

## **Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative**

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### **Abstract**

This study investigates the four major wars between India and Pakistan in the past 52 years in one Pakistani popular and one elite newspaper. Through the textual analysis technique, it was found that Pakistan print media applied nationalistic and highly patriotic approaches instead of doing professional and objective reporting on the four wars in the past. While India was criticized for war-mongering and jingoism, the warring policies of the Pakistani governments were eulogized. Though the key thematic strategies identified in this study like ‘Kashmir being an integral part of Pakistan, India being the sole enemy and the need for unity among Pakistanis’ remained consistent in the discourse, the role of UN and invocation of religion saw significant shifts since the 1965 war.

**Keywords:** Indo-Pak wars, Pakistani press, Patriotism, Nationalism, Ideology

### **Overview**

Since the Crimean War, the role of media in all major wars and conflicts has been put to rigorous academic analysis (Knightly, 2004; Carruthers, 2011; Lasswell, 1927; Allan & Zelizer, 2004; Tunstall, 2007; Gaddard & Robinson, 2008; Barnett & Roselle, 2010; Aday et al, 2005; Lewis et al, 2006; Goddard, et al, 2008). The critical media scholars have identified a number of key determinants of war-media nexus like – willingness of media to play the patriotic card, self-censorship, government censorship, role of lobbies and the commercial interests of media industries (Robinson, 2000; Entman, 2004). In South Asia, a number of researchers have analyzed the escalatory role of media during wars between India and Pakistan (Seth, 2016; Thussu, 2002; Joshi, 2004; Khalid, 2014). Despite making a valuable contribution to understanding the role of media in Indo-Pak wars, these studies do not provide a comprehensive analysis mainly for two reasons. First, the available literature focuses mainly on the 1999 war between India and Pakistan and makes scant references to the other three wars which were fought between the two neighboring countries in 1947, 1965 and 1971. Secondly, most of the available work on the subject is in the form of discrete reports produced by NGOs and graduate students. Researchers of the present study believe that for understanding the role of media in national wars and conflicts, a holistic approach is warranted more than exploring their role in an individual war. We believe that contrary to the atomistic approach for analysis of national mass media in a war the holistic approach enables one to make easier comparisons of media role and give a more vivid and delineated picture of the phenomenon in question for better understanding which in turn helps in drawing more

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relevant and rational inferences. Hence the researchers designed the present study to examine the role of national media in all the wars which India and Pakistan have fought so far against one another.

This study would contribute to the existing literature in two ways: First, it will help us know how media system in a third world country behaves in a belligerent environment. Second, it will help us know what factors have acquired prominence in media framing of the prolonged conflict between the two atomic powers. According to Madiratta (2014), the robust media in both India and Pakistan have added new dimensions to the decade-old rivalry between them while others have lamented that media in the two countries is responsible for conflict-escalation (Khalid, 2014; Boss, 2016).

Keeping view the above two objectives in mind, the researchers will first identify the key discursive themes in the leading press of Pakistan. Secondly, the researchers will record how these discursive themes vary over a period of time in the different wars.

### **Wars between India and Pakistan**

Since separation as two independent states in 1947, both India and Pakistan have been at the loggerheads due to an array of unresolved issues, particularly the disputed territory of Kashmir. The two countries have fought four wars in 1947-8, 1965, 1971 and 1999 and still they are not at peace with one another. Thousands of innocent lives have been lost in these four wars and despite interventions and commitments at bilateral as well as at international levels, the contested issue remain unresolved. As this study is focusing on the analysis of media conduct during wars, the researchers will try to briefly present key events in these four wars, though it is not easy to find impartial accounts due to the highly biased academic environment in India and Pakistan.

#### **First war (October 1947- January 1948)**

The first war erupted in October 1947 when tribesmen from Pakistan came to the support of Kashmiri Muslims who revolted against Maharaja Hari Singh' decision of accession with India. At the time of the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was one of the 564 princely states that had to choose either joining with India or Pakistan in accordance with the twin principles of geographical contiguity and self-determination. Though Kashmir had a Muslim majority (77% in the census of 1941), and shared a long border with Pakistan, the Maharaja refused to opt for Pakistan (Hussain 2009). To save his rule from the Kashmiri mutineers, the Maharaja requested the assistance of the Indian armed forces, in return for acceding to India. However, there is considerable debate among historians on the accurate timing between when the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir signed the document of accession and when the Indian army moved into the state. While Pakistani leaning historians

## **Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative**

believe the Maharaja signed the agreement under duress, the Indian historians believe the decision was made voluntarily (Hussain, 2009).

The Prime Minister of India Jawahar Lal Nehru approached UN and offered holding of a UN-administered plebiscite for deciding final status of Kashmir as part of agreement for ceasefire with Pakistan in 1948(Schofield, 2000). The United Nations passed a resolution that “both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite” (UNSC 21 April 1948). On 13 August 1948, UNSC adopted another resolution that also states that future status of the state Jammu and Kashmir will be determined in accordance to the will of the people of the state (UNSC 13 August 1948). However, these resolutions and commitments were never acted upon and even after seven decades, the stalemate continues.

