

South Asian Nuclear Security or Deterrence: An Analysis

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Abstract

Nuclear deterrence has by and large been unrelenting in South Asia since 1971 however a twist of events may abruptly alter this state to a degree that could prompt the decision-makers to go for rapid and illogical decisions. This paper studies the deterrence theory, nuclear terrorism, the prospects of Limited War vis-à-vis repercussions for South Asia and gives recommendations how deterrence be stabilized and peace preserved in South Asia

Key Words: Cold War, Second Nuclear Age, Nuclearised South Asia, NPT, IAEA, NSG Indo-US Nuclear Deal, Limited War

Introduction

“Unleashed power of the atom has tainted the whole lot, put aside our approaches of thinking, and consequently we flow en route for unmatched calamity”. Einstein

The world has gone under great transformations since the Cold War ended almost two and a half decades ago in the world order, which have directed the world to what most theorists term 'the Second Nuclear Age'. The first nuclear age, which was evidently marked by the strategic and ideological contention between the two super-powers, ended with the down fall of the Soviet Union. In the international security order, there are three driving forces of change which are; the super powers, technological revolution and geopolitical inflection points. The end of World War II, for example, saw the innovation of nuclear weapons together with their delivery means, which undeniably redefined the character of warfare (Krepinevich, 2012, p. 7). Art (1985) contends that balance in the nuclear age is the power to harm and not the power to defeat. Shelling (1966) reminds on the other hand that success is no longer a precondition for excruciating the enemy which later modified and constrained states' behavior towards a more rational direction (p. 22). The above notions contextualize to what is referred now as Deterrence Theory (Brodie, 1946, p.76).

Deterrence is by and large recognized as an aptitude to deter a state from engaging in a course of action, detrimental to one's fundamental security interests, (based on effusive potential).

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Specifically speaking, the *Nuclear Deterrence Theory*, as propounded by Brodie (Brodie, 1946) which is grounded in political realism, enriches our thought process to comprehend the potential character of nuclear weapons. The elements attached to deterrence theory are the perception of the level of threat or conflict, the hypothesis of rationality, the notion of retaliatory threat, and theory of offensive harm, conception of reliability and deterrence stability' (Morgan, 2003, p. 8).

The end of the Cold War has transformed the nature of dangers however in many ways, the security problems of weak and small states are the same and even greater than in the past. The experts developed theoretical approaches to the understanding of difficulties faced by small or weak states. Small and weak states are caught up in an invariable struggle to come across the road to security or at least to survival (Khan, 2011, p. 189). The international system has transformed from bi-polar world order into a multi-polar one, with different power centers emerging in different regions. The bi-polarity, demonstrated in an almost equal military balance of power to inflict damage, and the advent of nuclear weapons maintained an overall environment of relative peace during the Cold War Era. However, the emergence of new states in the post-Cold War period with dynamic economic, military and cultural powers challenging the traditional power centers has shaped a new and complex world order, more prone to conflict than the bi-polar structure of the Cold War. Resultantly, there is arise of sadistic extremist organizations, a hatchling divergence in cyber space, and wearing down the structure of strategic stability in three main conflict-prone regions; that is to say;

- a) MiddleEast,
- b) South Asiaand
- c) South-East Asia, are the major features which mutually contour the Second Nuclear Age.

In this new international system, there are multiple contending forces with different ideologies, strategic cultures, and often clashing geo political interests, which are in a constant state of competition. Egalitarianism among nations has been exalted as a proposal and international norm since the Napoleonic Wars; as Nicolson(1961) noted, 'the hypothesis had been that all sovereign and independent states in theory are equal, whatever might be their responsibilities or physical; power'. In this era, challenges are more than prospects and options. The targets of disarmament, non-

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proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology, which the five permanent members of UNSC once keenly dedicated to seek out through multilateral endeavours under the domain of the nuclear non-proliferation system, appears to have lost their significance to their existing political programs (137).

