, prosperous, democratic nation of your founder's dreams.

More than half a century ago, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, shared that vision as he addressed Pakistan's constituent assembly. "If you work together", he said, "in a spirit that everyone of you is first, second and last a citizen with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make."

The Quaid-e-Azam ended that speech by reading a telegram he had just received. The message expressed hope for success in the great work you were about to undertake. That message was from the people of the United States.

Despite setbacks and sufferings, the people of Pakistan have built this nation from the ground up, on a foundation of democracy and law. For more than fifty years now, we have been partners

with you. Pakistan helped the United States open a dialogue with China. We stood together when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Our partnership helped end the cold war. And in the years since, we have co-operated in the fight against terrorism. Our soldiers have stood together in missions of peace in every part of the world. This is your proud legacy – our proud legacy.

Now we are in the dawn of a new century and changing world has come into view. All around the globe, a revolution is taking hold. A revolution that is tearing down barriers and building up networks among nations and individuals. For millions it has made real the dream of a better life, with good schools, good jobs, a good future for their children.

Like all key moments in human history, this one poses some hard choices. For this era does not reward who struggle in vain; to redraw borders with blood. It belongs to those with the vision to live beyond borders for partners in commerce and trade. It does not favor nations where governments claim all the power to solve every problem. Instead, it favors nations where the people have the freedom and responsibility to shape their own destinies.

Pakistan can achieve great things in this new world. But real obstacles stand in the way. The political situation, the economic situation, the tensions in this region – they are holding Pakistan back from achieving its full potential in the global economy.

I know I don't have to tell you all this. This is something you know, something you have seen. But I do have hope. I believe Pakistan can make its way through the troubles and build a future worthy of the visions of its founders – a stable, prosperous, democratic Pakistan, secure in its borders, friendly with its neighbors, confident in its future. A Pakistan, as Jinnah said, at peace within and at peace without.

What is in the way of that vision? Well, clearly, the absence of democracy makes it harder, not easier, for people to move ahead. I know democracy is not easy; it certainly is not perfect. The authors

of my own country's constitution knew that as well. They said that the mission of the United States would always be, and I quote, "to form a more perfect union." In other words, they knew we would never fully realize our ideals, but that we could keep moving closer to them. That means the question for free people is always, how to keep moving forward.

We share your disappointment that previous democratic governments in Pakistan did not do better for their citizens. But one thing is certain; democracy cannot develop if it is constantly uprooted before it has a chance to firmly take hold. Successful democratic government takes time and patience and hard work. The answer to the flaw of democracy is not to end democracy but to improve it.

I know General Musharraf has just announced the date for local elections. That is a good step. But the return of civilian democratic rule requires a complete plan, a real road map. Of course, no one from the outside can tell Pakistan how it should be governed. That is for you, the people of Pakistan, to decide. And you should be given the opportunity to do so. I hope and believe you want Pakistan to be a country where the rule of law prevails. A country where officials are accountable. A country where the people can express their points of view without fear. A country that wisely forsakes revenge for the ruins of the past – and instead, pursues reconciliation for the sake of the future.

If you choose this path, your friends in the United States will stand with you.

There are obstacles to your progress including violence and extremism. We Americans have also felt these evils. Surely, we have both suffered enough to know that no grievance, no cause, no system of belief can ever justify deliberate killing of innocents. Those who bomb bus stations, target embassies and kill those who uphold the law are not heroes. They are our common enemies. For their aim is to exploit painful problems, not to resolve them.

Just as we have fought together to defeat those who traffic in narcotics, today I ask Pakistan to intensify its efforts to defeat those who inflict terror.

Another obstacle to Pakistan's progress is the tragic squandering of effort, energy and wealth on policies that make your nation poorer but not safer. That is one reason we must try to resolve differences between our two nations on nuclear weapons.

Again, you must make the decision. But my questions to you are no different from those I posed in India. Are you really more secure today than you were before you tested nuclear weapons? Will these weapons make war with India less likely, or, simply more deadly? Will it bring you closer to your friends around the world, closer to the partnerships you need to build your dreams?

Today, the United States is dramatically cutting its nuclear arsenal. Around the world, nations are renouncing these weapons. I ask Pakistan also to be a leader in non-proliferation. In your own self-interest and to help us prevent dangerous technologies from spreading to those who might have no reservations at all about using them. Take the right steps now to prevent escalation, to avoid miscalculation, to reduce the risk of war.

As leaders in your own country have suggested, one way to strengthen your security would be to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The whole world will rally around you.

I believe it is also in Pakistan's interest to reduce tensions with India. When I was in New Delhi, I urged India to seize the opportunity for dialogue. Pakistan must also help create conditions that will allow dialogue to succeed. For India and Pakistan, this must be a time for restraint, for respect for the Line of Control and renewed lines of communication.

