

The Role of America in Crises Management: A Study of India- Pakistan Crises (2001-2019)

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ABSTRACT

The enduring antagonism between Pakistan and India enlarged by thoughts of threat perception has spawned recurring crises. Because of the presence of miscalculations the possibility of an accidental clash between both nuclear powers was high. So, through the crisis management technique possible armed collision is controlled. The primary purpose of the study is to analyze the American mediation in the India-Pakistan crises. The nature of the study is qualitative because qualitative research supports explaining comprehensively and helps interpretive objectives to understand the role of America in the India-Pakistan crises. The case study method is applied for the present study and the selected era is from 2001 to 2019. Being a review study descriptive, exploratory and historical approaches are applied to discover the answers of the research questions. This research would offer a guiding structure for studying third-party mediation in the management of the crisis. Consequently, an analysis of this research will support to discover several potential findings of the American involvement in crisis management to keep strategic stability and peace in the South Asian region. But, there is no assurance that the findings and conclusions of this crisis management case study are applied to other contexts or crises.

Keywords: Crises, Crisis Management, Mediation, Perception

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Introduction

In 1947 India and Pakistan emerged on the map of the world as sovereign states consisting of about 1.3 billion (Thakur,2004). But they have tied into the hostile relationship that produced the crises carried high risks particularly when both countries become nuclear powers. (Chari et.al.,2007). In post9/11 era Indian foreign policy trends revealed that the government of India tried to achieve the recognized position of international power. To achieve the above-mentioned status India devised the following policy towards Pakistan.

- a) To declare internationally Pakistan as a shielding state and promoter of terrorist activism.
- b) Delhi tried to convince America to minimize the significance of Pakistan (Iqbal,2005) by alleging Pakistan's involvement in the growth of terrorism for many years.

The reasons of occurring of crises are that both countries failed to resolve their main issues like Kashmir (Fitzpatrick,2014) somewhat, only to worsen the foregoing conditions. Balancing atomic capabilities did not mollify these multifaceted circumstances. (Krepon,2018). Nuclear weapons do not have a calming outcome in their place, they intensify the complication halt a major war but produce crises carried nuclear threat.

Research Objectives

- I. To explore the reasons those forced America to play its role in management of the India- Pakistan crises.
- II. To analyze the American mediation strategies in India- Pakistan crises.

Research Methodology

The nature of this study is qualitative because it helps to explain comprehensively and supports the interpretive objectives of the study. Historical and exploratory approaches are applied to discover the answers to the questions. The historical approach is applied to describe the background of the issue and the descriptive approach used to get over the flaws of the historical approach and explains the techniques which are used by the India, Pakistan, and America to manage the crises. Whereas the descriptive approach addresses the shortcoming of the descriptive approach and discovers the existing situations and the different aspects of crisis management. The case study method applied for the present study is a kind of scientific research that discovers answers to the question through a scientifically well-defined process as it describes the events that occur naturally (Mason,2002). A case study method is limited by the definite era selected for investigation. For the present research, the selected era is from 2001 to 2019 which covers the Military standoff, the Mumbai attacks, the Uri attacks, and Pulwama Crisis. The unit of analysis is an important portion of the research, particularly in the case study (McNabb,2004). The role of America in the management of crises and the reasons for the mediation of the America in India- Pakistan crises selected as a unit of analysis for the present study. The data is systematized according to above stated analytical categories.

For the present research data was collected through primary and secondary sources. Primary sources consist the speeches, government officials' statements, press releases as well as official documents issued by the Indian, Pakistani and American governments. Data was collected through print and electronic sources. Print material included books, published reports research journals, and newspapers. whereas electronic sources included JSTOR and Google Scholar. The present research is handled analytically and for this purpose process of integrative review is applied that is a type of review in which the researcher describes and comprehends the present situation of knowledge, explaining disagreement and agreement inside(Neuman,2011).About 120 readings included books, published documents, research papers, and reports collected from libraries and through websites, JSTOR, and Google scholar were reviewed because for the analytical process literature review is necessary.

Analytical procedure for analysis of qualitative data as described by Creswell (Organization of data, reading, describing, categorizing, inferring, and clarifying)

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followed for present study. Analytical process started by categorizing the data, irrelevant data excluded only material that was needed to plan the study selected. The initial stage was the categorizing of enormous data in a way that could be utilized for analysis. The analytical process is contained to scrutinize the data and record detected inaccuracies. Ideas and themes were recognized according to the research questions. Themes evolved in terms of the role of America in crisis management in the India- Pakistan crises. The opposite opinion was taken from the data and this technique supported the construction of an objective approach to the study and drawing some conclusions.