The pledges made by the major nuclear powers to attain the goals of nuclear non-proliferation; arms control and disarmament through multi-lateralism have been washed out by their new geo-political, strategic and economic preferences, since global security situation has worsened. The deterrent and pre-emptive war doctrines in post-9/11 have vitiated the circumstances and intensified the challenges of global non-proliferation regime. States now are more susceptible than ever since World War II. The end of the Cold War has shaped auspicious circumstances for arms control as the end of the East-West contention has given way to the obliging approaches on major global security issues. Nevertheless, several perceptive regions like the Middle East and South Asia are exceptions as these regions have witnessed a quantum increase in arms purchases, advanced offensive weapon systems and introduction of military doctrines. The major nuclear powers are less fretful about nuclear non-proliferation goals than they earlier were. Now they come across more interested in their financial and geo-political objectives. Quite often, their strategies are derived from discrimination, exceptionalism and favoritism. By following such bigoted procedures, they are endorsing in securities at the regional level; predominantly in South Asia.

In this array of contest, the geo-political, geostrategic and economic interests of major nuclear powers have captured the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Today, the global efforts intended for nuclear disarmament are in front of demoralizing challenges. More than four decades ago, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons under its Article VI, the preclusion of nuclear proliferation under Article 1 and 2, and exploitation of nuclear technology for nonviolent rationales as the unassailable right of all states under Article IV. Nevertheless, a progressive corrosion of, what several identify 'the due international consensus', on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament is dispiriting (Jafar & Mahmood, 2014).

A Strategic Shift in Indo-Pak Nuclear Strategy

Military doctrines play a decisive role in pronouncements by states to utilize force in support of their policy objectives. In international politics, the realist theorists have by and large grouped the states' conduct into following types;

- Offensive and hegemonic realists argue that military expansionism is the rule of the game in global politics (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 34-35)
- Defensive realists view that the states lean to balance the power equation between the expansionist states (Waltz, 1979).
- Critics of these behavior patterns assert that the band-wagon group of states would tend to side with the expanding power (Powell, 1999).

The deterrence theory suggests that Strategic Equilibrium preserves peace and maintains stability. When deterrence achieves stability, uncertainty decreases, the security dilemma¹(Herz, 1950, pp. 157-180) and peace becomes possible. States behave rationally, asymmetry goes down and graphs for high cost of war and nuclear threshold rise upward, consequently, the probability of war decreases. In this context, states take rational and calculated decisions to maximize their strategic gains and minimize losses. Contrary to this, when deterrence becomes unstable, the nuclear threshold declines and the probability of failure of deterrence and war increases. Peace then becomes precarious and chances of nuclear employment increase. The second scenario is worrisome for South Asia. Based on the aforementioned debate, the ensuing section evaluates how the two states' distinct directions have guided them to translate the deterrence concept into their doctrines and strategies (Abbasi, 2015, p. 5).

The foreign and security policies of India and Pakistan are sated with crises, misperceptions and hazardous brinkmanship (Khan, 2005). In Pakistani perception, since the early 1980s, South Asia has observed a decipherable menace of war, a danger that one does not absolutely control. This vagueness in spirit had apparently engendered a loss of control over the crisis that accordingly further increased the threat and uncertainty dynamic in their bilateral knots. This trend of shared risk and insight that the circumstances may become unmanageable in crisis (Schelling, 1960, pp. 97, 200) and

¹Security Dilemma refers to the predicament that emerges between two states where any security initiative of state A is perceived as Threat by state B resultantly, it creates action-reaction syndrome between states A and B.

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moreover, the 'subsistence of nuclear weapons has therefore, began a comprehensible and evident restraint into the conduct' (Art, 1985, p. 125) of policy-making procedure of the two countries. Regardless of the existence of treacherous crisis and calibration of treacherous dogmas like the 'Cold Start Strategy' (Kapila, 2004), it has stirred them towards a strategic deadlock and deepened the factor of 'deception' in their liaison' (Tzu, 2005). Accordingly the existence of nuclear weapons has made a total warless probable between India and Pakistan (Art, 1985, p. 125). In this runny and hazymilieu, both countries have devised a glut of opposing approaches to achieve utmost dividends over each other. As a result the regional policy of deterrence has generated a condition of stability-instability on the Sub-Continent (Synder, 1965) which has made bilateral security relations hostage to their bitter history. Regardless of their lop-sided nuclear stance, India and Pakistan have hunted to soothe their nuclear equation by chasing the path of nuclear risk diminution and war evasion. New Delhi's advocacy of No Nuclear First Use against Pakistan will not be a plausible Confidence Building Measure, if not escorted by labors to deal with the issue of conventional military discrepancy between the two nuclear rivals (Hussain, 2005).