### **Second war (April-September 1965)**

India and Pakistan fought the second war in 1965. This war is attributed to two factors: First, the border skirmishes in the Runn of Kutch in April 1965 when Indian troops penetrated into Pakistani side and secondly, the operation Gibraltar which Pakistan army launched to support ‘freedom struggle’ in Indian controlled Kashmir in August 1965. According to an Indian author, Pakistani army resorted to war because it wanted to wrest Kashmir from Indian control(Ganguly 1990). However, instead of limiting the war to Kashmir, India opened up international border near Lahore and Sialkot which resulted in a full scale war between the two countries. By September 22, 1965, both sides agreed to a UN mandated ceasefire. The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution on 20 September, calling for a cessation of the hostilities(Ganguly 1990). On January 10, 1966, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed an agreement at Tashkent (Uzbekistan), agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines.

### **Third war (December 1971)**

This war started in March 1971 when civil war erupted in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) against the rulers of West Pakistan for their high-handedness. The military ruler of Pakistan General Yahya Khan ordered action against the suspected ‘Bengali separatist’. India intervened in the civil war and actively supported the Bengali separatists who wanted separation from the West Pakistan. On their request, India launched a land, air and sea assault on East Pakistan and in just 13 days was able to force Pakistan army to surrender at Dhaka, and took 90,000 soldiers as prisoners of war. East Pakistan became independent country of Bangladesh on December 16, 1971. Hostilities between India and Pakistan continued till July 1972 when both the countries signed Shimla Agreement and vowed to settle their differences through peaceful means.

#### **Fourth war (May-July 1999)**

In May 1999, Pakistani forces and Kashmiri fighters occupied strategic positions on the Indian side of Line of Control which led to an Indian counter offensive. The Pakistani military wanted to occupy terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector to provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement (Qadir 2002). This prompted a small-scale and limited war between the two newly nuclear armed states (Lavoy 2009). The international community, particularly the US was concerned this time and actively intervened to end hostilities between the two countries in July, 1999.

#### **Media, Wars and Conflicts**

According to the liberal theory of press, during wars, media should remain objective and impartial and expose lies and propaganda (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Since declaration of war is the most important decision that a government makes, and it is essential for media to critically evaluate such an eventuality. Unfortunately, this does not happen in the realm of real politik (Carruthers, 2011) though the need for correct information increases manifold during such occasions to counter the propaganda and jingoism of war-mongers (Barton and Campbell, 2001).

The existing scholarship reveals that journalists exhibit extreme form of patriotism and nationalism during wars and leave behind the considerations of professionalism (Knightly, 2004; Allan & Zelizer, 2004; Thussu & Freedman, 2003; Snow & Kamilpour, 2004; Ottosen & Nohresdet, 2010). From the Crimean war to the Spanish invasion of Cuba to the recent war of Iraq, media have predominantly supported the war initiatives of policy makers. In Rwanda and Hitler's Germany, media openly called for killing the 'enemy' by declaring them threat to national security (Des Forge, 2007; Herf, 2006). Likely, the US media largely remained subdued to elites during the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in modern times (Hammond, 2007; Snow & Kamilpour, 2004).

Researchers link the prevalent propagandist approach to different factors like commercial needs of media (Carruthers, 2011), professional ethos like objectivity (Lynch, 2013) and ideological orientations of journalists (Herman & Chomsky, 2010; Schudson, 2003). One key problem that war reporters face is to reconcile the canons of professionalism with the considerations of national security. While political and military elites always try to use media for their jingoistic purposes through censorship and secrecy during conflict times, journalists, professionally speaking, are usually interested in impartial reporting of events (Ottosen & Nohresdet, 2010). However, at times governments do not need to put curbs on media and they themselves become faithful servants (Wosfeld, 1997). Researchers have documented instances when journalists themselves demanded a curb on free reporting (Carruthers, 2011) during the first Gulf War and criticized independent reporters and scholars for disloyalty to the nation (Knightly, 2004).

## **Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative**

Researchers (Hussain & Lynch, 2016; Hussain, 2017) argue if journalists realize serious threats to national security, they become highly nationalistic and show extreme form of patriotism. “They readily eschew their journalistic independence and openly side with their own country. They believe that their profession should not lag behind other national institutions when it comes to serving the core national interests and readily offer their services as patriotic journalists” (Hussain & Lynch, 2016). Similarly, Hussain (2017) after analyzing various studies conducted in the different parts of the world viewed that media during war times show more patriotic considerations and ignore professional cannons. According to Philippe Sands (as cited in Hussain, 2017), the US media showed a noticeable reluctance to investigate events leading to the Iraqi invasion and the Abu Graib scandal due to the lopsided notion of national interests. Jeremy Tunstall (2007) argued that British and American journalists were aware of the massive human cost of the air bombardment during the Second World War but kept numb due to self-censorship and patriotism. Similarly, Graber (2003) has documented that the State Department prevailed over the media to refuse running Osama Bin Laden tape due to “secret messages”. Similarly Gaddard and Robinson (2008) believe that media are usually caught in patriotic milieu and avoid reporting on dissent to wars and thus contribute to the rally effect. Peace journalism scholars (Lynch, 2013; Galtung, 1998; Kempf, 2003) have found that traditional approaches of media promote wars by reducing conflicts to ‘us versus them’. In fact, most of the studies conducted through the peace journalism perspective have found that traditional media predominantly follow war journalism practices (Hussain, 2017; Lynch, 2013). In the case of US, as noted by Brooke Barnett and Laura Roselle, after the 9/11 incident, the media responded with a particularly patriotic slant. “Television news was marked by news reporters wearing flag pins; flag images; and red, white, and blue, patriotic banners”. Citing Birge (2004), they write “if any of the pillars of journalism have been shaken (since 9/11) it has been independence” (Barnett & Roselle; 2010). Critical media scholar Conniff (2002) criticized US journalists for having “little to do but wear flag lapel pins and read Pentagon press releases about the war”.