Crisis Management

Paul Diesing & Glenn Snyder defines crisis as an international order of relations between the government of two or more states in a great degree of clash that carries the maximum possibility of war. The emergence of crises has more risks in the nuclear age consequently, these contain a strange race among these the primary aim is to attain one's goal and have risk in which significance is the struggle to lessen the threats and prevention of tragedy (Schelling, 1966). Purpose of crisis management is an attempt to lessen the threats and retain control as much as possible. Whereas, on another side to use coercive diplomacy and risk-taking tactic effectively to receive the wanted benefits from the adversary and not hurt to interests of another and rank (Baylis, Wirtz, & Gray, 2018; Williams, 1976). one aim of crisis, management is to retain the grip on crisis and try not to turn into armed clash presence of a series of incorrect calculation, misperceptions, and faults of participated states or parties.

The Twin Peak Crisis 2001-2002

The Twin peak Crisis developed as the consequence of diverse incidents the one was on 13th December 2001 the attack on the parliament of India and the second was an army camp targeted and the bus was attacked on 14th May 2002. India blamed that Jaish-e-Muhammed militant Pakistan base group sponsored by intelligence agency of Pakistan involved in this attack. Instead, Pakistan banned the Lashkkaar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad militants organizations and the president of Pakistan General Pervaze Musharraf stated that our country would not allow any person or groups to be involved in terrorism in India or Indian-occupied Kashmir, but the tension was not lessened.

On December 18, 2001, the Indian government launched Operation Parakram with the deployment of approximately 800,000 troops alongside the border of Pakistan (Thies & Hellmuth, 2004). Delhi handed over a list of demands to Islamabad and demanded to hand over some persons to India (Bratton, 2010). The situation become more deteriorated when Pakistan denied to hand them over to India instead Islamabad asked for proof so that accused individuals could be trialed within Pakistan (Nation, April 8, 2002). In reaction, on December 21 Delhi detached diplomatic relations and (Tribune, December 21 & 28, 2001) train, bus, and air services halted. In response to the mobilization of Indian forces Pakistan also reacted with the counter deployment of its forces (Lavoy, 2007).

Indian Prime Minister stated aggressively that the use of arms would not only be for security. Whatever weapons were having, it would be brought into use ignoring any

caution of how injured the opponent was (Shukla, 2002). President of Pakistan Pervaze, Musharraf stated if pressure on Pakistan increased at a high-level possibility of the use of nuclear weapons could not be denied (Dawn, April 7, 2002; Krepon, & Cohn, 2011).

American Role

In Post 9/11 era it was the first crisis that emerged between India and Pakistan both were of America in the war against terrorism. So, it was a big challenge for Bush to defuse the crisis and have good relations with both states (Chari, 2003). After the 9/11 incident American administration designed aggressive diplomacy for Pakistan and India. From the perspective of war against terrorism, the American government needs the help of Pakistan in the operation in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

America perhaps might be more concerned approaching tension over the issue of Kashmir. The policy of "preemptive war" that America devised in "war against terrorism" against states those support terrorists, provided acceptance of Indian anti-terrorist activities in Indian-held Kashmir and to take action against terrorist groups inside Kashmir under the control of Pakistan. Pakistan-controlled Kashmir (Khan, 2005). In usual circumstances, the incident possibly might have been a significant apprehension of America. An American official said Afghanistan, however, was the main concern.

Moreover, the Bush administration had amazingly obvious impartialities in Pakistan, the reason that needs help in obstructing the pulling out from Tora Bora (Afghanistan) when the event of attack on Parliament occurred (Nayak & Krepon, 2014). Therefore, the American government deliberated on the Parliament attack and considered deployments of armed forces of both countries serious development and unwanted deviations from the war against terrorism.

According to a South Asian expert it was the first time that he observed the management of the crisis between Pakistan and India as a means, not an end for the reason that the goal was to have to keep American strategy about Afghanistan on the correct track (Nayak & Krepon, 2014). Blaming Islamabad for the October incident, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee

in a letter to the president of America wrote that if American administration did not use its influence to pressurize Pakistan to stop the support of terrorist groups based in Pakistan then India will be forced to tackle the problem herself (Sood & Sawhney, 2003). Informally Indian officials worked the diplomatic ways both in America and India.