The big powers are supporting India by spiraling its military potentials without given that regional security and stability dynamics. Contradicting Pakistan's access to the international nuclear export measures and giving a preferential treatment to India, has led to upsetting of the regional strategic equilibrium. The inequitable policies of a number of the big powers, in one way or the other, are giving birth to different inclinations in the realm of nuclear diplomacy where a few developing countries; mainly Pakistan; are being victimized. Pakistan is being put through the deep disinformation drives to smear its reflection and position in the comity of nations.

Pakistan is a state whose economic strength, diplomatic clout, military potentials and its non-military capabilities vis-a-viz India are limited. Lately the growing conventional forces and economic imbalance coupled with the effects of the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement and Strategic partnership and their collaboration in the technological fields, including in the realms of nuclear technology and joint scientific research and development projects, is expected to put Pakistan's policy of a 'minimum credible deterrence' under an intense pressure (Kahn, 2011, p. 1).

Currently, there are two major challenges that Pakistan has come across in this nuclear age;

- i. Its nuclear programme is under an extreme disinformation drive which is entrenched in fake, unreal, erroneous and imprecise postulations. That is smearing Pakistan's reflection. This movement is not merely generating fictitious unreceptive surroundings wherein sometimes, it turns out to be thorny for Pakistan to follow its national interest. It also calcifies the confirmation of misperceptions against Pakistan.
- ii. Pakistan is being deprived of the prospects to gain from non violent uses of nuclear technology for its national progress. The strategies founded on geo-political and commercial interests, bigotry, unfairness, selectivism, favouritism and exceptionalism are the major grounds of this unfailing contradiction.

Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state having a spotless trace of observance to all international accords and commitments. It has not only cherished all agreements that it has signed and consented, however, also preserved the character of some of the agreements it has note signed. It is internationally accredited that no matter what nuclear infrastructure or material Pakistan obtained for non-violent rationales, nevertheless very restricted, was by no means side tracked to its military nuclear programme, as a few of the other countries of the region have done. Regardless of this high moral position and collaboration, Pakistan is being separated against and secluded without rationale and sense.

Though four decades have passed when NPT was signed and ratified by majority of states, the scenarios of attaining aforesaid targets have remained a far-flung nightmare. Is the nuclear non-proliferation regime still having any substance or has it become moderately less pertinent in this new epoch of multi-polarity? "Are the two major nuclear powers, the U.S. and Russia serious about doing away with their nuclear weapons, and in so doing setting the example for smaller nuclear states to chase road? And, lastly, what are the prospects of nuclear energy regeneration? These questions, nonetheless not new, are at the heart of the nuclear debate in what some theorists have termed the Second Nuclear Age" (Jafar & Mahmood, 2014).

Pakistan's nuclear potential had come forward as a defence mechanism in response to developments in the neighborhood. Time has borne out that nuclear deterrence has been fundamental in retaining peace and stability in the region. Pakistan is trailing a peaceful nuclear programme that is under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and corresponding to

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international norms. Pakistan nuclear programme has been initiated for peaceful goals so, when talking about these issues, it must not label these issues: nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Conversely, when the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament is discussed, the issue of Kashmir must be focused too.

Since, this dispute lies at the root of the tension between Pakistan and India. In this framework, it is pertinent to mention that particularly after 9/11, the region around Pakistan has truly turned out to be the centre of strategic enormity of the globe. This region has become more unbalanced, more capricious than ever before and the whole status quo has been unraveling in the past, particularly in the Middle East. So, the nuclear question has happened to be trickier, and it has been observed that after 9/11, North Korea has surfaced as a nuclear power in the world. However, after 9/11, the mania which has damaged and which is subverted the rules of the nuclear game is the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. As far as South Asia is concerned, India has come out as world's largest importer of arms and advanced weapon systems. The current studies by some international institutions like the Stockholm International Peace Research institute (SIPRI) and the Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS) have confirmed this. Likewise, the Indo-US Nuclear Deal and the successive waiver given to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have critically destabilized the nuclear non-proliferation regime and endeavours at arms control. These developments have also the potential to propagate the germ so farms race volatility in South Asia.