In a detailed analysis, media professor Kae Hafez argued that broadcasters in the US not only revealed a clear pro-American bias during war coverage, but that many of them were outright patriotic and heated up public opinion during the war. He cites New Times reporter Chris Hedges that “When the nation goes to war, the press goes with it”. In line with the above, researchers in UK (Aday et. al., 2005; Lewis et al, 2006; Goddard, et al, 2008;) have found that media failed to question the logic behind Iraqi war and were more interested in the daily incidents and official outpourings.

Likewise, during border tension with Pakistan in 1999, researchers have found that Indian media were jingoistic and inflammatory. They not only openly sided with their government but what the military positively viewed as force multiplier to win popular support for war efforts (Thussu, 2002; Joshi, 2004). Similarly, in a detailed analysis of Pakistan and Indian media during Kargil and Mumbai attacks, Dwaipayan Bose (2011) found that the media of the two countries were ‘part of the problem’. She

further writes, “The media of both the nations have been fighting a proxy war that is blurring out factual and unbiased coverage of events in the subcontinent. Overly nationalistic posturing and jingoism lie at the heart of this. Journalists, columnists, TV anchors and analysts of the one country are busy exposing the {bias and hypocrisy} of the other, and in the process, adding insult to a 64-year-old injury”. Likewise, Vandana Seth (2016) found the Indian and Pakistani media were jingoistic and sensationalistic while reporting on bilateral relations. She writes, “media penchant for sensationalism has arisen to such an elevated level that it has overtaken coherent arguments made by sane voices. A certain level of detachment from the brouhaha produced owing to the skirmishes, which surfaces intermittently with our neighbor, is desirable for critical analysis”. Rahul Madirataa (2014) laments that media of the two countries is more preoccupied with security events, to the exclusion of non-security issues such as trade. He believes this approach has minimized chances for peace diplomacy—which otherwise has serious chances for success. Although the canons of professionalism demand objectivity and fairness from mediemen during peace and even during war times but contrary to these principles, national media are supposed by the government as well countrymen to promote national cause by manipulating representations in different forms i.e., spoken, written, pictorial and musical. The national mass media are also expected to play a very active part in psychological warfare against the enemy.

Keeping in view the literature review and the demand of patriotism from national media, the present study was designed to explore discursive strategies of news mass media of Pakistan during wartime. The researchers also wanted to examine that whether Pakistani news mass media followed the same discursive strategies during different wars or they were changed from war to war.

## **Methodology**

The researchers selected one English daily (Dawn) and one Urdu daily (Jang) for the purpose of this study. These newspapers were selected amongst English and Urdu newspapers respectively. They were selected on the basis of their circulation. Both these newspapers started publication before the creation of Pakistan and are considered agenda setters for rest of the media in Pakistan (Hussain, 2015). Moreover, both these dailies represent biggest media groups in Pakistan that own TV channels, magazines and regional and local newspapers. While the daily Jang is a popular newspaper and is read by the common Pakistanis, daily Dawn is an elite English language newspaper and is popular among policymakers and the top civil and military bureaucracy.

Following Rasul and McDowel (2004), the author applied the textual analysis technique to analyze the data. According to Forman and Damschroder (2008), textual analysis systematically analyzes texts to explain media content and textual data. Since the data for this study is collected from the media coverage of wars between 1948 and 1999, contextual information is needed to address the research questions. According

## **Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative**

to Berg (2004), textual analysis is better suited to provide detailed analysis of complex texts like wars and foreign policy. Only relevant editorials in the two newspapers were selected. The authors focused on the latent and manifest meanings of the texts to know how the two Pakistani newspapers discursively framed the four wars in different time periods.

The researchers collected all the relevant editorials published in the selected newspapers during the start and end dates of these wars.. The researchers personally visited the National Library Islamabad and the printed copies of the two newspapers during the selected time period were consulted. The editorials were read two times to ensure that only relevant articles are selected. Many editorials were excluded because they though related to war, these focused more on issues like civil defense, maintain law and order, discouraging profiteering etc. Out of total of 154 editorials, 80 editorials were finalized from the coverage of daily Jang which included 14 editorials relating to 1948 war and 22, 21 and 20 editorials related to Pak-India wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999 respectively. Similarly, 74 editorials were finalized from the coverage of daily Dawn which included 14 editorials relating to the 1948 war and 19, 20 and 21 editorials to 1965, 1971 and 1999 wars in that order.