Robert Black American ambassador in Delhi and constantly attempted to persuade his government on the problem of terrorism Delhi and Washington had ethical equality (Chari & Cohen, 2009). When the crisis reached its climax Indian senior leadership L.K Advani Deputy Prime Minister, George Fernandes Defense Minister, and Jaswant Singh Minister for External Affairs had an official visit to America. They conveyed the message to the Bush administration that the Indian administration's nuclear weapons against Pakistan will not stop India to take serious action against Pakistan (Stolar, 2008).

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Bush administration had a different opinion regarding Indian action of mobilization forces whether it was planned to threaten Pakistan as well as pressurize Pakistan to refrain from backing fighters or to the militants fighting with India in Indian-held Kashmir. From the perspective of management of the crisis, it was not significant what was the objective of India? but Diplomacy of Washington had to agree that the chance of war was real and respond subsequently. Richard Armitage stated that when violence enthused India tension between India and Pakistan reached its peak (Nayak & Krepon, 2014).

Washington had identified the sensitivity of risk connected to nuclear crises. America reflected a tilt towards Delhi and showed gestures in its favor. American leadership constantly had contact with Indian leaders enunciating sympathy and offering assistance in the investigation (Yusuf, 2020). American government proclaimed to freeze the assets Lashkkaar-e-Taiba and add it to the list of terrorist groups (Hindu, December 22, 2001). Moreover, the American government officially announced Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkkaar-e-Taiba terrorist organizations (Krishnaswami, 2001). American leadership said to the leadership of India to avoid war as well as considered the President of Pakistan's statement to take action against terrorists as an opportunity to avail more time from the government of India, if not to diminish the crisis.

American Secretary of State Colin Powell appreciates president of Pakistan Pervaze Musharaf for his strong stance and a brave statement that we are against any kind of extremism and terrorism and whether internal or external (Eckholm, 2002). Bush administration pressurized simultaneously Islamabad and Delhi through the Shuttle Diplomacy of Powel. Colin Powel came to Pakistan and pressurize Pervaze Musharaf to fulfill his assurance. And in his Indian visit, he assured Indian leadership regarding the authenticity of the Musharraf guarantee and assured the Indian government that Musharaf government is taking the solid step to control terrorist activities in Indian-held Kashmir (Kapur, 2008). He endorsed the claim of the Musharaf government that infiltration is decreasing and said that America will continue to pressurize Pakistan (Chakma, 2016). So, diplomatic activism of the American government India refrains from anticipating armed clashes (Bajpai, 2010). America's effective diplomatic actions received successful to convince both nuclear states not to amplify the crisis (Naqi, 2002). The emphasis of diplomacy stretched from speedy management of a crisis to a comprehensive strategic goal of lessening tension.

Second Peak

On May 14, 2002, the crisis again gained peaked, when militants attacked camps of the Indian troops and their families in Jammu. Vajpayee prime minister of India asked chiefs of Indian security forces to prepare for war with Pakistan. A few days after the incident, the army of Pakistan communicated to many countries including India, that it would be planning an order of tests of medium- and short-range ballistic missiles to show its first-strike capability (Khan, 2004; Dawn, May 28, 2002; Hindu, May 27, 2002).

Role of America in Crisis Management

After the Kaluchak incident, Delhi attempted effectively to convince the international community, particularly America to exert pressure on Islamabad and present Pakistan as an irresponsible country. At the beginning of peak II American administration was concerned regarding the probability of intensification and believed that if not succeeded to force Pakistan to take strong steps against terrorists, Delhi would amplify the tension. Colin Powell and Richard Armitage once again prepared to perform efficiently.

The important development during the second phase was a guarantee from the President of Pakistan Pervaze Musharraf to do his extreme effort to stop intrusion permanently across the Line of control. Visits of Armitage from Islamabad to Delhi supported the process of convincing both powers to abstain from the war. Washington played a considerable role in the management of crisis for the reason because the interests of America were also in danger and ultimately this favored soothing the crisis. In both Peaks of crisis changing aspects of circumstances and progresses boosted the mediation of the third party. Release of travel advisory based on the common perception of American and British officials that there was a big possibility of a crisis converting into armed clash and then intensifying into nuclear (Smith, 2011).