This nuclear deal has generated certain exceptions and detached norms and double standards. It is tremendously threatening since it drives the message that one country is rewarded for strategic purposes and politics, while the principles of non-proliferation are no more on the agenda of the major powers. What have been the consequences of the India-U.S. nuclear deal? One thing is clear: it was not about nuclear energy, because only 5% of Indian energy comes from nuclear power. The deal was aimed at promoting India to contain China. It was also about commercial reasons and selling power plants to India. It injected India in Afghanistan. India was given a role in South Asia which is larger than life. Owing to that role, in 2006, the Pakistani and American consent on Afghanistan unraveled. As a result, Pakistan grasped that Pakistan and the US do not have common goals depending on parity and reciprocity. The USA is eager to endorse India at Pakistan's cost.

Nuclear Terrorism

Schelling (1999) writes that “in Nuclearized South Asia ‘Victory’ is no longer a precondition for throbbing the enemy, as deterrence has defused this threat since the risk of hurting oneself in a standardized growth or a crisis, or in a bid to attain an unattainable goal, would be more dreadful”. In essence, Schelling has explained that the nuclear weapons have estranged the shared ‘coercive power’ and the ‘brute force’ in a conflict situation. Therefore, it is imperative to value that Pakistan was disinclined to enter the nuclear club. And it truly gate-crashed into the nuclear alliance, and had India not gone nuclear, Pakistan would not have had the chance to track suit. There are three basic conversions that have transpired and, these changes shaped the back drop of what is known as the liberal or derin the world (p. 22).

a. Contradiction of the Uni-polar World

The first is the enduring contradiction of the uni-polar world in the system subjugated by the United States, predominantly under the Bush administration. The United States is presently raising the panic of the Chinese and has engaged the use of force pre-emptively, and several may portray it as preventive use of force, without the assent of either the Security Council or the global fraternity as a whole (which carried the doctrine of precautionary war into play). This according to a current analysis signifies that super abundant war fighting potential when shared with an over-abundant belief in war would result in a conquest. So, armed with this idea of deterrent war, the United States marched into Iraq (and waged a war in Afghanistan as well). This American predisposition to greatly count on the use of force is not only breaching the norms of international law, however, also costing American tax payers very exceedingly. And nevertheless, the United States has been incapable to soothe. Either Iraq or for that matter Afghanistan, and the total cost of these endeavors, according to one estimate made by an American scholar Joseph Stiglitz, is worth at least \$4 billion (Jafar & Mehmood, 2014).

b. Rise of Non-State Actors

These thing is the rise of non-state actors who time and again have inter-continental leanings. For instance, the violent non-state actors operate in Pakistan (FATA), in India (North-East) and in Bangladesh, the same problem occurs and even in Syria, Mali and Africa, there is a mushroom escalation of these violent non-state actors.

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c. Materialization of the Cyber Space

The third change involves the materialization of cyber space as the new venue of conflict. As brainy and ingenious actors scan attain universal influences instantly by spending little amount of money in their capacity to dislocate the digital life, the digital livelihood which unquestionably means the cyber space.

Therefore, these are the three primary transformations which, according to many, have directed us to the second nuclear age. Bracken (2013) who in his book, "The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger and the New Power Politics" by that name, talks about this advent of second nuclear age as marked by a tendency that it doesn't matter who has the bomb, that's a fact of life, but it does matter whether that country is an ally of the United States or has strained relations with the United States. With that result and with that kind of observation, phenomenon of full context of nuclear deterrence becomes evident.

The suicide bombers, whether it be Al-Qaeda, or their off shoots, or any other group, it is not a question of, if nuclear terrorism will crop up by a group who plans to hit the United States, however, it is a question of when it is going to ensue? Subsequently, that apprehension which is over stated, predominantly when it draws closer to the use of nuclear weapons, shapes the conditions to the Nuclear Security Summits.

On this skate, it can be stated that on the vertical side, the rear the penalties and on the horizontal, it is the likely hood. Therefore, the chances of nuclear accidents, nuclear terrorism or biological terrorism are very rare. Nevertheless, the consequences are going to be atrocious and it must not be over sighted. Likewise, if there are WMD terrorism episodes, chemical radiological explosives, the prospect is going to be sky-scraping. However, the losses can be restricted. Nevertheless, thus far luckily, no terrorist group has thrived in either obtaining the resources or receiving sufficient support from a nuclear state to accomplish acts of nuclear terrorism; however, the West is very much apprehensive about it.