### **Research Findings**

The researchers used inductive approach and analyzed the selected editorials of both the newspapers i.e., daily Jang and daily “Dawn”. They identified key themes/topics that characterize editorial coverage of the four wars in both the newspapers. These topic areas have been given below.

#### **1947-48 war**

The two dailies primarily adopted three different strategies to report on this war: Kashmir is part of Pakistan; Eulogizing the sacrifices of freedom fighters and that Pakistan is winning.

#### **Kashmir as an integral part of Pakistan**

Most of the editorials described Kashmir as part of Pakistan which ‘India had usurped through stooge rulers’ (Dawn, November 4, 1947). The daily Dawn (Oct 28, 1947) reported that Kashmir has been contiguous to the areas ‘now consisting Pakistan’ for centuries which the ‘barbaric Brahmin leaders’ were adamant to change. “The division plan is crystal clear that Kashmir is part of Pakistan. We would never allow Hindus to snatch it from us”. Similarly, the daily Jang produced three editorials dealing with its history and culture and described it as the ‘natural choice to be part of Pakistan’ and that the ‘Hindu shenanigans would fail’ (November 4 & 5 & 6, 1947). Both the dailies were equivocal that Pakistan has launched the offensive to ‘thwart the Indian designs to capture the scenic state of Kashmir’. “Pakistan has the moral, ethical

and legal rights over the state of Kashmir. We would never allow any other power to deny us this right” (Dawn, Nov 25, 1947). Likewise, the daily Jang (Jan 15, 1948) described the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan as the only legitimate solution to this war.

### **Eulogizing the sacrifices of freedom fighters**

The Pakistani press greatly appreciated the armed struggle by the ‘freedom fighters’ who were fighting against the Indian army. Excessive religious jargons were used for them to motivate them and find new recruits for the war. The daily Jang (October 27, 1947) declared them equivalent to crusaders for fighting for the only nascent Muslim state in the world. The same paper in its later issue told its readers that Pakistan had a less-equipped army than India and ‘it is the duty of all countrymen to fight against the enemy’ (Jan 13, 1948). Similarly, the daily Dawn highlighted the gallantry of Pakistani militia and declared them the true descendants of Muslim crusaders. “The courageous jawan from northwest of Pakistan have joined this holy war to secure the future of our coming generations. We owe you and your sacrifices will be remembered for ever” (Dawn, Jan 8, 1948).

### **Pakistan is winning**

Right from the very outset of this war, the two dailies heralded its readers that Pakistan was winning. One representative story of daily Jang (Nov 3, 1947) stated, “Pakistan is superior to India on all accounts. We have brave people, we have great traditions. We are the descendants of great conquerors who ruled over India for centuries. Our claim is legitimate and our stance is moral. Who can defeat us?”. Similarly, the daily Dawn (Nov 7, 1947) reported that though militarily India was well-prepared but they lacked courage and valor. “All the citizens of Pakistan are ready to sacrifice their lives. We are not afraid of death. We Muslims prefer death over life when it comes to honor and self-respect. The time has reached, when we will prevail and subdue India, despite her numerical strength”. In the final weeks of the war, when it became evident that a large swathe of land has been occupied by the Indian forces, the press continued pressuring government to continue this war and disobey the UN resolution. The daily Dawn warned the international community that they would render this region to permanent turmoil if the Kashmir issue was not resolved (Jan 5, 1948). Likewise, the daily Jang (Jan 20, 1948) congratulated Pakistani people by winning one-third of Kashmir and hoped that rest of the Kashmir would be rejoined soon.

Summarily, the two newspapers focused on the political aspects of this war due to the ‘non-implementation of Indo-Pak division plan’ (Dawn, Oct 16, 1947). Both the newspapers aggressively stereotyped the ‘conspiracy and shenanigans’ of Hindu rulers and reminded its readers to remain vigilant. The press while highlighted the ‘cause of freedom fighters and appreciated their services for the country, it ignored the bitter



## **Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative**

reality that Pakistan was the aggressor and later forced by the Indian forces to retreat. Conflict journalism scholar Philip Knightly (2004) has recorded that during the Two World Wars, British media showed extreme form of patriotism and vociferously advocated to prolong the wars till victory is achieved.

### **1965 war**

The two newspapers primarily adopted three discursive strategies to describe this war: India as the aggressor, Pakistan being morally superior and the stress for solving the Kashmir issue. Below follows a detailed analysis on these three broad strategies.