During the Second peak, the most important phase was the visit to Armitage Islamabad and Delhi. A core component in the achievement of American diplomats in the management crisis was the desire of India and Pakistan not interested to begin a war. American president Bush contacted Musharraf and Vajpayee on June 5 and expressed his desire to reduce the tensions and resolve of core issue between both countries. In 2002 in the month of October India began to pull back its troop. A current election process would offer India as a usual start to pull out its army (Smith, 2011). On October 16, 2002, soon after the election Indian government formally called off Operation Parakram. Third-party arbitration played a significant role in assuring the crisis terminations.

Mumbai Crisis (2008)

The second crisis emerged between India and Pakistan as a result of an attack by Militants (Perkovich & Dalton, 2016). On 29 November, the fire was shot and there was also an explosion at Mazagaon, in the harbor of Mumbai, and at Vile Parle in a Taxi (Nayak & Krepon, 2012). Manmohan Singh Indian prime minister condemned the incident and said it was "well-organized and well-arranged attacks, unquestionably with outside links. The foreign minister of India alleged that preliminary evidence linked "militants with connection to Pakistan (Sengupta, 2009). Islamabad had refuted any evidence of the attack and complained that no concrete evidence was given by Delhi that might verify that participated militants had any links with other groups that had roots in Pakistan (Kronstadt, 2008).

Role of America in the Management of Crisis

The Mumbai incident shows the continuing deficits of struggle in America to attain its security objectives in the region. American officials effectively participated in crisis management. The American officials modified their previous skills as they efficiently applied the crisis diplomacy method to guarantee the abolition of the possibility of collision between Pakistan and India (Yousaf, 2018). Manmohan

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Singh Indian Prime Minister communicated his concern to The American administration conveyed that the Indian government need help from Pakistan because it was not certain that this is not the first of the series. To prepare the leadership of India not to adopt violent steps, the Americans could commit with Indian officials to persuade Pakistan to adopt more strong strategy against terrorist organizations operating within its frontiers. Two events made the condition complex for the Obama administration. Some experts declared that attacks had similarities with Al Qaeda's style of targeting for the reason that the style of the Mumbai attacks was simultaneous and Jews and westerners were attacked. (Whitlock & DeYoung,2008) and for the reasons of the complication of the incident. Some officials of the Obama administration thought the participation Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba had roots in Pakistan.The second was misapprehending the phone call by Asif Ali Zardari President of Pakistan.A diplomat of Pakistan informed the American official that President Zardari received a a telephone call from India saying to

be Indian foreign minister Mukherjee and he intimidated that in future India might target Pakistan. According to Condoleezza Rice American Secretary of State when inquired from Indian Foreign Minister about his call to the president of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari, he refused and said sulkily that he was in Calcutta he added how is it thinkable I was planning for war in Calcutta? (Rice, 2011) American Secretary of state Condoleezza rice contacted high-ranks officials of both governments (Kilroy, 2011). She stopped the prompt threat of war through phone diplomacy. She communicated Mukherjee 's answer to officials of Pakistani to ease their worries and visited both countries to soothe the tension (The Jerusalem Post December1, 2008). Indian officials said to Rice that the Indian government does not interested in military action and acceleration but you can observe the pressure of Indian people that we are facing, to calm the public you should force Pakistan to take solid action against militants.

Senator John Kerry Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee visited Pakistan, and said that he is certain that Pakistani leadership knows the need for a strong and severe crackdown on religious militant groups (Reuters, December 16, 2008). American officials perceived the arrest of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Lakhvi prominent leaders of Lashkar-e-Taiba as was an indication that neither (side) supported war Washington tried to neutralize the crisis immediately. Interests of Americans in Afghanistan forced American officials to take prompt action to neutralize the crisis and achieve de- escalation.

The Noticeable strategy of diplomacy applied by American officials was its ability to mediate the information concerning the judicial investigation of the attacks. American perceived involvement in the judicial process and its proposal of support in the inquiry to the Indian government accomplish the task of crisis management because it provides time to diminish the strain and slow the process of decision-making in India. The crisis was managed with the help of mediation in America played a dynamic role in soothing the crisis

Uri Attack (2016)

On 18 September 2016 terrorists targeted the military headquarters in Uri. Delhi accused Islamabad of this incident and a crisis had developed between contending states.

Narendra Modi Indian prime minister said in his speech in Kerala however accused Pakistan indirectly of involvement in the attack and criticized it for the help of terrorists and intimidated violent steps in this response. To reply the propaganda of the Indian government, the Pakistan army scheduled a visit for the media briefing for national and international media (Ghumman & Hashmi, 2021). Along the line of control, two sites were visited and Major General Asim Saleem Bajwa gave the briefing to representatives of the media that no attack had been performed and the location is solid evidence of it.