Therefore, when nuclear proliferation is debated, there is NPT regime. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the fundamentals take of this regime and then there is IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the implementer of the provisions of NPT and also numerous supply side groups NSG, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, so on and so forth which are meant to refuse the countries which are outside the NPT regime.

Therefore, it is very significant to know will nuclear-capable, non-nuclear weapon states persist to think that their security lies within the NPT, or will they too obtain nuclear weapons? The end of the Cold War produced promising circumstances for arms control as East-West rivalry gave way to cooperative approaches on major global issues. However, some sensitive regions like the Middle East and South Asia were exceptions as, contrary to the global trend, they witnessed a quantum increase in arms purchases and introduction of advanced offensive weapon systems. Global and regional rivalries are another factor. Renewed U.S.-Russia tensions; the Asia Pivot and tensions in South China Sea; Pakistan-India equation in South Asia, the massive arms imports and introduction of offensive weapon systems, including ABM systems, and one more factor, can add to the challenges in South Asia (Jafar & Mahmood, 2014).

The stone of nuclear war was laid in South Asia “as soon as India began its nuclear programme after it was beaten by China in 1962 and blew up its first device in 1974 while Pakistan developed a similar programme in 1972 after 1971 war. The inherent historical hostility, three wars between the two countries, unsettled Kashmir issue, and political culture and approach of the political and military elite offered prolific soil for these stones to evolve. They began to breed quickly after India and Pakistan experienced their nuclear capability in 1998. In the second quarter of 1999 they were on the verge of a conventional war and probably a nuclear war” (Inayatullah,n.d).

India formally compiled and announced its draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine (IND) on 17 Aug 1999. The major features of IND were transparent but some parts were kept deliberately ambiguous and are still under a big question mark. For example, India tried to lay down the large doctrines for the maturity consumption and employment of India's nuclear forces. Based on the Greater India's philosophy, India emphasized the normative posture in its draft nuclear doctrine. For example, the draft doctrine highlights that nuclear weapons possess the gravest hazard to humanity, peace and permanence in the international system (Draft Report of...1999). “The IND displayed that India's nuclear weapons would be used primarily in retaliation to a nuclear attack. The fundamental aim of these weapons is to prevent the use and risk of use of nuclear weapons against India (para 2.4). IND says, India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons,‘ and it would not use nuclear weapons against countries that did not possess nuclear weapons’ (Indian rational approach - based on normative spirit and non-violent notion) or were not aligned to countries that possessed nuclear weapons”.

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The doctrine declared that India maintains 'operationally prepared nuclear forces' (para 2.6a) with the 'potential to transform from peace time deployment to completely employable forces in the shortest possible time' (para 3.2). The most controversial and worrisome part of this doctrine was the Indian emphasis on nuclear triad, which says that the Indian forces will place nuclear devices in de-mated and de-alerted form, which can be assembled fast if and when required. It states, the nuclear forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land based missiles and sea-based assets' (para3.1). (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/ffja99).
Limited War Vis-a-Vis Repercussions for South Asia

The notion of limited war dates back to the 19th century when military theorists drew attention to the determinative liaison between political ends and military means." Both 19th century theorist Clausewitz and his 20th century successor Liddell Hart were committed advocates of the use of *Limited War* or limited force as opposed to total war. In the 19th century, when theories of Blitzkrieg and wars of annihilation subjugated military beliefs and strategies, Clausewitz opposed such impressions. He stated, "Political goals, as the inventive drive of the war, must be the standard for shaping both the endeavor of the military force and also the plan of effort to be prepared" (Howard, et.al; 1976: 81). In the Indo-Pakistan framework, limited war presumption is obtaining exceedingly sited proponents, achieving its own doctrinal uprightness, and even being publicized with historical pattern." As a doctrinal retort to prevent and intimidate Pakistan, Indian security planners have reiterated the American limited war perception dating back to the nineteen fifties" (Ahmed, 2003).