#### **India as the aggressor**

Within this category, two dominant sub-categories are employed: India have barbarian leaders and that India is doomed to fail. Regarding the first strategy, majority of stories focused on the ‘eternal hate that Indian leaders harbor’ against Pakistan (Dawn, Sep 7, 1965; Jang, Sep 7, 1965). Both the newspapers carried a number of stories describing the state of affairs of the Indian leaders for whom Pakistan was a sore pill and whom they ‘had never accepted it by heart’ (Dawn, Sep 8, 1965). One representative story likened Indian leaders to “Hitler and Mussolini who only know how to kill innocent people” (Jang, Sep 10, 1965). Another report termed the attack as a ‘paragon of barbarity’ that needed to be countered with full force (Jang, Sep 8, 1965). The two newspapers addressed Indian Prime Minister as ‘mini-Hitler, a megalomaniac who committed the timid act of invading Pakistan because he was having daydreaming and had lost link with reality’ (Dawn, Sep 13, 1965; Jang, Sep 12, 1965).

The second discursive strategy within this broad category discussed the ‘definite defeat for Indians at the hands of gallant Pakistani soldiers’ (Jang, Sep 15, 1965; Dawn, Sep 20, 1965). The two newspapers published detailed stories on the fate meted out to Hitler and Mussolini and predicted the same for India which was ruled by weak rulers. One report focused on the modern weaponry that India got from both US and USSR but concluded “it was a waste in the hands of Indian soldiers because they only knew how to be killed (Jang, Sep 19, 1965). Another report in the same newspaper alluded to the pre-historic times that for the last 4000 years, none of the Hindu leaders have been able to conquer areas that make Pakistan in modern times. It began like this, “when your forefathers failed to take a fresh breath in our lands thousands of years ago, it is foolhardy to dream of it in our times” (Jang, Sep 21, 1965). Similarly, the daily Dawn predicted that India would collapse due her own short-sightedness and foolish policies (Dawn, Sep 23, 1965). Finally, the two newspapers aggressively reported on the ceasefire agreement on 23rd September. In the thanksgiving day, the press declared that Pakistan has won the war and defeated India. “India agreed to ceasefire so early because their leaders knew Pakistan would prevail. We could have captured the whole of India but we want to tell them that we

are civilized people and we do not want to rule over them” (Dawn, Sep 23, 1965; Jang, Sep 23, 1965).

### **Pakistan being morally superior**

Stories relating to Pakistan, on the other framed it as a victim of Indian barbarity and that it stood high on moral grounds. Just like civilized European countries who countered the ‘savagery of Hitler, Pakistan is facing Indian aggression’ (Dawn, Sep 10, 1965). One representative story in daily Jang, for example, described India as a ‘blotch on human civilization’ who was killing innocent people to avenge her bloodthirstiness (Jang, Sep 8, 1965). The two newspapers predominantly framed Pakistani leadership as peace-loving people who were serving common people unlike the India which was run by a ‘liaison of thugs and barbarians’ (Jang, Sep 12, 1965; Dawn, Sep 22, 1965). While drawing on the dichotomy between good and bad, the press in Pakistan cited Islamic religious books and other treatises that good (Pakistan) will prevail over bad (India). The daily Dawn (Sep 16, 1965) in two detailed editorials headlined ‘crush the coward’ and ‘maniacs shall pay the price’ maintained that history was replete with conspiracies hatched by the Brahmins and banias (the two groups, historically, criticized in India for the exploitation of poor). The reports further stated “India is killing innocent people—we are scrupulously avoiding casualties—difference between those who have honor and those who are coward”.

Moreover, the newspapers stressed that now when the war has been imposed on Pakistan, it was ‘our duty to carry it to the logical end to nip the evil in the bud’ (Jang, Sep 15, 1965). The daily Dawn (Sep 19, 1965) carried a story asking the Pakistani leader to ‘paralyze India completely to save Pakistani and other neighbors from her scourge forever’. Even more brazenly, the daily Jang (Sep 18, 1965) thanked India for attacking Pakistan ‘for providing opportunity to us to expose her and decimate her into pieces’.

### **Stress for solving Kashmir issue**

The two newspapers openly defended the popular uprising in Kashmir and appreciated the courage and valor of the Kashmiri people. UN and other world powers were urged time and again to ensure plebiscite in Kashmir. The daily Jang (Sep 17, 1965) editorialized that the war should culminate in deciding the fate of Kashmir issue otherwise another war would broke out soon. The same newspaper in another report showed optimism that world powers would resolve this issue according to the resolutions of UN (Sep 20, 1965). However, on other times, the two newspapers remained critical of UN and other world powers for being ‘duplicitous’ and ‘siding with India’ (Dawn, Sep 16, 1965; Jang, Sep 19, 1965). A number of stories hailed the ceasefire agreement that it has brought the Kashmir issue on the global radar and now it would be resolved. However, in a hard-hitting detailed report on September 20, daily Jang warned that if the Kashmir issue was not resolved at this moment, Pakistan

## **Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative**

would drag this war for thousands of years. “We are not afraid of death. We Muslims are ready to defend our land and get Kashmir from India” reported daily Dawn (Sep 19, 1965).

Summarily, the Pakistani press openly sided with the government to accuse India of escalation and killing common people. The two newspapers never tried to check the fact that it was Pakistan who started the war. Similarly, the press created stereotypes of Hindu culture and did not realize that a sizeable population of them lived in Pakistan and their sentiments would be hurt. From the very first day of the war, the media asserted that Pakistan would prevail in this war and declared the ceasefire agreement on September 23, 1965 as victory for Pakistan.