I have listened carefully to General Musharraf and others. I understand your concerns about Kashmir. I share your conviction that human rights of all its people must be respected. But a stark

truth must also be faced – there is no military solution to Kashmir. International sympathy, support and intervention cannot be won by provoking a bigger, bloodier conflict. On the contrary, sympathy and support will be lost and no matter how great the grievance, it is wrong to support attacks against civilians across the Line of Control.

In the meantime, I ask again, will endless, costly struggle build good schools for your children? Will it make your cities safer? Will it bring clean water and better health care? Will it narrow the gaps between those who have and those who have nothing? Will it hasten the day when Pakistan's energy and wealth are invested in building its future? The answer to all these questions is, plainly, no!

The American people don't want to see tensions rise and sufferings increase. We want to be a force for peace, but we cannot force peace. We can't impose it. We cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute in Kashmir. Only you and India can do that through dialogue.

Last year, the world watched with hope as the leaders of India and Pakistan met in Lahore on the road to better relations. This is the right road to peace for Pakistan and India and for the resolution of the problems in Kashmir. Therefore, I will do all I can to help both sides to restore the promise and the process of Lahore.

A few months ago, we had a ceremony at the White House to mark the end of Ramadan. An Imam shared a message from the Quran, which tells us, that God created nations and tribes that we might know one another, not that we may despise one another.

During the years of my presidency, I have tried to know the Muslim world as part of our common humanity. I have stood with the people of Bosnia and Kosovo, who were brutalized because of their Muslim faith. I have mourned with the Jordanians and Moroccans at the loss of their National Council in Gaza. Today, I am proud to speak with you, because I value our long friendship

and because I believe our friendship can still be a force for tolerance and understanding throughout the world.

I hope you will be able to meet the difficult challenges we have discussed today. If you do not, there is a danger that Pakistan may grow even more isolated, draining even more resources away from the need of the people, moving even closer to a conflict no one can win. But if you do meet these challenges, our full economic and political partnership can be restored for the benefit of the people of Pakistan.

So let us draw strength from the words of the great Pakistani poet, Mohammed Iqbal, who said, "in the midst of today's upheaval, give us a vision of tomorrow."

If people of Pakistan and South Asia are driven by a tolerant, generous vision of tomorrow, your nation and this entire region can be the great success story of the world's next 50 years. It is all in your hands. I know enough about the ingenuity and enterprise and heart of Pakistani people to know that this is possible.

With the right vision rooted in tomorrow's promise, not yesterday's pain, rooted in dialogue not in destruction, Pakistan can fulfill its destiny as a beacon of democracy in the Muslim world, an engine of growth, a model of tolerance and an anchor of stability.

Pakistan can have a future worthy of the dreams of Quaid-e-Azam. If you choose that future, United States will walk with you. I hope you will make that choice. And I pray for our continued friendship, for peace, for Pakistan.

Pakistan Zindabad.

Government of Pakistan

National Reconstruction Bureau

Devolution of Power and Responsibility

The Seven Point Agenda

To address the institutional crisis and advance national reconstruction the Chief Executive elaborated a seven point agenda, which is:

- 1) Rebuild national confidence morale
- 2) Strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony
- 3) Revive and restore investor confidence
- 4) Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice
- 5) Depoliticize state institutions
- 6) Devolution of power to grass root level
- 7) Ensure swift and across the board accountability

The Chief Executive's strategy for the reconstruction of local government is part of the six points. This is because this reconstruction process utilizes a bottom up approach, and includes the following:

- 1) The devolution of power for the genuine empowerment of citizens.
- 2) The decentralization of administrative authority.
- 3) The deconcentration of professional functions.
- 4) The diffusion of power for checks and balances to prelude autocracy.
- 5) The distribution of resources to the provincial and local level.

Six of the principal characteristics of this plan are:

- 1) First, the voting age will be lowered from 21 to 18 years so as to bring the young generation in to the main stream of life as participants in the national process.
- 2) Second, creating local government structures along with a carefully crafted system for provision of requisite financial resources to the districts. These will enable the new governments to provide for more roads, communication, electricity, running water, sewerage, education and health facilities, on the one hand; and help the districts in the development of agriculture and industry on the other, thus opening the doors of greater job opportunities for the people. These are core objectives of the system and demand a new fiscal transfer mechanism to devolve responsibility, resources and authority to the local level while reinforcing provincial autonomy.
- 3) Third, granting one hundred percent representation for women and one hundred percent representation for the men in Union Councils and in Village Councils derived from them.
- 4) Fourth, the creation of a full fledged district government with the district as the basic governance and development unit of the country, and Citizens Community Boards at the grass roots level creating an enabling environment for massive peoples involvement in civic affairs through the close monitoring of services, citizens rights and security.
- 5) Fifth, the creation of an integrated rural-urban structure at the tehsil level to bridge the rural-urban divide for all times to come and turn the current trend of 'ruralism of urban areas' into a regular process of 'urbanization of rural areas'.
- 6) Sixth, establishing the politico administrative mechanism to arrest urban decay and set the stage for the coherent growth of our cities into potentially great urban centers.