Role of America in Crisis Management

American spokesman in a press briefing stated to take strong steps against terrorists. A bill was presented in the House of Representatives to declare Pakistan as a state promoter of terrorism. But the American government did not favor the bill. John Kirby spokesman of the American State Department denied any chance to support the bill. In contrast to Indian desires, the Obama administration did not release any strict statement against Pakistan in perspective of cross-border terrorism. Instead of fact that America was not satisfied with the performance of Pakistan in the Afghanistan war and demanded "Do more," so, the American government refrained to declare Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism.

Islamabad expressed the fear of nuclear war between nuclear powers of South Asia. Mushahid Hussain Syed repeated the worry of the Clinton Administration about nuclear war in south Asia in meeting with American officials during his meeting in America. He further said the tense situation between Pakistan and India might lead to nuclear war so, he insisted America should interfere and use influence on India to refrain from raising the tension.

Instead of this fact that President Obama's government's main center might be the ongoing crises in Syria and Yemen and the coming presidential election in America. Obama administration continuously kept eye on the situation and engaging officials of Pakistan and India soothed the situation and the Uri crisis was managed.

Pulwama Crisis (2019)

Convoy of Indian security forces that consists of approximately 2,500 military personnel targeted on February 14, 2019, in Pulwama (a place in Indian-occupied Kashmir). In this incident, about 44 soldiers were killed and several wounded. (Kronstadt, 2019). Pakistan quickly condemned the attacks and refuted Indian allegations of involvement of Pakistan in the attacks. (Kronstadt, 2019). Fighter jets of India on February 26, advanced Balakot, an area of Pakistan and Indian army claimed that the Indian fighter jets attacked the terrorist sites of Jaish-e-Muhammed in which senior leadership and many militants were killed (The Hindu, 27 February 2019). But Islamabad rejected the Indian statement (Ghumman, 2021).

Pakistan did air attacks on February 27 across the Control Line. Two MiG-21 Indian aircraft had been shot down inside Pakistan's airspace and captured pilot of India (Dawn, 28 February 2019). The crisis was at its climax, but the arrested pilot of

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India Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman handed over to India kept both nuclear powers refrain from kinetic escalation.

American Mediation

America instead of persuading Pakistan and India to refrain from escalation, it perceived it considered Indian action as Indian self-defense right. (India Today 16 Feb 2019). one the obvious difference from preceding crises was initially the uncaring reflections of American officials after air attacks of the Indian army inside Pakistan and Mike Pompeo declaring it “counter-terrorism action”, of India (Shamila, 2019). But the situation entirely changed after the aggressive reaction of Pakistan and stepping down was emphasized after the air attacks of India and the deadly response of Pakistan produced the threat of accidental intensifying between states with deliverable atomic weapons (Karamat. 2019).

This changing scenario forced the administration to act efficiently and effective participation to cool down the situation and ask both nuclear states to show responsibility and not amplify the crisis (Noor, 2020). For the reason that America had interests in the region from the perspective of Afghanistan and tactical relations with Delhi have continually played the role of mediator between both nuclear powers as it is not in the American interests that Pakistan and India to fighting with each other.

Donald Trump president of the American declaration of the situation as "very dangerous" was an indication that American diplomats were probably had applied track two diplomacy to lessen the tension (Dakshina, 2019). So, the main focus of American decision-makers were carried to an end the intensification of the crisis (Yusaf, 2019) intensification after the events on February 27 appears to have diminished because of involvement and mediation of America, and political assessment that had contented (Dalton, 2019) leaders of Pakistan and India with the prevailing status quo.

Conclusion

America played a key role in the management of the Pakistan- India crisis. Washington acted as a balancer and kept the balance with the desire to soothe the crisis and peaceful conclusion. In the twin peaks and Mumbai crises, American diplomats played a significant role by using shuttle and backdoor diplomacy. In Uri and Pulwama crises American role was effective to slow down the temperature when the crises were at their peak. The main reason for American mediation was its strategic interests in the region, particularly from the perspective of Afghanistan. The American apprehension about the threats contained in nuclear environments forced it to involve in crisis management efforts. Every time, its priority and primary objective was de-escalation and immediately appeasing the crisis. America can exert pressure on Pakistan and India, and as an outcome, it can support to evade conventional or nuclear war in the region and can help both nuclear powers to resolve their conflicts in which most important is Kashmir issue.

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