### **1971 War**

The Pakistani press adopted the following three discursive strategies to report on the 1971 war: Pakistan would come victorious, invocation of religion and calls for restraint and patience

#### **Pakistan to emerge victorious**

Right from the very beginning, the press told its readers that Pakistan was winning this war because it had gallant forces, was morally and ethically uplifted and had the support of the whole civilized world. Daily Dawn while referring to Indian belligerence stated that Pakistan was a small country and would not attack India. In a number of articles headlined “Incorrigible Indians”, “Indian expansionism” and “Indian belligerence”, the daily accused India for buying huge weaponry from Russia that it would now use against the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan (Dec 5 & 6 & 7, 1971). However, it reminded that these ‘mad enemy adventures to devour whole of South Asia’ would go waste as “victory is ours and gallant forces are winning this war by opening a new chapter of imperishable glory and setting up an unbelievable feat of retaining our land” (Dec 12, 1971). The press severely criticized India for ‘inciting Bengali miscreants’ who were mere ‘stooges in her hands’ (Dec 6, 1971). “To put an end to Indian Hitlerism, we should be militarily ready and defeat India. This is the only choice we have” (Jang, Dec 8, 1971). In other stories, the two newspapers stressed for continuing the war and not surrendering to India. The daily Jang (Dec 12, 1971) warned that despite odds, ‘we need to win because a single inch in Indian occupation would become cancerous for the integrity for rest of Pakistan. India wanted to create another Kashmir, and we cannot allow it at any cost’.

#### **Invocation of religion**

The two newspapers predominantly invoked religion to muster support against the ‘Indian aggression’. Daily Dawn in its December 5 issue reported, “Our treacherous enemy has attacked us again. Allah is with us and we will create a history by defeating

## **Mohammad Zubair Iqbal and Shabir Hussain**

a five times bigger enemy. The coward attack reflects Brahmin mentality to disintegrate Pakistan.” Similarly, daily Jang (Dec 5, 1971) reported that India wanted to stop the growth of Islam by killing our men and making our children and women subservient. Referring to Islamic history, in another account, the same newspaper exhorted on Pakistani Muslims, “Jihad (holy war) is obligatory. We offer our chests to bullets and continue fighting till the last blood”. In other articles, the two newspapers cited Quranic verses that it was forbidden to turn your back to the enemy. The daily Jang stressed that we should continue fighting and ‘disallow infidels to enter the holy land’ (Dec 16, 1971). When on December 20, 1971, it became evident that Pakistan has been defeated in the war and a new state of Bangladesh has emerged, the two papers mainly resorted to Islamic teachings for ‘guidance’. Invoking God, the daily Jang in a representative story stated, “our army fought for the honor and glory of Islam, we are betrayed by the enemy. Our women are abused and the thugs are dishonoring us. Capture them and hurl them to hell” (Jang, Dec 20, 1971).

### **Calls for restraint and patience**

In the closing days of the war, when it became imminent that Pakistan was losing this war, the press avoided reporting on the Indian victory. It stressed for exercising restraint and perseverance. Both the newspapers highlighted the historic resistance offered by ‘our soldiers’ and warned that the new state of Bangladesh would be an ‘anathema’ for the world. The daily Jang (Dec 18, 2017) requested ‘countrymen to value realism and accept new scenario as ordained by Allah’. Though Pakistan army surrendered to India on December 16, 1971 in Dhaka, the news about the fall were published as late as in December 20, 1971. In a major article on this date, the daily Dawn though did not mention that Pakistan has been disintegrated and its army surrendered to Indian forces, urged for ‘unity in this hour of distress’. While referring to Quranic verses, the daily asked its readers ‘not to despair, stand united and wait for the final victory.’ Likewise, the daily Jang in a highly emotional article, eulogized the ‘great sacrifices’ of soldiers who were even praised by the enemy. It described the plight of children and women and prayed for a divine intervention. Summarily, the press invoked religion and patriotism to garner public support for the war. Both the dailies criticized the separatist Bengalis for hobnobbing with India and working against the security of Pakistan. However, when India succeeded in defeating Pakistan and arrested its 94000 soldiers, the media though never conceded that India has won this war, asked countrymen to be patient and warned the international community against the ‘scourge of India and her baby Bangladesh’ (Jang, Dec 20, 1971).

### **1999 war**

The press adopted mainly three discursive strategies to report on this war: Centrality of Kashmir issue, Indian intransigence and critique on the international community.