Since the establishment of India and Pakistan, both countries have been implicated in numerous clashes that persist to cause the threat of unplanned war. These divergences comprise the Kashmir dispute, territorial rows such as Siachen, a nuclear arms race, and water disputes. Unlike in the past, any future war between the two countries, regardless of how limited it might be, will have the prospective to shoot up into a full-blown nuclear war in light of the tainted strategic surroundings. Though the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998 fundamentally altered the strategic backdrop in South Asia, the nuclear weapons have, however, to reassure the strategic permanence in South Asia in spite of high claims by different quarters. The question of solidity in South Asia cannot be cut off from global conventional and nuclear weapons policies. The US, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani (and to some degree Russian equation), represent a nuclear string affecting not only

the permanence of South Asia, nevertheless, also that of other regions. Hence, in the absence of a positive US role and the lack of a productive approach, depending on ground realities by both India and Pakistan, the chances of upholding strategic constancy in this region looks very dreary.

Shortly after the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, both countries formalized their particular nuclear doctrines based on contradictory approaches. Pakistan's nuclear policy guidelines are security driven and are precise to the insight of threats that originate from India. Its nuclear potential is exclusively for the rationale of prevention of belligerence and defence of sovereignty. While on the other hand, India has assumed as national policy a nuclear doctrine that has offensive designs and preserves the extent for conventional war fighting. Knowing well the dissimilarity to the United States and the former Soviet Union, "India and Pakistan have direct and very high ventures owing to geographical contiguity; the Indian leadership has reflected warfare and winning a limited conventional war against Pakistan. Such a limited war approach is component of its doctrine for attaining the desired political goals by exploiting the strategic space beneath the nuclear brink.

Many scholars think that this approach is potentially treacherous as it has the intrinsic risk of growth. For that reason, India's strategy of limited conventional war will prolong to generate insecurity and vagueness in South Asia" (Khan, 2004). The framework of strategic stability, the dynamic of strategic culture also plays an imperative role. Booth and Trood (1999) characterize the strategic culture as "...An idiosyncratic and durable set of beliefs, values and habits vis-à-vis the threat and use of force which have their genesis in such deep influences as geo-political setting, history, and culture. These beliefs, principles, and practices represent the mores which persevere over time, and wield some influence on the configuration and implementation of strategy (p. 4).

The nuclear doctrines of both India and Pakistan depend on the idea of upholding "plausible least deterrence." Analysts have already moved up questions about the deviating Indian and Pakistani deterrence doctrines. Pakistan has not come up with a declared nuclear doctrine; though, the fundamental argument of its nuclear policy rules is to proceed in a conscientious mode and to exercise self-possession in performing its deterrence policy without generating any risk to non-nuclear weapons states. Pakistan's potential is undoubtedly for deterrence of aggression and defence of its sovereignty. Pakistan will also hold a satisfactory conventional military force so as to preserve and if doable to move up its nuclear doorstep. Pakistani government time and again has stated "Pakistan as a responsible and recognized nuclear power deems in holding minimum deterrence as a

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basis of its national security policy.... [Pakistan] has no hostile plans against any other country;" however, "it would not allow any country drive it around. The Deterrence potential is the commentator of peace and guarantee of Pakistan's stability and security (*Dawn*, 2004, November 30 & *Daily Time*, 2004, November 28). From Pakistan's viewpoint, the Indian nuclear doctrine encloses inherent offensive and hostile plans, which would persist to generate volatility in the region. The Indian conception of *No First Use* appears blemished and simply emblematic.

The most treacherous feature of India's nuclear doctrine is that it keeps open options for conventional forces to carry out war and take advantage of the room offered by the nuclear factor whereas maintaining the level of conflict below the nuclear threshold. This sequentially subtracts the motivation for reprisal from the opponent by frightening it with calamitous costs of a nuclear holocaust. The Indian leadership perceives that Pakistan will be self-deterred owing to its second-strike potential. This approach is like betting where both parties remain under the risk of losing the game that must not be played by responsible nuclear weapons states. The tactic of no first use does not prevent India from intriguing plans to initiate its nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive strike. What if India chooses to open a *Limited War* depending on the notion of Cold Start and incarcerates territory of strategic significance to Pakistan? "What if India erroneously perceives a danger of a nuclear weapons' attack by Pakistan on its forces? Will India not launch pre-emptive strike against Pakistan's strategic resources to make certain that its conventional forces, which have incarcerated the region, stay integral? Who will prevent India at that point of time? Can India realistically proclaim a *No First Use* strategy? There are no cogent answers to these doubts. Commonly, the acknowledged dogmas turn out to be the first victims once war starts. Consequently, there is no rationale to judge that India will not open pre-emptive nuclear strike against Pakistani nuclear weapons or sites in unusual state of affairs"(Khan, 2004).