## **Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative**

### **Centrality of Kashmir issue**

Both the newspapers stressed on the solution of Kashmir issue to ensure permanent peace in the region. The press pointed to the ‘atrocities in Kashmir committed by the Indian soldiers’ and maintained that unless this issue is resolved, the whole of South Asia would be in trouble (Dawn, June 20, 1999; Jang, June 16, 1999). Both the dailies highlighted the ‘sacrifices’ of Kashmiris for their democratic right of self-determination. The daily Jang (June 7, 1999) reported that an indigenous resistant movement is going on in Kashmir and the ‘freedom fighters’ were winning. Similarly, daily Dawn (June 20, 1999) called on the international community to help resolve this issue and warned against being swayed away by Indian ‘propaganda’. The press reminded the international community that Kashmir was an unfinished agenda that needed urgent attention (Jang, June 22, 1999). In the final days of the war, when Pakistan announced retreating ‘freedom fighters’ from the disputed Indian territory, the press severely criticized government for being ‘lenient’ and ‘falling victim to the US pressure’ ( Jang, July 10, 1999). The press in line with official policy declared Kashmir as a disputed region where Pakistan was providing only moral and diplomatic support to the ‘Kashmiri fighters to free themselves from the Indian yoke’ (Dawn, June 22, 1999; July, June 19, 1999).

### **Indian intransigence**

The Pakistani press categorically declared India responsible for escalation and aggression. The daily Dawn (July 11, 1999) criticized ‘Indian obduracy’ for the continuation of war and advised their rulers to show statesmanship and go beyond jingoistic politics. Similarly, daily Jang (July 6, 1999) reported that Pakistan was ready for peace but it was India who was ‘adamant in shedding blood of the common people on the two sides’. Both the dailies urged international community to take notice of ‘Indian bellicosity’ which has driven the region to the brink of a nuclear war. The daily Jang (June 29, 1999) reminded that ‘India has failed to quell the movement for the right of self-determination and was now blaming Pakistan’. Likewise, the daily Dawn (July 12, 1999) advised India to “shun jingoism, give Kashmiri people their due and care for the teeming millions suffering from poverty and hunger in the region”. At times, in more stringent messages, the two dailies asked India to hold ceasefire and learn from her past mistakes where ‘ intransigence has cost her dearly in terms of human life and national repute’ (Jang, July 15, 1999).

### **Critique on the International Community**

The press aggressively criticized the Western countries for ‘hobnobbing’ with India to attack Pakistan and deny Kashmiris their right of self-determination. The daily Dawn (July 2, 1999) criticized UN and international community for pressurizing Pakistan to pull out forces from Indian territory. In another article, the daily asked the

international community to look at the Indo-Pak rivalry in its totality and pressurize India to resolve the Kashmir issue in which more than 40000 have been killed. Similarly, the daily Jang warned against ‘one-sided approach’ to the conflict and criticized ‘UN for its apathy and US for double standard’ (July 7, 1999). In other articles, the press asserted that India was unwilling to sign peace agreement because she was supported by the US and the world powers. “In the past three wars, the Western world has supported India—and now it is emboldened to kill innocent Kashmiris” (Dawn, July 13, 1999). The daily Jang published a number of articles when Pakistan was asked by the US to pull back its forces. In one representative article, the daily stated that the world was misguided by the Indian propaganda that Pakistan was the aggressor and severely criticized the government for acquiescing to the Western demands (Jang, July 20, 1999).

### **Conclusion**

This study was designed to investigate how the leading newspapers in Pakistan have framed the four main wars fought with India and to identify what changes (if any) have occurred in the discursive themes over the years. The analysis shows that both newspapers applied highly nationalistic and patriotic discursive strategies while reporting on these wars. The findings of this study are consistent with the available literature on war-media nexus that media becomes active agents of wars when national interests are involved (Allan & Zelizer, 2004; Thussu & Freedman, 2003; Snow & Kamilpour, 2004; Ottosen & Nohresdet, 2010). The first Indo-Pak war in 1948 was discursively framed as (a) Kashmir being of Pakistan, (b) services of freedom fighters were eulogized and that (c) ultimate victory awaits for Pakistan—all these themes indicate that the press openly advocated the warring policy of the government. Elsewhere, the literature on the press-politics interaction suggests that media in the US have openly supported governments during wars in Vietnam, Nicaragua and Iraq (Bennet, 2003; Entman, 2003). During the 1947-48 war, the Pakistani press supported the government policy to send ‘freedom fighters’ to the Kashmir region and join the ‘holy war’ against the Indian ruler. Similarly, the two papers declared that Kashmir was part of Pakistan and ‘we would keep fighting till winning whole of Kashmir’ (Jang, Dec 22, 1947). Likewise, both the dailies maintained from the very outset that Pakistan was winning this war due to her gallant soldiers, spirited people and inviolable history. Though no prior study exists on the role of Pakistani or Indian media on reporting the 1948 war, one can find many similarities with the role of media during the Two World Wars in the Western countries. Scholars (Knightly, 2004; Carruthers, 2011; Tunstall, 2007) have documented instances where journalists frenzied by patriotism and nationalism concocted stories to uplift morale of people and soldiers. Stories like German soldiers bayonetting the Belgian babies or molesting women were fabricated to influence public opinion against Hitler and support the official war policies (Tunstall, 2007).

### **Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative**

The patriotism and ethnocentricity in Pakistani press became more evident during the 1965 war with India. The press declared India as the aggressor and Pakistan as the victim of her shenanigans. The media never bothered to check that it was Pakistan who initiated this war. In fact, it is no secret in Pakistan nowadays that General Ayub Khan was the architect of this war. As shown in the analysis, Pakistani press aggressively resorted to anti-India rhetoric during this war. Pakistan, on the other hand, was absolved of all mischiefs. The two dailies wasted a lot of ink on recounting the jingoism of Hindu leaders and their intolerance towards Pakistan. The US and the UK media applied the same criteria during the Iraqi invasion in 2003. Saddam Hussain was referred to as Hitler who only knew language of force and that he could only be removed through use of force (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Gaddard and Robinson, 2008).

Similarly, in the 1971 war, Pakistan media mainly invoked religion to garner support against the 'Indian aggression' and gave surety to readers that Pakistani would prevail in this war. Nowhere, the two newspapers criticized the West Pakistan administration for highhandedness and discrimination against the East Pakistan. The freedom movement in East Pakistan was pilloried for being part of 'Indian conspiracy to launch a government of stooges'. The media retained the common Pakistani ignorant of the fact that East Pakistanis were left in lurch by the rulers from West Pakistan and they started the movement to demand fair treatment and equality. Many observers in Pakistan now agree that had the people knew the real causes of the 1971 insurgency and things conducted according to the wishes of majority of Pakistanis, the situation could have been different. Though East Pakistan became Bangladesh on December 16, 1971, the two newspapers did not publish this news in the next four days. By referring to a politician, both the dailies reported on December 20 that Pakistan 'has fallen victim to Indian aggression and Bengali stooges successfully in their efforts' (Jang, Dec 20, 1971; Dawn, Dec 20, 1971). Quite similar to this, Philip Knightly (2004) has noted that when US dropped atomic bomb on Japan in 1945, the mainstream media appreciated the marvelous scientific development by the US and ignored the fact they have killed millions of innocent people. The Washington Post published a single column after days of this catastrophic incident headlined "poor japs" (Knightly, 2004).

Finally, in the 1999 war, Pakistan media reporting primarily circled round the centrality of Kashmir issue which India has 'gobbled due to the apathy of the international community' (Jang, July 12, 1999). Like the 1965 war, it was Pakistan who launched this war but Pakistani media ignored this fact. The press criticized India for her jingoism and demanded the Pakistani government to retaliate with full force. Other researchers who have investigated Indian and Pakistani media during the 1999 war have found that media of the two countries was escalatory and jingoistic and put salt on the old injuries (Boss, 2011; Seth, 2016; Madirataa, 2014). One prominent feature of the Pakistani during this war was the critique on the United Nations and international community for being immune to the considerations of Pakistan and openly siding with India. Though the international community has certainly failed to

resolve the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, it cannot be criticized for pressuring Pakistan to pull back its forces from Indian territory that occurred during the 1999 war. However, Pakistani media exploited this old complaint against the UN and demanded it should arrange for plebiscite in Kashmir before asking Pakistan to revert to pre-1999 position. The pro-war propensity of Pakistan media becomes evident during the end of 1999 war when Pakistani government agreed to pull back its forces. This decision was strongly criticized by the media for ‘succumbing to Indian pressure’ and ‘showing leniency towards enemy’ (Jang, July 21, 1999; Dawn, July 19, 1999).

Regarding the second question, it is evident that Pakistan media predominantly applied the same nationalistic and patriotic strategies to report on these four wars and no major shifts were recorded. However, two discursive strategies saw some variations. First, the attitude towards UN and the international community has degenerated from hope to resolve conflicts to a conspirator. While in the 1947-8 war, Pakistan media saw the UN as ‘bastion of peace’, in 1965 they believed it ‘would rise from slumber’ and in 1971 war, they criticized it for being ‘mired in cold war’ and in 1999 war, they called it as a ‘worthless body’ and US and UK as ‘conspirators’. These shifts can be attributed to the official policy of the Pakistani governments. Till 1970s, Pakistan earnestly fought its case on Kashmir and other issues at the UN and hoped that world community would come to its help but could not get support for it. Since 1980s, Pakistan has realized that Kashmir is no ‘more sellable on the global stage’ and hence it is discussed more at bilateral discussions with India.

The second shift is the invocation of religion during wars with India. During the first three wars, religion was mainly used for garnering support for war efforts. This tendency almost vanished during the 1999 war. This may be attributed to two things at the government level. First, till 1971, Pakistan had two part--West Pakistan and the East Pakistan. Both these parts were thousands miles away from each other and Islamic identity was the only major commonality. So, exhorting religion in that context was the only hope to keep the country integrated. Second, the media knew that Pakistan was five times smaller country than India and could not withstand her military might. The Pakistani governments have realized over the years that Kashmir cannot be won through force by sending and financing ‘freedom fighters’. Religion was the main source of motivation for the Kashmiri Jihad ‘holy war’ and since late 1990s this policy shift has influenced the media coverage.

This study has certain limitations and the researches would recommend few more studies on the topic from different perspectives. First, a more empirical and quantitative analysis would greatly contribute to understand the war-media nexus during these wars. Second, two newspapers from India could be selected to compare the findings for greater understanding of the topic at hand. Finally, besides these four major wars, few other scenarios like the Mumbai attacks and the recent uprising in Kashmir could be included to investigate how the media of the two countries operate during peace but tense moments.



## Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative

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