Pakistan has not yet published its official nuclear doctrine or policy of employment. Pakistan's doctrinal announcements demonstrate some clear features of its doctrinal policy which came out in response to the Indian document released by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in Based on its proactive approach, Pakistan defined its doctrine to address the conventional asymmetric strategic balance and the existential threat from India to its security and survival as a nation. Therefore, it is believed that Pakistan's nuclear policy is directed to address nuclear as well as conventional threat coming from India. This policy was articulated in the light of its historical experiences with India (Abbasi, 2015).

How can Deterrence be Stabilized and Peace Preserved in South Asia?

Realistically speaking, conflicting interests and the distinct aspirations of the two states are likely to incentivize further arms developments and prompt aggression, the tension thereby increasing the prospects of escalation to an undesirable level. Indeed, advancements in nuclear delivery mechanisms do not stabilize peace and thereby contribute to the possibility of escalation of these states' insecurities. There is no doubt that nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in the national security policy of these two states as these weapons did maintain a fragile peace and prevented the outbreak of a conventional or total war.

The Kashmir issue is the most complicated conflict, which may trigger any kind of aggression and routine border skirmishes may convert into a future limited war leading to the possibility of a nuclear exchange. Besides Kashmir, the second important dimension is terrorism and extremism which redefined the threat spectrum, complicating the regional security situation and deepening mistrust after the terrorists attack on Indian Parliament (2001) and later Mumbai (2008), which India blames Pakistan for. The doctrines of the two states are not transparent enough with their deliberate ambiguity which increases the likelihood of war and undermines the prospects of war prevention. The ingredients attached to these doctrines carry the potential to escalate rapidly upward on the ladder of conflict.

Thus, the two states need to bring more transparency, thereby reducing the risk of accidents while retaining effective command and control systems. This will help the two states to achieve the true spirit of deterrence theory – which is - stable deterrence and secure peace. The two states need to build stable political relationship and enhance deterrence stability and mitigate their mistrust while promoting trade and building cooperation where it is possible. The two states should focus on devising diplomatic means for the settlement of the bilateral disputes especially Kashmir. Both the states need to clearly establish understanding that neither the use of total force is feasible nor the concept of total victory is achievable in the nuclear domain as was guided by deterrence theory. Presumably, the attitude of the two states is a fundamental problem, which further intensifies their differences. It is urgent that the two states increase efforts to institute peace by exploring areas of commonalities and learn from each other's good experiences, capabilities and practices.

Why could peace not be preserved up to this date? First, the two states could not induce the true spirit of the deterrence theory or effectively translate this theory into practice. Second, India is a revisionist and ambitious state in this region; it does not seem to be interested in resolving the territorial disputes. Thirdly, neither of the states seems to understand the escalation theory, the

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concept of limited war or the consequences of the employment of nukes. It is an urgent necessity that the two states take responsibility to avoid adventurism. Several options are available to reduce the risks of an arms race spinning out of control in the subcontinent. Short of major arms draw downs, the most effective course of action would be multilateral nuclear risk reduction measures that allow better communication and clearer understanding between India and Pakistan with the involvement of China.

Political and military elites in these countries need to grasp the true consequences of employment of nuclear weapons in their conflicts-prone region. They need to establish training centers on escalation and nuclear use and non-use understanding to generate public awareness. Both India and Pakistan should talk about their future peace and not wars and devise strategies to avoid uncertainty that could lead to a fateful conflict by following a path of doctrinal clarity for the good of the people of both the states. Both need to introduce an early escalation control strategy and measures such as mature early warning systems, nuclear signaling, and direct communication mechanism for military to military and political to political establishments. Both the states should behave as mature nuclear weapon states and induce highly rational behavior in their strategic actions. Both the states need to take a lead into global responsibilities to preserve peace and promote stability and eventually work towards strengthening of global non-proliferation institutional norms (Abbasi, 2015).

Conclusion

India and Pakistan's experience shows that nuclear deterrence in South Asia apparently has stabilized the region but the peace has been precariously maintained because the two states have not rationally demonstrated strategic responsibility to induce permanent peace and preclude the probability of war. The two new nuclear weapon states have failed to translate deterrence theory into strategy effectively to achieve secure peace as the two Cold War actors did. Thus, the new nuclear states' behavior goes contrary to the deterrence theory's fundamental notion in South Asia and is based on and directed by their distinct directions and goals. The chances therefore of a limited war seem high with increased risks of escalation in the absence of an escalation control strategy. Within such a scary environment the introduction of new technologies and Indian shift from land to sea based deterrence has aggravated the arms race and raised further questions on regional strategic stability. The two states' nuclear doctrines are flawed, uncertain and ambiguous and promote high probability of war (Abbasi, 2015). "India and Pakistan should become conscious that they cannot shun grave and

unavoidable risks of nuclear war until they rationalize and economize their military plans under some budgetary regime deciding how much is adequate for deployment and arms control mechanism. They have to realize that nuclear weapons provide no military rationale at all. They are totally useless – except only to deter one’s opponent from using them”. They need to realize that there is no victory in nuclear war, a nuclear war can only be controlled and won if one side consciously chose to lose the war, an event as unlikely in the future as it has been rare or non-existent in the past (Art, :122-123, 127).It is not necessary to win a nuclear war in order to deter it; one has only to ensure that both are likely to lose it. The low-yield weapons have introduced new dimensions and new risks, hence, conventional wisdom suggests that the two states should focus on defusing and managing the conflict before it escalates to unthinkable level.

The nuclear dimension in South Asia has been accordingly added to the intricacy of the Kashmir issue. Whereas it has discarded a military solution of the conflict, it has augmented the frequency of war like crisis that might go up into a limited to a full scale conventional conflict involving the likelihood of escalation to the nuclear level. The international community can play a considerable role in dragging the Sub-Continent out of a recurring instability caused by the unsettled Kashmir conflict which would greatly help in stabilizing nuclear deterrence in the region. This can be done through the vigorous commitment in sustaining a conflict management process in the region which will be acceptable to India, desirable to Pakistan and the Kashmiris and at the same time not very tricky for the international community to accomplish(Khan, 2011, p.144).

Recommendations

Following are the recommendations with regard to the South Asian security;

1. The non-NPT nuclear powers, together with Pakistan, ought to be accommodated within the main stream global non-proliferation regime in a non-discriminatory and impartial mode.
2. It should be acknowledged that one or a small number of states cannot hunt for utter security at the expense of others and security interests of all states must be offered equal consideration, predominantly at multilateral forums.
3. Instead of concentrating merely on the effects, it is essential to deal with the tangible reasons which compel states to build up nuclear weapons, together with fears from big and emergent conventional or non- conventional forces, venerable, unsettled territorial and other disputes and bigotry in the universal relevance of international laws, regimes, UN resolutions and

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norms.

4. The obligation of nuclear disarmament profoundly lies on the nuclear weapon states possessing thousands of weapons, which should reveal a transformed and universally confirm able assurance to attain nuclear disarmament within a rational time span.
5. The endorsement of nonviolent uses of nuclear technology necessitates a criteria-based and non-discriminatory strategy (in line with global obligations and under apt international safeguards).
6. The security guarantees offered by the NPT-nuclear weapon states need to be codified in a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty.
7. There is an urgent need to evolve a non-discriminatory international understanding to deal with the rising apprehensions cropping up from weakening technological inclinations (for instance; the growth, consumption and proliferation of anti-ballistic missile systems and interrelated technologies).
8. All states must jointly develop an international legal regime so as to avoid the militarization and weaponization of outer space and offensive and criminal use of cyber space by both states and non-State actors.
9. All nuclear weapon states must guarantee the security of their relevant materials as a national conscientiousness and believe the issue of existing stocks at the Conference on Disarmament.
10. Pakistan wholly meets the criteria for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and must be given non-discriminatory entréetointernational nuclear export control arrangements.
11. India and Pakistan must recommence their talks on nuclear confidence building and risk reduction measures. Pakistan's offer of a strategic restraint regime in South Asia presents a valuable structure for boosting strategic stability in the region (Jafar & Mehmood, 2014).

Pakistan is a conscientious nuclear weapon state and fulfills every standard necessary to be incorporated in the four international export control regimes, together with the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG). Pakistan wishes to play a prolific contributing role in attaining the aspirations of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, on the basis of impartiality and joint venture with the international community.

End Notes

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